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ABSTRACT:
ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS: STATE AND INDUSTRY IN 
ARGENTINA AND SPAIN, 1975-90
Isabel Ortiz
At the beginning of the 1980s, when the process of 
democratisation was at best fragile or incomplete in Latin 
America and Southern and Eastern Europe, economic crisis provoked 
a debate about the relationship between economic and political 
transitions. Various questions were posed about the compatibility 
of democracy and economic development, the possibility of 
accomplishing political reform during a period of acute economic 
instability and the practicalities of co-ordinating structural 
changes in the productive and political systems.
The thesis opens with an examination of the interrelationship 
between the political and economic transitions. This is followed 
by an account of structural change in Argentina and Spain in 
chapters I and II. Particular attention will be paid to events 
of the last decade but these will be placed in the context of the 
historical evolution of the international economy from the 1930s 
to the 1990s. Thereafter, the analysis will focus on changes in 
the social and productive systems.
Chapters III and IV describe and appraise the process of 
transition. Emphasis is placed on differences between Spanish and 
Argentine economic nationalism. In part, the distinct chronology 
of liberalisation manifest in the two case-studies may be 
attributed to the specifics of nationalism. This will be 
illustrated by an examination of the attempts to implement 
adjustment plans, to reform the state, to stabilise the financial 
sector, to implement tax reforms and the management of social 
conflicts. It will be shown that a gradualist approach is more 
effective than "shock therapy" and that in managing a transition 
from interventionism to liberalism the key question confronting 
the state is which sectors to protect -and how. It will also be 
shown that, notwithstanding policy rethoric, the process of de­
regulation has been patchy. Both the Argentine an Spanish 
governments have been highly selective in targeting sectors to 
be liberalised.
Chapters V and VI analyze the new productive structures that 
emerged from de-regulation. The following topics are considered: 
industrial policy; programmes of industrial restructuring; new 
levels of integration into the international economy; the process 
of policy-making; relations between industry and finance; the 
increasing role of the tertiary and informal sectors. Throughout, 
contrasts and comparisons will be made between Spain and 
Argentina and their evolving interaction with the world economy.
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CHAPTER I: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS
The concurrence of democratisation and economic crisis in 
Latin America and in Southern and Eastern Europe in the early 
1980s gave rise to a series of questions regarding the 
relationship between economic and political systems. Was it 
possible to carry out a political transition in a period of 
economic crisis? Was it possible to co-ordinate changes in the 
structure of production with political opening?
This type of questioning was influenced by the functionalism
which ran through the majority of works on political economy
which addressed the issue. On the one hand, the liberal tradition
considers that the more economically developed a society, the
greater its chance of consolidating a democratic system.*
According to this school of thought, it is economic development
2
which, eventually, permits a more equal distribution of income. 
On the other hand, the Marxist tradition offers an opposing view 
of this theory: in order to achieve high rates of economic
growth, a government needs to ensure the concentration of 
capital. This is to say, according to this Marxist school of 
thought, economic growth is achieved thanks to a regressive 
distribution of income, which is difficult to reconcile with a 
democratic regime. An authoritarian government which suppresses 
popular discontent would be more appropriate. Both traditions 
are guilty of economic determinism: for both, it is the economic 
growth which makes it possible (or otherwise) for a democratic
*Lipset, 1960. 
K^uznets, 1966. 
30'Donnell, 1979.
regime to be established.
More specific studies on the problems of the return to 
democracy in Latin America in the 1980s point to the 
unsuitability of economic crisis for a political transition. 
Although some authors* attribute more importance to economic 
factors, and others^ attach lesser relevance to certain economic 
variables, all emphasise that the democratic process was begun 
in an unfavourable economic context, and that the prospects for 
democracy were poor due to the foreign debt crisis, the recession 
and the need to implement severe economic adjustment packages. 
As it will be argued throughout this thesis, the comparison 
between the Spanish and Argentine cases shows that the 
independence of the economic and political spheres from each 
other is far greater, and the interrelations between them far 
more complex, than most of the authors cited above acknowledge. 
Perhaps it would be more interesting to re-focus the terms of the 
question, and ask which was the most suitable political system 
for implementing the economic adjustment and restructuring 
programmes of the 1980s. Discredited military governments that 
had come to power in the 1960s and 1970s lacked sufficient 
legitimacy to implement austerity measures by the 1980s. New 
democratically elected governments, which could put the past 
aside and which did not bear responsibility for previous bad 
economic management, were obviously better placed to implement 
reform. In-coming civilian administrations could claim to be 
engaging citizens in a new political experiment, involving them 
in a struggle for civil liberties and thereby making them more
*Malloy and Seligman, 1977; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986. 
^Gillespie, 1989; Kaufman and Stallings, 1989.
inclined to accept the hardships of economic adjustment.
It is precisely this fact that political survival does not 
depend exclusively on the results achieved in the economy that 
is one of the lessons of the Spanish transition. There is a range 
of "non-economic" policies which can in the short term lead to 
political legitimacy. This could be seen during the first 
Socialist Party (PSOE) government in Spain (1982-86), when a 
severe economic adjustment programme was implemented. 
F.Gonzalez’s team knew how to promote this "awakening" of civil
g
liberties . Extending the existing social welfare to the entire 
population, and incorporating the cultural vanguard and the old 
and new nationalisms within the political arena, the Spaniards 
saw these achievements as the product of the devolution of civil 
liberties under democracy. They appeared, then, to be a triumph 
of the system, and acted as a counterweight to the adverse 
effects of economic adjustment. Moreover, despite the increase 
in the level of unemployment and the failure to fulfil electoral 
promises, PSOE was re-elected with an absolute majority in the
g
As it will be argued in chapter IV, on the cultural level, religious 
censorship was abandoned and regional and cultural movements were encouraged, 
which required little expenditure but whose social effect was nonetheless 
massive. At the level of medical services, the General Law on Health (1986) 
gave universal protection, which suppossed a real increase of 6.3 million 
beneficiaries, while investment on health only increased 1% of GNP in the 
period 1986-89. At the level of education, 30% more of the 1982 population has 
enrolled in post-compulsatory education, without a parallel increase on 
teaching infrastructures, which has created problems of overcroweding. At the 
regional level, nationalisms were supported and the territorial 
administrations were expanded. Although this policy was costly in economic 
terms (25% of public expenditure), it also had important political 
consequences. On the one hand, it alleviated the national question, which had 
been one of the problems left unresolved by the first government of the 
transition (under theUCD). This is true not only in terms of Basque terrorism 
or of Catalan separatism, but also in the cases of the new regional claims 
which sprang up in areas which had no previous history of nationalism - among 
others, in Andalucia, Aragon and Valencia. On the other hand, the extension 
of local bureaucracy channelled energies, stabilising the democratic regime 
and the influence of PSOE itself in the country.
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following period.
I.1.ECONOMIC NATIONALISMS IN PERSPECTIVE
However, the comparison over the long term between Spain and 
Argentina reveals a second point which is far more interesting: 
the degree to which the first questions are shaped by their
context. What these nations have experienced is not simply a
period of economic crisis and political transition, but rather 
a profound structural transformation which will be difficult to 
reverse. This has been a transformation that has altered these 
countries’ patterns of development, their social organisation, 
their states, their political regimes, and their productive and 
financial structures, and their level of integration into the 
international economy.
This transformation has been experienced not only by these 
two countries, but also by the greater part of the world semi- 
periphery. For this area, the period 1930-1980 was an epoch of 
both economic and political nationalism, which began to be 
dismantled at the end of the 1970s. These forms of nationalism
took shape in the period between the First and the Second World
Wars, especially after the Great Depression. International 
economic relations, re-established after the war, were once again 
interrupted, although this time in a time of peace. The crisis 
of 1930 gave rise to a generalised lack of confidence in the 
advantages of international trade and re-enforced the 
protectionist attitudes present all over the world.
On the financial side, the processes of severe inflation 
ended in the abandonment of the Gold Standard and the emergence
4
1
of Central Banks . Financial knowledge was by then much more 
developed than in pre-war times, and it was put at the service 
of the Central Banks that arose in Europe, Latin America and 
South Africa. Each country insisted on determining their own 
money supply, the state of their reserves being a secondary 
consideration, in such a way that Central Banks were converted 
into a basic instrument of state control over macroeconomic 
variables.
On the production side, after the First World War, these 
peripheral zones of the East (Japan, India, Australia), Latin 
America and the South/East of Europe had seen a surge in local 
incipient industry meeting domestic demand during the war. Many 
of these industries did not survive the re-opening of foreign 
trade, but others pushed for and obtained state protection. Many 
of the tariffs which were initiated in the war period were 
maintained, re-enforcing both the tendency towards state 
intervention and the diversification of production. Further, 
since the First World War there was a worldwide trend towards the 
adoption of welfare measures to alleviate the adverse social 
effects of laissez-faire doctrine. As political and economic 
nationalism expanded to peripheral countries, states enlarged 
their sphere of protection towards the development of some social
7Kindleberger 1973:247-261.
S^ee Dlaz-Alejandro, 1984:19-22; Thorp, 1984:3-9. On the supply side, 
one of the main ECLA/structuralist arguments was the worsening terms of trade 
for the periphery in these years. Primary product prices were reduced in the 
Depression more than they had risen previously. Rigid wages and accumulation 
of stocks in the Centre meant an important reduction in demand. Recent 
research on the subject shows that ECLA*s thesis may be right in this respect 
(Thorp, 1984:2-3). The fall in import capacity in the Centre had important 
consequences for peripheral countries, lowering profits, putting pressure on 
wages and reinforcing the trends towards diversification of production and 
state intervention.
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welfare institutions.
In this way, in the 1930s the state emerged as an important 
role player in national economies. However, the technocrats of 
this period appear to have been guided more by an instinct for 
survival than by any statist desire to control and intervene. In 
many cases, the increase in public expenditure was an attempt to 
prevent economic collapse, in such a way that bankrupt industries 
and banks were bailed out, and public works in the infrastructure 
were promoted in order to deal with the problem of unemployment. 
The growing state interventionism was due to a growing awareness
q
of the failure of market economics. Economists themselves were 
very active in assigning an interventionist and benevolent role 
to the state in the correction of market imperfections. However, 
the assumption that governments would act in an impartial manner 
was hardly realistic. Firstly, it is rare that there is a single 
way of overcoming a specific market failure. Secondly, this 
assumption did not take into account the possibility of political 
pressures and influence. It is for this reason that today it is 
considered that most of the economic problems are caused by 
political errors rather than market failures; nonetheless the 
principal cause lies within the naivety of the original analysis.
To expand the competence of the state in the economic 
sphere, the economic systems which took shape had a lot to do 
with the national internal political alliances of the moment. 
State interventionism was not simply of a technical character, 
but also depended on the recent political history and the
q
Robinson’s theory of imperfect competition (1948), which dealt with the 
growth of private monopolies, or Keynes* General Theory of Employment (1936) 
are examples of this.
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ideology of the time; thus, the expansion of military budgets was 
common to the majority of these programmes of national 
recovery.^ The majority of peripheral countries initiated ISI 
(Import Substituting Industrialisation) policies in which the 
state played a central role in coordinating the interests of 
business groups at the same time as they were developing systems 
of social security to benefit urban workers. Only briefly during 
the Second World War did autarky emerge as a considered strategy 
in some countries. In the majority of cases, it was a matter of 
Keynesian states which subsidised both industry -through 
promotion- and consumption -through redistributive measures to 
create a domestic market.^
In global terms, these nationalist systems tended to go into 
crisis through two types of disequilibrium: fiscal and balance
of payments. The fiscal crisis was due to the fact that public 
expenditures almost invariably exceeding state - receipts. 
Peripheral nationalisms were systems with a tendency towards 
inflation, expanding the money supply was a habitual recourse of 
governments. Eventually a stabilisation was needed which would 
bring the macroeconomic variables back into line, at least 
sufficiently to allow governments to continue implementing 
expansionary policies. The problem of budget deficits was thus 
corrected but never resolved, since each subsequent expansionary
^Examples can be found from the economic experience of the Russian 
Revolution (1917) to the fascist governments with their autarkic rhetoric in 
Hungary (1919), Italy, Turkey (1922), Portugal, Poland, Lithuania (1926), 
Brazil, Chile, Peru (1930), Germany (1933), Austria, Estonia, Latvia (1934), 
Greece (1936), Brazil (1937) and Spain (1939). Compared to these, the New Deal 
in the US and pre-Peronist Argentinian policies were among the more moderate 
practices of the time.
^For global comparisons of semi-peripheral and Third World 
nationalisms, see Abel & Lewis, (Eds) 1985; Anglade & Fortin, 1985; Burnell, 
1986; Saunders (Ed), 1984 and Seers, 1983.
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period again produced a new crisis requiring austerity measures. 
This is what came to be called the economics of "stop-go". With 
respect to disequilibria in the balance of payments, this was due 
to the same logic of accelerated industrial promotion. Technology 
and some industrial factors of production had to be imported, 
such that the balance of trade was not brought into equilibrium 
by the level of exports, and the level of imports had to be 
reduced because of the scarcity of foreign exchange reserves.
During the 1960s, a series of corrective measures were 
adopted into the system of accumulation, described as the 
"deepening of ISI". The devices varied from country to country, 
depending on national particularities, but overall they centred 
on improvements in the efficiency of national production, 
creation of systems of export promotion to solve the problem of 
foreign exchange, and improvements in the fiscal system to 
correct budget deficits. The effect of these reforms was positive 
in the short run. The semi-peripheral countries recorded higher 
rates of economic growth than central countries, while at the 
same time maintaining the various national political alliances. 
However, the error of developmentalism was the failure to foresee 
that these distortions would be very difficult to sustain in the 
face of changes in international environment.
This was the case in the 1970s and 1980s, when a process of
12liberalisation was launched in the semi-peripheral countries .
12Here, the term periphery is used in the nineteenth century sense, this 
is, as a criticism of Classical economics and as part of the paired antinomy 
core-centre and periphery. In chapter II, there will be a further discussion 
with respect to Argentina and Spain, where a structuralist approach may have 
more sense. However, when considering Eastern Europe, the traditional, pre- 
Prebisch, nationalist and geographical sense of the term maybe more adequate. 
World-system analysis and Dependency theory are not implied here when using 
the concept "periphery", given the emphasis they give on the international
8
There are many reasons for this, and many local variations. 
Nonetheless, two factors are common to the entire peripheral 
bloc: the increasing awareness of the exhaustion of the dual
policies of Keynesianism and ISI, and the effects of 
international shocks. In the case of Southern Europe, the 
principal external factors were the two oil crises of 1973 and 
1979. In the case of Latin America, the foreign debt crisis of 
1982 contributed to the economic difficulties that had been 
brought about by the rise in crude oil prices. In South-East Asia 
and Eastern Europe, the most important external factor was the 
cessation of economic aid from their central allied powers, the 
USA (1970s) and the USSR (1980s).• Other external factors should 
be added to those mentioned above: the fall in primary product 
prices, the relocation of TNC investment in central countries, 
and problems of accessing international markets due to the 
consolidation of economic blocs.
The impact of international factors has not been the same
in all countries, and no single conclusion can be drawn as to the
vulnerability of the semi-peripheral countries. Those countries
which had substantial internal markets and high rates of economic
growth would have been able to alleviate the effects of external 
13shocks. Keynesianism could have been re-corrected and 
maintained. However, the depth of the crisis was magnified due 
to the growing awareness of the exhaustion of Keynesian-ISI 
expansionary policies. Perceptions of reality seem to be the last 
factors which unleashed the political changes. Throughout the 
1970s, the perceptions of the productive crisis were very similar
division of labour. This may be applicable to Spain, but not so to the 
Argentine after ISI.
13See Chapter II with respect to foreign debt in Latin America.
in the semi-periphery. National debates focused on the scale of 
economic backwardness, which was attributed to a limited openness 
to the international economy, overprotected manufacturing 
industries and rigid labour markets. Just as the greatest impact 
of the crisis in the 1930s was not its "real" economic effect in 
the medium to long term, but rather its strong psychological 
effect which reinforced protectionist attitudes and distrust of 
the advantages of the international economy, so it was with the 
impact of the shocks of the 1970s and 1980s. The "real" effect 
of this impact has been magnified by the fatigue generated by 
social and sectoral tensions and the dynamics of stop-go that had 
come to be associated with populism and corporatist 
distributionism.
1.2. ECONOMIC LIBERALISATIONS
It is arguable whether the macroeconomic crisis of the 1970s 
and 1980s was profound and inevitable or a sequence of lesser 
problems the significance of which was magnified by some economic 
groups who used it to impose a new economic policy agenda. 
Whatever the case, it is beyond doubt that a new package of 
economic policy tools -neo-liberalism- appeared during the 1970s. 
Neo-liberalism offered the promise of an efficient, meritocratic 
society, free of fetters of corporatism, self-regulating, and 
with fewer political tensions since the allocation of resources 
did not depend on the state but rather on the productive 
capacities of individuals and groups. In addition, it offered the 
risk of an economic transition, of political conflict provoked 
by those groups which would find themselves suddenly deprived of 
the protection provided by state interventionism. However, the 
perceived benefits were greater than the anticipated costs and 
a majority of the governments of the less developed countries
10
embarked on processes of economic liberalisation. Although the 
precise timing may have varied from country to country, it may 
be asserted with confidence that in Latin America,** Southern 
Europe and S.E. Asia, their programmes of economic liberalisation 
were followed by processes of political liberalisation. Only in 
Eastern Europe have the political and economic transitions taken 
place simultaneously.
Like any concept that is used politically, the term 
"liberalisation" has been abused. It has been used to denote 
things as different as modernisation, increasing efficiency, 
deregulation, and reducing protectionism. State intervention may 
be depicted as any process designed to modify the operation of 
market forces. Both the financial and the trade spheres have 
been/are interfered with, directly or indirectly, by governments. 
Liberalism has been an orientative goal rather than a reality. 
Indeed, state action has always been necessary for the further 
development of liberalism. There is no such thing as a self­
regulated free-market economy, because all states are 
interventionist. The debate is about the degree of government 
intervention. In this sense, we can define liberalisation as the 
adoption of policies which reduce state control of market 
mechanisms. It may be either the complete removal of controls or
Mexico excepted. See Cammack & O’Brien, 1985, and Stokpol (Ed.), 1985, 
for cross-country analysis of the military abandoning governments. For an 
analysis of the interrelationship between political and economic 
liberalisation from the perspective of the effects on economic development, 
see Haggard, (1990), who compares the Asian NICs with Mexico and Brazil. 
Nohlen (1989), and specially Alcantara, (1992) compare the various 
characteristics of the different political transitions which include economic 
factors, in Latin America, Spain and Eastern Europe. A comparision between the 
forms of nationalism in Latin America and Eastern Europe at the level of 
ideology and economic thought can be found in Love (1991).
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15their replacement with a less restrictive set of controls.
It will be concluded that it is a mistake to analyze the
experience of LDCs identified above in terms of dichotomised
concepts of interventionism or liberalism/liberalisation.
Although it is certain that the ethos of Western policy-makers
after the 1970s has been progressively less Keynesian, the world
1fieconomy is very far from advancing towards liberalism. The 
crisis of the 1970s led to the attempt to reduce public 
expenditure. This included the privatisation of the most 
inefficient companies, the subcontracting of private services, 
and the reduction of excessive regulations where they had 
prejudiced international trade. However, as it will be analyzed 
in the following chapters, liberalisation has not meant a real 
reduction in the influence of the state on society and on the 
economy, but rather a re-regulation of the rules of the economic 
game. Liberalisation has meant ceasing to protect some sectors 
but - not others; only those sectors which for one reason or 
another have been considered by their governments not to be of 
national interest have been abandoned to market forces.
The debate between liberalisation and interventionism must 
therefore be treated with caution, since it could obscure more 
than it illuminates. Part of the emphasis on this dualist 
conception is due to journalistic and political language. 
However, it is also due to the fact that most policy-makers of
^Krueger, 1986.
1 C
As it will be further explained in chapter II, the strengthening of 
the CAP within the EC, the increase in the use of non-tariff barriers, patent 
systems, and the proliferation of Multifibre Agreements in the 1980s 
protecting the developed countries against LDC textile products, are some of 
the examples of the limited success of the principles of liberalisation, non­
discrimination and multilateralism advocated by GATT.
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the 1980s were educated under the paradigms of benign 
interventionism of the 1960s.
1.3. PARADIGMS OF THE "BENIGN STATE MODEL" AND ITS CRITICS:
THE "NEGATIVE STATE MODEL" OF THE 1970s-80s.
After the Second War World, the ethos was one of world 
reconstruction, attainable through pragmatic policies designed 
to achieve economic and social development. As it was indicated 
above, this global paradigm of benign, welfare-maximising, 
"positive", corrective states, came from pre-war times, and it 
lasted for more than three decades, until the 1970s-80s. From the 
liberal approach, the success of the Marshall Plan fed the idea 
that development could be guaranteed given sufficient levels of 
external finance and national planning. From a nationalist 
viewpoint, state-promoted programmes of industrial expansion were 
the main means of stimulating recovery from difficulties of the 
inter-war period. From a Marxist perspective, the rapid 
development of the USSR raised expectations as to the 
possibilities of a socialist path. Some social scientists began 
to focus their analyses on the causes of the relative poverty of 
Third World countries and their potential for economic and social 
development. The amount of contemporary and historical data 
available in the 1940s-50s was, in the opinion of these 
researchers, sufficient to initiate a new academic field. This 
was the birth of Development Economics, parallel to Keynesian 
economics in developed countries. The new sub-discipline evolved 
in three main paradigms: Modernisation theory, Structuralism and 
Dependency, depending on their main ideological influence - 
Nationalism, Keynesianism or Marxism. The three had in common the 
rejection of Neoclassical analysis as a tool for policy-making 
in developing countries and the need of a substantial degree of
13
state intervention to promote development.
T A B L E  I I . l . 5
Main Paradigms in development•
MODERNISATION STRUCTURALISM DEPENDENCY
IDEOLOGICAL
BACKGROUND Liberalism
POLICIES Difusion of
modem values 
in backward areas, 
technology and 
capital imports, 
integration into 
the world economy.
INSTITUTIONS Rostow, 
and Lewi s, Hi rschman,
AUTHORS Myrdal, IMF, most
of WB.
Nationalism
Promotion of nat­
ional industry 
through protection 
(ISI); rural and 
fiscal reform, 
regional integrat­
ion.
UN ECLA(Prebisch, 
Furtado) Neo­
structuralist 
(Foxley, Bianchi, 
some WB staff)
Marxism
State inter­
ventionism, 
erradication 
of poverty, 
improvement 
of social 
conditions.
Cardoso, Amin 
Faletto, Frank 
Baran, Warren, 
UN Basic Needs 
approach.
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The so-called "Modernisation school" emerged in the 
1940s-50s in Europe and in the USA. The success of the Marshall 
Plan in Europe encouraged among economists the idea that 
underdeveloped economies could evolve to "maturity" (Rostow s 
stages) given adequate levels of aid and technical knowledge. 
Compared to structuralism, "modernisation" understands
The name modernisation is not very satisfactory, since it referes 
to Rostow*s work but it does not include all the non-structuralist authors 
(Rosenstein, Rodan, Leibenstein, Hirschman, Bauer, Yamey, Lewis, Myrdal, 
Myint). Their theories do not conform a unified body, and thus, classifying 
them under the same label becomes problematic. Some authors have grouped 
these works under other names: "Positivism" (Preston, 1982; but he excludes 
Myrdal),"Western theory" (Foster-Carter, 1984; but he includes structuralism 
in it vs. dependency), "Paradigm of the expanding capitalist nucleus (Hunt, 
1989) or "Development economics" as it appears in textbooks.
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development as economic growth, as a transition from a
traditional, subsistence-oriented economy to a dynamic market
economy. Little attention is given to centre/periphery backward
linkages; in general, it can be said that modernisation theorists
show optimism about less developed countries overcoming 
18backwardness. In most cases, Modernisation should be
associated with the Cold War and the fear of communist expansion
19into poor areas . There are many contributors to Modernisation 
theory, the difference lies within their proposed strategies for 
development^.
Structuralism was based on the nationalist experiences of
Latin America after the First World War and the 1930s crisis when
some Latin American policy-makers designed a development strategy
to reduce external vulnerability and to encourage national
21economic activity. The strategy was constructed through the 
use of three main policies: ISI (Import Substituting
Industrialisation), regional integration and rural reform. It is 
important to point out that structuralism does not oppose 
international trade, multinational investment or the agricultural 
development of a country. Rather, ISI policies were designed to 
artificially promote national industry at a particular period in 
which international capital (aid or foreign investment) had
18Myrdal and Myint’s work being the exceptions.
19See Staniland,M. 1985: What is political economy?. New Haven, Yale 
University Press.
For a review, see Hirschman, 1979; Hunt, 1989; Preston, 1982.
21Although these policies are associated with the work of ECLA/CEPAL 
during the 1950s, they were already implemented in the 1940s. See Love,J. 
1980: "Raul Prebisch and the origins of the theory of unequal exchange" in 
Latin American Rsearch Review.
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22priorities different from those of Latin America.
The implementation of developmentalist policies in 
peripheral and semi-peripheral countries during the 1940s-60s 
caused contradictory results. On one side, these areas achieved 
some growth and developed welfare systems. Whether these 
improvements were a result of the policies or of the changes in 
the international economic environment, is a debated question. 
On the other hand, the promotion of "artificial"
industrialisation generated many backward linkages of difficult
23solution. Explanations for the failure to meet policy goals 
and criticisms to such policies came from new theories 
(Dependency), from self-questioning by authors of both the 
structuralist and the "Modernisation" schools, and from 
Neoclassical political economists of the late 1960s-1970s.
Dependency theory owed much to Structuralist thought. Its 
point of departure was the same criticism of free-trade 
liberalism and the centre/periphery model developed by Prebisch, 
Furtado and other Cepalista authors. The difference reveals 
itself because it places a major emphasis on the circuit of
??For a review, see Hirschman, 1968 and 1987; Hunt, 1989.
23Structuralist authors like R.Prebish were the first ones to complain 
about the way in which the policies had been implemented. Rural reform never 
began. States abused their power in nationalising raw material output for 
exports and also had it overpriced in the international market. The moves 
towards regional integration were ineffective. States overexpanded, getting 
into debt in order to cover their budget deficits. Most governments had used 
and abused such policies without looking for future consequences. A well-known 
example of this is expressed in the Argentinian president’s letter to the 
Chilean ex-president Ibanez: "My dear friend: Give to the people, especially 
to the workers, all that is possible. When it seems to you that already you 
are giving them too much, give them more. You will see the results. Everyone 
will try to scare you with the specter of an economic collapse. But all of 
this is a lie. There is nothing more elastic than the economy which everyone 
fears so much because no one understands it" (General Peron, in Hirschman, 
1979:65).
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surplus extraction and exploitation -in that, Dependency points
out the adverse consequences of ISI implementation. Cardoso and
Faletto, Chilcote and Edelstein , among others, considered that
the results of such strategies have been the rapid expansion of
light industry without a parallel in basic production, the
penetration of multinationals stopping the emergence of national
industry, and a demographic expansion (with its subsequent
increase in poverty, migration, etc). Warren (1980), criticising
the distortions caused by badly implemented ISI policies, even
considered nineteenth century imperialism as a necessary step
25towards development in the periphery. Several authors have 
pointed out the correlation between ISI and authoritarian 
governments. Third World poverty is, in the view of the most 
radical Dependency authors, a problem difficult to solve; some 
writers support the rupture of all external links through
revolutionary processes and the implementation of planned
26economies as the only alternative.
Marxism was not the only perspective to observe the gap 
between theory and praxis of the 1940s-60s benign state model. 
Alternatively, Liberal economists and political scientists of the 
1970s started to describe and to analyze conflicts coming from 
the redistributive tensions of the welfare states. The US 
Pluralist Liberal tradition offered a good theoretical background
9 1
See Cardoso,F. and Faletto,F., 1969: Dependencia y desarrollo en 
America Latina. Mexico, S.XXI; Chilcote,R. and Edelstein,J. (eds.), 1974: 
Latin America: The struggle with dependency and beyond. Cambridge, Mass., 
Schenkman.
^O’Donnell, 1972; Malloy, 1977.
2fiFor a review, see Bossert & Klaren (eds), 1986; Cardoso, 1977; Goodman 
& Redclift, 1981; Hunt, 1989; Mendes, 1977; Roxborough, 1979; and specially 
Palma in Seers (Ed), 1981.
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for this.^
Liberal and Structuralist economists have also criticised
the degree of state interventionism recommended by previous
Development Economists. Thus, there were two main macroeconomic
orientations by the end of the 1980s within the main
international organisations. The Liberal approach defends the
need of major liberalisation and de-regulation processes and the
28achievement of growth through export specialisation . More
specifically, these measures should be accompanied by
implementing stabilisation plans, restrains on government
expenditure and supply-side reforms to reduce economic
inefficiencies. Privatising public assets, reducing labour
protection and in general cutting subsidies used to maintain
"uneconomic" activities, deregulating financial markets,
reforming the tax system, liberalising restrictions on foreign
trade and payments were the principal instruments • to achieve
economic efficiency and macroeconomic stability. This view is
associated with the orthodoxy of financial international
institutions such as IMF, WB or IDB, although it cannot be
extended to all their departments, since some of their staff have
started to defend more structuralist policies in order to
29sustain growth in developing countries.
The alternative view, Neo-Structuralism or Neo-Keynesianism,
27The work of Olson (1965) was very influential in the development of 
Public Choice theory and the analyses of rent-seeking groups and/or states 
(Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; Conybeare, 1982; Krueger, 1974).
^See Krueger, 1986; Rottemberg, 1986.
29See the brief but condensed review essay by Sheanan,A. 1989: "Economic 
adjustment programs and the prospects for renewed growth in Latin America", 
in Latin American Research Review.
18
agrees with neo-liberalism in that there is a need for restraint 
in government spending and a need to achieve some specialisation 
in the international market, but it also defends the need to 
maintain some intervention in development strategy and social 
matters. Neo-Structuralist authors are very critical of the role 
of international agencies in developing areas, especially their 
short-term policy recommendations: by placing too great an
emphasis on correcting macroeconomic stability, international
institutions are threatening economic survival in the long-
30run. Echoing Structuralists, Neo-Structuralists argued that
the state should be active in guiding the economic evolution of
a country. However, they place emphasis on correcting inequality
and rural poverty rather than being narrowly concerned with
industrialisation. Neo-Structuralist, also, attach greater
concern on macroeconomic coherence, give more attention to
diversifying export markets, to achieving regional integration
and to reducing particular trade restrictions, in part by the
application of more effectively targeted protectionist measures.
In other words, a selective policy of import substituting that
31is made consistent with export-promotion. Neo-Structuralism 
considers that private investment is not likely to happen the 
given situation of developing countries in the 1980s, namely, 
external debt, inflation, capital flight, world regionalism. 
Therefore, these authors regard a new type of Keynesianism as the 
best means of fostering Third World recovery after the 
contraction during the so-called "The lost decade".
Without going into the adequacy of the liberalisation and
30Fishlow, 1988:62. 
3*Ffrench-Davies, 1988:41.
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economic deregulation strategies, the question which confronted
policy makers was that of the most effective manner of
implementing these policies. There have been two main points of
reflection, which are directly interconnected: the timing and
sequencing of reforms, and the distributional effects of
liberalising policies. An appropriate sequence of reforms was a
key factor in ensuring success. Economic analyses have argued the
case for both the necessity of implementing all the reforms
simultaneously (Sachs, 1991), others for adopting the reforms
gradually (Krueger, 1986, Michaely, 1986). The majority of
economists have argued that gradualism seems the most appropriate
option from a political point of view, since the deregulation
measures lead not only to a regressive redistribution of income
32but also to a fall in employment. Given that economic
liberalisations had been initiated in parallel with democratic
transitions in the semi-periphery, the negative distributive
effects lead policy-makers to question how to manage the
33political arena at the moment of policy reforms. As it will be 
analyzed in the Spanish and Argentine cases, governments had to 
make a decision about providing some strategic compensations to 
secure the success of reforms. This leads to one of the key 
paradoxes of the economic transitions in the 1980s, and the main 
focal point of this research: it was the state that had to
organise the dismantling and de-regulation of state-centred 
societies.
^Krueger, 1986; Michaely, 1986; Mussa, 1986; Wells, 1987. 
Atkinson & Micklewright, 1991; Greskovits, 1991.
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1.4. ARGENTINA AND SPAIN: REASONS FOR COMPARISON
Both Argentina and Spain are examples of peripheral 
countries undergoing processes of liberalisation which have meant 
the deregulation and dismantling of an old system of production 
in favour of a new system with new priorities and new winners and 
losers. This will be the central concern of this thesis. The 
Spain under Franco (1939-75) and above all the Argentina under 
Peron (1943-55) and later administrations (1955-76) were 
paradigmatic cases of the forms of nationalism in the semi- 
periphery. The comparison presents some problems due to the 
differences that exist in the organisation of corporatism in the 
two cases. Nonetheless, the focus of interest has been on the 
processes of liberalisation: the way in which the role of the
state has been transformed, the impact of deregulation on the 
various social sectors, strategies adopted by the various 
corporate groups in the face of economic restructuring, the 
political priorities and their implementation, and the form that 
integration into the international economic setting has taken in 
the two countries.
Patterns of accumulation in the two countries show 
interesting parallels in the last fifty years. However, there 
were large differences before 1940. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, Argentine exports were much more successful than those 
of Spain: Argentina was regarded as one of the three fastest
developing countries of the time (with Canada and Australia). 
The paradox, in historical terms, is that Argentina became 
stagnant during the 1980s, while Spain began to be regarded as 
one the fastest growing economies in the world.
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By the middle of the nineteenth century, Spain had developed
a few highly protected industries -iron and steel in the North
and textiles in Catalonia. There were some attempts to reduce
protectionism in order to develop a more competitive industry,
34but political instability did not allow coherent policy­
making. Power alternated in swings between conservatives and 
moderate liberals. The latter started some reduction of
protectionism in 1841-49 and in 1869, allowing foreign
35investment, but this was reversed after 1891. It has been said 
that Spain evolved directly from mercantilism to interventionism,
o e
skipping the step of liberalism altogether. For Nadal (1975), 
the Industrial Revolution did not happen in Spain until the mid­
twentieth century.
The radical nature of the economic and political 
transformation in nineteenth century Spain is understandable 
since the independence of Latin America had cut the normal flow 
of revenue available to the Crown. The government became highly 
indebted, and the pressure to create some domestic wealth grew. 
However, Spain lacked many of the necessary elements for an 
industrial revolution. Technology was underdeveloped, natural 
resources little exploited, entrepreneurial initiative was
34Between the first Borbon restoration in 1814 and the second Borbon 
restoration in 1875, Spain suffered two civil wars (1833-40 and 1870-75), six 
constitutions, thirty-five military coups, the abdication of four 
kings/queens, one revolution (1868) and one republic (1873-74, which in less 
than a year had four presidents). The twentieth century has not been a case 
of stability either: although the governments managed to avoid intervention 
in the two World Wars -which, in fact, reinforced Spanish political and 
economic isolation-, the country experienced two episodes of monarchy (Alfonso 
XIII and the current king Juan Carlos I), two dictatorships (Primo de Rivera 
and Franco) and a parlamentary republic which ended in a civil war in 1936 
(Arango, 1978:20).
^Fontana, 1973.
^Tamames, 1986:201-212.
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regarded as sinful, the country lacked capital, and domestic
37markets were very limited. The main resources of Spam were 
agricultural (wine, wheat, olive oil, citrus) and mineral 
production. But mining and agriculture were constrained by the 
backwardness of the productive system despite a partial agrarian 
reform implemented during the nineteenth century by successive 
liberal governments. Although this primary production generated 
some exports, national development was sluggish and integration 
into the world economy limited. Spain remained one of the most 
backward European countries up until the 1960s.
Argentina began to specialise in export production a few 
decades after independence from Spain, expanding into the rich 
Pampa region. By 1880 it was already competitively exporting 
primary goods, mainly animal products and cereals. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, the main export market was England, which 
had become the world’s principal net importer of foodstuffs. 
Economic relations between these two countries did not end there: 
Argentina’s lack of capital was supplied by Britain in the form 
of investment in railways, docks, meatpacking houses, shipping 
firms, banking and public utilities. The only domestic industry 
was associated to processing products from the countryside -wool, 
beef, sugar, wine. Goods were imported from Europe. As in Brazil 
and Mexico, the Argentine political elite did not have any doubts 
about the virtues of international specialisation based on the 
country’s comparative advantage. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, even trade unions believed in the benefits of 
economic liberalism. However, Argentina’s integration into the 
world economy meant dependency on European demand. Any
37Harrison, 1990:82-86.
fluctuation abroad translated into sharp domestic repercussions. 
This dependency became clear after the First World War.
The conjuncture of the 1930s crisis and the Second War World 
badly affected the two countries. Its impact spread doubts about 
the adequacy of an out-ward oriented model of development in 
Argentina, and reinforced interventionism and isolation in Spain. 
With the governments of Farrell and Peron in Argentina (1944-55) 
and Franco in Spain (1939-75), the countries initiated autarkic 
policies, based on the transfer of agricultural income to 
industry and import-substituting industrialization (ISI). 
Although the two countries had different backgrounds, the 
policies of autarky presents a starting point for comparison.
The governments of Colonel Peron and General Franco had yet 
other common aspects. They were backed by the military, who 
monopolised major civilian offices. Authoritarian measures, 
though, were more rigid in Spain since the country was just 
emerging from a civil war. Politically, both are examples of 
populism. Demagogic nationalist rhetoric was the main technique 
of their discourses. Ideologically, Peron and Franco regarded 
themselves as "national saviours", rescuing their countries from
the "international red-jew-masonic concubinage" and from "the
38dangers of treacherous liberalism" . National reconstruction 
was based in a new multiclass corporatist society, where the
state played a central role. Trade unions were encouraged, but
39only those backed by the state , the state provided social
38Fascist slogans of the early Franco government.
39Sindicatos verticales (vertical trade unions), where workers could 
meet "freely" with the joint assistence of at least one employer, one member 
of the police and another from the church. Any other form of labour 
organisation was repressed (Spalding, 1977; Giner & Yruela, 1988:67-124).
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security and the benefits of a welfare system^, The "New Order" 
was inspired by fascist societal precepts of the 1930s.
The economic performance of the two countries in the 1940s 
supposed an improvement compared to the 1930s. However, by the 
early 1950s it became apparent that expansionary policies were 
not sustainable. In Spain, Falange officials found an opposition 
in Opus Dei. Opus Dei ("God’s Work", popularly known as "The Holy 
Mafia”) is a religious group whose members belong primarily to 
the commercial and financial elites. Their ideology is committed 
to economic liberalism combined with strict moral puritanism. 
Franco seemed to have been convinced of the need for alternative 
developmental programmes, and thus he started substituting 
Falangist ministers with Opus Dei members. The Vatican’s approval 
of this group may have been an important factor for this change. 
The Opus Dei project involved a continuing commitment to
industrialisation while stressing also the need to reduce 
regional differences and social inequality. Regional imbalances 
were never corrected, but there was a successful enlargement of 
the domestic market. On the other hand, Opus Dei considered it 
necessary to finish with autarky and progressively to open Spain 
to the world economy, that is, to Europe. In 1962, Spain
attempted to incorporate into the EEC, However, the application
was rejected for political reasons. Spain’s admittance into the 
Community had to wait for twenty-three more years. In the
meantime, Spain provided Europe with low cost labour, inexpensive 
holidays, cheap raw materials and, specially, a growing market
This was much developed in Argentina than in Spain. As it can be 
observed in the statistics, Peron’s economic management was further better 
than Franco’s, whose main worry seemed to be "el mando" (the authority). This 
emphasis on welfare can also be appreciated in the name of Peron’s party 
("Justicialist") compared to Franco’s Falange (phalanx, line of battle).
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for EEC exports.
In Argentina, Peron left government after a faction of the 
military threatened him, accusing him of both political and 
economic mismanagement. The Second Five Year Plan (started 1952) 
made Peron unpopular since it cut expansionary policies and 
included a two-year stabilisation plan. Politically, the military 
were affronted by Peron*s proposal that his wife Evita should 
stand as vice-presidential candidate in the 1952 election and by 
his anti-church policies^. The hard-line general Aramburu came 
to power in 1955 to eradicate Peronism and to restore conditions 
for democracy in Argentina. Most of Peron*s political policies 
were reversed. Economically, few steps were adopted. There was 
a devaluation and the renegotiation of many of Argentina’s 
bilateral debts. Finally, elections were held in 1957. The new 
president, Frondizi, was a professor of economics committed to 
the national development of Argentina, and convinced that his 
mandate was going to be shortened by military intervention -as 
it so happened. His ambitious economic programme had to be 
implemented under time pressure. This became a common feature of 
later presidencies; it makes an important difference in 
comparison to the Spanish case, where Opus Dei controlled power 
until the end of the dictatorship in 1975. On the contrary, 
Argentina had ten further presidencies until democracy . was 
restored in 1983, alternating military and civilian governments 
(table 1.2).
Contrary to Franco’s evolution, Peron became more radical in time 
with respect to the military and the church. Measures against the latter 
included legalisation of divorce and control of religious schools; this caused 
turmoils which ended in the Vatican excommunicating the entire Peronist 
governmental cabinet.
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TABLE 3« i • N • ••
A r g e n t i n i a n  and 
presidents.
Spanish
YEAR ARGENTINA SPAIN
1935 (...) A.P.Justo ..) Second Republic* 1936:R.M.Ortiz * 1936-39: Civil War
1940 *R.S.Casti11o * 1939: Gral.F.Franco
1945
*
*
1944: E.J.Farrell 
J.D.Peron
Falangista (^fascist) 
economic team
1950
1955 * E .Lonardi
1960
*
*
1958: Frondizi 
1962: J.M.Guido
Opus Dei economic 
team into government
1965
* 1963: A.lllia
* 1966: J.C.Ongania
1970 *
*
*
R.M.Levingston 
1971: A.A.Lanusse 
1973: J.D. Peron
1975 * 1974: Isabel de Peron
* 1976: J.R.Videla * 1977: A.Suarez
1980 * 1981: R .Viola/L.Galtier*
1985
*
*
1982: R.B.Bignone 
1983: R.Alfonsin
* 1982: F.Gonzalez
* 1989: C.S.Menem
The new government teams in Spain and Argentina began to try 
new ways of encouraging industrial development. Frondizi (1958- 
62) in Argentina and the Opus-Dei backed technocratic elite in 
Spain (1959-75) leaned more in the direction of moderate 
nationalism combined with some economic liberalism. Their 
programme involved opening up the economy, reducing government
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controls and trying to eliminate the most serious economic 
distortions. There were agreements with the IMF in 1958 in both 
countries. Stabilisation programmes succeeded in Spain (1959) and 
later Argentina under the military government (1968-69). The idea 
was a "developmentalist" one, trying to encourage a more 
integrated national economy but still rejecting the concept of 
an international division of labour. Agricultural development 
would follow the same path as industrial expansion -neither 
having a preferential treatment, nor subsidising other sectors. 
The main methods of financing such developments were foreign 
direct investment, taxation and sovereign debt.
The periods 1958-76 for Argentina and 1959-77 for Spain are
ones of relatively moderate interventionism, in parallel with the
Keynesian policies adopted in developed countries at the time.
The period of the 1960s did not see a radical change from
previous interventionist measures but a correction of them. These
measures did not work so well as in post-war Europe because of
42the scarcity of means and the mismanagement of resources. 
Stronger liberalising measures, in accordance with the world 
trend, were applied in the following years, under military rule 
in Argentina (1976-81) and under democracy in Spain (1977- ).
As mentioned above, the process and the way in which these
42Spain was not included in the European Recovery Program (Marshall Aid) 
by a UN decision in 1946 to institute economic sanctions to Spain, and 
ratified by US Senate and House of Representatives in April 1948 (not removed 
until 1953). After the defeat of Mussolini and Hitler, Franco’s Spain was 
ostracised by the international community, being the only exception Argentina. 
During 1947-49, Peron’s government lent Spain $264.3 million, which Franco 
used to buy Argentinian wheat, maize and beef. Diplomatic relations were not 
better between Argentina and the US. Although the UN did not decide to boycott 
economicly the country, diplomats made clear the US dislike of Peron’s 
government. However, the Cold War changed US policy. Franco and Peron’s states 
were tolerable in the view of USSR expansion, and they were granted with 
loans; this aid, though, had never the importance of previous Marshall Plans.
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liberalisations were implemented will be a central point of this 
study. What the Argentine economic evolution suggests is that 
interventionism was preferable to a badly implemented 
liberalisation. Contrary to Waisman and most liberal social 
scientists, whose thesis is that interventionism/ISI have been 
the cancer of peripheral and semi-peripheral countries (Waisman, 
1987), the Spanish case could show that a good transition from 
ISI may be a good path of development.
On the other hand, both countries had a democratic 
transition: Spain in 1975-82 and Argentina in 1982-89. Economic 
liberalisation had two important costs for both nations. One was 
the loss of some control of macroeconomic policy, compensated by 
economic success. The second has been a social cost, which has 
endangered political liberalisation of the countries. 
Stabilization programmes and reduction of protectionism implied, 
paradoxically, a worsening of the population’s living standards, 
when democracy was raising expectations. In both cases, the new 
Presidents were unable to carry out their electoral promises.
The comparison between Spain and Argentina is relevant since 
the two countries show a similar background in economic policy 
during and after the 1940s-50s. It is not possible to accompany 
this description of policies with statistical results given the 
unreliability of data for this decade. Tables 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4
and figures 1.1 to 1.6 show some comparative basic indicators 
from 1950/55 onwards. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show almost identical 
economic structures for the two countries in 1953/4. On the other 
hand, Argentina was more integrated into the world economy, as
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TABLE I.I.:
ARGENTINA AND SPAIN: MAIN INDICATORS, 1950-80.
ARGENTINA SPAIN
YEAR
REAL WAGES 
1974=100
UNEMPLOY. 
% active 
labour 
force
INFLATION
(%)
POPULAT.
(000)
REAL WAGES 
1974=100
UNEMPLOY. 
% active 
labour 
force
INFLATION
(%)
POPULAT.
(000)
1950 145.3 7.2 (*) — 15,893 — 2.8 (*) — 27,800
1955 122.2 — — 17,070 — — — 29,250
1960 100.0 — — 20,669 62.0 — 1.8 30,400
1965 122.6 5.5 — 22,352 49.8 — 9.7 31,600
1970 118.7 5.4 21.7 23,748 176.8 4.1 6.6 34,000
1975 100.0 5.3 335.1 25,383 100.0 16.1 24.0 35,800
1980 128.1 3.2 87.6 27,863 121.4 19.8 15.5 37,600
Sources: Argentina: real wages- INDEC in BAC, 1982; unemployment- INDEC in BAC, 1982; inflation- 
Dornbuch & De Pablo, 1988.
Spain: real wages- Ministerio de Trabajo in Tamames, R. 1986; unemployment- INE in 
Rodriguez, J. 1989; (*) UN statistics; Inflation in Rodriguez, J. 1989.
YEARS
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
\____
TABLE I .3.r
Argentina and Spain s real GDI? per 
capita and its components , 1950 —
BO, ± n  1975 U$S.
ARGENTINA
RDGPpc % C % I % GOV
1877 73 14 13
1981 70 20 12
1783 71 18 13
1829 68 18 12
1886 71 17 12
2000 72 18 11
1961 71 16 13
2025 72 17 11
2136 72 17 11
1975 71 23 12
2134 66 23 12
2275 68 22 11
2152 67 19 11
2043 69 21 11
2237 69 21 10
1392 69 21 9
2359 70 19 10
2391 69 20 10
2471 69 21 9
2655 67 23 9
2750 67 24 9
2901 62 27 11
2968 62 26 12
3045 63 24 12
3202 65 24 12
3159 66 23 12
3004 61 25 12
3071 57 28 11
2903 57 27 12
3148 58 28 12
3209 58 30 12
SPAIN
RGPpc % C % I % GOV
1163 76 15 9
1347 75 16 9
1403 77 14 9
1340 75 16 9
1506 74 17 9
1576 74 18 9
1680 74 19 9
1734 73 19 9
1795 73 20 8
1753 75 17 9
1737 72 18 9
1932 71 20 8
1098 70 22 8
2281 71 23 8
2382 71 23 8
2550 70 26 3
2730 69 27 7
2811 71 25 7
2916 70 25 7
3108 70 25 7
3231 69 25 8
3337 69 23 3
3587 69 25 7
3841 69 26 7
4031 68 27 7
4032 69 26 8
4111 70 25 8
4159 70 23 8
4187 70 22 8
4233 70 22 8
4264 70 22 <9
Jr
RGDPpc - Real GDP per capita
% C - Percentage of RGDP into consumption
% I - Percentage of RGDP into investment
% GOV - Percentage of RGDP into government
SOURCE: Summers & Heston, 1985.
TABLE X • 4 . s
Argentina and Spain : ±nde:x:@s
industrialisation, 1950—so.
ARGENTINA SPAIN
------V
YEARS I.I.P PG I.L.pc. I .1 .P. PG I.L.pc.
1950 100 100 100 100 100 100
1951 102.6 102 100.6 104 .5 100.9 103.5
1952 100.7 104.1 96.7 125.8 101 .7 123.7
1953 100 .1 106 .2 94 .2 126.1 102 .6 122.9
1954 108.1 108.3 99.8 135 .4 103.4 130.9
1955 121 .3 110.3 109 .9 145.9 104 .2 140.1
1956 129.7 112 .3 115.5 159.9 105.1 152.3
1957 139.9 114.3 122.4 174 .9 105 .9 165.1
1958 151 .6 116 .3 130.3 191 .3 106.8 179.1
1959 135 .9 118 .2 114 .9 193 .9 107 .7 180.1
1960 149.6 120.1 124 .5 190 .6 108.7 175.3
1961 164 .5 122 .1 134 .8 226.1 109 .7 206.1
1962 155.5 123.8 125.6 250.8 110 .8 226.3
1963 149.2 125 .6 118 .8 262 .8 112 .1 234 .6
1964 177.3 127.4 139.2 285 .4 113.2 252.1
1965 201 .8 129 .2 156.2 335.3 114.5 292 .8
1966 203.1 131 .1 155.1 358.1 115.7 309.5
1967 206 .2 132.8 155.2 379.7 117 .1 342.2
1968 219.6 134 .7 163.1 410.7 113.4 346.9
1969 243.4 136 .5 178.3 476 .7 119.8 397.9
1970 258.8 138.4 186.9 532.4 121 .2 439.2
1971 274.7 140.2 195.9 542.2 122.5 442.6
1972 285.7 142.2 200.9 614 .5 123.8 496.3
1973 297.1 144 .1 206.2 653.3 125.1 522.2
1974 314 .4 146 .1 215.3 721 .2 126.4 570.5
1975 306.4 147.9 207.1 706 .8 127.7 553.4
1976 297.1 149.9 198.1 729.8 129.1 565.7
1977 320.3 151 .8 211 .1 725.7 130 .3 556.9
1978 286.5 153.8 186.2 701 .1 131 .6 532.7
1979 315.7 155 .8 202.6 740.1 132.8 557.3
1980 303.6 157.7 192.5 768.7 134 .1 573.2
- <
IIP - Index of Industrial Production (1950 = 100)
PG - Population Growth (1950 = 100)
ILpc - Industrialisation Level per capita (1950 =100)
SOURCE: Argentina in Feldman & Sommer, 1986, p.22 
Spain in Carreras, 1989, p. 193.
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43can seen in the imports/exports columns in tables II.3-II-5 .
Differences started arising in 1963. It is then that Spanish 
GDP per capita begins to overtake that of Argentina. 
Nevertheless, the existence of different demographic conditions 
should be pointed out. The Argentine population grew 57.7% 
between 1950-80, while the Spanish increased only by 34.1%. Table 
1.3 also shows the components of real GDP per capita. Private 
consumption has been of less importance in Argentina than in 
Spain, especially after 1976; also, the Argentine government has 
absorbed more resources than the Spanish. However, the proportion 
of real GDP dedicated to investment has been higher in Argentina 
than in Spain (table 1.3). The effects of this on the 
industrialisation of the two countries can be observed in table
1.4. Overall, Spain shows higher rates of industrial growth but 
it must be remembered that at the beginning of the period 
Argentina was much more industrialised than Spain, hence it may 
be expected that the lower starting point would be reflected in 
Spanish growth rates. In fact, the sectorial distribution of 
economic activity shows than the role of industry has always been 
higher in Argentina than in Spain (figures 1.1-1.6).
These expansive policies found their limits in the 
imbalances of the Current Account. The constant increase of 
imports was not matched by export growth, especially in Spain 
(table II.3 and II.4). The main sources of foreign currency were 
agricultural exports in Argentina, tourism and workers* 
remittances in Spain. By the 1970s, domestic and foreign debt 
would assume an important role.
43cSee annex.
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In 1975, Spain had five times the GNP of Argentina, although 
Spain also had more serious Balance of Payments problems and 
rising unemployment. At the time, both countries were suffering 
high inflation, economic distortions, debt and political 
instability. Although their rates of inflation were of very 
different magnitude, it should be noted that Spain was one of the 
main world borrowers in the period 1975-80 (table II.2). However, 
the consequences of her indebtness differ greatly for the rest 
of the developing countries. In the 1960s, Argentina had a higher
TABLE II.2.z
Det)t indicator's for f ive large 
debtor countries z quantity debt -+- 
d e b t  s e r v i c e / e x p o r t s
C percentage) „ 1972-81.
i
1973 1975 ‘ 1977 1979
i
1981
COUNTRY
ii
b$ d/X b$ d/X b$ d/X b$ d/X b$
i
d/X
BRAZIL
i
13,8 36,7 23,3 40,8 35,2 48,7 57,4 65,6 75,7
i
66,9
MEXICO
ii
8,6 28,7 16,9 30,3 27,1 53,6 40,8 67,7 67,0
i
48,5
ARGENTINA 6,4 19,9 7,9 31,9 9.7 19,1 19.0 21,3 35.7
i
37,5
SPAIN
ii
5.7 5 ,2. 10,7 9,3. 16,3 13,3 22,2 15,7 33,2
i
19,0
KOREA 4,6
ii
11,5 7,3 12,5 11,2 10,2 20,5 13,9 31,2
i
18,8
«i
SOURCE: Cline,M. 1983.
proportion of equity than debt, while Spain seems to have been 
the opposite. The interesting point comes in the 1970s, when
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Argentina preferred debt to equity (FDI) in order to have more 
control of economic activity; paradoxically, it turned out to be 
the opposite with the 1982 debt crisis and a loss of economic 
sovereignty to the IMF. Spain shows a more balanced ratio between 
debt/equity in the 1970s which may explain part of the success 
in Spanish. This difference in patterns of foreign capital inflow 
appears to stem from a deliberate policy preference, illustrating 
that a relatively slow transition from interventionism to 
liberalism may be a good path of development.
By the 1980s, Spain had seven times the GNP of Argentina and 
was much more integrated into the world economy. Spain had also 
changed the structure of its economic activity, reducing 
agriculture and expanding services. Argentina, on the contrary, 
maintained its economic structure, but also the slow rate of 
growth. Hyperinflation was reduced but not solved, and real wages 
show a dramatic decrease. The reasons for this different 
evolution will be the core of this study.
However, there are problems involved in such a comparison. 
Argentina’s difficulties lasted longer and were more intense. 
Although the history of Argentina after 1958 is one of economic 
reform, it has two periods of [moderate] reversal (1963-66 with 
Illia and 1970-74 with Levingston, Lanusse and Peron). However, 
the common factor to all Argentine administrations along these 
four decades has been -like Spain- the desire to promote 
industrialisation.
On the other hand, political life has been much more 
unstable for the Argentine; as a reference, there were twelve 
different governments in the period 1958-82 (table 1.2).
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Political repression was also more intense in Argentina than in 
Spain -especially after the military coups of 1966 and 1976. 
While in Spain the government seemed to have liberalised to 
achieve growth and thus legitimacy, the belief in Argentina was 
that liberalisation could not be carried out without social 
repression. This difference may give important insights to 
correct O ’Donnell’s theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism^.
Another difference is that the Argentine was more developed 
and integrated into the world economy in the 1950s than Spain. 
Also, the proximity of Spain to the EEC raises the question of 
the advantage of proximity to a prosperous market. Nevertheless, 
a cross-country approach appears interesting since the 
comparative examination of certain systematic similarities/ 
differences can generate insights or suggest hypothesis to enrich 
the specific studies on both nations. Applying concepts and 
methods used for Third World analysis to Spain may discover new 
aspects of the recent developments of the country, and vice- 
versa .
1.5. THE RESEARCH: OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
Given that the main concern of the research is the 
transition from state-centred societies to less interventionist 
systems, the analyses has focused on the dismantling of import- 
substituting industrialisation and the changes in industrial 
protection, the core of economic nationalism in semi-peripheral 
countries.
There were many similarities between the industrial
^ O ’Donnell, 1979.
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structures of Argentina and Spain in the 1970s. The range of 
industrial production was very wide due to prevailing policies 
of import substitution. Domestic companies manufactured items 
from toothpaste to military machinery. At the end of the 1970s, 
the perception of the crisis in production was similar in Spain 
and Argentina. Economic backwardness was perceived as a lack of 
openness to the world market, and associated with problems of 
both an over-protected and inefficient manufacturing industry and 
a rigid labour market. Both countries had undertaken ISI 
policies, reinforced in the 1960s with the developmentalism of 
Frondizi and his successors in the Argentine government, and by 
indicative planning in Spain. Only brief periods of the stabili­
sation plans had interrupted the ISI pattern. In Spain, there was 
only one such interruption, in 1959. However, these periods of 
contraction never lasted more than three years, giving way to a 
new period of expansion -"stop-go".
In continuation, there was a definite realisation on the 
part of Spanish and Argentine policy makers that the strategy of 
ISI was becoming exhausted and there was a need to change the 
pattern of development. It is interesting to note that the 
literature of the period 1973-88 in both countries refers to 
crisis. Only very recently has the literature begun to analyze 
the situation from the point of view of economic change and 
industrial reorganisation. The increase in the price of oil 
provoked the OECD countries to bring about changes in industrial 
structure. Spain postponed the adjustment because of the 
political conjuncture. The tensions of the transition to 
democracy caused the government to raise wages. This meant that 
the Spanish economy ended the 1970s with very high costs and many 
companies in crisis. Since the government gave priority to
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politics over economics, the state adopted a protective role for 
many of these industrial sectors, which were absorbed by the 
National Institute of Industry (INI). In Argentina, the crisis 
was overcome by companies accruing debt at a time of negative 
real interest rates, as it will be seen in chapter II. At this 
time, neither Spain nor Argentina had seriously confronted the 
questions of industrial restructuring, raising productivity and 
industrial competitiveness.
Industrial restructuring would not take place until the 
1980s. The difference between Spain and Argentina does not lie 
in the diagnosis of the problem but rather in the solutions 
adopted by each country. In both, the state played an 
interventionist role but, as this thesis will conclude, the 
Spanish state played interventionism to a much higher degree than 
the Argentine state, which found itself without resources due to 
external indebtness. In both cases the strategies of industrial 
policy had been conditioned by global macroeconomic policy, with 
priority given to anti-inflationary measures and the reduction 
of the public sector deficit. In Argentina these emphases have 
been of a far greater magnitude than in Spain. This explains why 
the tools used to bring about restructuring in the Argentine case 
were focused on opening up markets. These industrial policies 
combined a process of tariff reduction with various measures to 
stimulate investment (tax holidays, extraordinary credits, 
regional incentives for areas most affected etc). In both 
countries, the results have been a process of economic concen­
tration and centralisation, the business strategies of the SMEs 
being more often closure, increased debt and the growth of the 
black market economy. In the same way, the absolute losers of the 
new industrial situation have been the workers, especially in the
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Argentine case, who have lost the benefits provided by a 
corporatist welfare state.
The question of the allocation of public funds is central 
to the subject of transition from interventionism. State 
administrations are reducing and/or altering the scope of their 
activities. In which sectors was/is protection going to be 
reduced the most? Which groups are to continue to receive state 
funds, and which ones are to be abandoned to market forces? How 
can state-centred societies legitimise the dismantling of 
protection to some social/economic sectors? What new economic 
groups will take shape in a system that is more integrated into 
the international economy? What will remain, and what will be 
created as a result of new strategies? Is there a strategy of 
industrial promotion in the granting of public assistance?
The available sources for this analysis are as follows. For
Argentina, there are the industrial census for 1973 and 1984, the
only ones available for the past 20 years. This information has
been supplemented with reports from UN ECLA in Buenos Aires,
CEDES (Centre for the Study of State and Society), the Ministry
of the Industry, FLACSO, Mediterranean Foundation, and studies
45by the University of Buenos Aires. Also, 29 interviews with 
various company directors, business and trade union associations 
in the key sectors (vehicle production, steel and food as well 
as the textile sector), functionaries from the Ministry of 
Industry and the other centres listed above. In some of these 
interviews, statistics were disclosed on sub-sectors over a 
longer time period (1984-91), which will be added to the official
45e See annex
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series of the industrial census.
For Spain, the system of information on the industrial
sector is different. It began with the census carried out in
1978, which has been complemented in the annual industrial
surveys. The 1978, industrial census brought together information
on 190,262 firms, whereas the industrial survey of 1988 only
covered 161,467 companies. This is due to the growth of the
informal sector in the last decade, as well as the lack of
replies, estimated by the National Institute of Statistics (INE)
46at 20 per cent. The surveys come out more often than is the
case for the Argentine industrial census, but the Spanish surveys
are less representative. The information comes from the Ministry
of Industry and the INE. In addition, this research draws on 17 
47interviews with members of employers* and trade union 
organisations, the National Institute for Industry (INI), 
functionaries with the Ministry of Industry, the Bank of Spain 
and academics at the Universidad Complutense in Madrid. Some of 
these institutions have given supplementary information and some 
of the series will be extended in time.
Since the point of comparison between Argentina and Spain 
is to understand the reorganisation of the productive network 
that has taken place through the process of economic 
liberalisation, a direct chronological comparison (ie Argentina 
1984-Spain 1984) is by no means the most appropriate. Thus, the 
data do not end with the last year of material available for 
Argentina, but rather all the available data for Spain are also
ifiCalculating this 20% would bring the total number of "formal" 
businesses in Spain at 193,760
47See annex.
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included.
Regarding the literature on this subject, there are two well 
noted tendencies regarding the analysis of the changes in the 
structure of production in the two countries. For Argentina, the 
leifmotiv is the analysis of the period 1978 onwards as a 
catastrophe for domestic industry. This was due to the changes 
in economic policy, the suddenness of liberalisation, the 
economy’s new openness, as well as a long period of inflation 
culminating in two cases of' hyperinflation. For Spain, the 
general tendency is to see the entry into the EC as the defi­
nitive beginning of the longed-for economic development. Both 
positions contain an element of truth, but are cliches which need 
to be corrected. As will be shown, the period 1980-90 was a 
period of restructuring of production in both countries, not an 
entry into an economic hell or paradise.
From an ideological point of view, the Argentine literature
is much more polarised than the Spanish, and is more coherent
methodologically, and therefore easier to classify. The dominant
10
emphasis is nationalist, with Marxist (mainly from ATE ) and 
structuralist (UN ECLA^, CEDES^) variations. There are also
48State Workers Association (ATE, Asociacion de Trabajadores del 
Estado). See Lozano et al, 1990; Feletti and Lozano, 1990. Some "free-riders" 
should be included into this group: Azpiazu (especially Azpiazu, 1991),
Basualdo (i.e. Azpiazu and Basualdo, 1989, and Basualdo (1991) for ATE), and 
some analysts linked to smaller research foundations, such as Calcagno, 
Khavisse and Peralta-Ramos.
49In 1991, the Industrial Economics team of UN ECLA Delegation in Buenos 
Aires was directed by B.Kosacoff and integrated by Azpiazu, Bisang, Carciofi, 
Gatto, Gutman, Kantis, Katz and Yoguel.
^Centre for the Study of the State and the Society (CEDES, Centro de 
estudios del Estado y la Sociedad). See the works by Canitrot, De Riz, 
Fanelli, Feldman, Frenkel, Machinea, Mazzorin and Rozenwurcel. Besides them, 
other institutions should be mentioned: CIEPP (Acuna, Goldbert), CISEA (Ala-
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research centres that are radically neo-liberal (Mediterranean 
Foundation). It is possible that the ideological polarisation is 
due to the fact that the majority of academics have been involved 
or are still involved in policy-making. UN ECLA and CEDES were 
associated with the Alfonsln government, whereas the Medite­
rranean Foundation is now associated with the Menem administra­
tion. The studies published by the Secretary of Industry are more 
technical, and thereby lose in terms of analytical richness. 
Moreover, the Argentine literature is more likely to incorporate 
political factors in economic analysis and vice versa. The 
majority of studies look at the role of pressure groups, 
employers* organisations, unions and the government.
In Spain, the style tends to be rather homogeneous, a
technical approach of a liberal nature. There is a surprising
lack of concern for political questions in economic texts. Even
the theme of economic policy is approached from a very clinical
point of view. The majority of the studies are commentaries that
draw extensively on statistical sources, the calculation of
future projections and the elaboration or comparison of models.
This seems to be related to the contemporary ethos in Spain.
While the 1970s were a time of ideological polemic and criticism,
with the consolidation of democracy and integration into the EC,
it seems to have been agreed that an allegedly post-ideological
era has been entered. There are exceptions, like M. Navarro’s
51analysis of industrial rationalisation or some of the studies
52collected by Etxezarreta which are more critical and focus
Rue, Lavergne, Huici, Jacobs, Palomino, Schvarzer). 
^Navarro, 1990.
^Etxezarreta (ed), 1991.
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more on the contradictions and consequences of the economic
transformations that have taken place over the past 20 years.
53Brana, Buesa and Molero claim to base their work on a Marxist 
methodology but the result is closer to structuralism than to any 
other form of analysis. Fuentes Quintana always puts forward a 
multidisciplinary approach, drawing on insights from -above all­
sociology but rarely discussing politics. Tamames began with 
studies of economic power and continues to present a very 
critical marxist viewpoint with respect to the Franco regime^, 
but he does not maintain this perspective in his analyses of 
Spain under socialism. On the other hand, there are no attempts 
to analyze the economy on the part of sociology or political 
science. Even the studies on trade unions usually restrict
themselves to questions of social pacts, the size and
55representativeness of the unions and so forth , but these 
studies fail to comment on economic policy in the way that the 
Argentine studies do. One of the few exceptions is Maravall, 
whose political sociological analyses always include economic 
factors.
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH
The book is divided in six chapters. Following this general 
introduction, chapter II explains the evolution of the 
international economy 1970s-90. The section does not only provide
53Buesa and Molero, 1988; see also Brana, Buesa and Molero, 1984: El 
estado y el cambio tecnologico en la industrializacion tardia. El caso 
espanol. Madrid, Fondo de Cultura Economica; Brana, Buesa and Molero, 1979: 
"El fin de la Etapa nacionalista: industrializacion y dependencia en Espana" 
en Investigaciones Economicas. 9, Madrid.
^Tamames, 1979 ans Tamames, 1989.
^Most of the studies included in Miguelez and Prieto (1990) are an 
example of this.
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the setting in which Argentina and Spain developed, but also the 
intention of the chapter is to understand these countries as part 
of the world semi-periphery. Their processes of stagflation, 
external debt, regional integration, stabilisation and 
liberalisation. In one sentence, the dismantling of economic 
nationalism is a feature shared by many countries in the 1980s.
Chapters III and IV are detailed analyses of the Argentine 
and Spanish economic and political transitions from 1975 to 1990. 
Both chapters have similar structures. They open with brief 
historical descriptions of the logic of their domestic statist/ 
nationalist systems up to 1975. Following this, an analyses of 
the dismantling of these interventionism is presented, breaking 
down the transitions to more liberal systems into their different 
phases. The main points of attention are the attempts to 
implement adjustment plans, reform of the state, the 
stabilisation of financial sectors, tax reforms and social 
bargaining conflicts. In the light of the two cases studied, the 
conclusion about de-regulatory strategies is that discriminatory 
gradualism is the most appropriate strategy in political terms. 
In carrying out such a strategy a government has to choose whom 
to hurt and whom to protect in order to guarantee the success of 
the economic transition. It has, in short, to discriminate on 
political as much as economic grounds. In this, governments had 
different alternatives, but both in the Argentine and Spanish 
cases the preferred policy option has been of a anti-inflationary 
nature. This is understandable given recent macroeconomic 
evolution -especially for the Argentine; however, by adopting 
deflationary measures, governments have dampened domestic 
industry and employment. SMEs and workers are the absolute losers 
of these economic transitions.
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Following on from this, Spain and Argentina’s new productive 
structures are analyzed in chapter V and VI, looking at 
industrial policy, the industrial restructuring programmes, the 
new level of integration into the international economy, the 
separation between industry and finance and the increasing role 
of the tertiary and informal sectors. Namely, the structural 
changes that have taken place in both countries as a result of 
economic liberalisation, and the re-insertion of Argentina and 
Spain into the world economy. The analysis of the policy-making 
process of industrial re-structuring in the two cases evidence 
the paradox that it has been the state itself which has had to 
play the leading role in reducing state intervention, in such a 
way that the rhetoric of liberalisation is out of line with the 
state’s actual discretional "dirigisme" over the economy. States 
have been selective when dismantling state protection. The 
degree, timing and even the promotion has not been equal for all 
economic sub-sectors. De-regulation has been selective and 
discriminatory; the most adequate term is "re-regulation" of a 
new national economic system.
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CHAPTER II: THE WORLD ECONOMY
This chapter will describe the international setting in 
which Spain and Argentina have developed. It will examine some 
theories of the evolution of contemporary political economy, 
analyzing the effects that these changes have had on the two 
countries. Both Argentina and Spain belong to the periphery of 
the world economy, and therefore their degree of control over 
international economic flows is reduced. In addition, since both 
countries have liberalised part of their economies, external 
dependency has increased. Thus, the chapter opens with a review 
of the phenomena of inflation and recession in the 1970s. The 
following sub-sections present an analysis of the external debt 
crisis and the processes of regional integration which took place 
in the 1980s. One of the central hypotheses of this thesis is the 
importance of geopolitics in the economy. The proximity of Spain 
to the EC has been one of the key factors in its recent 
development.
On the other hand, three decades of strong state 
intervention have left an important legacy in Argentine and 
Spanish policy-makers. Most of the policy options presented in 
this chapter resulted from deliberate decisions by the countries 
not to adjust existing strategies to new international 
conditions. Analyzing policies such as Spain’s decision to apply 
for membership of the EC or the sudden liberalisation essayed in 
Argentina after 1976 simply in terms of liberalism or 
interventionism may obscure rather than illuminate the nature of 
these policies. The 1970s witnessed the abandonment of a system 
of fixed exchange rates which involved the devaluation of the US
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dollar. These conditions necessitated a response by Spain and 
Argentina. But it is facile to interpret those responses crudely 
as evidencing a return to liberalism and internationalism on the 
part of the two countries. On the contrary, de-regulation in some 
areas and an opening to the world economy in various sectors was 
accompanied by new forms of control and intervention in others. 
In abandoning some industries or social groups to market forces, 
governments nevertheless continued to support those sectors 
deemed to be of "national interest".
This emphasis given to the interaction between international 
factors and state action does not allow to frame this study in 
a pure Structuralist, Dependentist or World-systems analysis. The 
importance that Dependentist and World-systems authors* give to 
the international division of labour in the core-periphery 
relations, may be applicable for Spain but less so to the 
Argentine. Yet, although states may play and adapt to the 
changing international scenario, the ability of any single state 
to transform the situation is constraint by its position in the 
international balance of power. A clear example of this will be 
examined in the external debt crisis. Latin American states were 
aware of the possible solutions, including default and thus 
challenging the world financial system. However, it was preferred 
to avoid collective action, to accept the case-by-case approach 
and thus winning some individual benefits from international 
institutions. It is not the centre of this study to analyze the 
evolution of world power; however, there will be an underlying 
Structuralist philosophy of inquiry, in the sense of examining
See specially Emmanuel,A. 1969: Unequal Exchange. London, Monthly 
Review Press, and Hopkins;t.K. and Wallerstein,I. 1982: World-Systems 
analysis. Beverly Hills, Sage.
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the "structural" factors which configure the Spanish and 
Argentine systems of accumulation.
II.1 THE 1970s: INFLATION, THE OIL CRISIS AND RECESSION
By the end of the 1960s, the Bretton Woods System was no 
longer functioning effectively. Because the US dollar was the 
principal international currency, the Federal Reserve had become 
the world’s banker. International liquidity was dependent on the 
US balance of payments and the USA had been experiencing a 
deficit since 1959. The deficit continued to grow in the 
following decades due to two main causes: increased public
expenditure associated with the maintenance of military forces 
all over the globe for the Cold War and the conflict in Vietnam; 
and also because of the expansion of TNC -investing overseas, 
these companies transferred production abroad, reduced the amount 
of exports and increased the trade deficit . R. Triffin, 
observing this phenomenon at the time, pointed out the 
contradiction that existed between the dollar liquidity and 
global economic growth3. Despite this and other contemporary 
commentary, international confidence in the USA continued in the 
1960s. While the system was functioning, the USA took advantage 
of its role as world banker, leaving aside the fact that its 
deficit was financed through European and Japanese demand for US 
dollars. The Johnson administration met the deficit by printing 
dollars without gold backing. This created excess international 
liquidity, but the USA still held large gold reserves. In order 
to correct the growing international monetary disequilibria, 
inflation and speculation against the dollar, a number of
K^enwood and Lougheed, 1989:282-283.
3Gilpin, 1987:149.
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measures were taken which widened the role of the IMF, notably 
the General Arrangements to Borrow and the Special Drawing 
Rights. The Japanese and the Europeans criticised US economic 
policy, but the fixed exchange rate system continued functioning 
as it benefited everyone.
However, the situation changed under President Nixon. In 
1970, the Nixon administration reduced interest rates in an 
attempt to stimulate the US economy. At the same time, the West 
German Bundesbank increased its rates, in order to avoid an 
increase in inflation. The result was a flight of US dollars to 
German banks. Confronted with a scarcity of dollars at home, the 
Nixon administration printed additional currency. This simply 
fuelled inflation, intensified the world recession and brought 
down the Bretton Woods system. The German government challenged 
the US authorities to change its dollars into gold. Nixon, 
lacking sufficient reserves, suspended the convertibility of the 
dollar and launched a number of protectionist measures and 
controls over wages and prices. The USA lost its control over the 
international monetary system in 1971, when the system of fixed 
exchange rates was abandoned in favour of floating rates.
There are four main interpretations of these developments. 
Liberal, realist and some Marxist writers, basing themselves on 
the work of Kindleberger, see it as an indication of the decline 
of US hegemony. The liberal writers underline the emergence of 
competing economic powers, and, given the danger of a return to 
economic nationalism, call for collective action/ Realism
Keohane, 1984:36-37. Also, in Keohane, 1984b: After hegemony:
Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princenton, Princenton 
University Press.
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adopts a more critical view, emphasising errors in the management 
of the US economy as the fundamental cause of the decline. 
Realist writers understand the current tendency towards 
protectionism as a tool for global survival. Rather than the 
aggressive economic nationalism of the nineteenth century and the 
1930s, realism accepts this "benign mercantilism" as the best 
solution for the world economy from the 1970s onward .
For the Marxist writers, the world economy entered a cycle 
of depression from the 1970s, increasing the contradictions of 
capitalism. Before the oil crisis, Baran predicted that the 
expansion of social welfare would create increasing public 
deficits and thus would lead capitalist countries towards 
inflationary processes and crisis. Further, the change in the 
structure of US production from consumer durables to volatile 
high-profit sectors like military production and financial
e
services has accelerated the process of the loss of hegemony . 
In the 1980s, the world political economy as being restructured, 
towards a new system which not clearly defined. Wallerstein 
(1982) predicts its organisation around two axes, Washington- 
Tokyo-Peking and Bonn-Paris-Moscow. From this perspective, the 
major problem with global reorganisation is that there is little 
space for the Third World. Even the "economic niche" occupied by 
the semi-periphery may be jeopardised as the centre becomes 
increasingly self-absorbed.
5Gilpin, 1987:404.
See Davis,M. 1984: "The political economy of Late-Imperial America" 
in New Left Review, n. 143, p. 6-38.
Not all Marxist writers accept the theory of hegemony. Amin (1982) and 
Arrighi (1982) consider that there are insufficient grounds to demonstrate 
that the liberal-capitalist system needs a hegemonic figure; the cases of 
England in the nineteenth century and the USA in the twentieth century are to
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Structuralism considers that liberal, realist and some
Marxist accounts exaggerate the importance of both the Bretton
Woods System and the decline of US hegemony. Firstly, the Bretton
Woods system was more rhetoric than reality until 1958. For
pragmatic reasons, the treaty was put on ice until the countries
of Western Europe were able to maintain fixed parities of their
currencies. Thus, the system only really functioned for a period
of about fifteen years, from 1958, when Europe had recovered due
to Marshall Aid, until 1971. Then it was abandoned, but not
through any kind of economic breakdown, but rather through a
deliberate political decision not to implement the adjustment
measures necessary to maintain the dollar at its parity value.
In words of Strange, "It was the pursuit of short-term instead
of long-term national interests that sowed the seeds of monetary
0
disorder and financial instability" . Instead of carrying out 
the adjustment, the USA preferred to abandon exchange rates to 
market forces. The USA did not emerge from this particularly 
badly: the world economy continued to be based on the dollar. The 
disadvantage of the "paper dollar" standard was volatile exchange 
rates, which was much less important for the USA than for the 
rest of the world. In fact, the new "non-system" allowed the 
printing of dollar IOUs without gold backing, such that the US 
government saw itself able to foster economic growth in the short 
term without needing to ease credit conditions nor reduce taxes, 
as the Ford and Reagan administrations later did. So, according 
to structuralist writers, there is insufficient evidence of a
be understood as historical particularities. The theory of hegemony may have 
been an intervention in the Cold War to justify North American world 
domination.
^Strange, 1988:102.
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dramatic decline in US hegemony. Analyzing the military, 
productive, financial and knowledge structures, Strange concludes 
that the power of the USA, when all factors are taken into 
account, has increased. Although from the 1970s, the USA share 
in world production had fallen due to the recovery of other 
countries, the USA continues to be the prime centre for military
Q
and economic decisions . The financial structure, according to 
Strange, requires a more subtle interpretation: it is certain
that Nixon’s abandonment of convertibility indicated a weak 
financial position, but it is also an example of the power to 
take decisions, since West Germany did not get its gold in 
exchange for dollars. Not only this, but the US government 
imposed a 10% tariff on all imports in order to try to rectify 
the balance of payments deficit, justifying itself in terms of 
the injustice done by the system of convertibility system. Thus, 
the Bretton Woods System was modified in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
survived. In fact, it never functioned properly, because of the 
(unresolved) conflict between two contradictory strands within 
US policy making -the liberalism of the economists and the 
realism practised by the State Department. But the system 
continues, largely through inertia, lack of effective 
alternatives and a residual common interest^.
The main effects of floating exchange rates were 
overvaluation of the dollar and excess international liquidity. 
Since the world operated under the "dollar standard”, most 
countries began to accumulate a large part of their reserves in
Q
For example, it is the home of the TNCs and international agencies, and 
dominates the knowledge structures (technology, research, universities, the 
media etc).See Strange, 1988:43-135.
^Strange, 1988:106.
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dollars. Continuing world demand for the dollar kept the exchange 
rate high, and put pressure on US domestic prices. The US 
government tried to rectify the situation through small 
devaluations at various times, which explains the dollar’s 
fluctuations. The successive depreciations of the dollar are some 
of the reasons which motivated OPEC to increase oil prices**. 
The major problem in international monetary affairs is that short 
term fluctuations prevail at the time when corrective measures 
have to be carried out, resulting in new problems on a world 
scale.
The rise in oil prices between 1973-74 and between 1979-80 
increased the inflationary tensions in the world economy. The 
West entered into the worst recession of the post-Second World 
War period, which was aggravated in the following years. Growth 
rates were negative in 1975 and 1981-82 (-3% and -2% for the OECD 
countries, as it can be appreciated in figure II. 2). Most 
developed countries began to implement deflationary policies and 
make adjustments in their system of production. With respect to 
the latter, the aim was to reduce dependency on oil by 
discovering new sources of energy and energy-saving technology. 
On the other hand, attempts were made to increase national 
comparative advantage through export-led strategies, adopting 
protectionist measures (non-tariff barriers) and achieving 
significant increases in productivity via adjustments in staffing 
levels and technological investment. The greater part of the 
industrial workforce was absorbed into the service sector. 
Whereas the ethos of the Bretton Woods System had been domestic 
Keynesianism and free international trade, the new ideological
**For a review, see Gilpin, 1987:142-151; Kenwood & Lougheed, 1989:283- 
288 McCormick, 1989:122..
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TABLE X X . 4 . s
exports and 
of destinat
5 , 1973-86
years.
imports by
n , ±n
selected
EC US RestOECD OPEC CMEA LatinAm Rest
EXPORTS
1973
1980
1986
48.5
49.7
60.1
13.9
5.6
9.2
7.8
5.8 
7.7
6.2
12.8
5.6
3.0
3.0 
2.9
7.0
7.7
2.9
13.6
15.4
11.1
IMPORTS
1973
1980
1986
43.2 
30.9
50.2
16.1
13.1
9.9
11.1
7.5
11.4
11.8
29.7
11.3
2.6
2.2
2.0
7.3
8.2
6.5
7.9
8.4
8.6
Source: Alonso,J. 1991•
TABLE XI.5. :
S p a i n : c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t r a d e  b y  
a r e a s  a n d  p r o d u c t s  , i n  
p e r c e n t a g e s , 1 9 8 5 — 8 6 .
EXPORTS IMPORTS
EC US RestOECD RestWORLD EC US R•OECD R.WORLD
ENERGY 7.8 12.8 4.1 7.5 4.8 11.0 4.2 64.4
FOOD 16.8 14.3 21.4 10.2 7.2 8.5 5.8 12.1
INTERME.
GOODS
CONSUMM.
GOODS
INVESTM.
GOODS
29.3
25.8
19.7
34.1 
24.9
12.1
42.8
14.0
16.5
51.0
10.1 
20.7
40.0
6.5
34.5
44.5 38.7 
2.7 16.6
32.5 34.2
17.5
3.5
2.3
Source: Alonso,J. 1991, based on data of Spanish General Customs.
line would be Smith at home and protectionism abroad.
Stagflation and growing public deficits made economists turn 
their attention from demand-side to supply-side policies. Thus, 
monetarist policies were preferred to Keynesian ones from the 
late 1970s, with states gradually reducing their sphere of 
activity, including privatising assets, reducing their budgets 
and their control over the economy. From a governmental point of 
view, the contradiction was that the 1970s depression involved 
states in higher social security and welfare payments, which 
required more public expenditure while GNP continued to fall.
The effects on countries like Spain or Argentina were 
immense. Spain did not take part in the fixed exchange rate 
system until 1959; nor did Spain possess the institutional means 
to carry out an independent monetary policy. It was with the 1959 
Stabilisation Plan that the exchange rate was set at a more 
realistic level, and therefore it was susceptible to the effects 
of a floating system. From 1970 to 1973 the balance of payments 
went from negative to positive, and US$6.7bn in foreign exchange 
reserves were accumulated. This affected domestic liquidity. In 
1973 the money supply grew by 28% and domestic prices rose by 
14%. On the other hand, both Argentina and Spain are oil- 
importing economies, and therefore were very vulnerable to the 
fluctuations in oil prices. The balance of payments deficits can 
be seen from tables II.4 and II.5. Spain was more affected than 
Argentina, the imports of OPEC crude accounted for 30% of the 
total imports in 1980.
The crisis in Spain was made more complex due to the 
democratic transition and the return to the implementation of a
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TABLE XX . 3 . r
ARGENTINA X EXPORTS BY COUNTRY OE 
DESTINATION, IN U$S, 19*7^ — 80.
COUNTRY NON-INDUSTRIAL INDUSTRIAL TOTAL %
Netherlands 432,232 191,600 623,692 11.5
Italy 399,703 95,291 494,995 9.1
W.Germany 262,437 88,581 351,018 6.5
UK 90,389 90,319 180,708 3.3
France 147,743 28,726 176,470 3.2
Belgium 65,801 15,894 81,695 1.5
Greece 46,267 2,256 48,522 0.9
EC 1,447,572 512,528 1,960,100 36.0
Brazil 361,935 260,980 622,835 11.5
USSR 520,345 48,621 568,966 10.5
US 166,410 336,895 503,305 9.3
Japan 251,223 49,551 300,774 5.5
Spain 252,030 48,541 292,571 5.4
Chile 83,719 122,912 206,631 3.8
Uruguay 32,317 108,190 140,507 2.6
Paraguay 21,601 106,727 128,328 2.3
Venezuela 22,729 95,919 118,648 2.2
Bolivia 28,945 82,910 111,855 2.0
China 87,668 19,534 107,203 1.9
Mexico 33,073 62,569 95,642 1.7
Others 110,040 116,452 226,952 3.2
Source: IMF, 1985.
compensatory policy. Contrary to other OECD countries, labour
costs rose. This was due to the paternalist policy of the
Francoist vertical unions (see Chapter IV); wage increases for
any given year were based on the previous year’s rate of
inflation plus two or three percentage points. In addition,
social security expenditure increased markedly. This brought the
paradox that in terms of wages and employment, workers were
better off under Francoism, leaving aside the difficult task of
adjustment for the democratic transition. Also Spain suffered
from a grave backwardness in terms of production and technology.
Figure II. 1 shows the different rates for Spain and the EC.
Although the difference between the two rates was 43 points in
1975, technological backwardness had increased in Spain in 1984,
12the difference having risen to 47.8.
With respect to Argentina, it is interesting to note that 
its levels of productivity changed in the opposite way to the 
rest of the world. Instead of reducing employment and labour 
costs, it increased production. Since the scale of production in 
Argentina was small, due to its restricted market, its technology 
-imported from countries with greater levels of production- was 
always underused. While the OECD countries were in recession, 
Argentina had fluctuating rates of GDP growth, from -7% in 1975 
to +7.3% in 1979 (figure II.2). The big shock for Argentina was 
to come as a result of the rise in US interest rates due to the 
monetarist policies of the 1980s. This requires a more direct 
consideration of the problem of foreign debt.
^Martin & Romero, 1991:543.
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II.2. THE 1980s (I): EXTERNAL DEBT
The US banking sector underwent several transformations
during the 1970s, after what has been called the "banks* identity 
13crisis”. The beginning of this crisis dates from 1967, when 
the First National City Bank of New York was changed into a 
holding called Citicorp, in order to extend its operations beyond 
traditional fields of activity. During the 1960s, TNC finance 
requirements were less intense than in previous decades, given 
that Third World nationalism reduced the rate of expansion of 
corporations into LDCs. Citicorp was the first bank to react to 
this problem of lack of demand for accommodation from traditional 
clients, a situation that would confront almost all banks in the 
1970s. Citicorp became the first "money centre bank”, reducing 
the importance of clients* deposits and instead buying and 
selling off-shore money, especially in the euro-dollar market. 
The transformation was also due to the convenience of 
diversifying currency holdings given the volatility of exchange 
rates. Increasing the scale of off-shore activities also enabled 
US banks to "escape" practically from the control of domestic 
banking regulations while the need to recycle the profits coming 
from the increases in oil price -petrodollars- provided another 
incentive to expand overseas operations. Between 1970 and 1980, 
the Citicorp concept was adopted by the 50 most important banks 
of the world, increasing competition in the oligopolistic 
financial market. But profits also increased. Banks were able to 
speculate with floating exchange rates due to the rapid mobility 
of capital from one country to another. New deposits came from 
OPEC members, whose revenues from oil were neither invested nor 
spent in their own countries. This increase in the money supply
^Lombardi, 1985:100-103.
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reduced interest rates and initiated a push towards new channels 
of lending.
Banks extended lending to governments who sought to cover
increasing public deficits associated with the continued
application of expansionary Keynesian policies by borrowing. Once
developed governments had been met, the prospect of financing
developing countries began to appear attractive. While OECD
economies were stagnant, some developing countries had 1% and 8%
growth rates, and their governments were craving for further
finance. The risk factor was overlooked in the belief that
nations do not become bankrupt. However, states do not borrow
under any legal framework and do not offer any pledge or
guarantee. "Is not Mexico more valuable than $85,000 million?"
the president of Citicorp asked in 1982. The fallacy of this
reasoning is that no institution has the legal capacity to
appropriate Mexican assets.** However, the quality of credit
appraisal declined as competition between the banks increased.
A lack of good statistical information about LDCs did not 
15help. Not even the strategy of financing programmes was 
followed. Loans were given "for the general purposes" of 
government use, without even ensuring that the funds were to be
used in a productive way. In the 1970s, sovereign lending was
16made without the minimum prudence. The only measures taken
**See Mujica, 1989.
Lombardi describes how a loan to Costa Rica was based on an article 
about the country in "Time" magazine! (Lombardi, 1985).
16This was an important shift in lending to developing countries. 
International agencies grant long-term loans for development plans (usually 
for 20 years on average with grace period of 10 years), whereas commercial 
banks before were just offering self-liquidating loans or advance payments for 
future sales.
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were the diversification of risk through so-called syndicated 
loans, wholesale lending and jumbo loans, that allowed minor 
banks to participate in the process of financing development. 
Thus, in 1982 it was discovered that 1600 banks were involved in 
the case of Mexico’s debt alone.
However, naivety is not characteristic of banks’ behaviour.
17The so-called "debt trap" referred to the type of interest 
applied to these easy loans. Credits were only made available at 
floating rates of interest, the London inter-bank offer rate, the 
LIBOR. This method of calculating interest allowed the banks to 
adjust to changes in the financial market. Over and above the 
LIBOR, banks added risk premiums. Bank profits were also enhanced 
by commissions and handling fees. Thus, medium-term loans were 
made with funds deposited in the banks on a short-term basis. The 
shift from fixed to floating interest rates (up to this point 
most LDC official borrowing had been financed by the 
international agencies at concessionary rates) does not 
necessarily imply a shift of risk-bearing from creditors to 
borrowers. If nominal interest rates are adjusted in line with 
inflation, the shift should not affect real interest rates. 
Nevertheless, despite the system of variable interest rates 
attached to sovereign lending, for much of the 1970s real 
interest rates were low or negative (-3% real interest rate in 
1975, as seen in figure II.6). However, when US "Reaganomics" 
started to change its fiscal policies, the situation was 
reversed*®.
^George, 1988.
t o
Thorp and Whitehead, 1987:346; for a more extended analyses, see 
Cline, 1983.
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The second oil shock at the end of the 1970s triggered a 
search for new ways of overcoming the crisis in developed 
countries. In the USA, the Reagan administration adopted 
Lafferite policies. The Lafferian argument is based on the 
assumption that a reduction in taxes encourages growth. Since 
this has also been a very suitable argument for electoral gains, 
it was uncritically adopted by most conservative governments 
during the 1980s -such as the Republicans in the USA, the 
Socialists in Spain and the Peronists in the Argentine. Thus, 
just after Reagan took the presidency in 1981, the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act changed the fiscal system. The shift was not 
only with respect to taxes, but also in the government’s budget: 
expenditures increased, especially in the area of defence. 
Reagan’s economic advisers agreed to this "anti-Lafferian" fiscal 
deficit if it could be financed by public borrowing and if the 
Federal Reserve Bank would maintain strict control over the money 
supply. Thus, Wall Street soon had its market full of bonds, 
which drove interest rates up in the process in order to attract 
investors. The high demand for the dollar pushed its price up 
further relative to other currencies.
US monetary restriction and fiscal expansion had immediate 
consequences. Both measures had the effect of further restraining 
world growth. Industrial countries had to increase their interest 
rates in order to avoid capital flight to the USA. This stifled 
investment. The overvaluation of the dollar increased 
international inflation -already present because of the second 
oil shock. The OECD countries found themselves in the worst 
recession since the Second World War, registering negative growth 
rates in 1982. Developing countries were left with their debt 
increased and exports notably reduced. Given that real interest
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rates rose from -3% in 1975 to 6.09% in 1982 (Figure II.6), and 
public spending expanded largely in the period, Third World 
government debt rose massively. The rise in the value of the 
dollar further reduced the ability to service and amortize old 
debt, increasing thereby the real costs of foreign debt. New 
loans were required to maintain interest payments on old debt.
The effects of this on Spain and Argentina can be seen in 
Table II.2. In a period of eight years, external debt increased 
six-fold. In 1973, it was US$ 6,4 bn. for Argentina and US$ 5,7 
bn. for Spain. In 1981, just before the debt crisis, the amount 
had risen to US$ 35,7 bn. and US$ 33,2 bn. respectively. The size 
of the debt is similar for the two countries, but the difference 
comes with the ratio of debts to exports. Spain’s ratio is half 
that of Argentina, 19% of exports as compared to 37,% for the 
Argentine.
In Argentina, most loans were used for non-productive
activities. An important part of the debt went to public
expenditure, which increased before and after every change of
government (military or elected). Thus, in the 1970s governments
19bought their legitimacy through borrowing. Military 
expenditures were also very important during the campaign against 
guerrillas (the so-called "dirty war") and in the preparation for 
foreign conflicts such as the Falklands/Malvinas. Overseas 
borrowing also financed inefficient state companies and 
overambitious development projects. Some of the credits were also 
spent on mere imports of consumer goods, and the rest 
paradoxically went through capital flight to OECD banks, where
19See Ames (1987) on expansionary cycles in Latin America.
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interest rates promised safe and good returns. Thus, the external 
debt did not bring about an expansion of the economy. On the 
contrary, when the debt crisis emerged it left the country at the 
crossroads. The blame can be put as much on the blindness and 
corruption of Latin American elites as on the international 
financial groups. Latin American governments should have foreseen 
that the easy availability of capital was only a result of the 
conjunctural position of the developed countries * banks. However, 
the temptation was very strong to take the easiest way out of 
their complex domestic situations.
By 1980, it became clear that foreign financing had 
overexpanded. The international banking system became aware that 
financial dependence was a two-edged sword, and that the crisis 
would not only affect borrowers but was also showing the 
vulnerability of the developed countries* banking system. Banks 
realised that the logic of their previous behaviour was wrong, 
and that, what was beneficial for one bank, applied collectively 
ended up damaging the system as a whole. However, governments and 
the financial community remained blind to the danger of 
bankruptcy until August 1982. At that point Mexico ran out of 
foreign exchange and declared that it could no longer make debt 
repayments. International bankers, already worried because of the 
Polish and Turkish experiences of 1981, started to panic.
The likely consequences of the declaration of moratoria by 
developing countries have been subject to several 
interpretations. Cline (1983) considered that it might 
jeopardise the stability of the whole world economy. On the other 
hand, Marxist authors such as S. George (1988) argue that the 
importance of the LDCs debt in relative terms was not so great.
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Total Third World debt stood at about U$s 1 trillion in 1986, 
which represented only one eighth of the OECD annual GNP, or just 
one half of US public debt at that time2®.
However, from the banks’ perspective, immediate action was
required. Banks -and governments- of the developed world rapidly
organised themselves in groups such as the Paris Club or Bank
Advisory Committees. The IMF came forward as a lender of last
resort to fill the gap between creditors and borrowers. Banks
lacked the power to impose economic measures to increase
liquidity in developing countries in order to repay debt.
However, the IMF had this capacity through the "conditionality"
clause, which linked the granting of new loans to the adoption
of specific policies that were regarded by the institution as the
21most appropriate to improve economic performance.
The IMF has played and still plays today a major role in the
debt rescheduling process. Prior to 1982, it had remained in the
background, dealing with temporary balance of payments problems
and small uncreditworthy countries. After 1982, the Paris Club
decided to expand the IMF’s resources, stressing that IMF
assistance should continue under the "conditionality" clauses.
IMF packages comprise credit and fiscal restraint, with targets
for the reduction of the fiscal deficit and the money supply, and
the "correction" of prices including exchange rates. There have
been several criticisms of the IMF’s role, ranging from technical 
22to moral. Deflationary measures have notably reduced domestic
20George, 1988:11-28.
21For a critical view of the Fund, see Milivojevich, 1985; Pastor, 1987.
22Some criticism have emerged from within the IMF itself -vid. Donovan, 
Reichman and Stillson in Pastor, 1987.
59
activity and growth, and therefore adjustment policies seem
neither efficient nor sustainable. New IMF loans are used to
service old debt, rather than helping to create new ways of
development that will allow future payments. The austerity
programmes have also caused social conflict, since they promote
reduction of public expenditure and wage restriction. The levels
of unemployment, income inequality, food prices, malnutrition,
mortality, homelessness and other problems have increased
dramatically in developing countries trying to stabilise their 
23economies . The decline in growth and the increase in social
tension have eroded economic confidence, which has stimulated
24capital flight and distrust of the new TNCs. Defenders of the 
Fund deny that the IMF is such an uncritical agent of creditor 
banks. It has obliged them, they argue, to make "involuntary 
loans" for the debt-rescheduling operations. However, it should 
be remembered that these new loans went to pay back accumulated 
interest. The IMF is dependent on western countries .not only in 
its organisation and financial resources, but also for 
intellectual support and guidance. Thus, it should not be 
expected to have a very critical approach to western 
interests.^
Fearful of not being able to maintain essential imports, 
developing countries became resigned to their indebtedness and
^Cornia et al, 1987; Loxley, 1986.
24Some authors have argued that even in the case that the IMF was 
successful, the result would be a return to the previous situation, and thus 
developing countries would need new external financing, becoming debtors again 
(George, 1988).
25Thorp, 1987:338. This type of argument also corresponds to the 
analysis of external debt as a bargaining game. See bellow, especially note 
27.
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started negotiating with the IMF, accepting its case-by-case 
strategy and refusing any attempt at organising themselves as 
banks did'*®.
In fact, the debt rescheduling process became a highly
politicised financial diplomacy. It has often been described as
27a bargaining game , in which two main fronts are defined:
debtors, and the coalition of creditors. The latter is formed by
banks, G-5 governments and the IMF, sharing the interest of
avoiding disruption of the financial system through rescheduling
and adjustment for debtors. They have rapidly organised a kind
of "cartel", offering immediate finance but also threatening
28sanctions to prevent cooperative action by debtors . On the
other hand, debtors developed little coordination, accepting the
case-by-case philosophy instead of exploiting the vulnerability
29of creditors to obtain concessions. This strategy was not 
caused by any kind of political naivety nor dis-organisation. In 
November 1982, the Mexican president Lopez- Portillo initiated 
secret meetings with his Argentine and Brazilian counterparts to
discuss the possibility of a multilateral response to the debt
30crisis; but his plan was rejected by the Brazilian government . 
Later attempts to organise a debtors* cartel, such as the Quito
^See Ffrench-Davies, 1987, and specially Kettell and Magnus, 1986:90- 
97,130-134.
^See Griffith-Jones, 1988; Holley, 1987; Kahler, 1985; Kettell & 
Magnus, 1986.
^Kettel and Magnus, 1986:127-130.
29It has been claimed that the Mexican and Argentinian delegations were 
in the same bank on the same day negotiating their debts with neither 
delegation aware of the other’s presence (O’Brien, 1986:48).
30Details of Latin American external debt crisis diplomacy can be found 
in Milivojevic, 1985.
61
Declaration and the Cartagena Group, showed a radical rhetoric
but in practice debtor members accepted the case-by-case 
31approach . The Prisoners* Dilemma could be applied to debtors: 
collective action could benefit all the countries, but they have 
preferred to act individually rather than taking risks. By 
threatening banks with the possibility of a debtors cartel, the 
large Latin American debtors were also able to get some 
reductions in repayments, and still remain friendly to the West. 
At home, by blaming the USA and increasing the already extended 
"anti-yankeeism", Latin American administrations were able to 
take unpopular measures to try to adjust and liberalise their 
economies.
The first meetings calling for cooperation were promoted by small 
countries, since they were the ones which suffer most from the costs of 
adjustment, as their exports were constrained by the decline in commodity 
prices and they were unlikely to regain their creditworthiness. Thus, in the 
first attempts at Panama and Caracas (March and September 1983), larger 
debtors showed their lack of interest. However, in 1984 the new Argentinian 
government started playing a more active role, since president Alfonsin was 
worried with the prospects of adjustment for democracy. In January 1984, the 
Quito Declaration asked for a continuing flow of information and action 
between the Latin American countries, for debt repayments to be linked to 
export earnings, for longer grace and amortisation periods, for no increase 
in the cost of the debt because of the negotiations and for an increase in IMF 
resources. Internal disagreements reduced the effectiveness of the 
Declaration. Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia disapproved of the radical 
stance taken by Argentina and the smaller countries. In March, when Argentina 
was close to its deadline for payment of interests to US banks, despite the 
Quito Declaration, these countries "rescued" Argentina by granting her loans. 
This generous example of Latin American cooperation can also be interpreted 
as unwillingess to challenge creditors. In June 1984, as interest rates 
continued to rise, Latin American countries met again in Colombia, forming the 
so-called Cartagena Group, which managed some consensus to send a signal to 
the London summit of the industrialised countries. It was relatively 
successful considering the later approach by the IMF and the US Federal 
Reserve. The Cartagena Group has continued its meetings; however, it never 
concluded any decisive solution. When the oil price fell in 1985, Mexico and 
Venezuela found themselves in a critical situation, while non-oil producers 
benefited. Mexico called or a new meeting of the Group (Punta del Este Feb. 
1986), where it played a much more aggressive role, while Argentina was 
conciliatory. The reversal of roles can be explained by the fact that 
Argentina had at the time an increasingly improved balance of trade and was 
also trying to implement successfully an anti-inflationary programme. 
Divergences have made the Cartagena meeting ineffective (O’Brien, 1986:48-52).
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In short, there were three main solutions to the debt crisis 
from the debtor’s point of view. The radical one, lead by the 
Cuban president Fidel Castro, was to form a debtors’ cartel and 
not to repay the debt. As described above, this solution was 
mostly used as a threat to creditors but never adopted. Secondly, 
there were several formal solutions, different arrangements with 
the IMF to pay debt back, implementing to some degree the 
"conditionality clauses" while receiving further financing. The 
Baker and Brady Plans, explained below, are example of this. 
Finally, there were local attempts to implement adjustment 
programmes -heterodox plans, such as the Cruzado and Verao Plans 
in Brazil and the Austral and Primavera Programmes in Argentina.
Responding to criticisms of IMF policies and the plight of 
the main debtors who considered that the burden of adjustment 
should not only be borne by LDCs alone, the USA announced new 
programmes, the Baker and the Brady Plans. These were supposed 
to increase lending to Latin American countries in order to make 
repayment in parallel to sustainable growth. Development 
institutions such as the WB and the IDB were to play a more 
active role within what would still be a case-by-case approach. 
In fact, these plans were designed at the end of the 1980s, when 
the international banking system had recovered from the financial 
crisis. Their reserves were enlarged due to the lending to 
European governments and to the rise of international interest 
rates. The result might have been debt forgiveness, but the 
financial community and G-5 governments preferred to take a small 
risk, promoting some further lending while securing "good 
behaviour" of LDCs, stopping nationalist experiments and 
reenforcing the opening of LDCs markets and economies. With 
respect to the first one, the Baker Plan, external factors such
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as the election of a new WB president delayed its
32effectiveness. The Brady plan was applied initially to
Mexico. Once again, geography proved to be an important factor 
in economics: the proximity of Mexico to the USA made the country 
the recipient of international organisations* aid. It was only 
much later, in the 1990s, a decade after the 1982 debt crisis, 
that Brady agreements would be signed for Costa Rica, the 
Philippines and Argentina.
II.3. THE 1980s (II): THE FALL IN PRIMARY PRODUCT PRICES.
The fall in the prices of primary products and the
increasing protectionism in the developed countries led to even
33greater deterioration in the position of LDCs. The decline in 
real prices can be seen from Table II. 7. If oil is excluded, 
prices of primary products fell from 100 in 1980 to 60.8 in 1986. 
The effects of this on Argentina have been very important. 
Although at the end of the decade the share of agricultural 
products in total exports had fallen to 62%, for the period 1980- 
86 rural commodities made up 73% of Argentine exports. The key
32Further, there was no later agreement between world institutions. The 
director of the IMF, M.Camdessus, and major international banks disagreed with 
the new plans and the more political approach advocated by the US Secretary 
of State J. Baker, WB director B.Conable and many academics such as J.Sachs 
(Morales, 1991:42-43).
33 The decline of prices of primary products is a complex phenomenon. 
It has been caused by several factors, such as the trend towards technological 
substitution of primary products by synthetic products (copper by optic fibre, 
zinc by plastics ...), the increasing tendency of developed countries to 
produce their own primary products (from oil to tropical fruits) or even 
changes in consumer preferences (replacement of sugar by articifical 
sweeteners, of coffee by coke). Some conjunctutal factors are also important, 
such as the increase in interest rates (which raises the costs of storage) or 
the expectation of further falls in primary product prices (which delays 
sales). Of Latin America’s 20 most important primary product exports, in only 
one case did the price rise in the period 1980-85: oil, and its price 
subsequently fell in November 1985. It should be borne in mind that gas and 
tin are the main resources of Bolivia, copper and cocoa are the main resources 
for Chile, oil for Mexico and Venezuela, etc.
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year was 1986 when the anti-inflationary Austral Plan was 
launched, and reserves did not reach the levels expected by the 
Central Bank (table III.l).
The debt crisis, combined with the fall in primary product
prices, had a devastating effect in a country like Argentina that
was accustomed to redistributive policies. The military
government fell from office in 1982, after the Falklands/Malvinas
conflict and the external debt crisis. The two democratic
administrations -under Alfonsin and Menem- had to bear the burden
of debts incurred by the previous governments. The implementation
of plans for the stabilisation of the economy and the reform of
the state had to be carried out without credits and under
pressure to service debts. Korea, Turkey, Mexico, Chile,
Indonesia and Thailand, in contrast, all received external
economic aid. Since taxes on primary export products were the
principal source of fiscal revenue, the Argentine state found
itself short of funds. Whereas the Chilean government could rely
on copper exports, and the Mexican and Venezuelan governments on
oil, the government in Buenos Aires found itself unable to
maintain state transfers: the Argentine government failed to
secure a sufficient share of agricultural sector income which was
in any case lower due to the fall in primary product prices. The
resulting fiscal gap ensured that the only alternative for the
government was to create internal debt, issuing bonds guaranteed 
34by the state. External debt payments were halted during the 
Alfonsin government, during and after the implementation of the 
Primavera Plan (August 1988). At first, the adjustment programme 
had the approval of international organisations, but in February
^Frenkel et al 1990:22-32; Graziano, 1990:129.
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1989 credits were stopped because of the plan’s failure.
On assuming Office in 1989, the Menem administration
considered that Argentina’s future was at the crossroads.
35Therefore, it launched a privatisation programme , where half 
of its capital went to service the debt, at the cost of reducing 
industrial subsidies and social and welfare expenditure. From 
1980 to 1990, Argentina’s GNP fell by 9.9%, its industrial output 
by 19.9%, and industrial wages by 32.8% while open unemployment 
rose from 2.6% to 7.8%. Not all these ills can be attributed to 
external debt, as will be seen in Chapter III, there were many 
mistakes in the implementation of the adjustment plans and 
economic policy. Nonetheless, the point is that the international 
situation has in no way been favourable for Argentina.
The difference with Spain is marked. With an absolute level 
of debt equal to Argentina’s (though not equal in relation to 
export earnings as shown in table II.2), Spain’s democratic 
transition and economic adjustment was carried out without an 
echo of the existence of external debt. The prospect of Spain’s 
entry into the EC has been an important factor.
II.4. THE 1980s (III): REGIONAL INTEGRATION.
As was seen in section II.1 of this chapter, the recovery 
in Europe and Japan after the Second World War reduced the 
relative share of the USA in the world economy. This change in 
economic relations after the 1960s evolved towards a situation 
of multipolarity, in which three main blocs, each with its own 
satellites/peripheries, have become apparent: the EC and Eastern
^Law n.23.696.
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36Europe, Japan and the Asian NICs, and the USA-Canada-Mexico .
Since international competition by the 1970s and 1980s was
no longer based exclusively on the reduction of production costs,
but is also included competition for access to markets, the blocs
tended to adopt protectionist measures. The successes in the
liberalisation of world trade in various GATT rounds have been
achieved at the same time as a growth of non-tariff barriers
(NTBs), such as voluntary restrictions, anti-dumping regulations
and other measures. UNCTAD noted that at the start of the 1980s,
3798% of world production was protected in some way or another . 
This neo-protectionism and the tendency towards economic 
regionalisation have been gathering pace in the course of the 
1980s, to such a degree that the last GATT talks, the Uruguay 
Round, took eight years to reach an agreement (1986-94).
The rise in protectionism has provoked relocation of TNCs, 
which are looking to penetrate these protected markets through 
siting their subsidiaries in the developed countries. The reduced 
importance of the international division of labour due to neo­
protectionism and technological development has seriously 
affected the LDCs. Their prospects have been twice worsened by 
external debt and the scarcity of international finance after the 
rise in interest rates in the developed countries. The adoption 
of neoliberal policies in the LDCs is closely linked to the 
attempt to attract investment and capital. In the absence of 
this, the majority of developing countries are trying to 
integrate themselves into the nearest economic bloc.
Whose satellites may also be Israel, Saudi Arabia, Latin America and 
once again the Asian NICs.
^See Sebastian, 1987.
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Paradoxically, in a world which is increasingly interconnected, 
belonging to one or another bloc is conditioned by geographical 
proximity. Geopolitics is one of the factors which most 
distinguishes the Spanish case from the Argentine; whereas Spain 
has the possibility of incorporating itself into the EC, 
Argentina finds itself with no alternative but to rapidly 
integrate with Brazil.
The EC is the example par excellence of regional
integration. Launched in 1948 as an agency of the UN, the
Organisation for European Economic Recovery (later the much
enlarged OECD) distributed Marshall Aid that was loaned to Europe
by the USA between 1948-52. There were two motives behind US
policy: the Cold War and the expansion of communism in Europe,
and the need to coordinate economic and social policies in a
Europe suffering from problems of inefficiency due to the scale
of its markets and economies. There were a number of attempts to
create a customs union, which failed because of tensions between
different countries, above all with the UK, given its ties to the
Commonwealth. Finally, in 1957, the six members of the European
38Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) signed the Treaty of Rome. The 
basic objective of the treaty was to create a supranational body 
which would regulate a real economic union and common market. The 
member countries had a 12 year transition period to dismantle 
intra-community tariffs and to implement common policies. The 
areas covered by these policies were: trade with third countries, 
agriculture, transport and coordination of economic policies, the 
avoidance of problems in the balance of payments. A social fund 
and a European Investment Bank were also established, as was a
38West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries.
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body of institutions -the European parliament, the Council of
Ministers, the Commission and the Tribunal of Justice. In 1973,
Denmark, Ireland and the UK left the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA) and joined the EC. Subsequently, Greece (1981), Portugal
39and Spain (1986) were also admitted.
Spain’s entry was vetoed because of the economic sanctions 
imposed by the EC against General Franco’s dictatorship. Contrary 
to what Whitehead (1986) maintains, the role of the EC in the 
democratic transition should not be exaggerated. Spain signed a 
Preferential Agreement in 1970, when the dictatorship was in full 
swing. The treaty’s content was purely commercial, and was very 
beneficial to Spain rather than to the EC.^ As can be seen in 
table II.4 and II.5, and figure II.7.2., already in 1973 around 
45%-50% of both imports and exports were of European origin. This 
is, Spanish dependency on the EC was happening much earlier than 
1986, the year in which the country formally joined the 
Community.
The entry of Spain into the EC dates from 1986, and was seen 
as a victory for democracy. Membership into the EC was on the 
mind of every Spaniard, as a result of the developmentalist 
mentality of the 1960s-early 1970s that encompassed the idea of 
becoming European. This explains why Spain sought rapid
39For a historical review, see Buchan,D. and Colchester,N. 1991: Europa 
relanzada, Madrid, Plaza y Janes; Fontaine,P. and Malosse,H. 1991: Les
institutions Europ^enes. Paris, Retz; Nicoll,W. and Salmon,T. 1994: 
Understanding the new European Economy. London, Harvester; Nugent,N. (ed.) 
1993: The EC. Oxford, Blackwell & Journal of Common Market Studies.
^The tariffs on Spanish products were reduced by between 40% and 70%, 
while those on EC products fell by just 26.7%. Thus, the agreement represented 
a substantial increase in exports for Spain, in exchange for a simple 
substitution of imports in favour of EC products (Montes, 1991:243-244).
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integration into the Community on fairly onerous terms. Entry 
into the EC was in the programme of all political parties given 
that its benefits were unquestioned, never debated, assumed by 
everybody, and above all taken to signal the end of Spanish 
underdevelopment. However, the advantages of integration have not 
yet shown themselves in the short run.
The trade deficit has grown since 1985, rising from 1.4% of 
GNP to 5.7% of GNP in 1992 (figure II.3). From 1985 to 1989, 
total imports grew 127.7% (169.3% for those coming from the EC) 
while exports grew by just 33.3% (75.7% for exports to the
EC)^. Moreover, entry into the European Monetary System (EMS) 
has forced the government to keep an overvalued parity for the 
peseta at the price of a loss of autonomy in determining domestic 
economic policy.
The core of the Spanish-EC agreement was the industrial and 
agricultural sectors. The agreements in the agricultural sector 
were the most complex and far-reaching, since this was the most 
protected and regulated sector in the EC (receiving 67.2% of the 
total EC budget) and Spanish competition signified some social 
and economic disturbances for some countries in the EC. The 
incorporation of Spain and Portugal into the EC involved an 
increase of 30% in the cultivable area and a 25% increase in the 
agricultural workforce, while the increase in the number of 
consumers was just 14%, and their level of consumption was 
substantially below the community average. The Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) does not affect all agricultural 
products equally, but mainly regulates products from the
^Montes, 1991:261-262.
temperate zone. Much of Spain’s produce is of a Mediterranean
nature, and therefore is subject to lower levels of protection.
Thus, wine, fruits, vegetables and oils compete with European
agriculture. This has meant that these are precisely the
businesses that are most vulnerable, and that have been regulated
by very long periods of transition -ten years instead of seven-
to the detriment of Spanish producers. With respect to meat and
dairy produce, Spain has found itself at a disadvantage in the 
42EC. Altogether, the Spanish government did not adequately
43negotiate the conditions of entry into the EC .
With respect to the industrial sector, the conditions have 
been the same for Spanish and EC producers. A reduction in 
tariffs in eight stages over a transition period of seven years 
was agreed. In the period 1985-89, imports of consumer goods grew 
by 296%. However, the imports of investment goods also grew by 
201%, although the most marked increase within this group was for 
transport materials rather than investment in machinery^. 
Concerning exports, the increase has been much more modest, with, 
paradoxically, transport materials standing out at -100.8%. This 
will be further dealt with in Chapter V. Summing up, integration 
into the EC has been negative for Spanish industry. Foreign 
direct investment was attracted but national industry could not 
compete with the rapid reduction of tariffs and the overvaluation
^Reig, 1991:164-173; see also Barcelo, 1989.
43Not all negative aspects can be blamed on the Spanish government. 
Interviews with EC officials reflected that part of the bad negotiation comes 
from the existence of parallel markets. The existence of a large black economy 
in Spain (see chapter IV) make that Spanish quotas are smaller than they 
should be, given that quotas are based on official data (from interview to M. 
Landabaso, DG XVI, Commision of the EC).
^Montes, 1991:161.
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of the peseta.
This brings us to the European Monetary System (EMS). The
PSOE government could have pushed for a more prudent policy
concerning the peseta’s position among the other EC currencies.
However, a political gesture by the socialist government to show
Spain’s pro-European good faith brought the country’s rapid entry
into the EMS in June 1989. Because of the banks* high interest
45rates then prevailing, the exchange rate was also high:
imports have been boosted further and exports hindered. The
government should have counted on the fact that 65 pta/DM was an
unreal exchange rate even when considering the 6% fluctuation
band mechanism of the EMS. Further, the supposed anti-
inflationary effects have been minimal, and after 1989 the
government sacrificed the possibility to use the exchange rate
46as an anti-inflationary tool.
Once tariff and tax (VAT) matters were considered nearly
harmonised, the European economies* points of convergence began
to centre themselves on matters such as: the levels of inflation,
budget deficits, external debt, exchange rates and long term
interest rates. There have been no political attempts to
harmonise balance of payments deficits, returns on capital,
regional inequalities, employment, welfare or other social
matters. These objectives indicate the balance of power within
the EC: priorities are based on Germany’s economic and political 
47interests . However, the options for a country like Spain on
^65 ptas to the DM.
^Alburquerque & Curbelo, 1992:120-124. 
^Alburquerque and Curbelo, 1992:119.
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the periphery of Europe have not proved to be great. An initial 
balance shows that the effects of integration have been negative. 
Defenders of the EC argue that the Spanish GDP growth rate was 
4.8% for-the period 1987-90 compared to only 1.4% during 1981-86 
(figure II.2). However, as is explained in chapter IV, this high 
figure is due to a large expansion of the service and 
construction sectors, which raises the question of Spain’s future 
international economic specialisation. The sectors that have 
suffered most from integration have been agriculture and some 
industrial sectors which have faced drastic restructuring, with 
high costs in terms of national employment. This again will be 
dealt with in Chapter V.
For Argentina, the question of regional integration was a
much more doubtful alternative. There have been various such
initiatives since the 1950s, showing no notable success. The
first attempts were launched by ECLA/CEPAL, and .were of a
technical-economic nature, aimed at taking advantage of economies
of scale in production and coordinating trade policies. This took
form in 1960 with the creation of the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA) including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The main reasons for its failure were the absence of regional
industrial policy and the proliferation of bilateral instead of
48multilateral treaties. In 1969, the Andean Group strengthened 
its internal ties in an attempt to reduce the influence of 
countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, that had a higher 
level of development. However, the Andean Group did not confront 
structural questions either, limiting itself to a series of
48Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru.
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commercial treaties of little relevance. Meanwhile, Argentina and
Uruguay signed the CAUCE (the Argentina-Uruguay Agreement on
Economic Cooperation 1974), based on a limited programme of
tariff reductions between the two countries. Finally, in 1980
there was an attempt to revive LAFTA through the creation of a
new agreement, the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
by the same member states. The debt crisis diverted attention
from the attempts at integration, although they did register
certain successes. Given that some of LAFTA*s failures were 
49corrected , intra-regional exports in 1983-85 were 9% of the 
region’s total exports and imports were 15% of the overall import 
bill. With respect to Argentina, 26.2% of its exports were 
destined to the region before the debt crisis (figure II.7.1).
The major force for economic integration in South America 
is MERCOSUR (South American Common Market), between Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. In 1985, Argentina and Brazil found 
that their economic problems and strategies were very similar. 
Both countries were experiencing a transition to democracy, while 
suffering from very high inflation and large public deficits. The 
two countries were also experiencing balance of payments 
deficits, and needed to restructure manufacturing in the 
direction of exports*. Large external debts, and exposure to IMF 
"conditionality" were further shared problems that had to be 
confronted when it came to implementing any desired economic 
policy. Furthermore, both countries needed economic stabilisation 
and a package of structural industrial reforms that would allow 
a degree of economic growth. In 1985 the Austral Plan and the 
1986 Cruzado Plan were initiated in Argentina and Brazil
49Multilateral agreements instead of bilateral, tariff barriers against 
third countries, etc (Mairal, 1989).
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respectively to carry out the perceived necessary adjustment. In 
July of the same year, presidents Alfonsin and Sarney signed the 
Act for Argentinian-Brazilian Integration in Buenos Aires, that 
was later ratified in 1988.
Initially, the treaty was an agreement which proposed 
cooperation and industrial and commercial sectoral adjustment in 
line with ECLA structuralism. However, in 1989, new presidential 
elections took place in both countries, and the new Argentine 
government of Menem and Brazilian government headed by Collor 
were firmly committed to liberalisation and opening up the 
economy. This meant a change of direction for MERCOSUR, whose 
central objective came to be the reduction of tariffs and NTBs, 
aiming at zero tariffs by December 1994. The date for economic 
integration was brought forward, abandoning the initial 
progressive, flexible and gradualist line. Anew series of 
protocols, signed in successive rounds, was centred on a linear 
and automatic reduction in tariffs, supposing that the countries 
would restructure themselves "automatically". In this respect, 
the differences between Argentina and Brazil are now important. 
Argentina barely possesses industrial policy tools and its output 
is in general less competitive than Brazil’s. In addition, Brazil 
has not suffered such a sharp process of deindustrialization as 
Argentina, and can count on a flexible system of credits to 
alleviate the counter-productive effects of opening up the 
economy. Nonetheless, both countries to date have kept to the 
timetable of tariff reductions.
50Ala-Rue and Lavergne classify the 23 protocols signed by
^Ala-Rue and Lavergne, 1991:16.
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1991 into five thematic categories: (a) those oriented towards 
stimulating intra-market trade; (b) scientific and technical 
agreements; (c) infrastructural accords; (d) agreements governing 
structural and sectoral coordination, the creation of a single 
currency in the long run etc; and (e) other measures of a 
cultural nature (table II.6). It is important to point out that 
up to 1991 social aspects have remained absent. Not a single 
protocol has been drawn up on labour regulations. However, 
protocol XXIII assumes the free mobility of people between 
borders by December 1994. This is greatly detrimental to 
Argentine trade unions. Despite the fall in real wages, open 
unemployment is still low in Argentina compared to Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. Argentine and Brazilian unions are trying 
to coordinate their efforts, but because of their lack of 
resources and their different organisational structures, progress 
has been slow. As will be seen in Chapter III, Argentina* s trade 
union structure is centralised and hierarchical; in that, all the 
unions in the various economic sectors are coordinated through 
the CGT (General Workers Union). In contrast, in Brazil each 
region has its own independent union structure. In various 
interviews that have taken place, Argentine trade unionists have
pointed out the problems with coordinating two such different
51organisations.
On the other hand, from 1989 the CGT has been split into two factions 
-the official San Martin CGT, which supports Menem*s policies, and the 
opposition Azzopardo CGT. Since the finances are controlled and distributed 
by the official faction, there are no funds available to organise contacts 
with Brazilian unions on the question of integration. Hugo Rojo (non­
governmental trade unionist UOM Argentina) comented how his faction was 
communicating with their Brazilian counterparts by regular post! CGT Azzopardo 
had many problems in financing meetings. In many cases, they were assisted by 
international social-democratic institutions (as the Ebert Foundation).
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TABLE II.6. 
MERCOSUR BROTOCOLS.
PROTOCOL A B C D E
I. Capital Goods *
II. Wheat *
III. Food Supplies *
IV. Trade Expansion *
V. Binational enterprises *
VI. Finances *
VII. Investment Funds *
VIII. Energy *
IX. Biotechnology *
X. Economic Studies *
XI. Information and mutual aid in case
of nuclear accidents and other *
emergencies
XII. Aeronautic Cooperation *
XIII. Metallurgy *
XIV. Land Transport *
XV. Sea Transport *
XVI. Communications *
XVII. Nuclear Cooperation *
XVlll. Cultural *
XIX. Public Administration *
XX• Currency *
XXI. Vehicle Industry *
XXII. Food Industries *
XXIII. Regional Frontiers *
Source: Ala-Rue, P. & Lavergne, N., 1991.
KEYS:
A. Trade related protocols, aimed at stimulating intra-MERCOSUR 
trade•
B. Scientific and technical protocols.
C. Infrastructural protocols.
D. Protocols governing structural and sectoral coordination, the 
creation of a single currency in the long run, etc.
E. Others.
If Argentina is less prepared economically for integration 
than Brazil, its social losses promise to be dramatic. What are 
the Menem administration’s motives for taking the initiative and 
speeding up the formation of MERCOSUR? There seem to be two 
reasons, namely a recognition of the lack of economic
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alternatives, and the dismantling of the corporatist system.
The recognition of a lack of economic alternatives lies at 
the very root of "Menemism". The debt crisis, the failure of 
Alfonsin*s heterodox stabilisation plan, the two harsh periods 
of hyperinflation and the fall in real wages during the 
democratic transition gave rise to an opposition which called for 
orthodox liberal strategies. This came to be the case with C. 
Menem, who paradoxically put forward his candidature from the 
Peronist Party, which has a long tradition of state 
interventionism. "The Latin American 1 Bohemia* must be done away 
with; the countries of the region must modernise themselves and 
join in the developed countries dynamic" . This rhetoric 
coincided, not accidentally, with "conditionality" proposals of 
the international organisations. However, the advantage of a 
strategy of liberalisation and economic opening up was more 
theoretical than practical. Figure II. 7.1. and table II.3. show 
Argentina’s export markets in the period 1976-80. The major 
market is the EC, which absorbed 36% of Argentina’s exports, of 
which 73.8% were non-industrial products. Other important markets 
were Brazil (11.5%), USSR (10.5%) and the USA (9.3%). Argentina’s 
process of liberalisation in the 1980s coincided with a problem 
of markets. The USSR disintegrated, while trade with the EC and 
the USA, overwhelmingly agricultural, has held up but still 
dependent on the results of the GATT negotiations. On the other 
hand, the opening up threatens industrial production if it is not 
balanced by compensatory policies. The only other trading partner 
to note is Brazil, whose 41.9% of exports are industrial.
Jj4
C.Menem, in Ala-Rue and Lavergne, 1991:21.
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Integration with Brazil is, in addition, part of the 
dynamics of regionalisation in the world economy. President Bush 
indicated the possibility of creating a continental union in the 
future -the Initiative for the Americas. The origins are to be 
found in the Republican Party’s critique of Carter’s foreign 
policy. The Santa Fe Documents (SFI and SFII in 1980 and 1988 
respectively) condemned the passivity of the Carter 
administration towards the advance of communism in Guyana, 
Jamaica, Granada and Nicaragua and towards the guerrillas in El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Peru. Therefore the documents proposed 
forging closer relations within the continent, based on the 
establishment of bilateral relations between the USA and the 21 
countries from Canada to Argentina. According to these documents, 
the USA would have to offer preferential tariff treatment to all 
Latin America’s agricultural and some of its industrial products. 
This would generate foreign exchange which could then be used to 
service foreign debt, thus reducing the need for new credits. The 
documents condemned statism, and advocated liberalisation, 
privatisation and the integration of those countries which are 
most similar, like Argentina and Brazil. In 1988 SFII also 
maintained the emphasis on anti-communism, and underlined the 
need to support democratic governments.
In June 1990, Bush met Latin American ambassadors at the 
White House officially to discuss the Initiative for the 
Americas, promising in addition to provide support in the GATT 
talks. This is related to the dynamics of the Uruguay Round 
itself. Faced with EC reluctance to liberalise agriculture, the 
USA has threatened to strengthen its measure of protectionism. 
The Initiative for the Americas, then, is a USA catch-phrase in 
case the Uruguay Round fails. If this does not happen, the USA
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will have lost nothing, since for the moment there have only been 
promises of cooperation, and the development of a Latin American 
market is, in any case, in the interests of the USA.
We turn now to the political rationale of integration. One 
of the key problems in liberalising such an interventionist 
economy as Argentina*s is its corporatist social organisation. 
By highlighting the lack of economic alternatives and speeding 
up the process of integration, the Menem government has been able 
to take decision making power away from the usual channels. In 
a country where both businessmen and trade unions have 
substantial power to lobby the government, this can be a useful 
means of implementing liberalisation policies. Businessmen have 
responded differently to the moves, depending on whether their 
sector has benefited from integration or has lost out. In 
general, their attitude has been to wait and see, given the lack 
of compensatory finance made available by the state. The vice- 
secretary of state for industry stated that Argentina’s 
businessmen were well suited for competition, since they had 
survived "Martinez de Hoz’s exchange table, two hyperinflations
etc . . . ; they are not going to have problems with this
S3challenge." Argentina’s budget deficit does not allow, in 
reality, large-scale compensation. Entrepreneurs have intervened 
in the drawing up of the protocols, seeking to ensure favourable 
conditions. This fact has no parallel for the unions, as has been 
noted earlier. Integration with Brazil has been used by the 
government as part of its manoeuvres to reduce union bargaining 
power. The dismantling of the very paternalistic labour system 
and the promise of lower labour costs has been a way of
53Pereyra de Olazabal, in Ala-Rue & Lavergne, 1991:41.
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compensating the business sector without increasing the budget 
deficit.
In conclusion, the increased global integration has brought 
with it an increase in dependency. The room for manoeuvre for 
governments on the periphery or semi-periphery gets less as time 
goes by. Whereas the countries of the Centre like Japan, Germany, 
and the USA (which has maintained its hegemonic leadership in the 
world), retain degrees of mutual interdependence, the non-central 
countries maintain a unilateral dependency. If they find 
themselves more or less integrated into the world economy, their 
internal policies are easily influenced by changes taking place 
in the Centre. Such is the case with both Argentina and Spain. 
The former has seen itself sharply affected by the external debt 
crisis and the fall in primary product prices, and the latter by 
the oil crisis and integration into the EC. Moreover, the 
processes of economic liberalisation carried out by the 
governments of both countries have increased their relative 
degree of dependency in the last decade.
This does not mean that these states are totally vulnerable 
to outside developments. As will be shown in Chapters III and IV, 
the governments of both countries have known how to use external 
conditions as a justification when implementing adjustments in 
domestic policies. The Menem administration is using the argument 
of a lack of economic alternatives to abolish subsidies to 
certain industrial and social groups, and is using integration 
into MERCOSUR as a means to assist the dismantling of Argentina’s 
corporatist state. In Spain, the idea of modernisation and entry 
into the EC have been present throughout the democratic 
transition, and have been presented as justifying every transfer
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of economic power from one group to another.
The processes of liberalisation, that is to say the 
dismantling of an old system of production to regulate a new one 
with other priorities and different social winners and losers, 
will be analyzed in Chapter V. Looking at the transformations in 
the productive structure, the new tendencies for Spain’s and 
Argentina’s international specialisation will be indicated. As 
has been pointed out throughout these pages, it is an error to 
analyze these countries in terms of the interventionism- 
liberalism binomy.
The ethos of western policy makers after the 1970s recession 
has been increasingly liberal, and given global interdependence 
has been extended to the majority of countries. However, the 
world economy is very far from advancing towards liberalism. The 
strengthening of the CAP in the EC, the increased use of NTBs, 
the patents system, the proliferation of Multifibre Agreements 
during the 1980s, the protection of the developed countries 
against LDC textile production... these are some of the examples 
of the scant success of the principles of liberalisation, non­
discrimination and multilateralism advocated by GATT. The 1970s 
crisis brought with it an attempt to reduce the scope of state 
activity in the economy, privatising the most inefficient 
companies, subcontracting to private firms and reducing excess 
regulation when they impeded international trade. But in most 
countries liberalisation has meant the removal of protectionism 
from some sectors to promote others; the only sectors that have 
been abandoned to the fate of market forces have been those that 
for one reason or another were considered not to be of national 
interest by their governments. The result is that the debate on
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interventionism vs. liberalism has to be treated with care, since 
it can obscure more than it clarifies. In peripheral countries 
like Spain and Argentina* economies that in the 1960s and 1970s 
were examples of Keynesianism in accordance with the rest of the 
western countries, liberalisation and modernisation have been 
political tools to take protection away from some sectors in 
favour of others.
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CHAPTER III: THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN ARGENTINA
This chapter will focus on Argentine economic policy-making. 
It will, concentrate on domestic developments that should be 
understood in the context of the world economy as discussed in 
chapter two. It is not the intention of this chapter to separate 
internal from external factors, nor to adopt a liberal or 
dependentista perspective. Following the international 
macroeconomic setting analyzed in the previous chapter, special 
attention will be given here to domestic institutional factors 
that conditioned policy outcomes. For this discussion, it will 
be necessary to first provide a brief review of the features of 
the Argentine model of growth. The next sub-section deals with 
the subsequent corrections of ISI policies. This presupposed the 
alteration not only of the economic structure but also of the 
political system. The chapter will show that the "liberal” 
economic policy by the 1976-82 military regime prompted political 
change. A badly implemented liberalisation programme provoked 
political crisis, ending with the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, 
the nationalisation of external private debt and the military 
themselves abandoning government. Precisely, this analysis will 
look at the interaction between politics and economics in order 
to appreciate the shifts in the model of accumulation. The next 
section will consider the evolution of macroeconomic policy under 
the democratic regimes of Alfonsin (1983-89) and Menem (1989- ). 
It analyzes attempts to control macroeconomic variables and the 
structural changes resulted from initial liberalisation and 
subsequent de-regulating impulses. However, it is too early to 
determine whether a new model of accumulation has emerged. If the 
1930s crisis created ISI and corporatism, the 1980s crisis is 
generating a new system that is not yet fully evident. This topic 
will be further analyzed in chapter V.
III.l. THE ARGENTINE ACCUMULATION MODEL, 1945-82
As seen in chapter I*, Argentina’s successful agro-exporter 
model created some conditions for industrialisation. It generated 
an internal market whose demand was initially satisfied by 
importing goods. However, the two World Wars plus the thirties 
depression reduced the volume of international trade, and allowed 
the emergence of some local manufacturing. Faced with this 
situation, the government had two alternatives: either to wait 
for the recuperation of international markets or to try a new 
pattern of development. Although the state represented agrarian 
interests, it started supporting secondary and tertiary 
activities after 1930 as an emergency measure . After the 1943 
coup, these activities were encouraged through programs of 
deliberate import substituting industrialisation (ISI). An 
associated enlargement of the state caused strong opposition 
among the agricultural elites. However, growth in the role and 
size of the state was politically feasible due to the support of 
both entrepreneurs and workers . Thus, Argentina developed a new 
social order, in accordance to the world trend of promoting 
welfare through Keynesian policies.
A model of accumulation based politically on co-optive
*See section 1.4.
2
The most relevant one being F.Pinedo*s keynesian style project, the 
"Programme for the reactivation of the National Economy" of 1940. The Plan 
Pinedo was based on the idea that the state should purchase those agricultural 
surpluses that could not be sold in the international market. Pinedo*s team 
knew that this would not be enough to reactivate the economy, so an extensive 
program of public expenditure was also started, mainly for housing. In 
parallel, the role of the Central Bank was changed in a way that it could 
provide easier medium and long term credit to help stablished developing 
industries. However, few of Pinedo*s policies were implemented, given the 
primacy of agroexporter interests.
^See Bergquist, 1987.
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social pacts and economically on the taxation of agricultural 
surpluses* was consolidated under colonel (later general) Peron 
during the latter part of the 1943-46 period of military rule and 
more particularly after his victory in the 1946 elections. This 
model also supposed the creation of a nationalistic civil- 
military order based on an expansive economic policy. In this 
way, Argentine society evolved as a constellation of conflictive 
sectors grouped around the state. These groups organised their 
interests in corporations which were coordinated by the 
government. Major economic "guilds” were (and are): SRA
(Argentine Rural Society), UIA (Argentine Industrial Union), CGT 
(General Workers * Confederation), ADEBA (Association of Argentine 
Bank Businesses), CAC (Confederation of Argentine Commerce) and 
CACON (Cofederation of Argentine Construction). Distribution 
conflicts amongst these sectors, without the moderating element 
of the international economy, created sharp alterations in 
prices, persistent inflation and sceptical social behaviour 
based in the short-run decision making.
After 1951/52, when the country had the first balance of 
payments crisis since the promotion of ISI, the model led to 
periodical crisis after which short-term stabilisation plans were 
required. This appears to be the main reason why Argentina had 
so many changes in government. After an economic expansive stage, 
a new administration would follow with restrictive policies. 
Usually, the new government would be constituted by some group 
of the military less committed to all embracing social alliances 
(i.e., including the strong Peronist trade unions). However, 
although there are many ideological differences in the fourteen
*See the classical study of Smith, 1968: Politics and beef in the 
Argentine.
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administrations that have held power since 1945, there has been 
much common ground, notably a general commitment to ISI. The 
system may not have been very efficient, but it succeeded in 
creating a growth in national industries, an enlarged market and 
more extensive welfare provision. Nevertheless, efficiency was 
not Peron’s goal nor many of his successors: Argentina’s inward- 
looking industrialisation was institutionalised by the military 
and thus nationalistic values conditioned development (i.e. 
promotion of steel, atomic energy, etc). The model worked in 
cycles of expansion and contraction -the so-called economy of 
stop-go. One of the central problems this created, the fiscal 
deficit, was only corrected but never solved. Since the state was 
at the core of Argentine development, fiscal resources lagged 
behind expenditures and governments were compelled to 
increasingly make use of borrowing and inflation taxation.
Ill.1.A. THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Over several decades, the Argentine economy developed thanks 
to state intervention. This was done through subsidies to both 
industry and consumption, i.e. income distribution measures. The 
public sector expanded notably during Peron’s presidencies (1946- 
52, 1952-55). This expansion was financed from reserves
accumulated during the Second World War (especially during the 
early years of his first presidency), revenues from the social 
security system and the consumption of public capital. One of the 
instruments for this policy was state banks (Banco Industrial and 
Banco Hipotecario, which supplied more than 50% credits absorbed 
by manufacturing and house building). In 1951/52 the state 
encountered its first external crisis and an important fiscal 
deficit. This was to become a constant in Argentine economic 
history. After 1952, governments had to obtain funds either from
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borrowing or issuing paper money -the so-called inflation tax 
(1952, 1959-61, 1971-onwards); the levels of inflation and/or 
debt depended largely on the extent to which an administration 
was prepared to pursue expansionary policies.
The Argentine tax system is legally sophisticated but 
operationally ineffective. This lack of congruence results mainly 
from the country’s high rates of inflation (therefore consequent 
collection lags) and the quantity of tax incentives and 
exemptions. In the last twenty years, tax collection covered only 
56,6% of public sector expenditure. The most effective reform was 
implemented in 1979-80 when Martinez de Hoz headed the Ministry 
of the Economy, and the collection coefficient reached 75% of 
public sector expenditure. However, after 1980 this proportion 
declined again. Table III.2 shows the structure of the Argentine 
tax system from 1970-82. Income and capital gains taxes are 
relatively unimportant and most revenues come from social
5
security and consumer taxes, mainly VAT . This bias in the 
system towards indirect taxation is worsened by the fact that the 
tax evasion rate was calculated at around 50-90% (depending on 
the years and sources). Taxpayers behaviour seems to be 
influenced by an expectation of periodical blanqueos (tax 
amnesties) that were applied by most new governments on assuming
e
power. Thus, it appears that Argentina economic development 
fully justifies increasing direct taxation.
With respect to public expenditure, table III.l shows the
c
The general rate of VAT was 20% until 1983 after which it was reduced 
to 18% by decree n.2,555.
g
Even when blanqueos were not given, the tendency to levy interest 
charges on tax debt below the market interest rate still made tax evasion 
profitable.
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important expansion in the period 1970-83. The state increased
its role into the economy as a way of encouraging economic
7
activity. This was achieved by subsidising prices to industry ,
8 9actively promoting particular industrial sectors or provinces ,
generating domestic demand*® through housing development
11 12 programs , the extension of social security benefits and by
the expansion of state employment. By 1975, this had created an
inflationary boom and short-run external debt. In terms of
percentage, the main items of this expansion in public
expenditure were: allocations to provincial administrations
(49%), grants to public enterprises (26.4%), national
administration expenditure (20.2%) and social security
(4.2%)13.
The Argentine fiscal deficit has been a constant feature of 
the political economy since the 1950s. However, to evaluate 
fiscal policy only from the viewpoint of its deficits would be 
an oversimplication. Before the 1982 debt crisis, the Argentine 
state had overall deficits, but still accomplished many 
objectives: it met social needs, stimulated employment, developed
7
i.e. energy charges by law 17,597/67, and distribution costs through 
the creation of the National Fund for Transport Infrastructure (FONIT) in 
1972.
8Law n. 14,781.
®Law n.19,640.
*®The "buy national" law n.18,875/71.
**The creation of the Housing National Fund (FONAVI) in 1972 by law 
n.19,929.
12Law n.18,610/67.
13Ministerio de Economia BA, 1989.
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T A B L 2  I I I . 1 . 2
ARGENTINIAN PUBLIC SECTOR
FINANCING AS EERCENTAGE
OE ONE , 19*70 —Se , SELECTED YEARS.
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Resources 23.3 15.8 27.8 25.5 23.4 23.6 22.8 27.9 28.1
* Tax 19.4 13.6 23.3 20.4 18.7 18.7 18.1 22.0 22.9
Others 3.9 2.2 4.5 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.7 5.9 5.2
Expenditure 25.1 31.2 35.3 38.9 38.5 40.4 35.6 33.8 31.7
Fiscal
Deficit 1.8 15.4 7.5 13.4 15.1 16.8 12.8 5.9 3.6
Way of financing deficit:
* Borrowing 0.9 1.8 3.4 8.3 6.4 -1.5 -1.1 0.6 2.9
* BCRA (*) 0.9 9.8 3.5 5.1 4.8 15.4 5.8 2.3 ---
* Others *1 3.8 0.6 0.1 3.9 2.9 8.1 3.0 0.7
(*) Central Bank issuing paper money ("inflationary tax")
Source: Presupuesto General de la Administracion Nacional, 1987.
industry, promoted welfare and redistributed income.^ Although 
fiscal deficits were a source of macroeconomic instability, it 
does not imply that a fiscal balance would have been the optimal 
solution. The system worked in its own way, meeting short-term 
solutions to imbalances. However, when the state took on the 
responsibility of the external debt by nationalising it, the 
mechanism no longer functioned effectively. It was as if the 
state became a bankrupt company that could not meet its 
obligations. Table III.3 shows the resultant reduction in public 
investment in the 1980s compared to the 1970s. The most affected 
sectors were industry (100% reduction from the 1971-75 level), 
social security (93.5% reduction), defense (79.6% reduction), 
administrative services (52.4% reduction) and transport (45.6% 
reduction from the 1971-75 level).
On the other hand, table III.l also shows the evolution of
^See Mesa-Lago, 1977.
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TABLE 111.3 5
E V O L U T I O N  O F  A R G E N T I N I A N  I? U 13 L I
I N V E S T M E N T  Z T O T A L  A N D  E O O N O M I
S E C T O R S , 1 9 7 6 - 8 5 ,  E A S E  1 0 0  =  M E A
1 9 7 1 / 7 5 .
3 . 1 .  E C O N O M I C  S E C T O R S Z
YEAR TOTAL ECONOMIC SECTORS
TOTAL ENERGY TRNSPT. TELEC. INDUST. AGRIC.OTHERS
1976 125.4 123.1 143.8 122.3 43.8 122.3 88.2 36.7
1977 141.2 133.8 155.8 120.6 125.1 111.6 117.6 41.3
1978 132.6 121.5 153.5 106.4 115.6 45.1 117.6 45.9
1979 120.2 108.6 126.5 102.2 146.9 45.1 117.6 36.7
1980 111.2 108.2 127.1 82.9 203.1 53.6 58.8 36.7
1981 101.2 95.5 120.8 71.2 184.4 6.4 58.8 32.1
1982 98.4 102.2 141.6 70.4 143.8 2.1 58.8 27.5
1983 91.5 93.7 127.1 62.8 143.8 2.1 29.4 50.5
1984 76.3 87.7 111.9 85.4 90.6 0.1 29.4 41.3
1985 68.4 78.4 111.5 54.4 71.9 0.0 88.2 41.3
3 . 2 .  S O C I A L  A N D O T H E R  S E C T O R S
YEAR SOCIAL SECTORS OTHER SECTORS
TOTAL HEALTH EDUC. SOC.SEC. TOTAL ADMINIST. DEFENSE
1976 98.6 300.1 80.1 77.9 165.6 35.7 185.9
1977 109.3 250.1 100.1 116.9 223.5 95.2 243.5
1978 111.1 350.1 113.3 90.9 231.5 119.1 249.1
1979 77.1 250.1 113.3 19.5 242.8 142.9 258.4
1980 78.9 300.2 106.7 19.5 162.4 107.1 171.1
1981 53.8 250.1 106.7 13.0 184.9 95.2 198.9
1982 39.4 100.2 86.7 6.5 123.8 83.3 130.1
1983 48.8 150.1 106.7 13.1 114.1 107.1 115.2
1984 30.5 100.0 73.3 0.0 35.4 83.3 27.9
1985 37.6 100.0 93.3 6.5 24.1 47.6 20.4
Source: Informe sobre la Inversion Publica Nacional, 1986.
Contaduria General de la Nacion, en Carciofi, 1990.
so
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the fiscal deficit. In 1980 it was 7.5% of GNP, relatively low 
compared to 1975 figure (15.4% of GNP). Although fiscal 
expenditure increased in the period under Martinez de Hoz, fiscal 
resources also grew thereby making it easier to manage the fiscal 
deficit. However, in 1981 and especially in 1982-83, the fiscal 
deficit expanded greatly (16.8% of GNP in 1983), because previous 
policy commitments, the Falklands/Malvinas war and the transition 
to democracy. When borrowing became negative in 1983, the only 
alternative was to make use of the inflation taxation. The 
Alfonsin government was left at a crossroads, where the 
management of inflation had become a political promise of the 
democratic government, and needed to be corrected. However, there 
were no other means to finance the state. The only solution was 
to cut state expenditure. Under Menem*s presidency, the public 
deficit was reduced to 5.1% of GNP in 1990 and has been 
calculated at 2.17% for 1991 and 0.17% of GNP for 1992,** this 
is, the lowest deficit since 1970. The paradox of the Argentine 
political transition has been that democratic governments had 
have to effect reforms based on the most regressive income 
distributional measures of the last decades and to cease making 
transfers that promote economic and social equity.
III.l.B. THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Going back to the 1940s, the key to Peron’s new economic
\
strategy was the development of an industrial sector and a 
parallel welfare system. Domestic industry was encouraged not 
only for the supply of goods it could provide, but also by its
15UN CEPAL estimations, 1992. Estimations coming from pro-Menemist 
research centres increase even more the reduction of the Argentine public 
deficit, -1.8 million of Oct.1992 pesos in 1990 (this is, 1.8 million pesos 
surplus), -1.6% million peso in 1991 and -2,8 million pesos in 1992 (CEI, 
1993:46).
91
capacity to distribute income and to create national demand. In
this way, an expanded industrial urban sector absorbed 72% of the
economically active population by 1947, leaving unemployment at
only 2.8%. In 1980, non-agricultural activities occupied 85% of
16the work force. Per contra, protected Argentine industries 
were not internationally competitive. Their development depended 
on the extension of the domestic market. Even in the case of 
progressive income distribution policies aimed at increasing 
demand, the national population is/was relatively low: in 1950, 
15 million, in 1980, 27 million -see table 1.1. This defines one 
of the main characteristics and constraints of Argentine 
industry: its small-medium scale given the small size of the
domestic market.
Moreover, the industrial sector faced other problems. On the 
one hand, while part of the industrial expansion strategy 1945-75 
was executed in order to create an internal market, there seldom 
was an excess labour supply. Thus, entrepreneurs did not 
accumulate on the basis of low labour costs but rather on 
subsidised credits and loans. Since inflation became a chronic 
phenomenon in Argentina after 1943, real interest rates became 
negative and fixed by the state. Without them, there would have 
been insufficient investment. On the other hand, the industrial 
sector was unable to export and thus, unable to obtain foreign 
exchange. Yet it still required technology, capital goods and 
various inputs which had to be imported. Moreover, in view of the 
scale of industry, these technological imports may not have been 
totally appropriate since they were created for large-scale 
industries.
^Palomino, 1987:36.
Prices did not reflect these structural inefficiencies.
Prices were fixed within the logic of domestic oligopolistic
markets, adding an entrepreneurial profit rate to costs. Both
wages and profits were subject to collective bargaining,
17supervised by the state . This system of social pacts created 
the paradox that both profits and wages did not depend on market 
performance but instead on bargaining power.
It is important to note that the "logic of industrial 
investment" is very different from that of developed market 
economies. The environment is highly unstable, and entrepreneurs 
are even less able to predict or control the evolution of 
relative prices, the balance of payments situation and 
inflation. This high risk could only be compensated by state 
subsidies and fiscal relief. This can only be provided by a 
strong state able to supply such resources. It will be argued 
that this is why the system came to an end when the government 
nationalised external debt in the 1980s and the fiscal deficit 
became even less manageable.
III.l.C. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Compared to the protected industrial sector, the main 
benefits for the agricultural sector came from exports. The 
agricultural sector supplied not only the domestic market but 
also international demand. That is, until the 1980s, it was the 
main source of foreign currency to the country -along with 
external borrowing, FDI and private remittances. This 
demonstrates one of the particularities of the Argentine economy: 
it fully depends on the success of the primary sector. From the
^Cavazzoni et al, 1984:15-25.
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agro-export sector, the state got not only foreign currency but 
also a constant supply of tax resources to finance industrial 
development. Further, another way of transferring capital from 
rural to industrial activities was the use of relative prices. 
The state would retard the exchange rate in relation to the 
inflationary increases of both wages and industrial prices. This 
would affect not only agricultural exports but also the balance 
of payments, which required periodic short-term stabilisation 
plans to correct their resultant imbalances.
Agricultural prices are mainly determined by the price of 
primary commodities on the world market: Argentine producers are 
price-takers. As described in chapter II, this is why a reduction 
in the world price of primary products would seriously affect 
state policies. This is not only related to taxable benefits but 
also to wages. In 1960, 60% of family income was spent on food 
and beverages; in 1974, 46.3% and in 1988, 40.1%*®. Although
these figures show the reduction as it relates to family 
expenditure on food, it should be noted that these national 
averages do not reflect social differences, so the percentage for 
working-class families would be much higher. Thus, a rise in 
primary prices causes a fall in non-food real income and 
therefore a fall of domestic demand for industrial products.
Up until the mid-1960s, the agricultural sector had a fixed 
supply. Economic cycles were not only linked to world prices but 
also to climatic changes. This was due to an unhelpful state 
policy for rural development. Making comparisons with Australia 
and Canada, Argentine land-owners rarely introduced fertilisers,
18INDEC, 1989, on Gutman & Gatto, 1990:18.
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machinery or any other technologies. This was a result, firstly,
of heavy taxation in Argentina, while Australian agriculturers
were getting subsidies to improve productivity as part of the
Commonwealth policy of international specialisation. Secondly,
the concentrated structure of land-ownership in Argentina seems
to have reduced entrepreneurial incentives since annual family
19profits were secured . In fact, the quantity of meat and corn 
exports was determined by the surplus above domestic market 
demand. Rural entrepreneurs did not plan trade strategies: the
simply exported whatever was not consumed nationally.
III.l.D. THE DYNAMICS OF STOP-GO
Based on a simplified two-sector model of the Argentine
economy, several economists have pointed out another
characteristic of the system: it functions on short-term cycles
20of expansion and contraction . Looking at the evolution of 
Argentina’s rate of growth, its cyclical pattern allowed social 
scientists to talk about the dynamics of "stop-go".
Until the mid-1970s, the dynamics of the system were the 
following. In an expansive stage, there was a fast development 
of industrial activities which increasingly demanded more and
19For a comparative perspective of institutional factors between 
agroexporter countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada), see Fogarty, 1985.
20Braun and Joy, 1968: "A model of economic stagnation. A case study of 
the Argentine economy" in The Economic Journal. n.312; Canitrot, 1981: "Teoria 
y practica del liberalismo: Politica antiinflacionaria y apertura economica 
en la Argentina 1976-81" in Desarrollo Economico. n.83, vol.21, Buenos Aires, 
IDES; Diaz-Alejandro, 1963: "A note on the impact of devaluation and
distribution effect" in Journal Political: Sidrauski, 1968: "Devaluacion, 
inflacion y desempleo" en Economica, vol.XI, La Plata; Thorp and Eshag, 1965: 
"Economic and social consequences of ortodox economic policies in Argentina 
in the post-war years" in Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 27, n.l. For a good critical review of these papers, see Katz 
and Kosacoff, 1989: El proceso de industrializacion en la Argentina:
evolucion. retroceso y prospectiva. Buenos Aires, CEPAL.
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more imports, until there was a balance of payments deficit, as 
the costs of technology imports became higher than the foreign 
currency reserves and earning provided by primary exports. In 
parallel, this growth of urban industrial activity generated an 
increase in employment and real wages. The positive effects of 
boosting demand had negative aspects as well. This results from 
the fact that, up to a point, demand boosting led to an increase 
in the consumption of primary products, followed by a reduction 
in agricultural exports. This would reduce the quantity of 
foreign exchange available and worsen problems in the balance of 
payments.
At this point, the recommended measure was a devaluation of 
the peso. Theoretically, a devaluation would modify the relative 
prices of both imports and exports, which would automatically 
correct deficits of the balance of payments. A Classical analysis 
would also point out that a devaluation would increase the 
competitiveness of exports, which would have an expansive effect 
within the domestic economy. However, theory and reality are 
often mismatched. The particularities of the Argentine system 
meant that devaluations generated a fall in economic activity,
and an increase in inflation and unemployment. This is what Diaz-
21Alejandro and others started analyzing by the mid-1960s. A 
devaluation promoted a relative fall in agricultural prices. 
However, this would not automatically produce an increase of 
exports since output only responded sluggishly to price signals. 
Only a reduction in the levels of domestic demand could 
facilitate a quantum growth in exports. On the other hand, 
industrial prices should fall, but in reality, did not; what did
^See footnote 20,
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fall was industrial output. Entrepreneurs adjusted through 
production volume and not through prices. Instead of responding 
to the reduction of demand by cheapening products, what factories 
reduced was their output. Moreover, prices had a tendency to rise 
since imports were more expensive. This is the main cause of the 
so-called "structural inflation". The contraction of industrial 
activity increased unemployment. Further, it promoted a 
regressive distribution of income; as domestic prices increased, 
nominal wages were stable but wages in real terms fell.
Whether the consequences of devaluation were or were not
fully understood at the time, the fact was that devaluations
solved problems in the balance of payments. On the one hand, the
drop in productive output reduced the demand for imports. On the
other hand, the contraction of real wages reduced domestic demand
and thus increased agricultural exports. Then, a new expansive
22cycle could be initiated.
III.I.E. CORRECTIONS OF ISI
This is how economists saw the Argentine economy by the 
1960s. The question that arose was how to solve these structural 
imbalances. There were several answers and all of them were 
applied at different times between 1960-80. The first solution 
was to expand the supply of agricultural products by increasing 
productivity and thus generating more exports. The second 
solution was to modify industry. This was done by encouraging 
increased competitiveness and the promotion of manufactured 
exports through new state subsidies and industrial deepening, 
namely, domestic production of basic goods and technology so as
22Katz & Kosacoff, 1989:45-66.
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to lessen the need to import. The third solution was a totally 
different alternative: to reduce state intervention and to
specialise internationally in primary commodities; that is, to 
abandon previous policies and to welcome liberalism. It is very 
interesting to note that all political parties agreed on the 
first two solutions, regardless their ideologies. Peronists, 
Radicals and military administrations in power during the late 
1960s-early 70s supported economic programmes to implement such 
policies. The third solution was one which caused conflict. It 
was only supported by some neo-liberal sections of the military, 
and was finally but irregularly implemented under dictatorship 
of 1976-82.
The static supply of agricultural products was modified
during the 1960s-70s. All parties became aware of the slow
erosion of the Argentine natural competitive advantage in
agriculture, and the importance of changing supply and efficiency
via technological innovation. Governments encouraged substantial
structural changes. The creation of the INTA in 1957 and of 
24the CREAs promoted the introduction of genetic,
biotechnological, mechanical and chemical improvements for
primary production. On the other hand, the state granted rural
credits for the use of these technologies and to promote exports.
Governments also encouraged the extension of the mix of
agricultural products. New agroindustries were created and the
25use of new marketing techniques were encouraged . An increase
23National institute of Agro-fisheries Technology (Instituto Nacional 
de Tecnologia Agropeacuaria).
24Rural Councils of Experimental Agriculture (Consorcios Rurales de 
Experimentacion Agricola).
^Gutman & Gatto, 1990:45-46; Nun, 1987:94.
in productivity was soon achieved and thus supply became more 
flexible. However, exports did not increase at the desired level 
given international factors, analyzed in chapter II.
The deepening of ISI was also promoted by all political 
parties. What became clear however was the fact that while ISI 
policies had led to a more extensive industrial network, they 
still had left some empty holes. These gaps were mainly capital 
goods and basic industrial inputs, which had to be imported and 
thus generated a pressure on foreign currency reserves. In 1958, 
under Frondizi’s administration, the law 14,781 on industrial 
promotion replaced the previous decree 14,630 of 1944. This legal 
framework articulated the exploitation of Argentina’s natural 
resources and the equilibrium of the balance of payments through 
the self provision of industrial inputs such as steel, paper and 
petrochemicals. This law was adjusted several times up until the 
end of the 1980s, expanding its action to increase the 
competitiveness of particular industrial sectors and to promote 
preferential regions and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), but 
overall it kept its original sense of developing an Argentine 
basic industry. This will be further analyzed in chapter V.
III.2. THE MILITARY (1976-82): LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ORDER.
Until a further initiative was attempted in 1986, Perdn’s 
death in 1974 was taken as marking the failure of the last social 
pact. From 1955 to 1972, nine different governments repressed 
Peronism, although corporatism was structuring the Argentine 
society. Finally, Peron was allowed to return from his exile in 
Spain and take government again. He came back with a political 
project inspired on the ideas of social democracy. He tried to 
build a structured party from the Peronist movement, and to
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cooperate with other political parties. As the new president, he 
also tried a social pact to restore economic order. However, the 
reality he found in Argentina was very different from the one he 
left in. 1955. In 1945 Peron had a relatively weak and split 
labour movement, which he converted into a monolithic
organisation loyal to his government. In 1973, the CGT was a very 
strong and powerful trade union, accustomed to leading opposition 
to government policies. On the other hand, entrepreneurs were not 
especially committed to Peron, given that most previous
administrations had favoured their interests. Although the social 
pact was signed, it soon disintegrated. Twenty days before his 
death, Peron threatened to resign from the presidency if social 
actors were not able to control their corporatist attitudes and 
try to commit themselves to some common agreement.
However, most social groups did not trust Per6n*s
government. Political parties were not capable of mediating
between social groups. There was an erosion of democratic 
politics. Congress was marginalised. Terrorism increased. This
contributed to the problem of governability manifest by the
26early-1970s . The most important aspect of the crisis, though, 
came in the economic field. In 1975 prices were rising at an 
annual rate of 700%, the balance of payments was in deficit, 
productivity had fallen, lock-outs and strikes had risen and 
capital flight had increased. Peron*s government was condemned, 
and many social sectors called for the return of the military.
26From the 1960s several terrorist groups started oppossing to 
government’s policies. The ideology of these revolutionary armed groups was 
either catholic or marxist. The most important of them was the so-called 
Montoneros, linked to the left side of the Peronist Youth. Peron himself used 
this group from exile as a political tool to desestabilise military 
governments. However, these groups were incompatible with Peron*s 
socialdemocratic administration, and they kept acting on their own. See 
Poneman, 1987; Rock, 1987.
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Trade unions were disorientated in view of some business
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strategies . In short, there was a general loss of confidence 
in existing institutions and policies.
Once in power, the military felt that the problem was deeper 
than the question of uncontrolled political freedom. The core of 
the matter was the whole Argentine economic and social system, 
based as it was on the primacy of an inefficient industrial 
sector and a general dependence of different social groups on the 
state. The military were particularly concerned about the power 
of trade unions. If the legacy of Peronist corporatism was 
structural imbalance, the most efficient way to eradicate an 
unsustainable social order was to introduce liberal measures. 
Many denunciations have been made of the violent political 
repression carried out during the following years. State 
terrorism has been itemised in the shocking pages of the Sabato's 
Report Nunca Mas (Never more). Labour officials and rank and file 
members constituted between one half and a third of the 
disappeared. Military "red-phobia" and its bloody repression of 
anyone and anything considered radical cannot be forgotten when 
a balance of the 1976-82 period is attempted. However, the most
effective dismantling of labour’s power was achieved through
28freeing market forces . Liberalism promised an ordered, 
efficient, self-regulated and non-conflictive future in place of 
acute economic and political crisis. This is how the Armed Forces
27There is evidence, for instance, of businessmen offering higher wages 
than the increase demanded by trade unions, with the intention of speeding up 
inflationary processes and thus a change in government (Canitrot, 1983:20).
28This supposedly anti-ideological background of liberalism is one of 
the most stressed points of Argentine Sociologist and Political Scientist, as 
reflected in the interviews to Cavarozzi (MIT), Iturrieta (AIETI), Rusell 
(FLACSO) and Schvartzer (CISEA).
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embraced liberalism. Liberalism was to become the new right-wing 
ideology, eclipsing traditional paternalism and nationalistic, 
autarkic ambitions. At the time, liberalism did not have a 
political representation in Argentina. However, as a philosophy 
it increasingly commanded the attention of centre/right 
intellectuals, the press, businessmen, the military and even some 
industrialists. The relationship between nationalism and
social/economic ideology in the Argentine spectrum may be
represented as follows:
LEFT CENTRE RIGHT
NATIONALISTIC Montoneros Developmentalism 
(Frondizi’s type)
TraditionalRight
Peronism
NON-NATIONAL. — Radicals New Liberal Right
This new liberal right has a parallel in Spain’s Opus Dei. 
How the Armed Forces, or a faction of them, changed their 
nationalistic ideology, is an interesting point. The main key 
seems to be the anti-corporatist effect of monetarist policies. 
There are, however, other factors. The Cold War redefined 
nationalistic conceptions. The East-West conflict led the 
Argentine military to stablish close links with the USA. The 
relationship was further encouraged by the doctrine of National 
Security, which considers that national internal conflicts are 
or can be a result of world conflicts -that is, communism. In
this project, obtaining new and efficient military technology
29from the USA was a priority .
^Peralta-Ramos, 1987:47; Schvarzer, 1986:243.
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In the period 1976-83, the military were split into three
main factions: (a) The faction led by Admiral Massera which
proposed the creation of a nationalistic atmosphere to regain
"national cooperation" through armed conflicts such as the
Falklands/Malvinas or Beagle Channel; (b) Generals Sudrez-Mas6n
and Menendez who proposed old-style repression of Peronist
unions; (c) Generals Videla and Viola, the faction which took
power, were the least nationalistic, and wanted to promote
economic change and recovery through liberal measures^.
However, all of them retained some interventionist attitudes.
Their conception of the state was not precisely one of having a
small, subsidiary role into the economy. Martinez de Hoz,
appointed minister of economy, adopted what he called "a
pragmatic point of view". That is, to allow the military to
expand public expenditure for their activities, even when he was
trying to reduce the fiscal deficit. Although Martinez de Hoz was
dexterous in handling the military, it has to be said in his
defense that they were often an obstacle to the implementation
of some of his policies. In other fields, the military totally
backed the minister. The military had an unclear view of their
role. They defined their government as transitory, and their
mission to stabilise the country in order to return power to a
democratic government. Once they had performed violent political
repression during the first months, their role was simply to back
all of the economic reforms. Thus, Martinez de Hoz’s economic
program was turned into a political program. The military
31supported him for almost five years . This time span is unique
30Rock, 1987: 369-370.
31From 1945 until 1982, only two ministers had half of this time to 
implement their programmes. These were A.Gomez Morales (33 months, 1952-55) 
and A.Krieger Vasena (29 months, 1967-69). In the last 30 years, Argentina 
had 36 ministers of economy, and the rest of the administrations never reached
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in post-Second World War Argentine history, and in an unstable 
country evidences the power of the regime and the support that 
it enjoyed from some sectors.
III.2.A. MARTINEZ DE HOZ* COMMERCIAL POLICIES
Martinez de Hoz made a similar diagnosis of the Argentine 
economy as had his predecessors. The novelty of his philosophy 
was a monetarist approach to the balance of payments, the 
reduction of role of the state in the economy, and the scant 
regard given to aspects such as employment, technology or the 
existence of monopolistic markets.
Martinez de Hoz’s commercial policy was based on a program 
of tariff reduction. The paradox came in that, although his ethos 
was liberal, state intervention was not reduced in the field of 
industrial promotion. In fact, industrial promotion increased in 
the area of intermediate goods. This sector was the one promoted 
after the 1960s with the "deepening" of ISI, and it kept and 
improved its level of governmental support. However, subsidies 
in the area of consumer goods were cut, given that the state was 
developing an anti-inflationary policy.
On the other hand, trade policy involved the equalisation
of all import tariffs and a general 40% reduction in their
32level . The government also had in mind the abolition of non­
tariff barriers (NTB). This will be further analyzed in chapter 
V. For the moment, what needs to be stressed is that the effects 
on the Argentine industrial structure were very significant.
more than 24 months on power (Schvarzer, 1986:19).
^From 93.7% in 1976 to 52.7% in 1977. See Lucangelli, 1989:43-46.
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During the initial phase of the reform program (1976-78), most 
domestic producers were only mildly affected by import 
competition due to significant redundancy in the tariff system. 
However, a second set of measures introduced in late 1979 
increased firms exposure, and badly affected SMEs. Larger firms, 
particularly holdings and conglomerates, were financially more 
flexible, had easier access to credit and had more market power,
thus facilitating their survival. This started a process of
33industrial concentration . Overall, all surviving industrial 
sectors gained in efficiency; however, the consequences of 
concentration in industrial output and income distribution were
regressive. Industrial output per capita fell from 1,058 US$ in
341975 to 764 US$ in 1982 . However, deeper examination shows 
that more than de-industrialisation was occurring. The process 
was one of industrial re-structuring: the surviving sectors
changed the pattern of Argentine economic development.
III.2.B. THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
The second pillar of Martinez de Hoz’s liberal policy was 
financial reform. The law 21,526 stated that the Central Bank
9 r
(BCRA ) would no longer control interest rates. They would be
free and fixed by each bank. The idea underlying this reform was
that national banks would match international rates. This policy,
together with the belief that domestic prices would match world
prices thanks to trade opening, was implemented as an anti-
36inflationary measure .
33Katz & Kosacoff, 1989:63-64.
34UN Statistics, in 1985 US$
3^ Banco Central de la Republica Argentina. 
3®Palacio-Deheza, 1981:82-84,148-168.
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The second reason for this financial reform was to stop the 
state from transferring capital to industry, leaving this role 
to market forces through financial institutions. The 
misconception in this reasoning was the expectation that banks 
would even finance industry, particularly in an inflationary 
environment and under an open trade regime. Argentine financial 
institutions were too accustomed to working in the short-term 
rather than investing in the dubious future competitiveness of 
national industry. Playing with the exchange rate, speculation 
and retail lending and borrowing, gave much higher returns.
The financial sector had a spectacular expansion (see table 
III.4). This was a result of law 21,526, against financial over­
regulation, which allowed commercial banks to open new branches,
subject only to the requirement of notifying BCRA three months
37in advance. This was modified in 1983 when prior authorization
by the Central Bank before new branches could be opened. However,
38even then the number of branches increased . What was not
predicted by the 1977 reform was that finance was going to become
the most profitable short-term business and thus finance would
take a dominant position in the Argentine economy. This therefore
still left the question of long-term industrial investment to the
state. It was a miscalculation to free the financial market so
rapidly, but the policy was implemented given that it was the
least politically costly liberalising measure -at least when
39compared to trade or labour. However, having an over-expanded 
financial sector in an inflationary economy reinforced short-term
37Law 22,871.
3®Arnaudo & Buraschi, 1987:2-10; Gutierrez, in Casas, 1989:77-81. 
^Peralta Ramos, 1987:47-50.
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tendencies*®.
III.2.C. THE CLOCKWORK ANTI-INFLATIONARY MECHANISM: LA TABLITA
Finally, the last point of Martinez de Hoz’s economic 
program was to control inflation. For this, four different 
policies were implemented, although none achieved their aim. 
Initially, the minister froze wages and liberalised prices (April 
1976-February 1977). From April to July 1977, the government 
tried a price reduction pact with industry and business. The next 
measure was an active monetary policy combined with liberalised 
prices and wages (July 1977-April 1978). Finally, in December 
1978, as the annual rate of inflation was still 150%, the 
government started a new program. The plan was based on a 
devaluation of the real exchange rate combined with a passive 
monetary policy.**
The idea was to foster a convergence of domestic and 
international interest and inflation rates by manipulating the 
exchange rate. This would be done thanks a pre-announced schedule 
of progressive devaluations -the so-called tablita cambiaria 
(table of exchange). The Central Bank was in charge of keeping 
this constant evolution of the exchange rate, in order to allow 
entrepreneurs to make future predictions. The Department of Trade 
became another important instrument of this anti-inflationary 
policy, since it would sanction any economic sector raising its 
prices to compensate for future losses. Combined with the trade 
policy, this was expected to affect internal prices. Eventually,
*®For D’Alessio, one of the key problems of the Argentine is the short­
term mentality as a result of rapid government changes since the 1960s and 
specially since inflationary upheavals (Interview to D*Alessio, Sociology 
Dept., University of Gottingen).
**Dornsbusch & De Pablo, 1989:48-64.
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it was expected that domestic and international prices would be 
matched in "one price". This would lead to a decline in the price 
of imports and a rise in the price of national products, that is, 
a real appreciation, without the negative effects of 
stabilisation, that is, wage reduction.
The whole program was a clockwork mechanism. Any disjuncture 
in the synchronisation of rates of inflation and timetabled 
adjustment to the exchange rate would signal the failure of the 
overall liberalising experiment. Martinez de Hoz was aware of the 
fact that there would be imbalances in the external accounts at 
the beginning, given that the tariff reduction would cause 
imports to increase. However, for the first time in Argentine 
history, the "magic" solution of increased international 
liquidity and negative real interest rates prevailed: external 
debt would level the balance of payments. This is why there was 
the need for a rapid liberalisation of finance, as explained 
above.
The end of the story is well-known: the plan failed. The 
exchange rate was indeed appreciated, but it was not accompanied 
by the expected effects. Inflation only responded gradually, 
declining from 170% in 1978 to 87% in the last quarter of 1980. 
Consequently, the currency became overvalued as rates of 
inflation exceeded the real exchange rate. Indeed, there was a 
huge appreciation of the exchange rate, a large current account 
deficit, important changes in the economic structure and a 
massive external debt. These became constraints for future state
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macroeconomic policy-making.^
Bad timing was the main cause of the failure. Although 
tariff reduction started in 1976, its effects were not seen until 
after September 1978. The reasons for this were various. Firstly, 
the existence of tariff redundancy. Secondly, the so-called 
"privatisation of tariffs", by which a distributing company would 
start importing goods when they were cheaper than national 
products, and fix prices at the same level as those of protected 
domestic products (thereby gaining excess profits) until new 
distributors entered the market and forced prices. Thirdly, there 
was the lobby capability of industrial sectors (i.e. steel, 
motorcars), which pressed on the government to retain NTBs. This 
delay in the effects of tariff reduction meant that domestic 
prices were kept high, and thus inflation did not decrease to the 
expected level. Thus, the tablita mechanism did not work^.
The overvalued rate represented a consumption subsidy for 
imports and for Argentines travelling abroad. Moreover, it was 
a subsidy for anyone transnationalising savings, that is, 
shifting their wealth out of the country. The opening of the 
financial markets allowed easy capital flight. This could have 
been corrected through adequate capital controls, as imposed at 
the time in Brazil, but to control finance would have meant 
abandoning the plan, and so the Martinez de Hoz* team would not
42In a way, it is a paradox that Martinez de Hoz’s liberal plan 
"...according to the Latin American tradition... could be labelled ’populist* 
(increasing real wages, appreciation of the exchange rate, large deficit in 
the current account), but with one serious difference: the way it was
financed, together with capital flight, left behind the burden of external 
debt" (Machinea, 1990:11).
^See World Bank, 1985
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countenance capital controls44. In 1979-80, the Central Bank had 
to borrow large sums of foreign currency from international banks 
in order to cope with the high demand for dollars. An important 
percentage of debt financed imports, luxury consumption, foreign
holidays and external private asset accumulation went abroad.
45
Capital flight is difficult to calculate, but the Central Bank 
estimates a quantity of U$S 21,500 m. in 1982, equal to almost 
half the total external debt at the time (1982, U$S 43,600m). 
There was the circle of debt: Banks in New York, Zurich or Tokyo 
were lending to the Argentine government which was financing 
capital flight which ended as deposits in the same foreign banks.
The evolution of real wages was also unpredicted. It was 
assumed that wages would be determined by the performance of the 
country’s exports. Perhaps this prediction was theoretically 
correct, but it did not apply for Argentina. The opening of trade 
affected some industrial products, especially consumer goods and 
the evolution of real wages for these sectors was from 60 in 1977 
to 71 in 1980 (1970 = 100). However, in the rest of economic
activities real salaries went from 60 in 1977 to 119 in 1980 
(1970=100). These sectors, from industry to services, were less 
affected by the state price policy, and could translate wage 
increases into prices. In other activities, international 
competition forced a reduction in labour costs through 
economising on the number of employees. Industrial employment was 
reduced 26% in the period 1976-80, and productivity increased 
21%. Nevertheless, the military were committed to full employment
44Calcagno, 1988:66-71; see also Thorp & Whitehead, 1987. 
45BCRA, 1984, in Carciofi, 1990:37.
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and industrial workers moved to services and SMEs, improving
46notably their income . This overall increase in real wages was 
another cause of the failure of Martinez de Hoz anti-inflationary 
programme. The lesson from the experience is that it is not 
possible to discipline unions only by the opening of the economy 
in imperfect markets while keeping full employment. The Chilean 
case is an interesting point of comparison since its economic 
liberalisation undermined union power and inflation. This was 
achieved due to a restrictive monetary policy and huge cuts on 
fiscal expenditure. The costs were the dismantling of the 
industrial sector plus 20% open unemployment. This result was not 
unintended by the Chilean government, since it was embarking on 
a new policy of international specialisation. However, the 
Argentine military were not convinced about abandoning the 
inward-looking development strategy. On the contrary, the regime 
wanted to discipline the social behaviour of both unions and 
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, while the policy mix, failed to 
achieve these objectives, Argentine industry was restructured.
Bad timing was not the only cause of the Plan’s failure. 
Throughout the Martinez de Hoz’s period there was a lack of 
fiscal discipline. Notwithstanding the project to liberalise, the 
public sector increased. The military Junta pursued its own 
agenda, buying the major airline -Austral-, the electric company 
-Italo- and several other business. F.M. (Fabricaciones 
Militares) were consuming 21%-30% of the national budget during 
the period. Officially, F.M. produce weaponry, explosives, 
chemicals, steel and electrical conductors, employing more than
40.000 workers. But F.M. also owned shares of mixed companies
46From intrview to Palomino, ClSEA Buenos Aires.
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(private-state owned), especially in the areas of steel and
petrochemicals. In addition, it had interests in companies
producing armchairs, transport equipment, sporting guns and much
else besides. Even Martinez de Hoz could not act against military
monopolies. The minister tried to privatise some marginal state
industries, but few buyers were found and most were just
47dismantled, while others were "emptied" . Around 150 state
companies were closed or sold during the period but overall there
was an increase in state industrial holdings and public
expenditure grew massively (see section on public sector). This
included the financing for the 1978 World Cup, motorways
48connecting Buenos Aires to holiday centres and others . Equally 
wasteful but more tragic was the financing of military technology 
and weaponry for both domestic (war against subversion) and 
international use (1982 Falklands /Malvinas conflict).
Ultimately Martinez de Hoz was forced to resign when the 
first president of the proceso, Videla, completed his term. 
Later, as the military regime began to collapse, General Galtieri 
assumed the presidency. Galtieri belonged to one of the 
nationalistic factions of the Army for whom the promotion of 
national unity became a political priority, even if it called for 
war. In the period March 1981-December 1983, four economy 
ministers took office: Sigaut, Alemann, Dagnino-Pastore and
Wehbe. The overvaluation of the peso (1979-82) had left the 
country in a difficult situation. Their administrations were
47"Emptying companies": In the Argentine "economic slang", was an
speculative action where companies were undervalued; then someone would buy 
them from the state and sell shares. Once those were sold, the company was 
declared bankrupt, so shares did not have to be paid back or, they were 
sometimes supported by the state (Interview to Bisang, UN CEPAL-ECLA).
^See Khavisse et al, 1987.
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handicapped, and their main objective (for the last two
ministers) was to create the necessary conditions for the
transition to democracy. An assessment of their performance is
complicated. They could not reduce inflation, but at least they
did not make the economic situation of the country worse. A
further difficulty, however, was the debt crisis in 1982, which
stopped the influx of loans to Argentina. The government deficit
was difficult to cover, and inflation (given the necessary
devaluation) became endemic. Sigaut and Alemann tried to
stabilise the economy, but their attempt was accompanied by
bankruptcies, declining industrial output, real wage compression
and unemployment. The Malvinas/ Falklands conflict increased the
economic deficit and reduced the international standing of the
country. Dagnino-Pastore and Wehbe tried to reduce debt and
49improve employment, at the cost of massive inflation . This was 
the legacy inherited by the incoming civilian regime in 1983. The 
problems assumed by the Alfonsin government were deep rooted: 
debt, high inflation, unexpectedly high real wages and the 
popular belief that there were good times to come with democracy.
III.3. ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE ALFONSIN PERIOD, 1983-89
Raul Alfonsin took power in December 1983. There were six 
main objectives for his administration: (a) To be in presidency
for the full six-year term and to hand over power to another 
democratically elected president; (b) to reduce the power and 
scope of the military and keep them out of the political arena; 
(c) to brake the link between trade unions and Peronism, this is, 
to "democratise" unions; (d) to restore economic stability; (e)
^Di Telia and Dornbusch, 1989:299-303.
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to "foster freedom" by, amongst other things, reducing the 
influence of the Church; and (f) to restore the international 
image of Argentina. When making a judgement on Alfonsin*s 
government, it should be remembered that there were many 
objectives. The president managed a relative success in terms of 
(a), (b), (e) and (f), but his administration did not restore
economic stability.
III.3.A. GRISPUN (1983-85)
During his political campaign, just like any presidential
candidate, Alfonsin promised solutions to all the country’s
problems, from political instability to inflation. Alfonsin*s
economic program was designed by B.Grispun, a Keynesian who had
been in government during Illias’s presidency (1963-66),
Grispun’s programme was based on controlled wage rises, the
renewal of credits and tax reform to correct fiscal deficits.
Since wage increases were desirable at the beginning of the
democratic transition, Alfonsin kept Grispun as his minister of
Economy and devoted his first year in the presidency to political
matters. Meanwhile, real wages and production increased slightly,
but inflation was higher than 20% per month. By the end of 1984,
during his visit to Washington, Alfonsin was advised by P.Volker
and the economic team of the Federal Reserve to end this
50expansionary policy . Domestic business and union groups were 
not happy with the economic situation either. In February 1985, 
Juan V.Sourrouille replaced B.Grispun.
50Morales, 1991:255
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III.3.B. SOURROILLE*S TECHNOCRATIC TEAM (1985-89)
Sourrouille and his team^ found themselves in need of a 
stabilisation plan but were aware that half of the government was 
against the principle and political consequences of an anti- 
inflationary shock. One of the problems confronting the 
Sourrouille team was a lack of support inside and outside the 
administration. The team was a group of competent technocrats 
viewed as untrustworthy by business groups and trade unions. Part 
of the blame can be credited to Alfonsin*s ideas on citizenship. 
The president wanted to break with the traditional pattern of 
Argentine politics, where "guilds" would appoint ministers to 
defend their corporate interests (SRA>M.Agriculture, 
CGT>M.Labour, the Church>M.Education, etc). Thus, the president 
wanted his cabinet to be formed by independent technocrats, in 
order to avoid the tensions of social bargaining when there was 
a need to implement adjustment. A further difficulty in the 
policy-making process was that half of Alfonsin*s government had 
a similar background to Grispun*s. The Presidential Secretary and 
the Ministries of Public Works, Industry, Agriculture, Internal 
and External Trade were initially in the hands of a group of
r  a
Radicals marked by the influence of E.Blanco and the 
experience of Illia’s presidency.
Sourrouille first idea was to design a "correct" 
stabilisation plan. For this, he considered external approval to 
be vital. Once the plan was sketched out, the minister met 
Volker, Baker and Larrosiere in Washington. All of them, the
51M.Brodersohn, J.L.Machines, R.Elbaum, D.Heymann, among others.
52Eugenio Blanco, keynesian economist at Buenos Aires University, 
minister of the "Freeing revolution" and one of the main executors of the 
Prebisch Plan.
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president of the US Federal Reserve, the Secretary of Treasure 
and the IMF director, respectively, ended up agreeing with the 
programme. This was the heterodox Austral Plan, based on the 
control of income policies (freezing of basic prices: exchange 
rate, wages, industrial prices) combined with a set of monetary 
and fiscal measures. The control of the main macroeconomic 
variables (wages, prices, interest rates and the exchange rate) 
was not enough as to secure the success of adjustment. The 
government agreed to reduce the scale of monetary emissions 
hitherto used to cover fiscal deficits. To compensate, there 
would be tax reform and an increase in public utility tariffs. 
Monetary policy included a reduction of regulated interest rates 
(they were fixed at 4% monthly), a major devaluation and a 
currency change: the austral would replace the peso. Initially, 
the plan worked as expected, and monthly inflation went from 
30,5% in June to 1,9% in October. Industrial output increased 20% 
after a period of turbulent price upheavals. Argentines backed 
Alfonsin*s policies, and the Radicals won the parliamentary 
elections of November 1985. In February 1986, the second stage 
of the Austral Plan was set in motion. Unfortunately, it did not 
succeed.
Globally, the evolution of inflation was positive for the 
plan. Wages and industrial prices had been frozen. However, 
consumer prices continued to increase by 2% to 3% monthly. These 
rises were concentrated in sectors that were difficult to control 
(mostly, services and fresh food). Inflationary expectations was 
one of the main obstacles for stabilisation. Contracts were still 
being done by month, predicting future rises on wages. Sectors 
escaping government control continued indexing, just in case. But 
this "residual inflation" was not the main cause for the Plan’s
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failure. There were three more reasons: the price of cereals in 
the international market) the fiscal deficit and the nonexistence 
of a social pact supporting the program.
As explained in chapter II, international prices of primary
53products fell 35% on average in 1986 and the Argentine terms
of trade worsened by 20%. Although this was unrelated to the
Austral Plan, the agricultural associations -SRA, CONINAGRO and
CRA- claimed and finally obtained tax relief and a reduction in
export "retentions"^. Since export taxes were one of the main
sources of revenue, the government found itself without funds to
finance the stabilisation plan. In this, Argentina differs
greatly from other Latin American countries. Despite the fall in
primary product prices, the Chilean state had direct access to
copper sales revenue and the Mexican and Venezuelan governments
to oil export profits to finance stabilisation plans and external
debt service. In Argentina, the traditional source of foreign
exchange earnings, the agricultural sector, was on private hands
and with the decline of international prices and compensatory
reductions in taxation, economic transfers to the state fell 
55precipitately . The other alternative source of finance used by 
the government was internal borrowing, issuing government- 
guaranteed bonds.
^Wheat, 25%; corn, 40%; soya, 30%.
54Politically, the plot was much complicated. Keeping with the 
Argentinian way of policy-making, through a policy of demonstrations and lock­
outs, the SRA managed to substitute the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
L.Reca, by E.Figueras, who represented the interests of the sector and kept 
a very critical attitude towards government’s economic policies. Given the 
electoral weight of the sector in some provinces, the radicals ended with the 
tax reform program in the rural sector and with further reductions in export 
retentions in 1987 (Golbert & Acuna, 1990:38).
^Frenkel et al, 1990:53-55.
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On the other hand, what became clear at the end of 1986 was 
that correcting the public deficit required of a full scale 
reform of the state. In the second stage of the Austral Plan, 
Sorrouille announced a set of measures known as the "July 
Program" (20/07/1987). These included privatisations in 
petrochemicals, de-regulation of state monopolies (transport and 
communication), the matching of domestic and international petrol 
prices, the restructuring of the financial sector and a program 
of export promotion as tariffs were reduced. In Sourrouille*s 
words, "What the Argentines are experiencing... is the crisis of 
a... populist model, that is, of a centralised model linked to 
a semi-closed economy" ("La Nacion, 21/07/87 in Acuna, 1990:48). 
The problem was not only inflation, but the system itself, and 
modifying the model's balance of power was not easy for a 
democratic government.
A social pact was never achieved. Sourrouille*s group was
sceptical that this would happen, knowing the conflictive
tradition of Argentine politics. As technocrats, Alfonsin*s team
planned an appropiate strategy and attempted to collaborate with
various sectors, most obviously by organising the CES
(Conferencia Economica Social) in July 1985, one month after the
56plan was already started . Initially all groups agreed with the 
Austral Plan. There was a 22,6% wage rise; however, salaries were 
not further indexed. Unions feared hyperinflation and therefore 
accepted this wage freeze. Business groups also consented to the 
price controls since profit rates were not immediately 
threatened. Fearing that there was no alternative and observing
^Acuna, 1990:33.
57US approval of the plan also encouraged business support . 
Sourrouille*s team predicted this need for "security" in early 
1985 when discussing the Plan with the IMF and the US Federal 
Reserve. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between 
different business associations. There are many entrepreneurial 
groups, but the most politically relevant at the time were ADEBA 
(banks), CAC (commerce) and an informal group of industrialist 
called "Captains of Industry".
The "Captains of Industry" were a group of major industrial
entrepreneurs, who wanted to have more influence on the
government’s decisions after their isolation during the Martinez
de Hoz period. Thus, the "captains" pressed to repeated meetings
58with Alfonsin in the first years of his presidency . Table 
III.5 shows a list of these fifteen main Argentine entrepreneurs. 
As it can be appreciated, their areas of interest were very 
different and thus the informal group soon split. In the second 
stage of the Austral Plan, entrepreneurial support for Alfonsin 
vanished. Most business complained about tax increases, but the 
main problem was the programme of state privatisation. By 
December 1987, when economic indicators were showing signs of 
stagnation and Peronism won provincial elections, all business 
associations doubted government resolve to implement thorough­
going reform and united against the implementation of tax reform. 
Thus, Sourrouille*s structural measures could not be pursued (the 
July Program), and Alfonsin*s economic policy was relegated to 
the short-termism^.
57See the collection of polls to enterpreneurs in CEPNA, 1988. 
^See Ostiguy, 1990.
^Machinea, 1990:63.
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60Trade unions also initially accepted the Austral Plan. 
However, by April 1986, unions started questioning the 
credibility of the Plan. The conflict between government and 
agricultural producers made them realise that they were involved 
in a zero-sum game. Steel workers (UOM) were the first to demand 
a return to wage indexation. After a thirty-three day strike that 
resulted in a loss of 1,5% of GNP, the government finally asked 
ADIMRA (the steel entrepreneurs association) to solve the 
conflict as soon as possible, fearing repercussions in the rest 
of the union sector. This had to be done by the Secretary of 
Commerce subsidising the increase of labour costs, thus breaking 
the intention of the Austral Plan. The UOM was one of the most 
powerful and active unions (see table III.6). From then onwards, 
there would be an average of 250 labour conflicts/year (of which 
thirteen were general strikes) for the remainder of the Austral 
Plan period (Figure III.l). There were strong reasons for such
a reaction. Real wages fell 28% in industry, 35% in commerce, 24%
61in the public sector and 10% in banking in the period 1984-88 , 
and, as table III.8 shows, kept decreasing. During the two 
hyperinflation crisis in 1989, 60% caloric deficiencies were
reported in workers families* diets. Prices changed daily and
there was looting of shops and supermarkets in Buenos Aires,
62Rosario and Tucuman. In 1989, when monthly prices changed from 
9,5% (January and September) to 196,6% (July), index adjustments
60Unions were traditionally peronist and they would not give too much 
trust to the radicals. One of Alfonsin’s objectives was to break the link 
between unions and peronism. For that, he promoted internal elections, 
encouraging the vote of apolitical leaders; but this did not give expected 
results, and peronist leaders were re-elected. A faction of the CGT dennounced 
Alfonsin for being "communist’' and "having sold out to imperialistic powers". 
See Poneman,D. 1987.
^Beccaria, 1989:19-23.
^Aguirre, 1990:24.
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Argentinian monthly inflation
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Source: UN data.
became difficult to calculate. Wages were literally paid with 
bags full of depreciating paper money.
Initially, one of the social effects of the 1989 
hyperinflation was political confusion and apathy. Life became 
a fight for survival that necessitated family support and 
strategies of cooperation. The economic crisis did not seem to 
cause political confrontation but individual panic. Collective 
hysteria reached all social groups in the panic to spend and 
consume. Spending and hoarding became part of the survival 
strategy of virtually all classes. This reaction had, and will 
continue to have, an important impact on future policies, given 
that so many years of inflation have erased any tendency to save. 
On the other hand, social or class struggle fades, since there 
is nobody to blame but the government. Table III.7 shows how 
major union-industry conflicts have occurred when the economy has 
been temporarily stabilised, that is, at the beginning of anti- 
inflationary plan, both in the Alfonsin and the Menem periods. 
This has always been an added difficulty for policy-makers. 
During the first hyperinflation crisis January-May 1989, when 
inflation was increasing an average 
T A B L E  1 1 1  . *7 r
ARGENTINIAN MONTHLY LABOUR
CONFLICTS, 1985—90.
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
1985 52 24 48 42 28 26 24 12 19 31 16 22
1986 17 21 33 45 55 69 52 52 67 66 54 32
1987 13 12 13 11 28 39 42 48 51 56 50 35
1988 25 27 51 56 53 66 48 47 37 55 45 31
1989 21 31 38 32 71 52 58 50 51 48 68 60
1990 54 69 92 56 62 68 61 57 - - - -
Source: Palomino, H., in ME1 Bimestre Politico y Economico", 
1985-91• Buenos Aires, CISEA.
6372.2% by trimester , the number of conflicts was actually 
reduced. However, this was not the case during the second 
hyperinflationary cycle (February-March 1990). The past 
experience and the recent elections strongly politicised the 
population, and labour conflicts rose again.
In April 1988, annualized rate of inflation was 606,5%, the
fiscal deficit continued to grow and external debt repayments had
64to be suspended. IMF pressure increased, and the government 
began the last stabilisation program, the Primavera Plan (Spring 
Plan, August 1988). The Spring Plan was an "emergency" plan in 
an attempt to adjust macroeconomic variables before the Alfonsin 
mandate came to an end. In the face of political crisis, the 
Sourouille team sought to avoid intensifying the tax reform. 
Thus, fiscal policy was not based on domestic taxes but rather 
on a double exchange rate, a fixed for agricultural exports and 
a floating rate for industry and finance. The Austral was 
devalued 11.4%, VAT reduced 3%, public tariffs increased 30%, 
public investment reduced, the exchange rate adjusted, 3,000 
trade tariffs eliminated, prices controlled for 180 days, and a 
wage freeze applied after a 25% increase in salaries. The plan 
also had external element. The approval of the IMF, the WB and 
the US Secretary of Treasury was sought in an attempt to secure 
the renewal of a U$S 2,500 million credit.
The Plan Primavera had rapid results: monthly inflation
declined to 11,6%, 9% and 5,7% in September, October and
November, respectively. However, it had also immediate effects
63CEPAL data.
64External debt repayments were interrupted from then until April 1990, 
when Menem*s goverment made an initial disinbursement of U$S 400 m.
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among business groups. Agricultural producers denounced the Plan 
and particularly the double exchange rate as acting against 
national interests, considering it as a return to discriminatory 
corporatism. On the other hand, entrepreneurs who had initially 
accepted the plan on the conditionality of VAT reduction, started 
to disagree with the government’s commercial policy and to
CC
boycott the Plan. The IUA (Industrial Union of Argentina)
split, some entrepreneurs supported the opening of the economy,
and others called for protection. This was the context in which
the Peronist opposition candidate, C.Menem, initiated his
presidential campaign, promising a ’’productive revolution’’, based
66on industrial subsidies and wage rises . In parallel, 
entrepreneurs took profit from the "low” austral and the supply 
of dollars by the government, leaving the Central Bank with few 
reserves. By December 1988, the Primavera Plan lacked credibility 
both for internal and external actors. On the 6th February 1989, 
the government suspended the supply of dollars. The effect on the 
black market was virtually instantaneous: the parity U$S/Austral 
rate changed from 1/17.92 in January to 1/47.9 in March (the 
official rates being 1/13.94 and 1/15.82, respectively). The 
monthly rate of inflation rose from 8.9% in January to 17% in 
March. Exporters refused to use the official exchange rate and 
business groups no longer accepted price controls. On the 3rd of 
March the World Bank announced that it would not make available
65The progressive tariff reduction that involved monthly cancellations 
of import tariffs effected under the Primavera Plan will be further analyzed 
in chapter V.
fifiOne of the reasons why the US kept offering economic aid to Alfonsin*s 
government may be the untrust on Argentinian political outcomes. The US 
Department of State initially feared C.Menem as another possible 
fundamentalist, in accordance with the 1980s world trend. L.Einaudi’s advisory 
team on Latin American politics gave bad reports on the peronist candidate, 
which seem to have been confirmed during G.Schultz’s visit to Buenos Aires in 
1988 (Morales, 1990:36).
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the U$S 350m credit tranche previously promised.
III.3.C. THE END OF THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION (1989):
PUGLIESE AND RODRIGUEZ.
Sourrouille had to leave office. His two successors, 
J.P.Pugliese and J.Rodriguez, had an average of 45 days each to 
solve the economic crisis. Inflation tripped into hyperinflation. 
The rate was 33.4% in April, 78.5% in May and 114.5% in June, and 
the average U$S/Austral exchange rate was 1/79, 1/290 and 1/540 
for each respective month. Presidential elections were held in 
May 1989, and the Peronist candidate, Carlos Saul Menem, won with 
47% of the vote. Inflation kept rising: 196.6% monthly in July 
and 3610,2% in August. Alfonsin was forced to resign the 
presidency before the end of his term.
There were various reasons for the hyperinflation. The 
Central Bank had to pay off U$S 400 m. of BONEX*82 (bonds of 
public external debt) in January 1989, which had to be financed 
trough domestic reserves since there was no external credit. This 
was exasperated by the fact that the government had been 
increasingly issuing short-term new bonds since 1987 (BARRA, 
BAGON, TIDOL, LEBO, TICOF I and II, TACAM I and II) and thus 
could not issue long-dated paper. By 1989, internal debt was
291.000 million australes while Ml was only 75 million
67australes . The only way to finance expenditure was to issue 
more money to cover the fiscal deficit, and to postpone the 
problem of the re-issuing of new bonds. This had a boomerang 
effect, since U$S 300m. of TACAM II had to be paid off in May 
1989. Some analysts have also commented that hyperinflation was
^Graziano, 1990:122-123.
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a market coup d'etat by financial groups accumulating wealth in 
dollars and entrepreneurs raising the prices of their products, 
since they wanted Alfonsin to departure from office as soon as 
possible®®.
III.4. PERONISM AND LIBERALISM: ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER MENEM, 
1989-
Menem took the presidency on August 1989, five months ahead 
of the official date. Soon, he had to acknowledge publicly that 
his populist-style project of a "productive revolution" had to 
wait. Before this, a programme of economic austerity was needed. 
After the economy was liberalised, the state would be reformed 
and inflation and public deficit corrected. Only then would it 
be possible to reach a new social pact and to boost domestic 
growth. This was a return to Alfonsin project but now there was 
no other political alternative. Menem called for a realist view, 
asking Argentines for short-term sacrifices and promising the 
"productive revolution" in a couple of years time. For this, he 
had the support of most industrialists, financial groups and 
unions, whose major figures were called "The twelve Apostles". 
Although Menem was forced by circumstances to implement economic 
austerity measures, he still wanted the state to coordinate and 
reconcile all social groups in the purest Peronist style. 
Initially, not only economic groups supported him, but also the 
Church and the military -to whom he promised amnesties from the 
Radicals* trials and "justice". This co-optive attitude was 
reflected in his first cabinet, under the so-called "strategic
®®Feletti & Lozano, 1991:10
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69alliance” . But this approach could not be sustained.
III.4.A. RAPANELLI (1989-90): FROM BUNGE&BORN TO STATE REFORM
The. new Peronist economic program was suggested by the
70Argentine multinational group Bunge & Born . J.Born refused the 
Ministry of Economy but appointed J.Roig to implement Plan Cero 
(Plan Zero). Only four days after Menem took office, the 
government entered its first crisis: prices had risen from 50% 
to 150% and Roig died of a heart attack.
N.Rapanelli replaced Roig both on the B&B Board and in
government. Rapanelli’s first measures were conjunctural. First,
a 250% currency devaluation (lU$S/655Australes) was implemented.
This bought official and black market rates closer. Secondly,
public utility charges were increased massively so as way to
71cover the fiscal deficit . Finally, there was a 90 day 
price/wage freeze. The effects were positive: Hyperinflation
turned into inflation (5.6% monthly in October), the Central Bank
69M.Roig, linked to the Argentinian MNC Bunge & Born, took over the 
Ministry of Econonomy; J.Gonzalez-Fraga, linked to foreign banks, the Central 
Bank; R.Frigeri, linked to the unions, the Chancellor of the Exchequer; 
J.Dromi, linked to the military, M.Public Works; Triaca, linked to the unions, 
to Labour (originally football referee G.Marconi was appointed in the post, 
but after many complaints he was reassigned to secretary). From L.De Riz 
interview, CEDES)
70
The group never had a peronist filiation. Quite the contrary, 
peronists always found B&B untrustful since the holding had more foreign than 
domestic investments (Green & Lauent, 1988:172). However, B&B has informally 
being close to most governments, advising but adopting a non-interventionist 
attitude. When J.Born substituted M.Hirsch in B&B’s presidency, the company 
policy changed. J.Born was opposed to friedmanite policies, and inspired his 
"Plan Cero" in Klein post-keynesian economics.
71There was a 600% rise in petrol, 736% in energy, 335% in transport, 
282% in telecomunications prices. These large increases have to be understood 
coming from a tradion of a subsidiary state to public services, and from the 
current need of state revenue. Given the inadequacy of the tax system, utility 
charges are a substitute for more conventional fiscal devices.
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kept building up reserves (from U$S 100m. in June to U$S 2,000m. 
in November), and internal debt was punctually paid. However, 
external debt was not paid and the IMF did not credit U$S 1,400 
as promised.
In August 1989 the Menem government passed laws 23,696/89
on State Reform and 23,697/89 on National Economic Emergency. The
objective of both was to reduce state expenditure. The Economic
Emergency law had two effects: it reduced industrial promotion
72subsidies by 50% and curved state purchases . Menem pictured
the state as a bankrupt enterprise, which could not play a
redistribute role to which it was accustomed. New Peronism seems
to have made an incorrect assumption by considering that a
regressive distribution of income would guarantee reinvestment.
Stopping welfare and industry subsidies will certainly help to
correct the state deficit, but it will in turn concentrate
wealth. If the state has any concern for Argentina’s future, it
should take responsibility for the way this capital is used. A
danger is that an important share of income could be transferred
73to the volatile world of finance .
On the other hand, to call for National Economic Emergency 
was attempt to gain state autonomy in policy-making. This is 
rather ironical when one considers that Rapanelli belonged to 
B&B, one of the "Captains of Industry". Alpargatas, Techint, 
Perez Companc and some other "Captains" were resigned to the cut 
in subsidies, but minor industrialist claimed protection from the 
government. As will be analyzed in chapter V, most producers
^The"buy national" laws n.5340/63 and 18.875. 
^Azpiazu, 1991:41-42.
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depended in one or another way on state subsidies; only 
industries with some international exporting focus remained 
supporters to the government. The UIA was flooded with 
complaints. At the UIA elections in January 1990, the inward- 
developmental ist candidacy of Mahler won against the liberal 
Montagna. It could be argued that these divisions within the UIA 
indicated that the Menem team accomplished the dismantling of 
industrial corporatist interest. Liberal policies had begun to 
break up what Wynia described as one of the main characteristics 
of Argentine politics; economic groups with direct claims on the 
government. The case of industrialists forming a "lobby" group 
to pressure for change may be direct proof of this.
Law n.23.696 on State Reform and Restructuring of Public
Enterprises, was centred in three main points: (a) The
privatisation of state assets (b) Tax reform (c) Administrative
74reform. Tax reform stablished an increase in the VAT (up to
13%) and the reconstruction of fiscal federalism (a transfer of
resources to the provinces). With respect to the Administrative
reforms, the "reduction of hyper-bureaucracy", real wages
declined notably partly because indexation was delayed. This
meant that the alternative was to rationalise the number of state
employees. Decree 2.476/90 virtually abolished tenure for civil
servants. Several state agencies were scheduled to be dismantled,
meaning unemployment for nearly 68.300 bureaucrats. Social costs
were supposed to be covered by either voluntary retirement or a
75program of absorption of public workers by the private sector .
^Law n. 23.905 
75Ministerio de Economia, 1991
128
With respect to the privatisation of state assets, in 1985
there were 297 state enterprises. These were owned by either the
eight different ministries (82 companies) and provincial and
76municipal governments (215 companies) . Unlike Eastern Europe,
Argentina was a Keynesian mixed economy which had been correcting
ISI promotion policies from the 1960s onwards. Thus, various
governments have successfully privatised state-owned companies
since the first fiscal crisis in the 1950s. Prior to Martinez de
Hoz, 45 companies had been transferred from the state to the
private sector. Paradoxically, the absolute and relative quantity
of public investment increased during the Martinez de Hoz’s 
77liberal period , although some 150 state companies were either 
privatised or closed. However, these companies were relatively 
marginal within the context of the public sector. The real debate 
on privatisation in Argentina started in 1983 with the return to 
democracy. The fiscal deficit meant that the state could not 
cover public enterprises losses.
In 1990, the Menem Administration began significant 
privatisations: ENTEL (State telecom), Aerolineas Argentinas,
part of Ferrocarriles Argentinos (Argentine railways), lO.OOOKm. 
of motorways, TV channels and some industries dependent on the 
Ministry of Defense. The program set out for 1991 included the 
privatisation of ELMA, ENCOTEL, Gas del Estado, Obras Sanitarias
76The largest enterprises belonged to the Central Administration: 
Ministries of Defense (31 enterprises), Public Works (22) and Economy (14). 
Of these, the eight largest companies (YPF, Gas del Estado, SEGBA, ENTEL, 
Aerolineas Argentinas, Agua y Energia, Ferrocarriles Argentinos and ELMA) 
produced about 70% of the sector’s aggregate value, absorbing more than 30% 
of the total public sector investment program. This contributed to 27,8% of 
the total public sector deficit (World Bank, 1985:99)
77Argentinian public sector investment as a percentage of total 
inverstment was 36.1% in 1972-75, 43.6% in 1976-79 and 42.5 in 1980-83 (World 
Bank, 1985)
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de la Nacion, YCF, Administracion General de Puertos (port), BA
Underground, and parts of Ferrocarriles and YPF (petrol). The
management of privatisations has been discriminatory and
discretional; provoking a nationalist response and charges of
78government corruption . The paradox of Argentine development is
that having initially transferred to the state responsibility for
investment provision and investment decision-making, as a result
79of privatisation the government has now renounced 
responsibility for this task. Constrained by a fiscal gap, the 
Menem Administration’s main goals were limited to solving short­
term problems of inflation. The private sector has been given all 
future responsibility for the production of both goods and
services. Inconsistently, some companies have even been
80privatised with the help of subsidies given by the state.
Since October 1989 trade unions have refused to accept a new 
wage freeze arguing that entrepreneurs are trying to compensate 
for the reduction in subsidies through reducing labour costs. As 
was the case with the UIA, the CGT split into two factions: the 
pro-government CGT-San Martin and anti-regime CGT-Azopardo. Up 
to 1992, no social pact had been agreeded upon. Under these 
conditions, it is arguable that it may ever occur. Unions cannot
^See Grupo Ocho, 1991:57-60.
^Notably law n.23.697/89.
on
E.Calcagno (OIT, Iberoamerican Labour Organisation) denounced that the 
benefits coming from the selling out of public companies have in later cases 
being channelled towards external debt repayments The privatisation of 
Aerolineas Argentinas (national airlines, 1990), for instance, caused a 
national debate since the state lost one of the few [marginally] profitable 
enterprises but the public sector did not get any evident revenue.
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see a reasonable future. Liberalisation and the dismantling of 
the state centred system are eroding the reason-d'etre of 
corporatism. Economic unification with Brazil (MERCOSUR, see 
chapter II) may be justified in terms of industry, but definitely 
not in terms of labour. The Argentine organised working class had 
many benefits under corporatism: unemployment around 2% or 3%, 
a welfare system, comparatively high wages, etc. Up to 1991, no 
one of the 24 protocols in the MERCOSUR Treaty protected labour. 
Azopardo-unions were fearful of Brazilians, Paraguayans and 
Uruguayans flooding the Argentine labour market. This would be 
in accordance with the government’s liberal program of reducing 
labour costs to avoid inflation, and to promote competitive 
exports. The Argentine experience contradicts the theories of 
O ’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead’s theories (1986) about the 
importance of social pacts at moments of democratic transitions. 
The Argentine state failed to implement a pact during the 
transition period, given that both democratic governments opted 
for other strategies.
81An interesting example of government-labour relations in Menem’s term 
was the case of the rail-workers strike. This was organised by the militant 
base, againts CGT-San Martin decision-center will. Workers stopped their 
activities in several lines around Buenos Aires for three months. The 
government did not complain: from the Ministries of Economy and Public Works 
point of view, the strike was saving millions of Australes daily and thus 
helping to correct the public deficit. The then Minister for the Economy 
Gonzalez was happy to close the rail services, since there were alternative 
private, efficient and especially less costly bus lines. Finally, the 
government consented on allowing things to go back to normality, without 
dismissals. The confused rail-workers ended the strike with no improvement 
whatsoever. A.Argiiello, secretary to the Union, apologised to the government 
and reminded the administration that Union Ferrocarriles submited a report on 
rail-restructuring in 1987. That is, in the view of strikes not being a tool 
for polical bargaining, the union itself was the one encouraging the 
government to apply new strategies for securing jobs.
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III.4.B. ERMAN GONZALEZ (1990-91): PREPARING FOR CAVALLO (1991-
Hyperinflation emerged again (figure III. 2), coinciding with 
as the Central Bank was required to find U$S 300m. to redeem the 
BONEX*87. The dollar rose to lU$S/1550Australes (18/Dec/89), and 
Rapanelli was replaced by Erman Gonzalez. Gonzalez* priority was 
the objective of reducing inflation. In one year, 1990, five 
different policy-packages were tested (Erman I, II, III, IV and 
V). Gonzalez did not succeed in the reduction of inflation, but 
he managed to provide a high level of reserves at the BCRA so 
that the Central Bank had room for manoeuvre later. It was to be 
the next team at the Ministry of the Economy, headed by Domingo 
Cavallo, that won the battle to stabilise the economy.
Plan Erman I was based on the freeing of markets and the 
82exchange rate . Erman II converted, by government fiat, short­
term internal savings into long-term external debt bonds: 58% of 
fixed-term bank deposits (that is, 7 days in Argentina) and 71% 
of internal debt bonds were confiscated and exchanged by 
BONEX*89 . Given that the Ml was very low (in December 1989, 
4.5% GNP), this turned the state became the primary holder of 
Australes in the country, giving strong power to the Central 
Bank. In parallel, there was a scarcity of paper money, and 
inflation declined to 7.4% per month in April. The Central Bank 
only printed Australes to buy dollars coming from exports, and 
to accumulate them as reserves. This implied that the state 
modified the floating exchange rate depending on its demand for
82The control of the exchange rate generated an interesting debate in 
which the main positions were defended by Gonzalez’s successor, D.Cavallo 
(fixed convertibility), the minister Gonzalez (floating exchange rates) and 
the ex-president of the Central Bank A.Canitrot (pragmatic approach: crawling- 
peg), as defended in a debate at IDES 4/91 an later interview.
^Feletti & Lozano, 1991:18.
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dollars; but the Central Bank did not guarantee convertibility, 
so speculation was reduced. However, the effect on economic 
activity was very recessive. By the end of 1990, none of the 
"Twelve Apostles" supported Menem.
Once hyperinflation was corrected, Gonz&lez dedicated his 
efforts to correcting the fiscal deficit. These were the Ermans
gi
III, IV and V plans. These concentrated control of the public 
sector in the Ministry of Economy. All public sector contracts, 
except for those dealing with privatisations, were suspended 
and/or obligations redeemed with state bonds (also known as
or
"junk-bonds"). National Banks were restructured. The Executive
Committee on Administrative Reform was created to rationalise
civil servants and public workers and to write a legal framework
86regulating voluntary retirements, dismissals and layoffs . 
Finally, public utility tariffs were increased by 1041%, and all 
public enterprise earnings consigned to the Ministry of Economy.
The Erman Plans refinanced the Central Bank, up from U$S 
900m. in December 89 to U$S 4300m. reserves by November 1990 and 
reduced the state deficit. This allowed the subsequent economic 
team to launch the now famous Convertibility Law of April 1991. 
The Cavallo Plan was based on the Central Bank holding sufficient 
reserves to back all local currency in circulation and to convert 
local notes into US dollars on demand. After the Erman Plans, the
84Exercised through decrees 435 (March 1990), 584 (April 90) and 1757 
(September 90), respectively.
85Banco Hipotecario and Banco Nacional de Desarrollo.
^Lozano et al, 1990:6-7.
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87BCRA was able to buy up surplus U$S from domestic holders and 
release sufficient foreign exchange to meet demand. Also, in 
advance of the introduction of a new currency, the BCRA began to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate.
External debt repayments were reinitiated (April 1990) in
the hope of getting access to the Brady Plan, but at the price
of a large increase of internal debt (U$S 15,6 billion). These
benefits of this policy were bought into question by a reduction
in domestic economic activity caused by tight monetary policy and
trade opening. During Erman V, trade tariffs had to be
reinstated, keeping with the MERCOSUR timetable of tariff
harmonisation. GonzAlez may have been efficient in dealing with
the short-term problem of the fiscal deficit, but the cost of
go
this strategy is what Tanzi has referred to as fiscal tension. 
Fiscal tension explains the consequences of reducing of the 
public deficit without taking into account long-term 
implications. Fiscal tension was heightened as external debt 
repayment transfers were not only from the state but also from 
domestic private companies buying former public sector firms -the 
government set up a programme whereby privatised enterprises 
could be purchased with public debt.
The Brady Plan gave the government the idea that foreign 
banks should not be seen as another group fighting for a share 
of Argentina’s income but rather as new agents of economic 
development. Thus, in December 1989 a fund was created for the 
conversion of Argentine debt, coordinated by the Bank of Tokyo,
87Changing again the currency from australes to pesos* See Price 
Waterhouse, 1992:8-11; CEI,1993:19-29.
®^In Frenkel et al, 1990
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the Midland Bank, Banco Rio de la Plata (P£rez-Companc Group) and 
the World Bank. One of the most critical aspects of government 
policy was the way that it has dealt with the foreign debt. 
Menem*s government has been defending and legitimising its 
economic policies which have been pursued at very high internal 
costs, on the grounds of external constraints and lack of 
alternatives. Given that the Brady Plan was launched when the 
international banking community had already recovered from the 
debt crisis, Menem*s policy can be subject to serious criticisms. 
As it will also be seen in the Spanish case, the faith that semi- 
periphery liberalising administrations place in the notion that 
international integration foster development is far from being 
sustained.
For many, the first year of the Menem*s administration 
represents a "deepening" of the 1980s, the "lost decade". From 
1980 to 1990, Argentine GNP fell 9.9%, industrial output declined 
by 19.9%, consumption fell 13.4%, national income contracted by 
80%, investment fell by 36.2%, inflation rose from an annual 
average of 5.4% to 38.6%, industrial wages contracted by 32.8%, 
open unemployment increased from 2.6% to 7.8%, underemployment 
increased from 5.2% to 8.9%, and the external debt rose from U$S
27.2b. to U$S 63.3b. (of which the public sector share changed
89from 53.3% to 92.3%). However, the Argentine current account 
went from -2,5b.U$S to +5,3b.U$S. This is partially a result of 
the reduction of the domestic market, but mainly a change in the 
industrial structure, re-orienting its strategy towards an export 
development model. This subject will be further analyzed in 
chapter V and it will be shown that it may be more appropriate
^Azpiazu, 1991:41.
to talk about a decade of transformation rather than a decade of 
loss.
To conclude, although there has been much written about 
economic liberalisations in the South Cone in the late 1970s, 
liberalism in Argentina under Martinez de Hoz seems to have been 
more political and ideological than economic. It was a useful 
political tool to reduce the power of unions and a way of 
obtaining external finance. The paradox came in that the freeing 
of financial markets led unexpectantly to an external debt 
crisis. The nationalisation of private debt, added to other 
factors such as the fall of international prices for primary 
products, pointed to the end of the Argentine corporatist model 
of accumulation. It was by 1983, with the restoration of 
democracy, when the real debate on economic liberalisation began. 
Only then was the liberal project viewed as one of the few 
alternatives for future development. Further, the tensions and 
disorientation coming from transformations in society and the 
real economic meant that the Argentine state was itself 
responsible for the frustration of its own stabilisation 
attempts. This policy contradictions resulted in two bouts of 
hyperinflation. However, there are many degrees and means of 
liberalisation. The role of the state in the economy has changed 
in recent times, and yet it can still be argued that the state 
needs further restructuring. However, a reduction in state 
functions as to facilitate the free operation of market forces 
is not the only option that can result from economic chaos and 
the resultant search for short-term solutions. Corrective 
measures were applied during the classic period of ISI and other 
remedies were introduced during and after the 1980s. However, the 
force and intensity of policies designed to limit -or to make
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more efficient- state action varied considerably, depending on 
the attitude of the government in power. By picturing the 
Argentine state as a bankrupt enterprise, liberal governments 
have centred their economic policy-making on the short-run, 
placing the responsibility of long-term investment in economic 
and social actors in the private sector. Economic adventurism is 
tempting, but not prudent; other countries, like Spain and Brazil 
have been -and continue to be- more cautious. But this is 
material for the next chapter.
137
CHAPTER 4: THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN SPAIN
This chapter examines the macroeconomic evolution of Spain 
over the last twenty years, paying particular attention to the 
interrelation between political and economic transition. This 
section is fundamentally descriptive, in order to provide a 
setting for the analysis of industrial policy and structure which 
will be presented in the next chapter.
The chapter opens with a brief assessment of the logic of 
autarky under Franco. This is followed by an account of the 
first steps towards dismantling the interventionist regime taken 
with the 1959 Stabilisation Plan and the reversal of this process 
of liberalisation with the development plans of the 1960s. 
Subsequently, there is a discussion of the 1970s crisis, when the 
political transition took priority over economic matters.
The economic transition can be divided into four stages. The 
first (1977-78) was directed by E. Fuentes Quintana during the 
first democratic government. In this phase, a necessary economic 
adjustment began, thanks to a strategy of social pacts. A 
critique of the Moncloa Pacts and later social agreements will 
be presented based on theories of neo-corporatism*. The second 
stage (1978-82) of the economic transition corresponds to the 
crisis of UCD and the hold-up in the adjustment process. 
Adjustment was continued and developed in a third stage (1982- 
85), under a Socialist government and co-ordinated by the team 
headed by M.Boyer at Ministry of Economy. This section will pay 
particular attention to the financial crisis of the period (the 
worst in post-Second World War Europe) and the interventionist
*0'Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, 1986.
role of the state in the stabilisation of the banking sector, an 
example of a policy of gradualism and careful liberalisation of 
the Spanish economy. This section also considers the deregulation 
of the labour market and growth of the informal economy and the 
evolution of the social security system. The fourth stage (1986- 
89) began with the replacement of Boyer by C. Solchaga and 
corresponds to a period of economic expansion.
The chapter opens with an assessment of Spain’s entry into 
the EC and NATO as a reflection the developmentalist drive in the 
mentality of Spanish policy-makers. A balance of the effects of 
membership of Spain was provided in chapter II. This chapter 
extends that analysis, emphasising the effects of entry upon the 
domestic economy, by focusing on monetary policy (the cost of 
maintaining the peseta in the European Monetary System) and tax 
reform (including the introduction of VAT).
The chapter ends with a brief analysis of various 
perspectives on the future of the Spanish economy. Inflation, the 
pace of short-term growth and the productive crisis raise doubts 
about the implementation of monetary adjustment measures. Since 
these problems are of a structural nature and not conjunctural, 
as defined by the PSOE government, it may be convenient to design 
a new (medium-term) alternative economic policy. Finally, the 
chapter concludes that the Spanish state’s greater autonomy with 
respect to social groups, the gradualism of the liberalisation 
process, and the expectations of benefits from integration into 
the EC have been the key factors in Spain’s economic transition.
IV.1. PROTECTIONISM AND AUTARKY
In Spain the idea of economic independence based upon
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industry can be traced back to the nineteenth century, more 
particularly to 1875 when there was a radical change to 
industrial protection initiated by the then Prime Minister, 
Canovas .del Castillo . The roots of this economic nationalism 
were the recognition of Spain’s increasing backwardness relative 
to other European countries, the instability of the world 
economy, and a romantic anti-foreign sentiment typical of the 
nineteenth century. After 1891, import tariffs grew so 
dramatically that the conservative Canovas del Castillo’s policy 
became known as the hunger tariff, given its effect on price 
increases. The Tariff Law of 1906 accentuated isolationist 
tendencies. Other laws, such as the Industrial Protection Law of 
1907, aimed to deepened the process of industrialisation. The 
Cambo Tariff of 1922 increased some tariffs to 100% ad valorem
and further tariff adjustments followed in 1926, 1927 and 1928.
3
This legislation was still in force in 1960 .
The main ideological centre of this doctrine was the 
National Economic Review (Revista economica nacional), founded 
in Madrid in 1916, which was to be very influential in the 
country’s subsequent economic evolution. The Review brought 
together all debates on state intervention, national self- 
sufficiency, development of the domestic market and the promotion 
of new industries. Later, in the 1930s, it published articles on 
economic autarky, that were influenced by the Italian 
experience*. The architects of the Spanish version of this 
economic model, Gual Villalba and A. Robert, among others based
9
Who was later to publish How I became a protect ion is t(1890).
T^amames, 1986:476-482.
*The use of the term autarky was popularised in Italy after 1935, when 
the country suffered from international economic sanctions.
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themselves on these interventionist ideas to create the doctrine 
of "complete protectionism"*.
When General Franco took power in 1939, the rationale for 
autarky was more ideological than economic. Although World War 
II certainly interrupted international trade, in Spain autarky 
was maintained as an historical achievement. Complete 
protectionism referred to the fact that the state not only 
shielded industry, as in Argentina and other European nations, 
but agriculture as well. Agricultural protection was well rooted 
in Spanish history, and had been very effective in the nineteenth 
century. In 1895, for example, there was a tariff of 69% on 
wheat. This produced two negative effects. On the one hand, it 
held up any attempt to modernise the rural sector. Due to the 
existence of numerous large estates, landowners earned large 
marginal profits and did not concern themselves with re-investing 
this profits to improve techniques and land productivity. On the 
other hand, protectionism created a structural tendency towards 
rising primary product prices, which meant that labour costs were 
high, thereby undermining the international competitiveness of 
the industrial sector. In the rest of Europe, industrial output 
increased sharply at the end of the nineteenth century precisely 
due to of increased agricultural productivity.
5
Proteccionismo integral. Opposition to this ideology was centred around 
Valencia and Madrid. In Valencia, one of Spaing most prominent rural areas, 
the Centre for Valencian Economic Studies began to argue that the region’s 
export capacity was greatly hampered by state protectionism. In Madrid, the 
main sources of liberalism were, in turn, to be found at the Institute for 
Political Studies and the Faculty of Political and Economic Sciences, founded 
in 1943. Academics like R. Pepina, V. Andres Alvarez and M. Torres Martinez 
were publicly very critical of "complete protectionism", and defended the 
necessity of incorporating Spain into the world economy. This group was very 
influential in liberalisation in 1959. See Velarde, 1991:977-994.
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Tariff protection and the process of import substitution 
were not sufficient to sustain economic development at the 
European pace. Comparing the index of industrial production of 
a number of European countries during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Spanish industry grew initially at rates 
similar to France, England, Belgium or Holland: 2.3% from 1829-
g
61 . Subsequently, this rate was not maintained. High labour 
costs resulted in very limited industrial profits and, therefore, 
low investment. The growth of socialist movements after 1868 was 
inevitable given the miserable living conditions of the workers. 
However, pressure from these movements did not serve to correct 
the main distorting factor -agricultural prices- and industrial 
growth continued to stagnate. Thus, the second stage of the 
industrial revolution failed in Spain, holding back the 
development of railways, electricity, chemical industry, etc. . 
Other factors which impeded the formation of self-sustaining, 
autarkic economic growth were the absence of an internal market 
which could have stimulated production, and the technological 
backwardness of agriculture and industry alike.
One of the principal contradictions of the autarkic policies 
was the concentration of income. The distribution of income shows 
a noticeably unequal structure under the Franco dictatorship. The 
only available data are from 1964 onwards, when the post-1959 
economic boom was already underway (table IV.2). In contrast with 
the redistributionism of the Peronist model of the period, low 
real wages in Spain precluded the extension of the domestic 
market, and the lack of demand reduced the incentive to increase
C^arreras, 1991:93. 
7Nadal, 1975.
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industrial output.
If the system did function, it was due, internally, to state 
intervention, wage compression and public and private investment 
through banking institutions. Externally, it was due to foreign 
direct investment, foreign debt and the export of some primary 
products in which Spain enjoyed a natural comparative advantage 
(wines, minerals, fruit, canned food).
Following Gerschenkron, banks have played an important role
as entrepreneurial substitutes in Spain, as in other late
0
industrialising countries . Tamames (1977) pointed to the 
connections between the banks and industry in the 1970s (table 
IV.3). The political unrest before and after the Civil War 
resulted in banks avoiding medium and long term loans. Faced with 
the need for credits for economic development, the Franco 
military government created a regulatory body which benefited 
banks and businessmen alike, at the expense of the individual 
saver. From 1951, banks were obliged to set aside 30% of their 
deposits for cheap long-term credits or shares with low returns 
in some strategic or public sector. In the case of the Cajas de 
Ahorro (non-profit making savings banks), the percentage was 60%. 
The low interest rates paid by employers led to complaints from 
the bankers about the distorting effect that this privileged
0
The financial structure developed,in turn, around the government and 
industrial activities - that is in Madrid and the Basque Country. In Spain's 
other important industrial area, Catalonia, the banks did not survive the 
crisis of the 1920s. The seven major banks in 1980 for the most part were 
still associated with the industrial zones in the North and Madrid: Bilbao, 
Santander, Vizcaya, Popular, Banesto, Hispano-Americano and Central. 
Banesto,however is a separate case, given that it was developed by Pereire 
Brothers when the French built the Spanish railways; it is, in any case, 
another example of the type of financial structure found in developing 
countries (Graham, 1984).
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circuit of loans had on interest rates. This argument makes 
little sense,though, given that the whole system was highly 
interventionist and that, when the balance sheet was drawn up, 
the banks were earning high profits. The low returns on these 
investments were compensated for by high interest rates on short­
term credits. In addition, the administration never imposed 
controls on operating margins, with the result being that the 
Spanish banks* margins were the highest in Europe .
The resulting financial structure was highly concentrated. 
In the 1960s, seven out of the 112 banks accounted for 70% of the 
country’s capital, granted 60% of loans and directly controlled 
a quarter of the 200 largest companies in Spain. Up until the 
start of the 1980s, Spain was the country with the largest number 
of banking outlets in Europe, followed by Belgium. As will be 
seen later, an attempt to liberalise this system in 1977 provoked 
the biggest financial crisis in postwar Europe. This crisis 
resulted in a wave of banking mergers which increased the degree 
of concentration still further. By the mid-1980s, the seven 
largest banks controlled 80% of the country’s capital.
Thus the autarkic system was based on a high level of 
protectionism which favoured the agrarian, financial and 
industrial elites. The role of the state was not simply the 
maintenance of public order, but participation in the areas where 
economic activity would have been lacking -industry, public 
works, and welfare. Government expenditures were financed 
through the issue of public debt and indirect taxation. Public 
debt has been the traditional recourse of the Spanish state,
^Graham, 1984.
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which throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has 
embarked on various political courses of action without 
sufficient economic backing. After the Civil War, inflation grew 
precisely because of the enormous issuing of public debt, and was 
not reduced until the Stabilisation Plan of 1959.
With respect to the tax system, government need for funds 
after the Civil War led to the Law of 16/12/40, through which 
special direct and indirect taxes were levied. In practice, only 
the latter were collected. Direct taxes were increased from 1% 
to 7%, but no account was taken of the annual variations in the 
rate of inflation and so their effect was minimal. Traditionally 
legislation on tax evasion had been very lax and as a result tax 
fraud was common. Despite some attempts at tax reform^, the 
first collection of direct taxes did not take place until after 
1977, following the restoration of democratic rule.
In a system where prices were high due to tariffs and 
indirect taxes, wages were regulated by the Ministry of Labour 
and not trade union pressure, in marked contrast to Argentina. 
Before the Civil War, wages in Spain had been regulated through 
social pacts. Under the dictatorship, strikes and sackings were 
both prohibited, and therefore, so were the means for collective 
bargaining. The workers found themselves protected through 
minimum wage legislation and restrictions on dismissals, but did 
not have the right to organise themselves into union nor to make 
wage claims. Law of 6/12/40 gave legal recognition only to 
officially authorised trade unions. These official unions, called 
vertical unions, brought together the employers, technicians and
10Laws of 26/12/1957 and 11/6/1964.
145
workers in one industrial sector under the supervision of the
state. There were a total of 28 such unions, their role being to
identify and resolve production problems and to gather economic
statistics. This type of industrial relations was in
contradiction with ILO resolutions and the UN Charter for Human
Rights**. After the Civil War, the working day was very long and
real wages very low. In 1956, the Decree of 8/6/56 allowed for
localised agreements between workers and employers, to reward
workers for productivity through incentives and bonuses. It is
difficult to quantify the effect of this new norm, given that the
settlements were arrived at the level of the individual factory.
However, some recent company studies show that negotiations of
this type were already taking place before the law was passed,
12and that wages could be as much as doubled as a result . What 
is clear, in any case, is that the official government statistics 
are not very reliable in this period.
Meanwhile, there was a progressive extension of social
13security, developed through the National Welfare Institute 
attached to the Ministry of Labour. In 1943, a system of national 
health and obligatory health insurance for workers was enforced, 
which was later extended to the agricultural and service sectors.
In 1969, an ILO (International Labour Organisation) delegation to 
Spain condemned Franco’s policies. Following this, new union laws were drawn 
up (Law of 17/12/71) but there was not a single significant structural change.
12Paris Aguilaz calculates that in 1948 the official earnings of an 
office worker in Vizcaya were 14 ptas, while he received 13.67 ptas in 
complementary payments (Maluquer de Motes, 1989:512). Meanwhile, complementary 
payments in the industrial zone of Catalonia around 1950 amounted to about 
half of the total annual pay (Molinero and Ysas, 1985). The problem with these 
studies lies in the definition of "complementary pay", which includes payments 
for wear and tear of tools, apprenticeship schools, uniforms and work clothes, 
and payments to people on military service (Maluquer de Motes, 1989:510-514).
13Institute Nacional de Prevision.
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Social security was financed through deductions from wages (8% 
to 11%) and employer contributions (5% to 8%). After 1963, the 
expansion of social security required more funds, which the state 
provided.
Given the state’s lack of resources (basically, coming from 
indirect taxation in an economy of low demand), it may be 
possible that vertical unions promoted forced savings which could 
be invested in development projects**. In Argentina forced 
savings existed, but the state always had an active role in 
investment. Spain needs further research in this field. As has 
been shown, very low interest rates were paid to individual 
savers, and banks had the obligation to devote 30%-60% of their 
deposits as cheap investment loans. This might also be a case of 
forced savings.
Franco’s policy, like Peron’s, claimed to be anti-party and 
15cross-class . Supposedly, the Movement acted impartially on 
behalf of all social groups. However, in contrast to Argentina, 
the Spanish experience of the Civil War had pitted the 
left/republicans against the right/fascists. Whereas the Peronist
Justicialismo had the merit of coordinating the majority of
18Argentine social groups , the Franco regime discriminated not 
only against trade unionists, but also communists, socialists and 
republicans. In the period of autarky, Spain developed a kind of 
corporatism, in which the main social groups (the financial,
**As O’Donnell and Malloy showed for Brazil.
*^ See Tezanos, 1989.
1KWith the exception of landowners, who were forced to finance ISI but 
still had strong political influence, and the non-Peronist unions which were 
severely repressed (see chapter III).
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industrial, and land owning elites but not the workers) agreed
on their levels of economic activity, coordinated by the state.
In many respects, it could be said that these groups were trusts
or cartels which operated with state consent to the detriment of
the lower classes. Franco was never a developmentalist dictator,
and neither was Peron. They were two militarists whose principal
objectives were political: to impose order on what they
considered to be a conflict-ridden society and world. In Spain
the idea of autarky mimicked the ethos of the military regime and
the unstable postwar situation in Europe, but, in fact, there was
17no elaborate ideology behind it .
IV.2. THE STABILISATION PLAN
Around 1950, the usefulness of autarky began to be 
questioned. GNP was still below the level of 1935 and 
interventionism did not seem to be justified by its economic
results. Eleven years after the Civil War, the Spanish people
18were still living under a harsh postwar regime , and there was 
no sign of improvement. In 1947, an illegal strike in the Basque 
Country and its echoes in other cities convinced the government 
that repression by itself was not enough to maintain order. 
Meanwhile, important changes were taking place in neighbouring 
countries. In 1948 NATO and the Marshall Plan were launched, but 
the economic sanctions in force against the Franco regime meant 
that Spain would not be included in any European project.
However, the Cold War brought about a change in 
international attitudes towards Spain, whose dictatorship was
^ See Linz, 1978.
18For example, food rationing was still in force until 1951.
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criticised but preferred to communist rule. Meanwhile, the image
of the USA was improving among the Spanish elite. As in
Argentina, the military realised the advantages of a strategic
alliance with the West. In February 1949, the Chase National Bank
granted Spain a credit of 25 million pesetas to cover imports 
19from the USA , and so, the advantages of co-operation were made 
clear.
In 1951, there was an important change within the 
government. Carrero Blanco, an Opus Dei member who was later to 
become a decisive figure in Spanish politics, was appointed 
Presidential Secretary. Also, the Catholic-Liberal Ruiz-Gimenez, 
who was also to play an important role in the transition to 
democracy, took charge of the Ministry of Education, and Arburua, 
a technocrat with links to finance, became head of the Ministry 
of Commerce. In 1957, yet another important governmental change 
made Navarro Rubio Minister of Finance and Ullastres Minister of 
Commerce. These people formed the cradle in which important 
future changes were nurtured. By this time, opposition guerrillas 
had been totally crushed, and the Civil War was relegated to the 
past. A new generation of students and technocrats began to see 
economic (and if necessary political) change as vital for the 
country. Therefore, when these transitional political figures won 
positions of power, they confronted the traditional Falange 
government in a very diplomatic manner. They defined their role 
as apolitical technocrats, and presented economic reforms as 
inevitable; social welfare and economic growth were necessary to 
re-establish confidence in the government. Since the majority of 
these young technocrats belonged to the conservative Opus Dei and
^Tamames, 1986:567
the greater part of the government’s bureaucrats possessed little 
knowledge of economics) Franco ended by accepting and supporting 
them as a means to political survival. Thus, the Falange had to 
share political power with a new group. International pressure 
was also an important tool for the technocrats of Opus Dei in 
legitimising their role. In 1958, Spain joined the World Bank, 
the OECD and the IMF. It was then that the IMF sent a delegation 
to Spain: their report pointed to economic distortions and
recommended a package of reforms. This was the beginning of the 
1959 Stabilisation Plan.
The 1959 Stabilisation Plan involved a radical change in
20Spain’s economic policy. According to Fuentes Quintana , there 
have been two fundamental events in Spain’s twentieth century 
economic history -the 1959 Stabilisation Plan and the country’s 
entry into the EC. The objectives pf the Plan objectives were: 
(a) the reduction of inflation through restrictive monetary 
policy and a public and private pay freeze; (b) devaluation of 
the peseta to make the exchange rate more realistic, in turn 
reducing imports and boosting exports; (c) tax reform; (d) credit 
reform; and (e) restructuring the framework of industrial 
relations. Of these objectives, only two were really carried out: 
(a) and (b). However, perhaps the most important thing about the 
plan was the change that it represented in the government’s 
orientation and attitudes. The plan sparked a period of economic 
growth which lasted until 1974-75 (table II.2), although it must 
be remembered that high growth rates in this period also reflect 
preceding economic stagnation. Growth was stimulated by a gradual 
opening up towards the outside. This release from isolation
^Fuentes Quintana, 1991:4.
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resulted in a number of decisive effects in terms of the 
importation of technology and the exportation of services, like 
tourism.
From a political perspective, there were two relative losers 
in this adjustment policy - workers and the landowners. The 
Stabilisation Plan pushed wages down even further; discontent 
grew and was brutally repressed. However, the trend of wages over 
time shows that wages did increase substantially later on; in the 
medium term the workers did benefit from the Opus Dei economic 
programme. As it regards landowners (except those of the 
efficient Mediterranean area), profits were dependent on 
excessive protection and differential pricing, which could not 
be maintained since these were the principal causes of Spain’s 
structural inflation.
The Stabilisation Plan was a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for economic development. Its role has been 
exaggerated, leading to the neglect of other decisive factors. 
Cultural values are not usually considered in economic analyses, 
or only marginally, due to the impossibility of quantifying their 
effect. However, in the Spanish case they were a key factor. The 
roots of a sense of backwardness and the deification of a urban- 
industrial lifestyle in the minds of the Spanish people are among 
the basic elements of Spain’s developmentalism. The action of 
holding more than one job (pluriempleo) and migration from the 
countryside to the towns and overseas are prime examples of the 
initiative of a generation which saw modernisation as a personal 
adventure.
On a factual level, this spirit of developmentalism can be
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seen above all in two areas, an almost unlimited supply of labour
and a growth in domestic demand. Regarding the former, the exodus
from the countryside to the towns was massive,for example, from
1950 to 1975 the proportion of the economically active population
engaged in agriculture fell from 47.6% to 21.7%, a reduction
21which took half a century in France . In addition, it is
necessary to recall that many workers held more than one job,
although no data exist on the subject, thereby implying a growth
in real household purchasing power. Meanwhile, the entry of women
into paid employment must also be considered. During the 1960-70
period, it is estimated that one million women entered the labour
market, amounting to some 10% of the economically active
population. On the other hand, overseas emigration was very
intense. More than a million and a half workers emigrated
officially to Europe, representing 80% of the total emigration.
The effect on the balance of payments was important, accounting
22for 30% of total foreign exchange earnings . The growth of 
domestic demand as a result of the personal desire for change was 
one of the chief driving forces behind the country’s economic 
development. Also, the growth in consumption increased in line 
with the rise in wages, while also allowing scope for national 
savings (tables 1.3 and IV.4).
Hence, economic growth during the period was predicated on 
a surplus supply of labour, financial resources (domestic 
savings, remittances, tourism and foreign direct investment), 
sustained market expansion and the beneficial proximity of the 
EC. Care must be taken not to commit the error of retrospective
21Fuentes Quintana, 1991:14. 
22Alonso, 1991:330.
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fdeterminism, namely stressing only those factors that promoted 
economic growth and assuming that this was the only possible 
outcome. Reality, of course, was much more complex. At the time, 
official optimism about development was not sustained. In the 
short-run, the system proved highly unstable. There was a 
balance of payments crisis and inflation, a situation 
superficially similar to the economics of stop-go in Argentina. 
Secondly, the effects of the oil crisis and the world recession 
came at a time of political instability, resulting from the death 
of General Franco and an overall uncertainty of the transition 
in process.
Theoretically, the economic programme was regulated through
three Development Plans: 1964-67, 1969-71 and 1972-75. From the
start of the stabilisation, Opus Dei technocrats assumed that
planning would be necessary future development. To this end, the
government solicited a World Bank study in 1960. However, the
plans were conceived along the lines of French indicative 
23planning , and involved a reversal of the tendency towards
economic liberalisation initiated with the 1959 Stabilisation
24Plan. As Preston comments , the economic development of the 
1960s occurred almost in spite of the over-cautious 
interventionist attitude of Opus Dei policy-makers.
The implementation of the three plans raises two immediate
23After World War II, state intervention took many forms. In the USA it 
was mainly forms of indirect investment promotion; in the UK, nationalisation 
and joint ventures; in France, indicative planning. This idea was conceived 
by J. Monnet in the 1940s and was adopted by De Gaulle as a means to restore 
la grandeur francaise after the war. Indicative planning was based on creating 
a planning body which could bring together employers, unions and technocrats 
from the state administration to draw up a coordinated development programme.
^Preston, 1990_141.
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questions: why was the process of liberalisation halted; why the 
application of the French model, given that it is one of the most 
politicised planning models and requires social reconciliation 
and representation? With its vertical trade unions autonomous 
administration, the Spainish dictatorship had little in common 
with the French democracy. Therefore, it would have been easier 
to turn to a more technocratic, apolitical and dirigiste model 
of development. One explanation is the predominance of French 
cultural and political in Spain. Although, this should not be 
exaggerated given the indication of other patterns of development 
in the World Bank report. Other explanation are of a more 
political nature. The process of incorporating Opus Dei into the 
government did not involve substituting one elite for another, 
but rather the integration of a new elite into the political 
arena. That is why the liberalisation embarked upon by the 
technocrats of Opus Dei was limited by the framework of the 
political regime. They could change its organisation, or distort 
the market where necessary, so long as they avoided broad 
political reforms, reforms which could have cost the "development 
men” [political] power. In this way, the ideas of French 
indicative planning were much better suited to the Falangist 
model of society. A protector state mediating between social 
groups for the common good, namely the theoretical construct 
employed by the Spanish elite to justifying social regulation and 
the protection of corporatist interests. In this manner, the 
Cortes Organicas (the non-elective "organic” parliament) approved 
the first development plan .
The process of liberalisation required the dismantling of
25Law of 27/12/63.
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state intervention in areas such as the labour market, the tax
system, and the financial and industrial sectors. This
dismantling could have jeopardised the survival of the Franco
regime. Maintaining what Fuentes Quintana has termed
"discretional interventionism", the system’s implicit pact was
preserved: "employment stability and wage growth permitted by
development bought off the unions while privileged financing,
limitations on competition and reduced tax pressure won the
26political support of the employers" . The pattern of 
intervention carried out by the technocrats in the 1960s had its 
raison d ’etre: all social groups were benefitting relatively,
although growth was below what was potentially attainable. The 
mistake, however, lay in not foreseeing the difficulty in 
maintaining distortions in the face of any change in the 
international economy, as happened in the 1970s when the domestic 
economy experienced a profound crisis.
An analysis of the three development plans shows that their 
effective was very limited. Primarily, there was a real gap
between predictions and results, so much so that it remains
27doubtful just how "indicative" the plans truly were . For this 
reason, the second plan (1969-71) introduced what were called 
"warning signals", a series of basic economic indices which were 
allowed to fluctuate within set limits. For example, the price 
index would give a warning signal if it rose 2% above the figure
^Fuentes Quintana, 1991:19.
27For example, in the first plan (1964-67), public investment was just 
77.7% of the planned level. Similarly with private investment: the 
construction sector grew by 25% in 1963-64 when the plan estimated 8%, and 
tourism brought a 39.2% increase in foreign exchange earnings, compared to the 
predicted 10.9%. What was worse, however, was the lack of control over the 
general price index and the cost of living, which went up by 17% and 40% 
respectively during the four years (Tamames, 1990:57-67).
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for the previous quarter. As Tamames notes, this "was practically
a publicity formula, so that from time to time the press would
28remember that ‘there is a plan*" . This raises questions 
concerning the extent of government control over the economy and 
the politics of control. Was the governing elite "claiming" the 
credit for successes achieved by the independent action of 
others? It could be argued that economic growth occurred despite 
the plans.
The gap between the official economy and the real economy 
was increasingly obvious. The third and fourth Plans (1972-75 and 
1976-80 respectively, the latter never being implemented due to 
the death of Franco) displayed a different character in that they 
raised the issue of structural economic change and the 
suitability of less autocentric development strategies such as 
investment selectivity, greater rigour in the allocation of 
resources, the competitiveness of the system, the importance of 
social factors, the elimination of political factors in the 
determination of prices, and economic integration into the rest 
of Europe. However, the political weakness of the regime limited 
the impetus of these plans. Finally, with the change of 
government of 13/12/75 the Ministry of Planning and Development 
came to an end, and was officially dissolved in January 1976.
The period 1960-73 was not one of uninterrupted growth. Like 
Argentina, Spain was an example of stop-go. Short-lived phases 
of economic growth led to the overheating of the economy and 
disequilibria in the external sector. The most important of such 
periods were 1967-68 and 1971-72 (see table 1.3). Inflationary
^Tamames, 1990: 62.
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pressure was reduced through contractive measures, generating a 
short recession. Yet, the system functioned. It was at the end 
of 1973 that it entered into crisis. The reasons were both 
internal, and external. As noted in Chapter II, the rise in the 
price of oil, international inflation and increases in interest 
rates progressively undermined the stability of the system. 
Internally, the causes were political, for instance, the increase 
in social tensions and the assassination of the regime’s heir 
apparent, Head of Government Admiral Carrero Blanco. The 
combination of economic crisis and political crisis meant that 
appropriate adjustments were not made. General Franco became 
seriously ill, and the country was beset by political 
confrontation.
At first, the popular response to economic growth had been
to accept the regime, as the Opus Dei technocrats had expected.
In 1966 there was a referendum to secure Franco’s continued rule,
and although manipulation was obvious, since the government
launched an incredible propaganda campaign, 95.6% voted "yes".
The PCE, the principal opposition to the regime since the Civil
War, was in a crisis due to the severe repression it had suffered
and due to the improved conditions for the working class after 
29the 1959 plan . Therefore, the regime was much more accepted in 
the 1960s than has often been supposed. As Balzac noted: "those 
who read about the French Revolution will never know the great 
changes of opinion that took place at that time. The need for
29This does not mean that the government showed signs of political 
tolerance. In fact, there were a couple of cases where the continued 
repression jeopardised Spain’s international image. The first was the brutal 
torture and execution of the communist J. Grimau in 1963, and the second was 
the murder by strangulation of the anarchists F. Granados and J. Delgado. Both 
incidents were given very little publicity, of course, since the regime was 
trying to portray to the outside world a tourist image of the country - 
flamenco, beaches and the successes of Real Madrid F.C. (Preston, 1986:11).
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peace and prosperity after a period of violent upheaval caused 
the cruellest crimes to be completely forgiven" (from "A Sinister 
Affair"). Franco was never loved by the Spanish people -he 
belonged to the folklore of the 1930s-40s, but the average 
Spaniard was inclined to political amnesia whenever there arose 
possibilities for developing other activities.
In 1969 Franco grew ill and Carrero Blanco, a member of Opus 
Dei, became head of Government. The question of political 
succession started to be mooted. The only group openly opposed 
to democracy was the traditional faction of the Falange. The rest 
of the political and social groups in power, from the Opus Dei 
to the liberal factions of the Church and the Falange, to the 
banks, businesses and students, showed differing degrees of 
acceptance of a transition to democracy. Thus on 22 July 1969 don 
Juan Carlos was proclaimed future king and successor, though this 
was not without its critics. The left (PCE/PSOE) considered him 
a puppet of Francoism. It turned out to be more problematic for 
the traditionalist faction of the Falange, which found itself out 
of the political game. Two weeks later, on August 10, the Falange 
denounced the scandal of the MATESA affair, which implicated Opus 
Dei in the fraudulent use of state funds for the export of 
textile machinery. On the 29th of October Franco's condition 
deteriorated, giving carte blanche to Carrero Blanco, who 
immediately replaced all those ministers opposed to Opus Dei and 
the transition. The Falange and its supporters, fundamentally in 
the Armed and Police, Forces began to act on their own, beyond 
government control. Social and political repression grew, and, 
as a consequence, so did uncertainty about the future political 
transition.
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Politics took priority over economics. The first response 
to the crisis was the so-called "compensatory policy" based on 
price intervention in order to avoid new rises in inflation, 
subsidies on energy consumption, a boost to domestic demand to 
compensate for the fall in overseas demand, and an increase of 
wages in order to alleviate social tension. The consequences of 
these measures were diverse. Petrol consumption increased as did 
the budget deficit. The position of the external accounts 
deteriorated. Yet the mass of the population acted as if the 
crisis did not exist, thereby laying the base for future economic 
problems. The Franco regime was in its death throes and was 
leaving the difficult job of adjustment to the next government.
Thus the transition took place in Spain at a time of 
profound economic crisis. In this delicate situation, the 
provisional governments of Arias Navarro and A. Suarez (Nov. 1975 
to June 1977) followed permissive economic policies. The first 
democratic elections for many years were held with inflation at 
16.9% in 1975 (rising to 24.5% in 1977), with a marked balance 
of payments deficit, and a fall in the rate of growth down from 
6.4% p.a. for the period 1964-74 to 1.8% p.a. in 1975-78 (growth 
would be negative in 1979). Unemployment grew from 396,000 in 
1974 to 2,204,000 in 1982, while real labour costs per worker 
rose by 190% between 1970 and 1982 (table IV.4). As in Argentina, 
the economic situation did not provide a favourable setting for 
a successful political transition.
IV.3. FUENTES QUINTANA (1977-MARCH 1978)
THE ADJUSTMENT: THE MONCLOA PACTS
In the first two general elections in 1977 and 1979, the UCD 
won a third of the votes. This was due to A. Suarez’s leadership
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1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
TABLE XV.X. z
Spa 1 n z evolution of tlie main 
macroeconomic aggregates, 1976—
9  2 .
GNP GNP A  FISCAL BUDGET X PUBLIC CENTRAL BANK INTEREST
OOO Mill. per capita GNP PRESSURE DEFICIT DEBT/GNP RESERVE RATE, 3
pesetas 7. GNP (*) X GNP U*S millions MONTHS
6849 191,2 3,3 • • -0,0 0,00 4952 • •
8695 239,8 3,0 • • -2,1 16,18 6132 15,5
10751 293,2 1/4 24,3 -1/5 14,97 10015 17,6
12529 338,7 -0,1 25,4 -1/8 16,13 13117 15,5
15209 408,1 1,2 26,7 -2,8 20,22 12358 16,4
16989 450,Q -0,2 27,9 -3,0 22,46 15337 16,2
19567 515,3 1,2 27,9 -5,4 25,97 11530 16,3
22235 582,6 1,8 30,1 -5,2 29,60 11228 20,0
25111 655,2 1/8 30,4 -5,5 34,79 15778 14,9
28201 733,0 2,3 31,2 -6,5 38,89 13301 12,2
32324 837,3 3,3 32,0 -5,2 39,02 16001 11/7
36144 933,6 5,2 33,8 -4,4 42,55 30172 15,8
40164 1034,9 5,0 33,5 -3,2 38,42 39875 11,6
45025 1157,8 4,5 35,0 -2,5 37,56 44422 15,0
50074 1285,3 3,7 33,9 -2,8 37,52 53104 15,1
54775 1403,6 2,3 34,1 -2,9 37,79 66283 13,2
58677 1501,2 1/0 33,3 -2,6 39,98 50484 13,3
Source: GNP: INE
Others: Banco de Espana.
(*) includes social security and taxes.
TABLE XV.4. Z
SpaXn: evolution of labour
indicators, 1976—92 -
YEAR
TOTAL
POPULATION
(000)
WORKING 
AGE POP. 
(000)
ACTIVE • 
POP. 
(000)
EMPLOYED
POP.
(000)
UNEMPLOY­
MENT 
RATE (7.)
A  ANNUAL 
WAGES
&
PRODUC­
TIVITY
1976 35824 26724 13120 12544 4,39 19,3 • •
1977 36256 26962 13172 12432 5,62 25,0 4,05
1978 36667 . 27284 13172 12180 7,53 20,6 4,78
1979 36995 27482 13101 11896 9,20 14,1 4,40
1980 37272 26737 12660 11404 9,92 15,3 7,31
1981 37751 27115 13045 11172 14,36 13,1 4,50
1982 37970 27483 13206 11061 16,24 12,0 6,31
1983 38162 27837 13353 10984 17,74 11,4 6,45
1984 38328 28203 13437 10668 20,61 7,8 8,37
1985 38474 28583 13542 10571 21,94 7,9 7,92
1986 38604 28907 13813 10880 21,23 8,2 7,62
1987 38716 29306 14306 11368 20,54 6,5 5,16
1988 38809 29763 14620 11772 19,48 6,4 5,79
1989 38888 30173 14819 12258 17,28 7,8 6,54
1990 38959 30429 15019 12578 16,25 8,3 7,73
1991 39025 30690 15073 12609 16,35 7,9 9,13
1992 39085 30953 15142 12439 17,85 7,2 9,36
Source: Total population: INE.
Wage increases: Ministerio de Trabajo. 
Others: Encuesta Poblaci6n Activa.
and to the fact that his party, the UCD (Union of Centre-
Democrats), was a conglomeration of small moderate centre
parties. Enrique Fuentes-Quintana, an academic with no previous
political affiliation, was pushed to the fore as the Vice
President of the government. Fuentes-Quintana undertook the
necessary task of stabilising the economy. To this end, he drew
30up the so-called Moncloa Pacts , laying down the guidelines of 
an economic policy of adjustment and restructuring.
The Fuentes-Quintana package included three types of 
measures. The fundamental component was its stabilising content, 
based on the devaluation of the peseta, slowing down the growth 
of public consumption, putting a ceiling on the growth of the 
money supply, and imposing a wage limit in line with inflation. 
In order to compensate for the effects of the adjustment, an 
increase in public investment, a progressive extension of 
unemployment benefit coverage, increased financing of social 
security, tax reform increasing the weight of progressive direct 
taxes, expansion of free education and the promotion of public 
housing were planned. Finally, there were a group of measures 
aimed at rationalising the economic system through the control 
of public expenditures, reform of social security, reform of the 
financial system, a programme of legal actions in agriculture, 
as well as, a new energy policy.
From the viewpoint of economic adjustment, the Moncloa Pacts 
were successful. Annual inflation was halved (from 30% in July 
1977 to 16.5% in December 1978), the balance of payments showed 
a surplus in 1978, and tax reform was underway. Yet the Moncloa
30The first attempt of a social pact since the Civil War. The name 
Moncloa refers to the Spanish Parliament Palace where the pact was signed.
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Pacts involved much more than just a policy of economic
adjustment. They laid the basis for the consolidation of a new
societal order based on social bargaining. It was a matter of
state importance to get out of the crisis, rather than a party
policy, and this was achieved thanks to the agreement of all
political groups; in other words it was what has been called
31"consociational democracy" . There is an extensive comparative
literature on this subject (primarily O ’Donnell, Schmitter and
Whitehead, 1986). The process of transition in Spain is compared
favourably with that of other countries. However, the Moncloa
Pacts were not social pacts stricto sensu. It was in the same
year, 1977, that the vertical unions were dismantled and the
right to organise was recognised. Given the existing
institutional and organisational confusion, the initiative was
political rather than social. It was the political parties that
32signed the Moncloa Pacts . The paradox of the Spanish case is 
that social democratic ideas were accepted as the most 
appropriate for the economic and political transition, but, in 
the absence of a consolidated system of pressure groups, the 
state itself promoted and institutionalised the relations between
^See Lijphardt, 1974.
32The reason that all the political parties signed was due to a 
political master stroke by President A. Suarez. The left was initially opposed 
to the Moncloa Pacts, since they were not pacts and, besides, they stood for 
the policy of adjustment. However, Suarez pressured Carrillo -leader of the 
PCE- to endorse them as a sign of democratic public spirit to confirm the 
recent legalisation of the PCE. Once this had been achieveed ., PSOE was left 
on its own, and ended up signing the Pacts. In any case, if the PCE and PSOE 
accepted the austerity plan, it was to the extent that the Pacts also 
promised, among other things, changes in union structure, the handing back of 
union funds confiscated in the Civil War and democratic control over the 
social security budget (Maravall, 1985). Once established, the various
social groups accepted the Pacts -in the case of the unions because of the 
promise of wage indexation. Strangely, it was the CCOO rather than UGT who 
welcomed the Pacts more. But in just one year the unions were demonstrating 
against the government’s policy (from the interview to LagoCarballo, previous 
vice-Minister of Education of Spain, 1980-82).
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the various social groups. "Neocorporatism" served to advance 
liberalisation rather than social democracy overturn corporate 
institutionalism.
The formation of pressure groups was, after all, rather
recent in Spain. The CEOE (Spanish Confederation of Employers*
Organisations) coordinated employers in the industrial and
service sectors from 1977 onwards (table IV.6 ). Its strategic
strength lies in the fact that it is a single united employers*
body in the face of other social groups. However, there are
strong tensions within CEOE, given the different interests of
some sectors of industry as well as between small and medium
businesses and the big firms. The formation of the CEOE should
be seens as an attempt to gain time by a group of business
leaders who were worried by the role played by the trade unions
33in the transition . Thus the organisation was more suited to
the role of collective bargaining, rather than acting as a
34pressure group given the diversity of interest within it .
With respect to agriculture, the situation is the reverse. 
Initially, various professional organisations were formed, which 
in the course of time were reduced to five (CNAG, CNJA, , COAG and 
APA-FTT). This diversity has resulted in difficulties in 
establishing a common front for negotiations. The question is 
even more complex when we introduce the old Chambers of Commerce 
and Agrarian Chambers, established under Franco and still not 
eliminated and whose domains at times clash with the new
33 *C. Ferrer Salat (from Fomento del Trabajo Nacional), A. Rodriguez
Sahagun (CEE), F. Mansilla (CGE) and N. Mazin (AEI).
^Pardo & Fernandez, 1991:157.
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«ir
employers* organisations .
In the case of the unions, the phenomenon of the
proliferation of numerous associations also appeared at the start
of the transition. Finally, two major union organisations were
consolidated -UGT and CCOO, initially close to PSOE and PCE
36respectively . Nevertheless, it must be stressed that that
Spain has one of the lowest levels of union membership in 
37Europe. It is possible that the figure of 11% is too low, and
should be put around 15-20% of the wage earners at the end of the
is1980s . In 1982, CCOO accounted for 40.5% of the total union 
membership, and the UGT 37.4% (see table IV.7).
The Spanish unions are not representative if we take the 
level of membership as an indicator. However, if we analyse the 
union elections, it emerges that the workers* participation rate 
is 77%. However, this only represents 23% of total economically 
active population (see table IV.8 ). All these factors are 
relevant to the formation of neocorporatism in Spain; the unions 
have consolidated themselves as political delegations in which 
the workers show no interest in participating directly, but
^Giner & Perez Yruela, 1988:131-132.
^Alos and Lope, 1991:239.
37According to the European Social Institute, in 1986 the figure was 11% 
of the workforce as compared with 82% in Denmark (1986), 46% in the UK (1984), 
45% in Italy (1983), 43% in the former Federal Republic of Germany (1983), 35% 
in Greece and Portugal (1983) and 12-16% in France (1985). We must remember 
that in Argentina the level of union membership was 50.52% (Godio, 1991:427).
38The problem consists in the fact that the unions calculate the number 
of members by the number of membership cards issued, which considerably 
inflates the real figure -according to the unions the membership figure is 
between 40 and 45%. This is confirmed for some industrial sectors and regions, 
but not for all (Miguelez, 1991:219-220).
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nevertheless, they use them pragmatically as a means of making
their demands heard. This strategy has implications for the
institutionalising Spanish unions. They are organised along very
centralised lines, given that the union function is mediated
through political negotiation. Rank and file, committees,
sections and federations have not developed as they have in other 
39countries . Although centralisation is an effective strategy 
for political negotiation, at the same time it results in a loss 
of ability to secure deals at the firm level where important 
changes are taking place in production (staffing levels, work 
flexibility etc), without any consultation with the workers 
themselves^. This immaturity of Spanish trade unions has 
contributed to the stability of the political transition.
O ’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead refer to the Spanish 
transition as a model case of neocorporatism^. Although Spain 
is an example of a well managed transition, neocorporatism played 
an important, but not decisive, role. Pactismo could be applied 
in the country because of the disorientation and immaturity of 
various social groups, and also, because of the prospects of 
future prosperity held out by the EC. This is not to belittle the 
skill of Spanish politicians. The point is, however, that the 
experience may prove difficult to apply in other countries where 
lobbies have a long tradition, for example Argentina. An analysis 
of all the social pacts up until 1990 shows how irregular these 
parts were, and that it is not possible to speak of the
39Except in the most industrialised regions like Catalonia and the 
Basque Country. In the latter, the biggest union is neither CCOO nor UGT, but 
ELA-STV.
^Alos & Lope, 1991:219.
^ O ’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986b:38-39.
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institutionalisation of corporatism. Five social pacts were 
signed between 1977 and 1987. In only two of these cases did the 
major unions take part (ANE and AI). The CEOE intervened in all 
of them, and the government took part in only two of the 
agreements (ANE & AES). From 1987-1990, a period in which both 
the unions and the CEOE had been consolidating their 
organisations, the government did not achieve a single social 
pact. Given that there is no continuity in the formulas of the 
pacts, the social democratic system seems more an ideological 
justification of the policies carried out by the Spanish state, 
than a prerequisite for political and economic success.
PARTICIPANTS IN THE SOCIAL PACTS 
TRANSITION 1977-90
OF THE SPANISH
SOCIAL PACT PARTIES CEOE UGT CCOO GOVT
Moncloa, 1977 X X
AMI (Interconference 
Framework Agreement) 
1980-81
X X
ANE (National Agreement 
on Employment) 1982 X X X X
AI (Interconference 
Agreement) 1983 X X X
AES (Economic and Social 
Agreement) 1985-86 X X X
Politically, pactismo was a strategy restricted to the first 
years of the transition when there was a general awareness of the 
insecurity of democracy. The threat of a military coup and 
terrorist violence created an understanding amongst political
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42groups of the need to close ranks . However, as the PSOE became 
increasingly aware of its electoral strength, it moved away from 
consensus politics and began to play the role of an opposition. 
In the general elections of 1977 and 1979 alike, the level of 
support for both the UCD and PSOE stayed constant at 34% and 29%, 
respectively. In its party conferences in May and September of
1979, the PSOE began to reorient its policies, redefining itself 
as a modern socialist party along the lines of the German Social 
Democrats and transforming itself into an electoral alternative 
to the UCD.
IV.4. THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS PARALYSED
ABRIL MARTORELL and GARCIA DIEZ (MARCH 1978-DEC 1980) 
Already by 1978, the UCD began to experience a governmental 
crisis. In March, Fernando Abril-Martorell replaced Fuentes 
Quintana and reforms set out in the Moncloa Pacts were 
discontinued. Abril Martorell pursued conjunctural policies that 
were imposed in the face of disagreement between of the main 
employers* groups and trade unions.
The second oil crisis worsened the situation for the UCD 
government. The rise in the price of crude oil and the world 
recession resulted in stagnation and inflation. The effects of 
the austerity programme were added to those of the recession, and 
the decline in employment intensified. In order to counteract 
these effects, the government reversed some of the steps taken 
under Fuentes Quintana. This reversal allowed for a greater
42The terrorist group ETA alone produced 268 victims between 1977 and
1980. Apart from terrorism from regional separatist groups (like ETA), there 
were also groups from the extreme left and extreme right. As regards military 
pressure, in November 1978 a coup was foiled when "Operation Galaxy" was 
broken up. However, in February 1981 a (failed) coup d’etat did take place.
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permissiveness regarding tax fraud and a more generous tax 
deductions structure that would necessitate an increase in 
indirect taxes to maintain the level of tax receipts**.
The crisis of the UCD was manifested from 1980 as a double 
crisis of political and economic management. On the one hand, the 
multiparty nature of UCD posed problems of leadership, which 
culminated in the dismissal of Suarez in January 1981. Leopoldo 
Calvo-Sotelo assumed the presidency of the government. However, 
he did not share the popularity of his predecessor: 82% of voters 
considered him "too right wing" and he did not even run for the 
following presidential elections**. In the eyes of the 
electorate, General Tejero’s failed coup d ’etat only one month 
later, in February, was just one more sign of the weakness of the 
UCD government. In May 1980, PSOE had tabled a motion of censure 
on the handling of policies of employment, education, regional 
autonomy, and the then existing controls over the press. Although 
this motion was not passed by parliament, the next censure motion 
of April 1981 brought the government down. The UCD coalition was 
dissolved after the 1982 elections.
IV.5. BOYER: THE SOCIALIST ADJUSTMENT POLICY
The UCD’s loss of popularity and the general rejection of 
the right wing mentality by the Spanish people after the 
dictatorship meant that the PSOE won overwhelmingly in the 
October 1982 election (Table IV.9). This gave the party an 
absolute majority in both the Congress and the Senate and much 
greater room for for manoeuvre in implementing economic reform.
**Gonzalez-Calvet, 1991:152-159.
**Maravall, 1991:45.
167
The only constrain upon PSOE action was the danger of 
jeopardising future electoral prospects. From the point of view 
of political strategy, the PSOE played its cards well, because 
after a period of adjustment (1983-85), they returned to win with 
an absolute majority in the next general election of 1986, and 
also won with a relative majority in the following general 
elections of 1989 and 1993. This is particularly surprising when 
one considers that the PSOE’s 1982 election campaign was based 
on two promises: Spain’s immediate withdrawal from NATO and the 
creation of 800,000 new jobs. In 1986, Spain ratified its 
membership of NATO and official unemployment had risen to 
2,942,000. The paradox of the PSOE is still greater when it is 
realized that a socialist government saw itself faced with the 
task of carrying out a programme of economic liberalisation and 
adjustment in order to achieve entry into the EC.
The explanation of the PSOE’s electoral efficiency is found 
not only in the charisma of its leader Felipe Gonzdlez and the 
lack of charisma in the opposition figues but also in the 
collective historical memory of privileges and inequalities of 
Spanish right-wing authoritarianism. The PSOE electoral slogan, 
"Time for change", captured the spirit of developmentalist of the 
1960s-70s in order to show that "Spain is not different"^. Even 
today, the PSOE is still strongly identified with the rhetoric 
of European modernisation. Economic and political "normalisation" 
is a key strategic priority in understanding the economic policy 
of the socialist decade. Opinion polls show how the population 
assumed, and continues to assume, that economic adjustment and 
liberalisation as a necessary step to achieve economic
45This was a meaninful publicity slogan for turism promotion during the 
developmentalist period.
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prosperity, even at the costs of three million unemployed in
January 1993. The PSOE is seen as the least bad political
alternative. On the other hand, it is this drive towards
"European standards" that has made the government push for
Spain's rapid integration into the EEC without adequate
discussion or protection of national interests and a precipitate
46integration into the institutions of the Community . This 
"fight against time to achieve modernisation" explains the 
evolution of orthodox macroeconomic policies followed during the 
socialist period.
Miguel Boyer was the first socialist Minister of the 
Economy. His diagnosis of the Spanish economy did not differ from 
that of Fuentes Quintana: the country needed not only adjustment 
but also economic restructuring. This time the analysis was also 
backed up by reports from the OECD, IMF and the Bank of Spain. 
Thus the Minister's response to the PSOE's electoral promises was 
that in order to create 800,000 jobs in the medium-term, in the 
short-term it was necessary to reform the economic system. The 
policy of adjustment was based on reducing inflation, the balance 
of payments deficit and the budget deficits. The policy of 
reforms was subordinated to that of adjustment, and was to be 
gradual rather than radical. It was based fundamentally on the 
reorganisation of certain industrial sectors (private and 
public), reform of the financial system, measures to make the 
labour market more flexible, reform of social security and 
adjustment of the agricultural energy sectors. The basic idea 
behind these reforms was to prepare for the entry of Spain into 
the EC.
46For a crtical view of Spanish membership tino the Ec, see Alburquerque 
and Curbelo, 1993.
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The reduction of inflation was achieved thanks to a 
restrictive monetary policy, wage moderation and control over the 
price of specific products and services. The results of these 
measures were effective and inflation was reduced from 14.2% in 
1982 to 8.2% in 1985. Wage moderation was coordinated through the 
Interconference Agreement (AI, 1983), although in 1984 labour 
conflicts rose again due to the process of industrial 
restructuring and the fall in real wages (Table IV.4).
A second very important effect and instrument of the
restrictive monetary policy throughout the socialist period has
been the rise in interest rates. The need of financing the public
deficit was parallel to the need of a deflationary policy. Two
digit inflation during the transition resulted in nominal
interest rates being adjusted to changes in the price level. The
restrictive monetary policies, the fall in family savings in the
crisis and the increase in the budget deficit reinforced this
tendency of rising interest rates. In the Socialist period, real
interest rates in Spain were among the highest in Europe (Figures
IV. 1. and IV. 2) This attracted large sums of capital and
47increased the country’s foreign exchange reserves ,
compensating for the growing foreign debt and external deficit. 
However, it has had negative effects on business activity, 
traditionally financed through private bank loans. As will be 
shown in chapter V, many enterprises changed their financial 
pattern, so business profits went to debt repayment instead of 
industrial investment. Trying to compensate for the scarcity of
47In 1992, Spain had more than U$S 70 billion reserves. Even after the 
speculative maniouvres after the three sucesive devaluation of the peseta at 
the end of 1992-beginning of 1993, Spain was the fourth country of the OECD 
in terms of total quantity of reserves (U$S 45 billion), after Japan, Germany 
and the US, and was the first in the world relative to GNP and population (The 
Economist, 3/7/93).
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private financing, the PSOE took the initiative in promoting
subsidised loans to the private business sector through the old
Official Credit Institute (ICO). In 1987, the ICO accounted for
4811% of the total bank lending to the private sector .
The reduction of the external deficit was also successful, 
going from U$S -4,102 million in 1982 to U$S +3021 million in 
1985. This was due to the devaluation of the peseta in December 
1982, and to the subsequent floating of the exchange rate. These 
changes were geared to the long-term, since tariffs were being 
reformed at the same time as measures to promote exports were 
being adopted.
Attempts to reduce the public deficit did not achieve the
expected results. The planned measures were the continuation of
the tax reform begun in 1977 and the constriction of public
expenditure. The fiscal side will be discussed in the pages that
follow. As regards public expenditure, it grew instead of being
reduced, due to the marked expansion of local and regional
government, as well as the increase in expenditure on social
security and central government. 1985 was the year when public
expenditure reached its highpoint of the decade 1979-89 (6.5% of
the GNP). Despite this, the level of social security expenditure
was far below the EC average -around 20% of GNP along the
socialist period, compared to 26% in the EC. This backwardness
manifested itself in almost every field -health, education,
49transport, and housing . The other major factor behind the 
increased budget deficit was the cost of propping up the banks
^Ontiveros and Valero, 1991:406. 
^Gonzalez-Calvet, 1991:204-210.
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and of industrial reorganisation, which involved a limited but
necessary system of unemployment subsidies. In 1983 came the
, 50expropriation of the holding company RUMASA on tax grounds . 
The cost to the state was 560 billion ptas (1984 US $3.48 
billion) financed through the issuing of government debt^.
The RUMASA affair brings us to the problem of the financial
crisis that Spain experienced in the period 1978-85, the biggest
52banking crisis in postwar Europe . Of the 110 national banks 
that existed in 1977, only 58 survived by 1985 (Table IV. 10). The 
causes of the crisis were various: in an over-protected system, 
the bonanza of the 1960s led to irrational strategies like the 
over-expansion of the number of banking outlets and the less than 
prudent handling of financial activities -the so-called moral 
hazard syndrome. As liberalisation of the financial system got 
underway, the only way of compensating for losses resulting from
50The RUMASA holding company devoted itself to buying out bankrupt 
businesses, and in 1978 the government gave indication that it would not cover 
the losses if RUMASA overstretched itself. However, the company continued its 
policy. Its owner, Ruiz Mateos was a member of Opus Dei and from 1978 was 
considered the richest man in Spain. This was not actually the case, since it 
was due to what Ruiz Mateos had declared in the 1978 tax returns, but in 1982 
tax fraud was still 41%. The expropriation of his company and his subsequent 
imprisonment had an air of "exemplary punishment", showing other businessmen 
the government’s resolve. The expropriation could be seen as a positive step 
in so far as the financial situation of the company was precarious; however, 
the costs this entailed for the state and the way in which the company was 
reprivatised are open to serious criticism. It is paradoxical that the 
government ended up doing precisely what it had not wanted to do -cover 
RUMASA’s debts. On an anecdotal level, it may be noted that Ruiz Mateos was 
imprisoned in Germany and extradicted to Spain. In prison, his mental health 
deteriorated. Finally, he stood in the elections to the European parliament, 
winning a seat due to the popularity of his case. All else aside, the RUMASA 
case must be understood in the context of the financial crisis and the 
interventionist role played by the Spanish state to avoid the worst effects 
of liberalisation.
^Tamames, 1986:219.
^See Graham, 1984.
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increased competition was to raise the costs of intermediation. 
Meanwhile, this had to be understood in the Spanish context of 
very close ties between the banking and the industrial sectors - 
the RUMASA case being an extreme example of this- such that the 
1970s crisis in production dragged down with it many financial 
institutions.
The government thus found itself at a crossroads - either 
it had to let the laws of the market take their course and so 
abandon the banks to their fate, or it had to intervene to 
protect both depositors and businessmen and avoid a financial 
catastrophe which would, apart from anything else, have damaged 
the image of the country. The government opted for the latter 
course of action, intervening skilfully in the stabilisation of 
the banks. To this end, it created the Deposit Guarantee Fund
M
(FGD) , also known as the "banks’ hospital", which intervened
in the cases of 26 of the 51 bankrupt banks, 20 belonging to the
RUMASA group. Another four were taken over by bigger banks and
only one bank went into liquidation. Financial reform is a
further example of the gradualism and the skilful handling of the
economic transition. Once again, action by the Spanish state has
been considered as a model. But the costs of caution and
gradualism were high and implied a larger burden to the state and
sound banking houses (the costs of the RUMASA rescue package were
financed along equally by the FGD and the surviving private 
54banks) . Finally, as in Argentina, the result has been far 
greater concentration in the financial sector. At the end of the 
1980s, seven major banks controlled 80% of the country’s capital.
^Royal Decree 3,048/77. 
5401arra, 1989:211.
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However, social questions remained unsolved, and moreover 
unemployment, the Achilles Heel of the PSOE government, worsened. 
The causes of unemployment in the 1980s were various, and not all 
of them are related to the government's handling of the economy. 
The high population growth of the 1960s, the entry of women into 
the labour market and the return of migrant workers from Europe 
have produced a significant increase in the economically active 
population. On the other hand, industrial reorganisation, the 
move towards flexible working to raise productivity and the 
adjustment plans have increased the tendency towards higher 
unemployment, and these have been products of the Socialists' 
economic policies.
The peak came in 1985 when unemployment reached 21.5% of the 
economically active population, falling to 19.5% in 1988 and 
16.2% in 1989, but increasing again to 21% in 1993 (Table IV.4). 
These figures probably over-estimate the true level of 
unemployment, since there is an important informal sector 
comprised of unregistered small and medium size firms and in the 
agricultural and service sectors (tourism in particular). The 
Ministry of the Economy estimated the real rate of unemployment 
at 15.9% in 1986, 5.2% below the official figure. Even so, this 
is a very high figure and has provoked confrontation between the 
PSOE and the unions. The UGT had only just signed the AES social 
pact in 1985, and subsequently joined with CCOO to protest 
against the Socialist government's inadequate social policy. 
Furthermore, real unemployment rates may be pushed higher as the 
process of industrial restructuring caused a substantial number 
of workers to take early retirement.
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Inducing flexibility in the labour market undermined the
PSOE electoral promise to fight unemployment. One of the
government’s arguments about re-industrialisation has been the
lack of labour flexibility and high labour costs that act as a
disincentive to investment. Both arguments are not correct. With
respect to labour costs, they have been reduced 10.2% since 1985.
This makes Spain the country with the third cheapest industrial
labour costs in the EC after Portugal and Greece. Furthermore,
the labour market has become very flexible following the
socialist adjustment; half of the population over 16 survives
thanks to temporary contracts and to the existence of a
55traditional family unit. Wage reduction and increases in 
productivity did not promote an increase in employment, as 
forecasted by the socialist government. Wage moderation was 
exclusively an anti-inflationary mechanism without redistributive 
effects on job creation. In fact, the Spanish productive system 
has serious structural problems in increasing the number of 
jobs. As can be appreciated in table IV. 4, the quantity of 
"formal" employees has been constant since 1976. Neither the 
period of expansion (1986-91) nor the extension of flexible 
contracts has caused unemployment to fall below 16%.
The continuing problem of high levels of unemployment leads 
to a consideration of public social expenditure. Until 1960, 
public expenditure did not satisfy the demands of the Spanish 
society, because the regime was not under any democratic 
pressures. Even in the 1980s the situation with public services
55This has important social effects, like delayed marriages, decrease 
in natality rates, etc. as the demographer Livi-Bacci noted for Italy. 
Following the INE (National Institute of Statistics), the mean age to leave 
the parent’s home in Spain has become 29,5 years old (INE, 1993). The 
existence of family solidarity in traditional Spanish culture is one of the 
key explanations of young people’s survival during the 1980s.
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fell far short of meeting the needs of the population. In this
respect, the PSOE’s philosophy has been that economic efficiency
56is a precondition for meeting social needs . In contrast to
French or Greek socialism, which, to begin with, argued that
there was a ”third way" between capitalism and communism, the
PSOE has not embarked on any such experiment. On the contrary,
it has set its priority on economic soundness and has carried out
policies similar to those the Spanish right might have
implemented had it remained in power. Furthermore, due to the
absence of a significant political alternative, the Socialist
government has had sufficient political autonomy to implement
more radical measures with the object of closing the gap between
Spain and the rest of Europe and of generating stable economic
57growth. This has caused divisions within the party itself.
An analysis of public expenditure shows that social spending 
has grown during the transition from 9.9% of GNP in 1975 to 18% 
in 1992. The greatest increase has gone on pensions (from 3.5% 
of GNP in 1975 to 8.7% in 1989, with 10% predicted for 1993) and 
the lowest in health (from 4.0% of GNP in 1982 to 5.0% in 1992). 
Despite these increases, comparison with the other EC countries 
shows that only Portugal has a lower investment in social 
expenditure as a proportion of GNP (figure IV.3).
56Maravall, 1991:56-67.
57This has caused a confrontation between the President F. Gonzalez and 
the ex-Vice-Premier and vice-general secretary of the PSOE A. Guerra. In 
practice, there are questions of a political order in the background of the 
debate. Guerra resigned his position (January 1991) after a scandal over 
misappropriation of funds. Due to the structure of the party, where the top 
levels hold a lot of sway, this has divided the socialists into two blocs - 
"families". Given the fall of French socialism (March 1993), and given that 
liberal measures alienate social support, future divisions within PSOE are 
predictable.
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The balance between economic growth and social equality is 
one aspect of the PSOE's policy that is most open to criticism# 
Rather than aiming at a higher quality of services, the PSOE's 
policy has been for a quantitative expansion in order to extend 
the services to the greatest possible number of citizens, but 
with the lowest possible investment. It could be said that Spain 
has a limited welfare state system, where the typical welfare 
state institutions exist nominally, but their capacity and 
resources are much less than those existing in a mature system.
Cfl
This means that post-compulsory education became possible for 
30% more of the population than in 1982. This figure, added to 
the 45% increase experienced in the period 1975-82, has resulted 
in the over-crowdeding of universities. The same has occurred 
with medical services. After the 1986 General Law on Health, the 
system provided universal protection (a real increase of 6.3 
million people who benefited from the system between 1982 and 
1989). However, funding increased by a mere 1% of GNP in this 
same period (Table IV.13). It is interesting to refer to a 
particular strategy within the government's cultural policy which 
conforms to the same pattern of low expenditure and great 
expansion: in a time of economic stabilisation, with high
unemployment (47% for those under 25) freedom of expression, pop 
culture and various types of popular festivals were encouraged.
One of the political lessons to be drawn from the record of 
the PSOE administrations is that the enthusiasm about the 
transition to democracy and the awakening of civil liberties, 
above all in regimes where religious morality has been strong, 
can give wide sections of the population the necessary drive to
^14 and over; 16 and over after the LOGSE Law of 1990.
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bear the burden of economic adjustment. PSOE knew how to take 
advantage of this reservoir of goodwill: in other transitions
this popular enthusiasm has been rapidly dissipated, for example 
in Argentina under Alfonsin.^ An extensive literature^ has 
pointed out the problems of consolidating democracy in times of 
economic crisis. The Spanish case shows that although a bad 
economic setting is detrimental for a political transition, a 
political transition can be a good setting for economic 
adjustment and stabilisation.
The relationship between democracy and development has been
the subject of an intense academic polemic. Liberal-functionalist
thought upholds that democracy follows, given adequate levels of
61economic stability and development ; against this position,
62some Marxist authors argue the opposite , basing themselves on 
the experience of the Latin American dictatorships. This theory, 
known as "bureaucratic authoritarianism", maintains that 
development occurs precisely because of the high levels of 
political repression. Both approaches commit the error of 
economic determinism. The degree of independence of the economic 
and political spheres seems much greater, and the relations
59Another example of skillful political management is the gradual 
dismantling of controls over the means of communication. The UCD maintained 
the state monopoly over television, although it did allow independent 
broadcasts. The Socialists have continued this approach, and it was not until 
1990 that the government privatised TV and radio operations. In a country like 
Spain, where newspapers are not very widely read, the importance of 
controlling TV news is vital. According to an estimate by the daily newspaper, 
El Pais, in 1984 47.1% of the news reports were on the progress of the 
government, to the detriment of information on unions, conflicts, employers, 
other parties etc (El Pais, 5/12/84).
^Kaufman, 1985; Kaufman & Stallings, 1989.
^Lipset, 1960.
^ O ’Donnell, 1979.
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between them much more complex, than has been thought. The 
Spanish transition shows how political development can move ahead 
of economic development, measured in terms of housing, education, 
size of-the middle class, etc.
Returning to the account of the economic transition, even 
though social expenditures had been low, at 43% of GNP the cost 
of Public Administration in 1987 was considerably above the OECD 
average. Spending priorities have targetted the expansion of 
regional bureaucracy, industrial reorganisation and financial 
stabilisation. The last point was dealt with above, and 
industrial restructuring will be the core of chapter V. With 
respect to the Administraciones Territoriales (regional 
administrations), these were developed under the PSOE and 
currently take up 25% of public expenditure . The 
administrative system inherited from the times of Franco was 
over-centralised, so the creation of a new bureaucratic network 
and structure not only helped legitimise the democratic regime 
but also created jobs and eased regional nationalistic tensions. 
Between 1977 and 1985, the public sector generated 45,000 new 
jobs; but the pay of administrative workers has been relatively 
low. On the other hand it is to be remembered that the national 
question had been one of the problems left unresolved by the UCD 
government, and not only in terms of Basque terrorism or Catalan 
separatism (both also unresolved under PSOE), but also with the 
appearance of mythological patrias (fatherlands) and regional 
claims in areas with no former nationalist tradition -like 
Andalucia, Aragon and Valencia. Although the extension and/or 
broadening of local bureaucracies has fed back into these
^See Gonzalez-Calvet, 1991.
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incipient nationalisms) it has also channelled political 
energies, stabilising the democratic regime and consolidating the 
PSOE’s own influence in the country. This is another example of 
skilful political strategy: by incorporating nationalisms new and 
old into the political arena, they come to be seen by the people 
as achievements associated with the return of civil liberties 
under democracy. They appear, therefore, as a victory for the 
system, and act as a counterweight for the adverse social effects 
of economic adjustment.
IV.6. SOLCHAGA: EXPANSION AND LIBERALISATION
At the end of 1985, once the economy was stabilised, Boyer 
was replaced at the Ministry of Economy by Carlos Solchaga. 
However, entry into the EC required the continuation of economic 
liberalisation. Solchaga had headed the Ministry of Industry 
during the previous PSOE’s Administration, and was responsible 
for the implementation of the harsher phases of industrial 
restructuring.
The idea of joining the European Community had been present
throughout the transition. It was the project par excellence of
each of the main political parties. Entry was an objective that
had been around since the days of developmental ism and was an
idea that had been sustained for three decades - Europe was
"modernisation". Despite Spain’s entry into the EC being denied
in the 1960s due to the economic sanctions against the
dictatorship, the Opus Dei government obtained a Preferential
64Agreement in 1970 , linking Spain to the Community even if only 
64The Preferential Agreement was a commercial treaty through which 
tariff reductions were agreed on by both parties. These concessions were 
greater on the part of the EC (from 40% to 70% for Spanish industrial 
products) than on the part of Spain (from 25% to 60%), and so it was a
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peripherally. Finally, it was the Socialist government which had 
the political "success" of signing the Act of Admission in 1986. 
It is interesting to analyze this drive given that there was no 
significant debate over the suitability of Spain’s entry into the 
EC nor the of the later incorporation into the EMS. The benefits 
were simply taken for granted. Awareness of the costs and risks 
of joining only appeared afterwards.
As previously indicated, the signing date of the Treaty of
Admission was January 1986. It is no accident that it was the
same year as the ratification of Spain’s membership of NATO. For
ideological reasons -basically the generalised anti-militarism
after the dictatorship- Spain’s immediate exit from the Atlantic
alliance was a programmatic principle for the PSOE in the 1982
elections. However, once in government, the PSOE reconsidered the
question and in the State of the Nation debate in October of 1984
put forward a new policy on the matter. This amounted to Spain
maintaining its membership of NATO, but demanding a reduction in
US troops within its territory. This ideological turn-about did
not come about solely from diplomatic motives, but also because
of the delicate relations between the government and the
military. Staying in NATO incorporated the military into the
European democratic project, and reduced tensions concerning the
reduction of military expenditure and the power of the Armed
Forces. Faced with the danger of losing political confidence
65because of failure to keep to election promises , the PSOE 
decided to call a referendum on the question. This was a risky
beneficial treaty for the country. Spain confined itself to substituting 
Community products for its imports, while it substantially increased its 
exports (Montes, 1991:245-246).
65The other electoral promise being reduction of unemployment, which in 
fact increased its rate from 16.2% in 1982 to 21,9% in 1985.
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political manoeuvre; in the same circumstances, PASOK did not 
dare call a referendum in Greece. The opposition on both the left 
and the right launched a very tough campaign against PSOE. As a 
result the referendum was converted into a vote of confidence in 
the government. Some 53% of the population gave their support 
to the PSOE’s policy. In July 1985, only 20% of the electorate 
had been in favour of remaining in NATO, 46% were in favour of
ge
pulling out, and 34% did not know or did not reply . Thus, the 
PSOE reaffirmed its political support with this Pyrrhic victory.
The PSOE was anxious to negotiate Spain’s entry into the EC, 
but the Community was experiencing a period of recession. For 
Brussels the incorporation of Spain and Portugal was not a matter 
of priority. This inequality in the negotiations was reflected 
in the content of the agreement, whose terms were not the most 
favourable that Spain and Portugal might have been able to secure 
in a less asymmetric bargaining environment.
Thus in 1986 a seven year transition was agreed for 
accommodating the country into the Community. Three fundamental 
areas were marked for this transition -tariffs, indirect taxation 
and administrative policy. The problem with integrating Spain and 
Portugal into the EC was that the transition period coincided 
with preparation for the Act of Union of December 31st 1992, 
involving the process of adjustment in all the economies of the 
Community. That is to say, the Spanish and Portuguese economies 
have had to be doubly adaptable, since they had simultaneously 
to bring into line their domestic markets, their monetary 
capacity, along with harmonising their economic, social, R&D and
66Maravall, 1991:53-54.
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ecological projects. This question was dealt within Chapter II.
One of the most relevant effects of entry was the
introduction of Value Added Tax. The tax system was being
reformed very slowly during the transition. It was in 1986, with
the introduction of VAT, that Fuentes Quintana’s 1973-76 plans
were completed. The expected inflationary effect was almost non­
et
existent. On the other hand, 1987 was the first year in recent 
Spanish history that direct taxes brought in a greater amount 
than indirect taxes (see Table IV.11). In overall terms, this 
involved an important step towards a progressive taxation policy. 
Nevertheless, the growth in tax returns in this year was not due 
to an increase in the individual tax burden, but rather to a 
reduction of fraud. The introduction of VAT and the growing 
governmental threat to tax evaders led to the emergence of a 
million and a half new contributors. However, compared to Europe, 
the tax burden in Spain is still low (Table IV.12). Moreover, 
Spain is a country where the informal and hidden economy is 
estimated to account for 21.9% of employment, and this sector 
escapes fiscal control.
A more detailed analysis raises doubts about the progressive 
extent of the tax reform. Indirect tax is still 2% above direct 
taxation, the reverse of the EC average. The government has been 
wary when it comes to interfering with the distribution of 
income. There are three reasons for this: the control of
inflation, control of the public deficit and the aim of economic 
growth. Tax rates have risen proportionally more for low incomes
67Martinez Cortina, 1991:45-47. The reasons have not been studied in 
depth. Two main hypothesis were pointed in the national economic press: (a) 
fraud, and (b) enterpreneurs reduced the margin of benefits so consumption 
would not be reduced by sharp increase in prices.
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than for average incomes. The PSOE bought uncritically Laffer*s
argument that redistribution through progressive taxation
conflicts with boosting economic growth because it may be a
disincentive to entrepreneurial activity; therefore,
redistribution should be carried out through public expenditure
and by spreading progressiveness through inheritance and wealth
taxes. However, these taxes are not high in Spain, and as
previously shown, public social expenditure continues to be
insufficient. Since tax fraud remains extensive, the
progressiveness falls on those workers or salaried professionals
68whose money incomes cannot be falsified . In 1991, this group 
accounted for 77% of the total income tax receipts. Data from 
Direccion General de Tributos (General Tax Directorate) shows 
that 47% of Spanish entrepreneurs declare their annual earnings 
below the minimum official working wage! (DGT, 1993).
In 1986, Spain entered into a period of economic expansion. 
This was occurring at the same time as a global economic recovery 
due to the fall in oil prices. However, domestic factors were the 
principal cause of the boom, fundamentally an expansion in the 
home market and not, as anticipated, increased exports to the EC. 
In fact, integration into the EC has caused an important deficit 
in the balance of payments. External demand had been 
progressively boosting the Spanish economy until 1984, but began 
to fall in the following year. Imports grew by 65.4% from 1985 
to 1989, while exports grew only 28%, resulting in the balance 
of trade being negative in 1985 (-1,006 billion ptas) (Montes, 
1991). The external deficit has been compensated by capital 
imports due to the high interest rates and as a result of
^Gonzalez-Calvet, 1991:198-200.
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increased public borrowing. However, if the growth in domestic 
demand is not accompanied by an appropriate policy of export 
promotion, the negative effects will be seen not only in the 
external sector, but also in terms of growth and employment.
The growth of domestic demand was due fundamentally to the 
growth of public and private consumption and gross capital 
formation. Politically, initiating a period of expansion has been 
a positive policy in so far as it temporarily reduced 
unemployment (Table IV.4) and generated a certain redistribution 
of income, necessary after the period of economic adjustment. 
However, the danger of growth through spending was that it 
postponed the problem to the future, making stabilisation 
necessary in the next period^.
Direct investment has caused a spectacular jump in gross 
capital formation, rising from 164 billion ptas in 1985 to 667 
billion ptas in 1989. The effects on the industrial structure 
will be commented on in Chapter V. In any case, some 45.4% of 
these investments have been in construction, causing an enormous 
increase in the price of land in the major cities and thus 
generating inflationary pressures. This strong rise in fixed 
capital investment had very positive effects on construction and 
services, which have reacted spectacularly and have become the 
most dynamic sectors of the Spanish economy. However, this growth 
in the demand for property, aggravated by the speculation which 
developed in line with it, produced a real housing crisis, adding 
to the PSOE’s problems over social policy.
^Fuentes Quintana, 1991:65-72.
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The growth in domestic demand caused an outbreak of 
inflation, rising from 5.3% in 1987 to 6.9% in 1989. These 
figures are not alarming considering that at the beginning of the 
PSOE administration it was 14.4%. However, the growth in 
inflation remains a preoccupation in terms of integration into 
the European Monetary System. As was seen in Chapter II, entry 
into EMS represented a loss of autonomy in determining economic 
policy, since the possibility of manipulating exchange rates as 
policy tools to regulate economic disequilibria was sacrificed. 
There was too the adverse effect on trade as high interest rates 
and an overvalued peseta reduced the competativenes of exports. 
At the Madrid EC summit (June 1989) the government announced 
Spain’s entry into EMS as a signal of the country’s European 
spirit. The news was a surprise even in Spain, and left the 
Minister of the Economy in the difficult position of having to 
carry out a new stabilisation policy in response to the 1986-89 
period of expansion, but now with a new limitation -without the 
power to use the exchange rate as part of the adjustment package.
Faced with the social costs of an adjustment policy 
necessary to further economic development, the government decided 
to bring forward the elections by eight months. They were called 
for October 29th 1989, and once again the PSOE was elected. 
Carlos Solchaga, still at the head of the Ministry of the 
Economy, was faced with the difficult task of implementing a new 
package of harsh monetary, tax and budgetary measures. This 
period of adjustment, begun in 1990, has not yet been completed 
because of its dual function, namely, correcting macroeconomic 
imbalances and meeting EMS requirements. On the other hand, 
politics took over economics once again, and the PSOE embarked 
on an expensive national propaganda drive -the campaign for the
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1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona and EXPO*92 in Seville- designed 
to demonstrate the modernity and development of contemporary 
Spain.
IV.7. CONCLUSIONS: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 
OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY IN THE 1990s 
1992 was a year of contrasts for Spain. On the one hand, the 
international image created the grandeur and pomp of the Olympic 
Games and EXPO*92. On the other hand, unemployment rose to 17.8% 
(21% in June 1993), GNP growth was only 1% (0.1% below the EC 
average), the trade deficit continued to increase and annual 
inflation rose to 10.3%.
Solchaga*s team diagnosed the situation as a "conjunctural 
overheating of the economy", for which there was a need to
implement not only monetary and budgetary adjustments, but even
70credit controls . Both diagnosis and policies are not 
necessarily acurate. An annual rate of inflation at 10% is not 
desirable but neither dramatic, especially when considering Latin 
American standards. However, 20% unemployment and the scope of 
the Spanish trade deficit are dangerous symptoms. PSOE’s priority 
comes from the need to sustain EMS parities in the short run 
rather than medium/long term productive and social requirements. 
Moreover, Solchaga*s diagnosis may be based on a flase premise, 
that the productive crisis and inflation are conjunctural. As 
will be argued below, these are structural problems which require 
more complex solutions than deflationary measures.
70The so-called Activos Liquidos en Manos del Publico (ALPs or 
"Liquidity assets in public hands"), a paradoxical control in a liberal- 
oriented government.
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Three reasons support this argument: the origins of the
Spanish economic boom; the basis of inflation; and the roots of 
productive crisis. The reasons for the economic expansion of 
1986-92 were pointed out in the previous pages. Briefly, the 
integration of Spain into the EEC and the stability of the peseta 
associated with the EMS made investment attractive to foreign 
capital. As can be appreciated in table V.4 and figure IV. 5, 
investment occurred, not in productive activities, but mainly in 
construction and services, especially finance. Real interest 
rates and public debt offered high returns given restrictive 
monetary policies. On the other hand, this was parallel to a 
recovery of the world economy due to the fall of oil prices. 
However, in Spain this phenomenon was more accentuated because 
of a large expansion of domestic demand, and not because of an 
increase of exports as expected from the integration into the EC. 
In fact, one of the most obvious effects of Community membership 
has been a large trade deficit covered foreign capital inflows 
stimulated by high rates of interest.
The reasons for the new rise of inflation results from an 
expansion of domestic demand. This means that the rise of prices 
cannot be blamed equally on all economic sectors, but only on 
those which expanded. As demonstrated above, the most dynamic 
sectors of the Spanish economy at the end of the 1980s were the 
non-externally tradeable services and construction. This 
produced a sharp increase in the price of land, given the sudden 
surge in demand and the limited supply of available land in most 
Spanish cities. Table IV.14 gives evidence that prices rose much 
more intensively in services and construction than in industry 
and agriculture. Further, an examination of the relationship 
between contribution to GNP and deflators of different economic
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71from 1976 onwards , proves that this relationship has always 
been favouring the denominator’s components -excepting 1984. This 
differential character of inflation in Spain shows that an 
adequate anti-inflationary policy should be more refined and 
sophisticated than global deflationary measures. PSOE’s policy 
of defeating inflation through wage reduction and general 
adjustment measures does not appear to be the best policy option. 
Instead, a discriminatory sectorial treatment may be a more 
effective solution, with less social costs.
The reasons for productive crisis are to be found in the 
high growth of financial costs and export difficulty given the 
appreciation of the peseta. This has generated a sharp reduction 
in the number of SMEs, a dramatic increase in the unemployment 
rate and a tendency towards informality as a measure of business 
survival. Some of the unemployed were absorbed by the informal 
economy, others in the service sector. However, it should be kept 
in mind that the process of tertiarisation of the economy has 
been due to the expansion of Public Administrations, that is, the 
state sector. One fourth of the active population remains 
unemployed. Thus, the implementation of adjustment policies will 
reduce the rate of growth and will deepen the productive crisis, 
without having a clear effect on inflation. Further, there are 
many risks in continuing with current policies. Real appreciation 
of the peseta is "structurally” damaging exports, including 
services such as tourism where Spain has got an adequate 
infrastructure and capacity. Flexibility of the labour market has
71For the index shown in table IV.14, values higher to 1 indicate more 
inflationary pressures coming from agriculture and industry; values less than 
1, from construction and services.
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created the danger of potential unemployment, since 35% of 
employment in Spain is temporary and thus could end up as open 
unemployment if economic activity was to fall.
There are several mechanisms for an alternative economic 
policy. Firstly, it is difficult to envisage any economic 
reactivation that does not break with the Plan de Convergencia 
(Convergence Plan), an adjustment programme designed by the PSOE 
in order to comply with the Maastricht Treaty. To keep a fix 
parity for the peseta in the EMS is a very expensive way of state 
intervention. It implies domestic deflation while exports 
remained over priced. Moreover, the government should take in a 
more relativistic approach to the importance attributed to 
inflation. At least, to debate the adequacy of sacrificing 
employment and economic growth in order to keep to the Maastricht 
level of 3% annual inflation. As Euroeuphoria is turning into 
Europessimism, there are more and more reasons to re-think the 
speed and the scope of integration. Some authors propose the use 
new forms of export promotion for sectors with future potential, 
without contradicting EC normatives, such as R&D promotion, 
programmes of technical professional instruction, credits for the
marketing of Spanish products outside, or the use of non-tariff
72barriers .
There is also the residual problem of public resources. Tax 
fraud could be reduced; it may be a mistake for the PSOE to 
accept the Lafferian argument that tax fraud encourages business 
investment. Informality has been a survival measure for those 
SMEs damaged by the competition of EC imports. However,
^See Martin-Seco, 1993.
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informality has only been an strategy for increasing profits for 
those companies in the service sector. On the other hand, it may 
be positive to abandon the neo-liberal phobia against increasing 
public spending. Overall, increases in public expenditure had 
negative consequences when allocated to activities such as those 
of 1992. However, directing public funds into productive 
activities means investment for the future development of the 
country. In 1992, Spain, with the UK, had the lowest public debt 
of the EC (40% of GNP, compared to the EC average 58.3% of GNP). 
Keynesians would not find few reasons to keep Spanish public debt 
at such low levels, but would recommend increasing it moderately 
in order selectively to expand public spending.
Although the Spanish political transition has been
considered a "model" in so far as it has succeeded in
incorporating all social actors within the new system, the same
judgement cannot be extended to the economic transition, since
some social groups have lost out. In fact, what the Spanish state
has demonstrated is its great autonomy from the majority of
social groups, even under democracy. In a gradual process of
liberalisation and dismantling of state intervention, the ones
who have been hurt the most are those who have lost the benefits
of state protection without having the benefit or the alternative
of joining in the new economic dynamic. Fundamentally, these have
73been some small and medium sized firms and workers. As pointed 
out previously, the AES, signed in 1985, was the first and last 
social pact under the Socialist government. The unions, first 
CCOO and then UGT, rejected the government’s economic discipline. 
Industrial strike, very high at the beginning of the transition
73Analyzed in Chapter V.
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(1975-79) and then apparently stabilised, has risen under the 
Socialist government (figure IV.4). In December 1988, the country 
saw a general strike, the first for 50 years; no social pact has 
been agreed since then but the country suffered again another 
general strike in 1992. From 1978 to 1988, a total of 3.1 million 
workers have lost their jobs, almost a quarter of the active 
labour force. The unions have not only opposed the effects of 
industrial reorganisation, but have also demanded more public 
expenditure in the social sphere and a more progressive tax 
system. The government, for its part, claims it is necessary to 
make the labour market more flexible in order to make industry 
more competitive internationally, and casts the blame for 
inflationary tensions on the lack of wage moderation. In this 
respect, the PSOE should understand that industrial conflict is 
not the result of economic ills, but rather a symptom of the 
structural changes that are being engendered. The advantage that 
the Spanish government has over, for example, the Argentine, is 
that there is the prospect of economic growth, and therefore the 
distribution of income is not a "zero-sum game", and in the long 
run there will be a relative gain for all social actors.
In conclusion, Spain has seen a process of intense political 
and economic change in the last 15 years. Considering the 
intensity of the transformations and the problems that other 
countries have had in carrying out such changes, the balance 
sheet has been positive in terms of the way the transition has 
been handled by both UCD and PSOE. As D. Gilmour commented, there 
is an excess of criticism within Spain itself, and there has not 
been much sense of perspective when it comes to evaluating the 
moderation of the politicians and the success of the transition. 
The democratic governments have succeeded in dismantling part of
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the state interventionism inherited from the Franco period, in 
adjusting the country, incorporating Spain into the EC, promoting 
economic growth and consolidating the political regime. However, 
as has been argued throughout this chapter, the social costs have 
been, and will continue to be, very hight. Entry into the EC 
could have been achieved on better terms. Macroeconomic forces 
appear to be only temporarily under control. The twin problems 
of high interest rates/inflation confound easy solutions. Recent 
economic growth has been due to an over-expansion of the service 
and construction sectors. As a result, Spain’s new economic 
structure raises doubts about where it is heading. This is the 
subject for the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V: INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 
IN ARGENTINA AND SPAIN, 1977-90.
In the preceding chapters the transformations that took 
place in Spain and Argentina over the last fifteen years were 
analyzed. In chapter II changes in the international economic 
setting were noted. These included the impact of the floating 
of exchange rates, the rise in interest rates, the problem of 
external indebtedness, the increase in the price of oil, the 
question of the formation of economic blocs and the neo-pro- 
tectionism of the 1980s. In chapters III and IV the changes 
that occurred in the domestic economies of Spain and Argentina 
were examined, for example, the abandonment of economic 
nationalism in favour of policies of a neo-liberal nature, the 
attempts to implement adjustment plans, the reform of the 
state, the stabilisation of the financial sector and conflicts 
between employers and trade unions.
Consequently, this chapter will concentrate on adjust­
ments associated with the transformation from an essentially 
interventionist to a largely liberal system. The focus will 
be centred on changes in the industrial sector, particularly 
new forms of specialisation and the organisation of production 
resulting from domestic policy changes and shifts in the 
global economy. The chapter is extensive and is divided into 
two sections. The first deals with Spain, the second with 
Argentina. In both cases references will be made to changing 
macroeconomic variables, the evolving character of the 
industrial sector and the impact of changing priorities in
patterns of public expenditure, especially in the social and 
productive spheres.
V.l INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN SPAIN, 1977-90.
V.l.A. DIAGNOSIS AND OUTCOME
Already in 1981, under the UCD, the policy of aiding 
bankrupt firms began to be abandoned in favour of a programme 
of restructuring for three industrial sectors. But it was to 
be under the socialist government of the PSOE (1982 - ) that 
the restructuring programme would really be put into force. 
The diagnosis underlying the industrial reorganisation policy 
launched under the socialist government was based on the 
perception that, as a result of the policy of import-substi­
tuting industrialization pursued since the early 1900s, 
Spanish industry was rigid and unbalanced. A secondary 
assumption was that these structural problems had been 
exacerbated by distortions of the 1970s, namely the rise in 
labour costs and petrol prices. From the PSOE perspective, the 
crisis of industry was not a crisis of effective demand, but 
rather a crisis of productive structure that required adjust­
ments on the supply side. The comparison was, and continues 
to be made, with the situation in Europe. The failure of the 
Keynesian policies implemented by socialist governments in 
Greece and France at the beginning of the 1980s provided a 
very timely example^. The public sector deficit strengthened 
this tendency to take supply side measures and this implied 
that it was preferable that the private sector should under­
take the adjustments. The only strategy for boosting private
Wravall, 1991:48-51.
Figure V.1. : DIAGNOSIS AND OUTCOME OF SPANISH INDUSTRIAL
POLICY. 1977-1990
DIAGNOSIS (1978)
A PROFITS
A INVESTMENT
A EMPLOYMENT
V LABOUR COSTS V FINANCIAL COSTS
A COMPETITIVENESS
OUTCOME (1988-90)
INVESTMENT
V EMPLOYMENT
V LABOUR COSTS
INFORMAL SECTOR
A FINANCIAL COSTS
V COMPETITIVENESS
investment without increasing the public deficit was to reduce 
labour costs, make the labour market more flexible and reduce 
the cost of finance.
Diagramme V.l presents a synthesis of the diagnosis and 
what followed in Spain*s industrial restructuring in the 
1980s. It was expected that the reduction in labour costs and 
the cost of finance would result in an increase in profits 
which would then be translated into a higher level of in­
vestment and therefore of employment.
The main problem confronting the PSOE government was how 
to reduce labour costs. This was not only because of the 
paradoxical fact that it was a socialist government having to 
deal with the problems of economic adjustment and labour 
flexibility, but also due to the grave unemployment situation 
-18.1 per cent in 1983. Making the labour market more flexible 
came into conflict with the explicit objective of reducing 
unemployment. With a programme which stood for the adoption 
of corrective measures on the supply side, the achievement of 
such an electoral promise of 800,000 more jobs would have to 
be postponed until new private investment came on stream. As 
was noted in chapter IV, the socialist strategy was for 
"growth f irst, redistribution later". Even this redistribution 
was not put forward in terms of a rise in wages. Fear of 
inflation meant that the government opted for the path of 
increased employment and improvements in the ‘social wage*. 
However, the PSOE did not obtain the results it had hoped for, 
and unemployment rose to 20 per cent in 1987.
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The outcome was less simple and less desirable than 
expected. Part of the problem lies with the diagnosis of 
situation and consequent industrial policy carried out by the 
Ministry of Industry, especially concerning the increase in 
the cost of finance. It did not count on the restrictive 
monetary and credit policy adopted by the Bank of Spain in 
order to reduce inflation. Moreover, the overvaluation of the 
peseta reduced Spanish competitiveness. Labour costs fell, and 
industrial profits rose, but there was little new 
reinvestment. Rather, companies used increased profits to 
reduce debt. Also, they were channelled towards less risky 
activities such as public debt or property speculation. The 
industries most affected were the SMEs. They turned to the 
black market for survival. Thus, there was an enlargement of 
the informal sector. Employment continued to fall until 1989, 
when the unemployment rate was reduced to 16 per cent. 
Nevertheless, after this modest fall, the rate began to rise 
again and reached 17.8% in 1992. A large part of the new 
investment made at this time came from TNCs, attracted by the 
future incorporation of Spain into the EC. Direct investment 
as a proportion of total foreign capital inflows rose from 
8.3% in 1977 to 34.5% in 1988. Yet, as the 1988 figure shows, 
the greater part of this capital inflow from overseas con­
sisted of portfolio investment associated with the increase 
in the public debt. Moreover, a significant part of direct 
foreign investment was in property. Hence there was only a 
limited growth in productive capacity and little positive 
effect on levels of employment in the long-run.
197
A full explanation of this will be provided in the follo­
wing pages, mainly focusing on the temporal development and 
evolution of industrial policy, introducing cross-temporal 
descriptions of different matters, such as industrial debt, 
FDI, and SMEs. The evolution of industrial policy in the 
transition period can be divided into four stages which 
correspond with changes in government and the Ministry of 
Industry (MINER). Under the UCD government, there were the 
Abril-Martorell (1977-80) and the Bayon phases (1980-82). 
Under the socialist government, there have been the Solchaga 
(1983-86) and the Croissier phases (1986-89).
The first two stages correspond to the centrist UCD go­
vernment, and will be explained briefly under the same 
section. Franco’s death took place in 1975, and priority was 
given to stabilizing the political transition and to the 
control of inflation. Structural reforms were relegated to a 
secondary position. After the Moncloa Pacts (1977), the go­
vernment began to put forward a policy of industrial restruc­
turing. However, this would not be elaborated legally until 
1981, and was barely applied due to a governmental crisis and 
the end of the UCD mandate to rule. Thus, the first democratic 
government was a continuation of the emergency policy initi­
ated under Francoism -"patching up". A new industrial policy 
based on organizational reform was developed under the
socialist government. This was evolved around three axes: the
2
general norm for restructuring and reindustrialisation , the 
law on regional incentives for the correction of economic
2Law 27/1984.
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imbalances and the National Plan for scientific investment 
and technological development*. However, these policies 
incorporated many features inherited from the period of the 
democratic transition. The chapter pays special attention to 
the policy-making process with respect to industrial restruc­
turing, given that one of the main arguments of this research 
is that state dirigisme has continued in Spain after democ­
racy, and that this was critical to the stability and success 
of the political transition.
V.l.B. INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1977-82: "PATCHING UP"
The period 1977-80, in which Abril-Martorell headed the 
Ministry of Industry, was one that witnessed a lack of co­
ordination in industrial policy. As can be seen from Diagramme 
V.2, many of the industrial programmes launched under the 
Franco’s regime were still in forced. However, this policy of 
extending the time period on concessionary loans and continu­
ing state support for large companies that were facing diffi­
culties had nothing to do with a continuity of the industrial 
development plans of the dictatorship. Rather the strategy was 
driven by the need to avoid political unrest. This was 
similar to the emergency policy developed in the last years 
of Francoism which came to be known as parcheo, or "patching
»iup.
The eleven sectors or subsectors which were favoured 
during the period from before 1975 until 1982 were as follows:
3RD 1535/1987 
4RD 1750/1987.
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textiles; iron and steel; mining; electronics; vehicles; 
household electrical goods; chemicals; pharmaceuticals; food; 
shipbuilding and "industries related to national defense". The 
support for which companies in these sectors could apply for 
were of two types, public grants and tax exemptions.
There were no legal norms laying down the criteria for
granting concessionary loans or public assistance by the
5
government to companies. Within the Central Administration, 
the Industrial or Executive Commission was the arbiter when 
it came to determining the industries to be selected. The 
criteria adopted in decision making were socio-political ones: 
the number of workers involved, and the amount of pressure the 
companies could exert on the government. Thus the Executive 
Commission tended to protect firms already in receipt of some 
form of assistance. In many cases it was simply a matter of 
extending the time period of protection that had been granted. 
There were five such programmes: the restructuring plans,
concerted actions, industries with preferential interest, 
exceptional loans to firms in crisis, and the absorption of 
firms by the public sector. The detailed scheme of the laws, 
sectors and companies is presented in table V.6 .
I.Bayon took over at MINER at a difficult time. As was 
seen in chapter IV, there was a restructuring in the UCD’s 
administrative team in 1980 following the vote of no confi-
Rather, this was carried out by means of a report in which a 
consultant from outside both the company and the government would indicate 
the problems the company or companies were facing. These studies used to 
be drawn up rather hastilly, since they did not comment on the feasibility 
of the investments from a national or even sectoral point of view.
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dence in the government proposed by the PSOE. This political 
crisis took place at the same time as the second oil shock in 
1979, which automatically provoked businesses to demand 
economic assistance to compensate for the rise in oil prices. 
Institutions like the National Industrial Institute (INI) and 
the Internal Credit Bank (BCI), entrusted with the task of 
absorbing firms in crisis or facilitating credit flows to 
firms in difficulty, pointed out the limit of the policy of
e
"patching up" . Extraordinary loan assistance, nationalisation 
of firms in crisis and the financing of industrial loans at 
preferential interest that are indicated in diagramme V.2 and 
table V .6 were continued. In some cases, in order to be able 
to apply such measures, fictitious industrial sectors were 
invented, such as "basic electronic equipment for cars" or 
"heavy forging". Also, some segments of subsectors were 
elevated to the status of sectors; for example, "copper semi- 
elaborates" or "electrical components" were included as
7
"sectors" in industrial policies (Navarro, 1990).
Finally, a regulation was drawn up in order to initiate 
a process of industrial rationalisation in Spain. Initially, 
this should have been in two sectors: household electrical 
appliances and special steels. However, the loans granted to 
the rest of the sectors were exhausted and needed to be rene-
c
Interview to Gutierrez-Cobos, INI.
There were eleven sectors involved: household electrical appliances 
(RD 200/1980), special steels (RD 2206/1980), integral iron and steel (RD 
878/1981), textiles (RD 2010/1981), electronic equipment for vehicles (RD 
2793/1981), shipbuilding (RD 643/1982), copper semi-elaborates (RD 608/19- 
82), electrical components (RD 769/1982), common steel (RD 917/1982), 
footwear (RD 1002/1982) and heavy forging (RD 1788/1982).
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wed. It was then that the first general plan appeared. In 
accord with the Spanish government’s dirigiste policy, the 
programme was announced by decree , without either consulting 
any of the social groups, or any possibility of holding a 
debate in Parliament or making amendments. However, Royal 
Decree 9/1981 was never implemented due to the general elec­
tions in which PSOE came to power. Even with the loss of 
popularity to which the UCD was confronted, its government 
kept with the design of an industrial restructuring policy, 
and the Law 21/1982 was approved which reinforced the basis 
of RD 9/1981.
Law 21/1982 was very significant for future policy deve­
lopments given that it was the first real attempt at indus­
trial restructuring and later laws were much influenced by it. 
Law 21/1982 also involved important changes in the handling 
of the reorganisation measures. It supposed a first step 
towards decentralisation, offering increased participation for 
the Regional (or Autonomous Communities) Administrations 
involved. Regional Administrations would serve as a channel 
of communication between the central government and the 
companies and would be responsible for the implementation and 
supervision of policy. The devolution of responsibility to the 
regions was due largely to pressure exerted by the Basque 
local government. The Basque Country was both an area of 
great political tension and its industries were among those 
likely to be most affected by economic aspects of the reform. 
However, as special provisions could not be made for the
8RD 9/1981.
Basque authorities alone, the scope of the legislation was 
extended to all Autonomous Communities in Spain. The elabor­
ation of requests was now no longer left in the hands of only 
the company’s management and the outside consultant, but 
theoretically was the task of the Tripartite Commission. This 
Commission was made up of trade unions, businessmen and the 
state. Although this was an important step towards regulating
the rationalisation of Spanish industry, in practice the
g
projects were presented in many different ways. The organisa­
tion and running of the projects was in the hands of the 
administration, both central and regional, which created an 
Executive Commission. This Executive Commission was given the 
task of selecting the companies undergoing reorganisation, and 
controlling the implementation of the plans. Following the 
pattern of preference for big companies, it was the latter who 
benefited from the rationalisation plans. It is interesting 
to point out that treatment was offered independently of the 
origin of the company’s capital, be they subsidiaries of TNCs 
or companies with Spanish capital.*®
g
For example, in the case of textiles, the project was presented by 
a decision by the central administration (by Royal Decree). Only in iron 
and steel and in shipbuilding did the unions have a say, due to their 
higher level of organisation and strength (Interview to Diaz-Pena, CES).
*®In the electrical components subsector, for example, the companies 
selected were Bianchi, Grupo Piher and Fagor Spain. With respect to the 
car industry, only FEMSA and BOSCH benefited, despite the protests of the 
subsector’s employers* organisation (SERNAUTO) (Navarro, 1990). It is 
significant that the footwear sector, made up of SMEs, did not get to 
benefit from a single project, despite having been declared a sector 
undergoing reorganisation. The only option for firms in this sector was 
to become informal.
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V.l.C. INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1982-89: THE SOCIALIST 
RATIONALISATION
In 1982, PSOE won the general elections. C Solchaga, who 
would later become Minister for the Economy (1986- ), was
assigned to the presidency of MINER. In the industrial sphere, 
PSOE began by amending the rationalisation law launched by the 
UCD through RD 8/1983, which then became Law 27/1984 or the 
General Norm for Restructuring and Reindustrialisation. PSOE 
did not put forward any general industrial policy apart from 
restructuring until Spain’s entry into the EC in 1986. The 
problem of the public sector deficit hurried the government 
into abandoning the expansionary public spending programme and 
encouraged it to attempt to involve the private banks in 
financing industrial rationalisation^.
Formally, the process continued as before, through legal 
decree, precluding any debate in parliament or dialogue with 
social actors. There were meetings throughout 1983 between 
entrepreneurial groups, private bankers and the administra­
tion; union representatives being excluded. It is significant 
that in this period the so-called Societies of Restructured 
Industries were formed and came into effect. The various 
industrial lobbies were special steels (1980), copper (1981), 
"heavy forging" (1983), small and medium shipyards (1983), 
household electrical appliances (1985) and fertilisers (1985).
^Interviews to Gutierrez-Cobos, INI, and Cuevas, CEOE.
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The confrontations between the government and unions 
reached such a level of tension that the Minister for In­
dustry, Solchaga, ended by handing in his resignation. This 
was not accepted by Prime Minister GonzAlez. As leader of the 
socialist party, Gonzalez had promised that the government 
would always be open to social dialogue. But this dialogue 
only took place regarding wages, and not job creation and 
industrial reorganisation. Paradoxical for a social-democratic 
administration as the PSOE claimed to be, there was only one 
real social (ANE) which was signed up at the beginning of the 
PSOE mandate. Later attempts cannot be considered as social
pacts given that at least one (and sometimes several) social
12organisation refused to participate in the agreement. The 
largest union (CCOO) was not a party to any of the majority 
of the accords, adopting a confrontational stance with respect 
to the government. The reason given by the socialist party in 
justification for maintaining this attitude towards the unions 
was the latter*s irresponsibility, given the unpopularity of 
the adjustment measures among workers. The PSOE considered 
that the majority of union members had been brought up in the 
struggle against Francoism, and maintained the same confronta­
tional attitude towards the government without recognising
12AMI (Interconferential Framework Agreement, 1980-81) was supported 
by the employers association CEOE and the second largest union, UGT, but 
not by CCOO and the government. The second was the only proper social 
pact, ANE (National Agreement on Employment, 1982). AI (Interconferential 
Agreement, 1983) was not signed by the government. Finally, AES (Social 
and Economic Agreement, 1985-86) was not supported by the CCOO. From then 
onwards both unions, UGT and CCOO have maintaned a confrontational attitu­
de towards government policies. Labour conflicts, aparently estabilised 
after the transition period 1975-79, have increased under socialist rule. 
This includes two national strikes in the period 1989-92, the first since 
pre-war times (Ortiz & Curbelo, 1993:85-86).
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that rationalisation was necessary for the country. The argu­
ment had a point since Spanish unions failed to re-organise
13themselves. The number of affiliates remained very low . 
Union had been consolidated as political delegations to 
express general national labour problems. However, after the 
death of Franco, this centralised structure did not encouraged 
the development of rank-and-file factory level union activi­
ties, where important productive transformations were happen­
ing -flexibility, employment adjustments and so on.^ The 
immaturity of Spanish unions has given the state an important 
autonomy to manage labour questions without consultation.
The inclusion of banks was due to the fact that PSOE came
into government needing to draw up an economic adjustment
programme. The PSOE had in mind the structure of bank-industry
relations of Spain, and assumed that the relationship would
be maintained when industrial re-structuring was necessary.
The government was aware of the financial crisis that the
sector was experiencing but the worst effects were still to
come in 1985, when Spain faced the biggest banking crisis in
15the postwar history of Europe.
^11% in 1986, the lowest in the EC.
^See Miguelez, 1991:220.
15Of the 110 national banks that existed in 1977, when the system was 
still overprotective, only 58 survived by 1985 (Table IV.11). The main 
causes are found in the irrational strategies developed during the 1960s 
bonanza years, such as the over-expansion of the number of banking outlets 
and the less than prudent handling of financial activities -the so-called 
moral hazard syndrome. As liberalisation of the financial system got 
underway, the only way of compensating for losses resulting from increased 
domestic competition was to raise the costs of intermediation. This became 
unsustanaible when the banking sector started to open up to international 
competition (Graham, 1984; Olarra, 1989:209-213).
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As was noted in chapter IV, the relationship between the 
banking sector and industry in Spain was originally very 
close, as is the case with late industrializing economies. But
as the Francoist protectionist system crumbled, the relation-
16ship changed . As will be seen later, it was the employers 
who paid the social costs of the transition, and who found 
their debt burden rise progressively. When the government 
tried to involve the banks in financing industrial restructur­
ing, the banks opted for a minimalist role. This was not so 
much due to changes in the relations between the banks and
industry but because the banking sector itself was undergoing
17a process of internal restructuring .
Moreover, the increase of real interest rates stimulated 
entrepreneurs to reduce industrial debt. As seen in chapter 
IV, two digit inflation during the transition resulted in 
nominal interest rates being adjusted to changes in the price 
level. The restrictive monetary policies implemented by the 
PSOE, the fall in family savings in the crisis and the increa­
se in the budget deficit reinforced this tendency towards
18rising interest rates . In the Socialist period, interest 
rates in Spain were among the highest in Europe -oscillating 
between 15% and 20% in the period 1976-84 (table IV.l). Thus, 
industrial debt was unsustainable. Table V.3 shows the
16Torrero, 1991:597.
17From interview to Gutierrez-Cobos, INI, and Yagiie, MINER.
18In this respect, one of the main complains of the CEOE (Spanish 
Entrepreneurs Association) was the problem of high interest rates, even 
when accepting the increase in public expending in industry under the PSOE 
government (interview to Cuevas, CEOE).
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evolution of the degree of indebtedness by sector. For 
industry as a whole, the equity/debt ratio declined from 
1:1.62 in 1982 to 1:0.78 in 1988. The most indebted sectors 
were iron and steel, mining, shipbuilding (included in trans­
port) and wood and furniture. Of these, iron and steel and 
shipbuilding were two sectors undergoing industrial restructu­
ring with a debt ratio higher than 1:4 because they were 
protected by government and had access to public credit at 
interests rates lower than the market level. The reduction in 
the level of indebtedness in 1988 was impressive. Only five 
sectors showed a level of indebtedness higher than 1:1 :
transport (including shipbuilding), iron and steel, electrical 
equipment, textiles and mining. Nevertheless, it has to be 
kept in mind that the rate of industrial indebtedness depends 
on the type of links between banks and industry. In Japan, 
where these relations are extensive, the ratio equity/debt in 
1984 was 1:4.77, while at the other extreme, in the US and UK, 
where banks and industry have not been interdependent in their
historical development, the rate of indebtedness was 1:0.61
19and 1:1.16 respectively . The degree of indebtedness is not 
what is important, but rather the significance of this 
indebtedness in the context of the concrete economic relations 
in a country.
20Following the analysis of Gerschenkron , who observed 
that late-comers of the nineteenth century tended to develop 
a strong linkage between the banking and the industrial
l90ECD data.
90
See Gerschenkron, 1966.
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TABLE V .3. Z
SPAIN Z EVOLUTION OE INDUSTRIAL 
SECTORSz BERCENTAGES OE
ENTERPRISES DEBT r OE USE OE
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY AND OF 
INFORMALITY, 1932—33.
SECTORS % DEBT 
1982 1988
% USE P.C. 
1986
% INFORMAL. 
1986
ENERGY 179 66 86.5 8.3
WATER — — —
MINING (METAL) — — 92.1 6.2
STEEL 428 142 78.7 5.3
MINING (NON-METAL). 251 102 67.1 —
NON-METAL.INDUSTRY 41 20 82.1 —
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 118 76 79.7 —
METAL PRODUCTS 74 78 79.4 —
MACHINERY 147 76 82.6 —
ELECTRIC MATERIAL 125 130 81.3 —
TRANSPORT MATERIAL 426 164 87.6 —
of which cars — — — —
FOOD, BEBERAGES, TABACO 69 47 72.3 17.6
TEXTIL 110 121 82.3 33.1
SHOE + LEATHER 101 67 85.4 34.9
WOOD + FORNITURE 220 27 79.1 2.3
PAPER + ARTS 124 48 83.0 16.9
RUBBER + PLASTICS 100 60 87.0 —
OTHERS (toys, Optics...) 30 21 78.7 17.9
TOTAL 162.0 77.8 81.0 20.0
Source: MINER, Ministerio de Economia.
systems, Spain in the 1980s is an example of a transition from 
a German-style system of bank-industry relations to a liberal 
one. Industry distrusts the banks, and is paying its debts, 
and the banks distrust industry. In this case, Spain presents 
a good example of the disintegration of an economically 
nationalist alliance of finance and production.
However, the PSOE did not predict this disarticulation 
and launched Law L27/1984. As it was commented before, this 
owed much to the restructuring programmes initiated under the 
UCD government, and above all to the policy of elaboration, 
management and control of projects employed previously.
Following L27/1984, the declaration of a firm going 
through the process of rationalisation was made by MINER, 
although the firms and the unions could also make petitions. 
MINER was also entrusted with selecting the firms that were 
to benefit from the rationalisation plans. The selection 
criteria laid down in Law L27/1984 were very general, based 
on firms needing rationalisation. It seems that PSOE preferred 
not to make the criteria more specific, despite the problem 
of bureaucracy, with the multiplication of the number of 
petitions, in order not to commit itself legally at the time 
of making the selection. Looking at benefited companies, there 
was a logic in the selection. The rationalised industries can 
be put into three groups, from greater to lesser priority: (A) 
the hard core of the restructuring -iron and steel, ship­
building, and household electrical goods; (B) sectors which 
were strategic in the medium term such as textiles, common 
steel, fertilizers, ITT and ERT groups; (C) sectors in
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difficulty, but with growth potential if means of promotion 
were applied -machinery, vehicles, motorcycles.
Once MINER had selected specific firms for restructuring, 
a Control and Continuation Commission was established, along 
very similar lines as the Tripartite Commission set up under 
Law L21/1982. This Commission was formed by the Central and 
Autonomous Administrations, and the corresponding employers 
and union organisations. The role of the unions continued to 
be minimal, despite the fact that in this case they could 
manage the correct implementation of plans that were not drawn 
up with union agreement. However, union pressure was very 
important when it came to analyzing the type of measures to 
be applied, above all with respect to the Funds for the 
Promotion of Employment (FPE) -analyzed below.
The measures applied in L27/1984 can be divided into four 
types: tax, financial, social and labour, and industrial
promotion. The tax measures were based on a system of tax 
allowances identical to the one drawn up by UCD in the Law 
L21/1982. The rest of the measures, however, were much more 
elaborate. The financial measures were now based not only on 
the granting of public loans -many of which were necessary to 
cover the accumulated debts- but in addition attempts were 
made to encourage private banks to collaborate in the finan­
cing of industrial restructuring. Law L27/1984 established a 
number of compulsory investment ratios for all banks. The 
banks, however, found the risk too high, and did not get 
involved in a single case with a particular firm. Instead, 
they limited themselves to buying BCI (Bank of Internal
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Credit) bonds, guaranteed by the state, leaving the role of 
allocating the corresponding credits to the BCI. Also, those 
firms who were quoted on the Stock Exchange were encouraged 
to issue new shares, at a nominal value below that of existing 
shares, but with equal rights.
The social and labour measures were the subject of a 
great deal of conflict. At first, MINER proposed that the 
labour contracts for surplus manpower in industries being 
rationalised be terminated. The unions were opposed to this 
measure, instead advocating that the contracts be suspended, 
since they considered that in this way the Administration 
would be forced to find alternative employment for the surplus 
workers. For the Administration, this was a bad solution, 
because it removed the incentive for workers to look for other 
jobs. In the end, union pressure meant that in decree RD 
335/1984 on the Funds for the Promotion of Employment (FPEs), 
the question of terminating or suspending contracts remained 
relegated to negotiations in each sector.
The FPEs were a system which guaranteed protection to
21surplus workers in firms undergoing rationalisation. The 
workers who benefited received 80 per cent of their average 
pay until they obtained another job, for a maximum of three 
years. Those who were 60 or more were offered the possibility 
of annulling their contracts and accepting early retirement. 
In the case of steel, this applied to those aged 55 and above.
21 Finance was organised through the National Institute of Employment 
(INEM), Ministry of Social Security, the firms, the FPEs themselves and 
the so-called "solidarity quotas" -from the wages of the workers.
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The FPEs were very costly for the state and their efficiency
was doubtful. It is difficult to elaborate a balance of
gainers and losers. The FPEs were a means of compensating
workers who lost out as a result of rationalisation, but they
did not stimulate real job creation. On the other hand, they
were not applied to all sectors, but rather to those where the
22unions had the greatest power. Table V.7 shows the evol­
ution of the funds. The number of workers who had found 
another job in December 1986 was just 16.4 per cent, adding 
an extension of another 18 months. This was insufficient, and 
subsequently a second extension had to be added. By the same
token, the government launched the National Plan for Profes- 
23sional Training , consisting of short courses to adjust the 
workers from the industries being rationalised to the demands 
of the labour market. In 1989, still only 32.1 per cent had 
found other jobs or had retired.
In 1989, the government decided to terminate the FPEs,
convinced of their scant efficiency in terms of shifting
24workers into new jobs . Workers who were less than 55-52 age 
range and who had pending job offers were forced to give up 
their contracts, and accept lower incentives with indemnities 
between 4 and 4.5 million pesetas (US$ 33,300-45,800). In the 
case of the special steels, electrical equipment goods and
22From the interview to Malo de Molina, Central Bank of Spain. These 
sectors, and the laws regulating FPEs, were: Special steels (7.1984), 
integral iron and steel (9.1984 and 1986), shipbuilding (1.1985) and 
household electrical goods (1.1985).
230rder 31.7.1985, 0.20.2.1986, 0.9.2.1987 and 0.4.4.1989
240rder 3.3.1989
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shipbuilding, the central administration offered early retire-
25ment starting at 52 years.
The balance sheet has been complex. From the state’s
point of view, the FPE resulted in a very substantial loss of
public funds (see table V.9), 17.5 per cent of the total given
over to industrial policy, which in this case was not invested
in any productive activity. Despite the importance of this
figure, a comparison with EC countries shows that as regards
the policy of active job promotion Spain occupies an average
position. In part, the state ran the FPEs badly, given that
many cases of workers rejecting job offers from the INEM have
been recorded. The workers preferred to remain within the FPE
21*
-perhaps in hope of getting their contracts back. Also, 
many employees working in the informal sector while receiving 
money from the FPEs at the same time, have been revealed.
However, unions claims were correct in denouncing that 
there was no reindustrialisation policy parallel to the 
rationalisation policy, and the number of jobs continued to 
fall without the creation of alternatives. Table IV.4. shows 
that the quantity of formal jobs has remained constant since 
1976 (around 12 million over a population of 40 million 
Spaniards), and there are no signs of improvement. Many firms 
have discriminated against workers covered by FPEs, treating
As Martin-Seco (1993) points out, if these "early retirements" are 
considered as "covered unemployment", the official unemployment rate 
(20.1% average period 1984-89) should be further increased.
Navarro (1990) notes that the workers in special steels who were 
incorporated into the FPEs received an average of six job offers each, the 
majority of which were rejected.
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them as individuals with a union background, who were very 
politicised and accustomed to very high salaries compared to 
the rest of the industry. The state paid compensation to those 
firms which took on workers from the FPEs, at a time when 
unemployment was very high in Spain (19.7 per cent in the 
period 1984-89). The alternative of using flexible contracts 
and part-time workers was more economical for employers. The 
FPEs introduced inequalities in the labour market, about which 
the unions themselves complained, since prioritising the re­
employment of old workers hindered the employment 
possibilities of the others.
Finally, the industrial promotion measures involved 
programmes for the Urgent Reindustrialisation Zones (ZUR). As 
distinct from the development plans drawn up under Francoism, 
the ZURs aimed to restore the industrial level of the zones 
that were in crisis because of rationalisation. The perspecti­
ve was medium term, rather than to foster long term industrial 
development as the development plans of the 1960s and 1970s 
did. The benefits of the ZUR consisted in state subsidies for 
activities, up to 30 per cent of the investment in a project, 
facilities for obtaining official loans, and tax allowances. 
The state in this way financed new industrial projects; only 
after 1987 were subsidies to the service sector included. The 
firms favoured in the plan, on the other hand, had to give 
preference to workers from the FPEs.
The declaration of an area as a ZUR depended on central 
and regional administration. There was a precedent to the
214
27official declaration of the ZURs , which was the case of 
Sagunto (Valencia). Sagunto benefited from similar aid in 
1983, due to the process of rationalisation (in fact, closing 
down) of its iron and steel companies. The regions declared 
as ZURs after the Law 27/1984 came into effect were: 
Asturias28, Cadiz29, Madrid39, Nervion3*, Vigo-Ferrol32 and 
Barcelona^.3*
The balance sheet for the ZURs is also complex. It is 
undoubtedly positive, since the programmes promoted the crea­
tion of industry and jobs. The comparison with Argentina, 
where the state has not invested funds in industrial restruc­
turing, is especially relevant when the balance is drawn up. 
Table V .8 shows us how important the investment and creation 
of jobs were in the ZURs.
27L27/1984
28RD 188/1985
29RD 189/1985
30RD 190/1985
^Bilbao, in the Basque Country (RD 531/1985)
32Galicia (RD 752/1985)
33RD 914/1985
34It is interesting to note that since the declaration of an area as 
a ZUR depended on the agreement between central administration and the 
autonomous regional administration, the first areas declared were those 
communities whose governments were also socialist. Galicia and Barcelona, 
with conservative governments, were the last nterview to Buesa, 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid).
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However, table V .8 also shows the weaknesses of the ZUR 
programme as regards its efficiency as a means of reactivating 
industry. The first observation is that the areas which show 
the greatest economic activity are Madrid and Barcelona. These 
were also the zones with the highest indexes of economic 
activity in Spain prior to being declared ZURs. The question 
is, then, whether it was necessary to declare them ZURs. 
Barcelona and Madrid have absorbed 61.1 per cent of total 
investment in the ZURs, 55.7 per cent of the subsidies, and 
have provided jobs for 63.6 per cent of the FPE workers who 
were employed. It is possible that they could have absorbed 
the same number of FPE workers and subsequently generate a 
similar level of investment, without the need for state 
subsidy.
Conversely, the rate of investment recorded in Madrid and 
Barcelona tended to be more capital intensive than in the rest 
of the ZURs. The average for projects carried out in Madrid 
and Barcelona was an investment of 555.1 million pesetas, 
whereas in the other ZURs it was just 353.3 million pesetas. 
This raises the question of whether the Spanish government was 
simply carrying out a covert industrial promotion policy, at 
a time when entry into the EC did not allow it openly. If this 
was the case, the operation was not of particularly great 
scope, since the ZURs only represented 1.7 per cent of the 
spending on industrial policy (table V.9). Another possibility 
is that the Spanish government declared these areas ZURs in 
order to benefit from the European Funds for the Regional 
Restructuring Programme (Zone 2). However, the hypothesis is 
not very feasible, since the sums received from the EC under
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this category represent just 0.008 per cent of the funds
$Jj
allocated to industrial policy .
As regards restructuring, the period 1986-90 shows con­
tinuity with the first socialist government. The president of 
the INI, L.C. Crossier, went on to be Minister of Industry, 
and C. Solchaga went from MINER to be Minister for the 
Economy. As previously stated, the industrial restructuring 
plans were continued until 1990.
The main difference came with Spain’s entry into the EC. 
The EC approved the steps towards economic stabilisation 
carried out by the socialist government in Spain, which gave 
PSOE the legitimacy to carry through its programmes. As re­
gards industry, it reinforced the pattern of restructuring, 
at the same time as showing the need for widening the scope 
of industrial policy. As is shown in Fig. V.2, two new lines 
were opened up: the National Plan for Scientific and Techno­
logical Investigation and the Law on Regional Incentives to 
Correct Economic Unbalances. On the other hand, entry into the 
EC supposed a sharp reduction of tariff barriers and thus an 
important increase of imports. The effects of this on the 
balance of payments and domestic production make the balance 
sheet very complex.
As mentioned above, the main instruments of industrial 
protection under Francoism were subsidies, legal regulations
35This hypothesis was confirmed by Landabaso, DG.XVI, Commission of
the EC.
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required to establish a business, tariff policy and the deve­
lopment of public enterprises in those fields where private 
capital did not invest. With respect to effective legal pro­
tection, this had begun in Spain at the time when ISI policies 
were implemented in the 1930s, and was based on the need to
obtain administrative authorization in order to form, expand
36or transfer any business . This remained in force until
1964. RD 157/1963 authorised the unrestricted creation of 
industry, except in those sectors which required minimum 
hygiene or technical standards, for which legal authorization 
was still needed. This law was subsequently modified in 1964,
1965, 1968, 1975, 1978 and 1980. Whereas in 1963 some 48.4 per 
cent of industrial sectors had been subject to some form of 
prior administrative authorization, in 1980 this applied to 
just 22.7 per cent (arms production, energy and pharmaceuti­
cals) .
Tariff reduction began in Spain in 1959, with the stabi­
lisation plan and entry into the IMF and the OECD. The average 
rate of effective protection for industry fell from 68.4 per 
cent in 1962 to 31.2 per cent in 1968, The second major impul­
se came with entry into the EC. As was noted in chapters II 
and IV, a transition period of six years was agreed for Spain 
and Portugal where each year (including the year the treaty 
was signed, 1986) a reduction in tariffs of approximately 12.5 
percentage points was to take place, until these countries’ 
barriers were brought in line with those of the EC.
36RD 20/6/1938
The effects of such an opening up were dealt with in 
chapter II, where the positive and negative aspects of incor­
poration into the EC were discussed. The Spanish trade balance 
became negative from the date of entry into the EC, and there 
has been no sign of a recovery. Table V.5 shows that the trade 
deficit was some three billion pesetas in 1989, 7.1 per cent 
of GDP at current prices. In 1980 prices, the deficit rose 
from 1.4 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 11.2 per cent in 198937. 
In breaking down international exchange with the EC, the trade 
balance has gone from a positive figure to a deficit of a 
billion and a half pesetas. The import/export performance has 
been very different according to the sector. From 1985 to 
1989, imports of consumer goods rose 269 per cent, those of 
semi-finished goods by just 78 per cent. Non-energy imports 
come mainly from the EC, rising by 168 per cent in the period 
1985-89.
The industrial systems of Spain and Argentina have been- 
/are oriented to the production of intermediate (semi-elabora- 
te) goods and consumer goods. A brief international comparison 
shows how in the developed countries -Germany, Japan- the 
production of means of production is dominant over the produc­
tion of consumer goods and basic products, which supply the 
domestic market. Table V.l shows Spain’s external trade by 
sector, and it can be seen from this table that it is interme­
diate and consumer goods which are the most important for both 
imports and exports. In 1975, the most largest industrial 
imports were in the following sectors: energy, machinery,
37Montes, 1991:261-262.
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chemical industry and steel. By the same token, the sectors 
which generated the most export earnings were transport mate­
rials and cars, steel, machinery and chemical industry. These 
sectors were and are protected by various industrial promotion 
programmes, and therefore are the most dynamic sectors in the 
economy. The system as a whole was less integrated than in the 
other developed countries; that is to say that in Spain there
was a lower degree of interrelation between productive activi- 
38ties. Since the ISI policy gave priority to the maintenance 
of the industrial network over the question of efficiency, the 
technological resources needed to maintain manufacturing 
installations were imported.
Thus, the level industrial specialisation was low compa­
red to other countries, since national industry supplied 
domestic demand and only in a few sub-sectors did an orienta­
tion towards exports exist. In Spain, 82 per cent of demand 
for industrial products were met with domestic production in 
1980 (the figure for the EC is 75-78 per cent) and the country
exported just 11 per cent of output (19-22 per cent for the 
39EC) . In proportion as the Spanish economy became more 
internationalised, exports grew, although always more slowly 
than imports. In 1985, before entry into the EC, the sectors 
or sub-sectors with the greatest orientation towards exports
38This was especially notable in the branches of machine production. 
Whereas in developed countries the means of production are strongly linked 
with the other branches of industry, in Argentina and Spain this subsector 
behaves like just another branch of industry. Some machinery is produced, 
but not enough to meet internal requirements, so that a greater proportion 
has to be imported from outside (Tables V.l and V.5).
^Buesa & Molero, 1988.
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were shipbuilding, steel, chemicals and cars. In 1989, as can 
be seen in table V.l, the most export-oriented sectors were 
those with the highest proportion of foreign investment, with 
the exception of steel: cars, chemicals, steel, machinery,
food and beverages. In addition, table V.5 shows that the 
level of exports of chemicals, steel, machinery and food and 
beverages did not cover the imports in the same sectors.
In the period 1986-89, there were certain changes in the 
field of restructuring. The chief characteristic of this 
period is discretionality. Rather than having a general rule 
for dealing with the problem, each sector was now treated in 
a particular manner, from the tax field to the creation of new 
rationalisation projects. The legitimacy of the socialists* 
programmes meant that the Central Administration reduced its 
consultation with the different social actors.*®
The role of the EC in controlling the development of the 
restructuring plans was very important. This was due, in part, 
to the strict EC norms on the question of industrial sub­
sidies. The Treaty of Rome clearly established that member 
states must not use public funds to intervene in free competi-
The role of the Autonomous Communities in the drawing up, running 
and control of rationalisation projects was reduced. In some cases, the 
Central Administration consulted with an EC commission in order to decide 
whether industries deserved to be restructured (integral iron and steel, 
and steels). In other cases, this was planned between the Central Adminis­
tration and Transnational groups (telecommunications and fertilisers). In 
the case of domestic electric goods the Catalan local administration also 
intervened. The the case of common steels the programmes were worked out 
between employers and the governments. Finally, in the case of shipbuil­
ding, the line followed in 1983-86 was continued, through dialogue between 
the administration, the employers and the unions.
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tion. However, it did allow state aid directed towards social 
ends, compensation for natural disasters, offsetting the 
economic disadvantages of the poorest regions and to carry out 
projects of common European interest. In 1978, the Commission 
authorised the granting of subsidies to carry out restructu­
ring, regulating the norms of sectoral rationalisation. The 
Commission considered that Spain’s industrial policy was in 
agreement with EC directives. Only in the cases of shipbuil­
ding and iron and steel did Spain and Portugal have a special 
transitional regime. The Act of Admission specified a period 
of four and three years respectively for reducing the volume 
of public aid to these sectors. EC membership gave legitimacy 
to Spain’s Central Administration to demand greater discipline 
from both employers and unions.
When discussing the cost of rationalisation in Spain, it 
is interesting to note the lack of available data on the part 
of the Administration, especially from 1985 onwards. These 
various sources show inaccurate information: the MINER and ME 
statistics frequently do not indicate dates or periods which 
enter into the accounts, the categories vary from one year to 
the next and the categories on many occasions are too vague, 
in a non-comparable form. One possibility is the lack o co­
ordination between the projects in different sectors as the 
rationalisation policy was broadened out**. Another possibil­
ity is that the Spanish government did not want to commit 
itself, given its imminent entry into the EC. Table V.9
**This was the reason given by government technocrats when intervie­
wed (Yague. MINER).
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presents estimates of the total expenditure on industrial 
policy in Spain 1978-90, which should only be taken as a 
reference point.
After Spain’s entry into the EC, two new lines of indus­
trial promotion were launched, in agreement with EC policies.
These are the Law on Regional Incentives to Correct Economic 
42Disequilibria and the National Plan for Scientific and
43Technological Development .
The system of regional incentives in Spain was establis­
hed through five programmes of promotion in the most deprived 
areas, apart from the ZUR programme mentioned above. These 
areas are: Great (or Large) Areas (GA), Preferential Zones and 
Industrial Complexes (ZYPPLI), Declining Industrialised Zones 
(ZID) and Economic Promotion Zones (ZPE). The first three came 
into force in the previous periods; the second two from 1988 
onwards. It is interesting to look at the map of Spain accor­
ding to deprived areas (figure 3). All the areas that make up 
the extent of Spanish territory, with the sole exception of 
the Balearic Islands, are considered as deprived areas in need 
of industrial restructuring and/or promotion. Surprisingly, 
the map even includes the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in 
Africa! This policy may be related to two objectives: promot­
ing political decentralisation and the demand for European 
Structural Funds. With respect to the first point, it was 
noted in chapter IV that one of the most skilful of PSOE’s
42RD 1535/1987 
43RD 1750/1987
TABLE V .11.s
DISTRIBUTION OE SPANI SH SUBSIDIES 
BY SECTORS, IN MILLION RESETAS, 
PROGRAMMES ZUR , ZID ^ ZPE, Z YRRLI 
& GAEI, 1985—30-
SECTOR N.PROJECTS SUBSIDY % SUB/PROJECT
ENERGY 25 800.3 0.5 32.0
METALS (mining+industry) 79 4,862.8 3.3 61.5
NON-METAL (") 596 25,432.0 17.4 42.6
CHEMICAL 251 15,417.1 10.5 25.8
METAL PRODUCTS 586 14,708.0 10.0 25.0
MACHINERY 262 6,978.5 4.7 26.6
ELECTRONICS+COMPUTERS 68 16,604.9 11.3 244.1
TRANSPORT 179 14,760.6 10.1 82.4
FOOD INDUSTRY 359 11,908.6 8.1 33.1
TEXTIL,LEATHER,SHOES 565 7,418.0 5.0 13.1
WOOD+FORNITURE 565 10,380.0 7.1 18.3
PAPER+PRINTING 234 4,501.8 3.0 19.2
RUBBER+PLASTICS 46 2,468.3 1.6 53.6
OTHER MANUFACTURES 323 9,879.8 6.7 30.5
TOTAL 4,138 146,120.7 100.0 35.3
Source: MINER 1987, 1989.
policies was to encourage "civil liberties", including 
favouring nationalist political activities and regional 
decentralisation. It was, then, necessary not to have dis­
crimination by the Central Administration. This should be put 
in the context of that in the democratic transition, when the 
priority was given to political aspects over economic ones.
With respect to demand for the European Structural Funds, 
one of the requirements for the granting of overall subsidies 
is cofinancing with national regional development plans. There 
was, then, a need to initiate such policies in areas which, 
because of their low GNP, high unemployment or need for ratio­
nalisation and modernisation of production would be eligible 
to receive EC subsidies. In 1987, this was all the country’s 
regions.^ With the exception of the Baleares, whose princi­
pal economic activity is tourism, and the cities of Barcelona 
and Madrid, the rest of the regions of Spain are classified 
as developing areas and eligible to request aid from the EC’s 
Structural Funds. As is shown in Fig. V.9, EC grants are not 
very substantial, amounting to only 0.6 per cent of the aid 
which comes from Spanish public funds. The Spanish governmen­
ts’ requests for EC funds was not, however, illegitimate. 
Barcelona and Madrid benefit from the ZUR programme, but are 
not included on the list of developing regions, and the other 
regions fulfil all the criteria for being incorporated into 
the EC’s category of Less Developed Zones (EC Zone 1 in Dia- 
gramme V.3, to which the Programme of Regional Development,
^If average GNP per capita in the EC is 100, Baleares was 98, Madrid 
97, the Basque Country 96, Catalonia 93 ... with finally Andalucia and 
Extremadura with 59 and 47 respectively (Cuadrado Roura, 1991:763)
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1989-93, is applied) and Zones undergoing Restructuring (EC 
Zone 2 in Diagramme V.3, to which the Programme of Regional 
Restructuring, 1989-93, is applied).
Table V.10 shows the regional distribution of industrial 
promotion subsidies. It can be appreciated that the areas 
which receive the most are precisely those which in 1983 had 
the highest NNP, with the exception of Castilla-Leon. Galicia 
received 18.6 per cent of the industrial subsidies, Andalucia 
15.9 per cent, Castilla-Leon 15.8 per cent, Catalonia 9.5 per 
cent, the Basque Country 8.8 per cent and Madrid 8.1 per cent. 
Of these regions, only Andalucia had a negative rate of growth 
of GDP. The rest had a GDP growth of 1.5%, which was the 
average growth in Spain. The region of Valencia, with an NNP 
on 1983 of 10 per cent and average GDP growth of 2.2 per cent 
in 1978-83, received the lowest amount of industrial subsidies 
-0.4 per cent.
Table V.ll shows the sectoral distribution of the pro­
jects approved by the control commissions of the ZUR, ZID, 
ZPE, ZYPPLI and GA programmes. The sectors that were most 
favoured by the industrial promotion programmes were mining 
and non-metal industries (which received 17.4 per cent of the 
subsidies), electronics and computers (11.3 per cent), chemi­
cal industry (10.5 per cent), transport (shipbuilding, cars 
etc) (10.1 per cent), food (10.1 per cent) and metal products 
(10 per cent). Considering that programmes for fostering 
technological development are not included in the regional aid 
programmes in Table V.ll, it is interesting to note that the 
level of subsidies per project for the electronics and
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TABLE V .1.Z
SPAXN r I MI? O RTS AND EXPORTS BY
X N D U S T R X A L  S E C T O R S  ^ X 1ST
PERCENTAGES, 1975-89, SELECTED
YEARS.
SECTOR IMPORTS EXPORTS
1975 1985 1989 1975 1985 1989
ENERGY 30.6 39.0 13.1 3.6 8.7 5.8
MINING 4.0 2.5 3.0 1.6 1.2 1.3
STEEL 10.4 7.9 7.4 14.5 17.2 10.4
CONSTRUCT.MATS. 1.1 0.4 1.4 4.3 2.8 3.8
CHEMICALS 15.3 14.0 13.3 13.2 15.5 13.7
MACHINERY 23.0 12.2 16.6 14.4 9.8 9.5
ELECTRON.+COMP. 1.4 8.5 14.7 1.4 3.8 7.7
TRANSPORT MAT. 5.7 8.5 15.1 20.2 27.1 24.2
of which cars 0.3 1.4 11.6 3.5 9.9 20.4
FOOD+BEBERAGES 4.9 2.0 3.5 7.6 6.2 6.9
TEXTIL 1.6 1.4 2.1 5.7 4.4 2.4
SHOE+LEATHER 0.5 0.9 2.8 9.9 5.7 6.2
Source: MINER
computers sector is seven times higher than the average. If
we analyze these results in the light of Tables V.l, where it
shows that the sectors with the highest level of exports in
1985 were, in order, transport, steel, chemicals, machinery,
energy, food and beverages, it must be concluded that Spain’s
regional promotion programmes have benefited the sectors which
export the most. In 1989, the export "winners" were transport,
chemicals, steel, machinery, electronic and computers, and
food and beverages. That is to say, with the exception of
mining and non-metal industry, which consist of construction
materials for the most part and which supply internal demand,
all of these are sectors that are promoted not only by systems
of regional aid but also by the industrial rationalisation 
45programmes.
The key factor seems to be investment, either in the 
form of state subsidy or FDI -and rarely reinvestment of 
profits given industrial debt repayments as seen above. It 
should be noted that in a larger or lesser form, the Spanish 
government has subsidised all successful industrial sectors, 
rationalising their firms before welcoming FDI or directly 
promoting the sector’s development.
The growth in industrial output recorded in Spain in the 
1980s has not only been due to the reinvestment of profits in
45A more desegregated analysis shows that not all sectors have been 
successful in exports due to the subsidies. In transport, the main 
exporting subsector was shipbuilding in 1985 which benefited from 
subsidies. However, in 1989 it was vehicles, which benefited from lesser 
subsidies but expanded through FDI; in any cae, the Spanish government 
helped in the rationalisation of vehicle firms to welcome FDI (interview 
to Molero, Universidad Complutense de Madrid).
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a way which would be typical, in Gerschenkronian terms, of the 
Anglo-saxon liberal model. Investment in a country like Spain 
has been in large part due to foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Table V.4 shows how FDI in industry counted for 8.3% of the 
total direct investment in 1977, changing to 34.5% in 1988. 
There were several reasons, low labour costs, a favourable 
government attitude, expansion of domestic demand in the 
period 1986-91, and the perspective of integration into the 
EC. Given that labour costs were lower in Portugal or Greece, 
domestic demand higher in France or Germany and government 
policy towards FDI more favourable in the UK or Ireland, the 
expectations of future integration of Spain into the EC seem 
to be to be one of the key factors to attract TNCs as a way 
of gaining later entry into the European market. This is once 
again in stark contrast to Argentina. If the key factor is 
protected markets, economic liberalisation in Argentina should 
be questioned.
Table V.4 shows that the ratio of foreign investment to 
total investment from 1977 to 1988 has risen in all sectors, 
except in energy, steel, metal products, motor cars and rubber 
and plastics. The relative modest growth in the motor industry 
is due to the large investments which were carried out before 
Spain entered the EC. Looking at the percentage of FDI in each 
industrial sector as a proportion of all overseas investment 
in Spain, we can see that the sectors which have absorbed the 
largest proportion of FDI are the most subsidised as well: 
chemicals; food and beverages; paper and graphic arts and the 
vehicle industry. In the case of chemicals and vehicles, these 
are two of the most competitive sectors in terms of exports;
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whereas food and beverages and paper are sectors with a high 
internal demand.
It is interesting to note that the Spanish government has 
indiscriminately subsidised capital, both national and trans­
national. The administrations of the transition period in 
Spain never pronounced on the form of property or the organi­
sation of companies. Criteria such as the size of the business 
or the origin of its capital are not considered as relevant. 
With the exception of the Funds for the Promotion of Employ­
ment (FPE, see below), priority has been given to investment, 
modernisation and industrial efficiency, independently of 
factors such as nationality or the capacity to generate jobs. 
It will be argued later that the association of efficiency 
with big companies is not justified.
Concluding the restructuring and reindustrialisation 
implemented in Spain between 1982-89, the Spanish government 
has been carrying a policy of industrial promotion. It is 
interesting to note that although the socialist 
administration’s rhetoric has been for liberalisation and 
modernisation, there has been a massive expansion of public 
sector spending. In chapter IV it was indicated how the 
Spanish public sector, which in 1975 was an almost model 
example of the minimalist state advocated by liberal economics 
as a panacea, increased its expenditure from 25 per cent of 
GDP to 42.1 per cent in 1987 . That is to say, the Spanish
state has liberalised and deregulated part of its economic
^See Alcaide, 1989.
activities, but at the same time has increased the state’s 
actions in some of these sectors in transition. The comparison 
with the Argentine case is more relevant than ever, since the 
various administrations, faced with the possibility of public 
expenditure blocked by external debt, were forced to 
liberalise and deregulate without the possibility of 
protecting those activities or social groups that needed it. 
Contrary to Waisman’s thesis, which considers the ISI policies 
as generating economic backwardness and inefficiency, the 
Spanish case shows that the question does not lie in ISI, but 
rather in the manner in which the policies are corrected in 
the transition to another type of organisation of production.
After 1989, the Spanish government took industrial res­
tructuring plans as terminated. However, as it was mentioned 
before, there were other industrial promotion plans underway. 
With respect to the National Plan for Scientific Investigation 
and Technological Development, it was the other major channel 
for industrial promotion in co-ordination with EC programmes. 
The Plan was launched in 1987 (RD 1750/1987), with three 
principal guidelines: it promoted technological innovation in 
general, and research in the pharmaceutical industry and in 
electronics and computers. The Centre for Technological and 
Industrial Development (CDTI) was created in order to evaluate
projects of technological interest and to promote their 
47exploitation.
^ , The CDTI was created in 1978 with U$S 40 million (18 funded by 
the World Bank and 22 by the Spanish government).
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The Spanish public funds allocated to each programme are 
shown in Table V.9. Until 1990, subsidies to R & D made up 
just 1.6 per cent of total expenditure on industrial promotion 
in Spain, or 2 per cent if EC aid is included. The EC subsidi­
sed 32 per cent of R & D activities in Spain, this being the 
area which received the highest contribution from the EC. 
However, Spain received just 5.4 per cent of EC R & D subsi­
dies. In the period under study, the Spanish state was in a 
transitional phase of its entry into the EC. Both sides, Spain 
and the EC, were trying to take advantage of this transition 
period. In this case, Spain was not receiving its proportion 
of R & D aid, while it was nonetheless contributing 100 per 
cent of the quota to some of its agencies which it had been 
incorporated into prior to 1986. The Spanish government has 
constantly maintained a stance of demanding aid for the less 
developed zones from the EC. This has continued to be one of 
the chief sources of tension after the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1991).
The subsidised areas are shown in Table V.12. Information 
technology and Electronics are prioritised. From 1990 the 
Programme to Promote an Environmental Industry, Energy and 
Technological Base came into effect (1990-94), which is to 
receive new subsidies, amounting to 80 per cent of the total. 
In any case, the programme’s objectives are very broad, cove­
ring many areas which have to be desegregated, from energy
48through to chemical industries .
48MINER, 1990.
Finally, it is necessary to mention a couple of plans put
into effect by MINER. The first is the Plan for the Promotion
49of Design, Quality and Fashion (Q & D). The programme could 
have had great potential, if the resources had not been 
allocated so meagrely (just 0.1 per cent of Spain’s total 
industrial policy funds). The plan ran over four years (1988- 
91), and its objective was to increase the sophistication of 
design in industrial textiles, leather, footwear, costume 
jewelry, furniture, toys and ceramics. One of Spain’s possible 
international specialisations could be developing design 
products, but one of the problems in promoting a project of 
this type has been the black market economy and the high 
number of "invisible" SMEs operating in this field.
Spanish promotion to SMEs during the period 1979-89 was 
pure tokenism, just 0.1 per cent of total public spending on 
industry (Table V.9). This aid has been organised by the In­
stitute for Small and Medium Sized Industrial Business (IMPI), 
which is dependent on MINER. The aid has been centred on two 
areas: systems of information and consultation to firms, and 
cofinancing projects through the Collective Action Associa­
tions (SAC) and the System of Reciprocal Guarantees (SGR).
The Spanish government has opted for a strategy of sup­
port for big business. There are two possible causes of this. 
The first is that the Spanish government may have pursued a 
policy of pick-up-the-winners: encouraging those activities 
which promote economic success regardless of political fac­
490.1/6/1988.
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tors. The second possibility is that big companies have recei­
ved 99.8 per cent of industrial funds due to neither economic 
criteria nor to any strategy of industrial promotion, but 
rather to the simple fact that big industrial groups possess 
much more capacity to exert socio-political pressure on the 
government. Given the importance of the democratic transition 
and the process of selection of the firms which were to bene­
fit (seen above), the answer seems to indicate that the crite­
ria used have been socio-political motives, rather than it 
being a strategy based on developing future competitiveness. 
Is this reason why the SMEs, which could have played a criti­
cal role in the creation of jobs, have not been fully integra­
ted into the industrial policy plans. The Spanish socialist 
government, however, has embarked on no experiments to en­
courage cooperatives and SMEs in the industrial arena. Ins­
tead, state aid has been given to large companies arguing that 
they are the most efficient.^
ISI protection and orientation towards the domestic
market in previous decades meant that the average firm size
was smaller than in the developed countries. According to the
INE in 1978, some 88 per cent of firms in Spain had between
1 and 49 employees. Since the domestic market was made up for
the most part by SMEs, the monopolies and/or oligopolies were
51to be found in very specific sectors. Buesa and Molero
50 The lack of interest shown by successive Spanish governments in 
SMEs is paradoxical given that Europe’s largest and most successful co­
operative, Mondragon, is found in Spain. Mondragon’s efficiency seems to 
stem from the co-operative creation of its own banks, in such a way that 
the savings are reinvested (Thomas & Logan, 1982).
^Buesa and Molero, 1988:90-97.
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presented an analysis of the degree of concentration and 
competition in the various sectors of Spanish industry. The 
results are in four categories, the first two being monopolies 
and very concentrated oligopolies with a high ability to 
influence the market, representing just 7.7 per cent of 
employment. In 1978, these subsectors were: energy, mining,
telecommunications, tobacco, paper, vehicles, office 
machinery, shipbuilding, watchmaking and sugar. Category III 
corresponds not to large firms but rather to medium sized 
firms, which acted like oligopolies despite the fact that the 
degree of concentration was less than in categories I and II: 
iron and steel, signal equipment, salt extraction, and optics. 
The rest of the subsectors were in category IV, competitive 
SMEs, which accounted for 84.6 per cent of employment. Nonet­
heless, control of markets is not achieved only through oligo-
52polistic practices. Tamames and above all Brunet have
analysed the interconnections between industrial groups and
the role of employers* pressure groups in influencing the
government on prices and incomes policies during the last
years of the dictatorship and the transition. They found 22
cases in which institutional strategies were altered to the
53benefit of the employers during the transition.
^Tamames, 1977:180-204; Brunet, 1986.
C 0
. These pressure groups were: FENINASA (Fertilisers), ANFA, AGFAE 
y AGFAM (Sugar), UNESA (Electricity), Union Salinera (Salt mining), 
Potasas Espanolas, OFICEMEN (Concrete), SERCOBE (Machinery), ANFAC (Vehi­
cles), ANFE (household electrical appliances), Consorcio de Neumaticos, 
Instituto papelero Espanol SA, CAMPSA (petrol), UNESID (iron and steel),
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The problem with these analyses is that the sectors where
this takes place are the most concentrated ones, in which the
employers* associations seem to be a sign and a reinforcement
of oligopolistic power over the market. In 1970, some 46.6 per
cent of prices were controlled through authorizations; in
1983, controls still existed on 35 products, affecting the RPI 
54by 15 per cent . Oligopolistic practices and international 
pressure to liberalise forced the Spanish state to pass Law 
L.110/1963 on the Suppression of Practices Restricting 
Competition. The Tribunal for the Defence of Competition was 
created through this law; this tribunal penalised price agree­
ments, refusals to sell or supply services, "disloyal competi­
tion", and division of markets. Between 1964 and 1984, the 
Tribunal initiated an average of 19 cases per year, of which 
on average sentence was passed on only 11.4 each year; in the 
most active period (1981- ) 50 per cent were absolved^.
The subject of SMEs is complex, since one strategy for 
resisting the increased pressure of taxes at the time of 
opening up the economy has been "submersion" into the black 
economy. Calculations about the black economy in Spain use 
various methods, and therefore are not comparable. The results 
are varied (table V.19), estimating the black economy as 33
CONSTRUNAVES (shipbuilding), CARBUNION (Coal), FARMAINDUSTRIA (pharmaceu­
tical), CEOPAN (bakeries), AFHAE (flour), ANIEL (electronics), AEFVP y 
ANFEVI (glass) y ANDELUZ (lamps) (Tamames, 1977:180-204; Brunet, 1986:85- 
87; Buesa & Molero, 1988:90-97).
^~See Brunet, 1986
55Buesa & Molero, 1988:100-103.
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per cent of GDP^®, 2.3 per cent of GDP^, 6.5 per cent of
5ft 59GNP , 22.9 per cent of National Income , 27.1 per cent of
the employed population (Ministry of the Economy, 1985) and
between 9.6 per cent and 11.3 per cent of the active
60population . Some pioneering studies in specific sectors and 
regions of Spain indicate that black economy activities amount 
to as much as 20-25 per cent of the textile industry in the 
Valencia region, 15-30 per cent of Catalan textiles (Tarrasa- 
Sabadell), 30 per cent of car repair workshops in Cordoba 
(Andalucia), and 21-36 per cent of informal businesses in shoe 
manufacturing in the Alicante area (Valencia). Various methods 
have been used, from lighting consumption to direct interviews
gl
with workers and employers . These studies show that the 
degree of involvement in the informal sector for industrial 
SMEs was approximately 27 per cent in Spain during the 1980s, 
and 21.9 per cent for- all economic activities (Table V.3). The 
black economy seems to have been developed mainly in 
agricultural activities (30.9 per cent), in small industry 
producing consumer goods (food -17.6 per cent; textiles -23.4 
per cent; confectionary -42.9 per cent; leather -32 per cent; 
footwear -37.8 per cent), as well as the service sector (cons­
truction -18.7 per cent; hotels -26.1 per cent; shops -24.9
56Terceiro, 1982, using unspecified methods.
57Bank of Spain, 1981, based on Gutmann s method on money demand. 
^Frey & Wech, 1983 
^Lafuente, 1980.
^Ruesga, 1988:63.
^Ruesga, 1988:88-99.
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per cent; workshops -16.2 per cent; domestic service -60.4 per 
cent; and private education -20.4 per cent). Looking at the 
regional distribution of informal activities, the highest 
percentage is to be found in areas where official statistics
show a higher figure for unemployment and a lower figure for
62 63economic activity , or where agriculture or the service
Ci
sector ) play an important part.
The black market economy is not just a means of survival
for the SMEs. Although reliable figures do not exist on the
amount of subsistence activity, there are studies on the
importance of subcontracting. A large number of big companies
reduce costs and increase flexibility through subcontracting
65to SMEs in the informal sector. Lawrence Benton , in a study 
of small informal firms in the electronics sector in Madrid, 
shows how subcontracting to informal SMEs has been due not 
only to their lower costs, but also to their higher quality 
and speed of production in semi-finished goods. The 
electronics sector is of course one of the sectors undergoing 
restructuring in Spain, and 70 per cent of its production is 
located in Madrid. The businessmen in the informal sector were 
for the most part specialised workers who began by using 
family labour, going on to create firms of no more than 25 
workers who had no official protection. Although some of these 
firms enjoyed strong demand from big companies, they also
R2Andalucia, the Canaries, Extremadura.
^Castilla-Mancha
Cl
The Mediterranean regions.
^Benton, 1990:255-271.
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began to experience serious financial difficulties, given the 
impossibility of gaining access to loans. The case of 
textiles, footwear and toys in the Valencia region (Ybarra, 
1990) it emerges that the informal sector is organised by the 
businessmen themselves who supply the technology and materials
CC
to families. On the other hand, the use of informal workers 
has led to the closure of industrial plants, with the 
employers claiming this is due to "the crisis" and the need 
to increase the competitiveness of production.
Overall, there are various reasons for the informal 
sector, and these do not seem to be limited to the reduction 
of tax costs and the protection of jobs, but also to flexibi­
lity of the labour force, and the speed and quality of produc­
tion. This is related to the evolution of Spain's industrial 
economic policy in the last 50 years. Under the dictatorship, 
the economy did not experience a high rate of growth, but was 
totally formal, coordinated by a paternalistic state which 
fostered full employment with low wages. In proportion as the 
political power of Francoism was growing weaker and labour 
discontent grew at the end of the 1960s, the state got itself 
out of the situation by increasing repression and at the same 
time wages when political conflicts got out of hand. Thus, it 
was the employers who paid the costs of the opposition to the
fidSome 84 per cent of the workers in the informal sector indicated 
that their wages are lower than those in factories, and only 2.8 per cent 
received payment for illness and/or fixed costs. However, 51.6 per cent 
work between 5-8 hours a day, less than in factories. The largest amount 
of this work is carried out by housewives, in order to supplement their 
husbands* earnings (46.7 per cent). If the head of the family has an 
official job, this means that both the wife and the children have access 
to state social security (Ybarra, 1990:241-251).
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regime. The transition did not make the situation any better. 
After the massive strikes of 1975-76, the unions were recogni­
sed and wages rose. The Moncloa Pacts were the first attempt 
to regulate them, as was seen in chapter IV, not only for 
reasons of business competitiveness, but also basically to 
control inflation. However, the vicissitudes of the transition 
to democracy led to a relaxation of the incomes policy, post­
poning the adjustment to the period of socialist rule. Once 
the PSOE was in power, part of its policy has been to protect 
those groups of workers with the greatest political muscle: 
this was the case of those from the large firms which were 
undergoing rationalisation. The FPEs accounted for 17.5 per 
cent of total expenditure on industrial policy up until they 
were finally ended in 1989. Given that one of the principal 
concerns in PSOE’s economic policy has been to foster economic 
activity in Spain and to increase competition, they opted for 
a policy of "pick-up-the-winners,M giving aid to big business 
and ignoring the informal sector. Despite the fact that the 
government has not fostered the SMEs, it has maintained a very 
tolerant attitude towards them, due to their importance in 
promoting employment and business competitiveness, in spite 
of the negative effects on inflation and tax receipts. The
large extension of social security provision is related to
6?this policy of permissiveness towards the informal economy.
B7The General Law of Public Health extended public medicine services 
to all the Spanish population in 1986. This meant a real increase of 6.3 
million beneficiaries although investment only rose by one per cent of GNP 
in the period 1982-89 (see chapter IV).
238
In this way, Spain is evolving towards post-fordism 
thanks to informality. On the one hand, the advantages of a 
new division and organisation of labour are achieving positive 
effects, offering quality and speed of production at the same 
price because of decentralisation and the size of SMEs. PSOE 
may not be wrong in protecting big enterprises since they lead 
SMEs through subcontracting their services. On the other hand, 
this has been developed by the informal sector, so workers pay 
the disadvantages of this post-fordist evolution.
At the policy level, this carries the implication that 
two of the central justifications put forward by the socialist 
government lack any basis. The first is that supporting big 
business results in an increase in efficiency. As Sabel, Piore
CO
and Berger, demonstrate, the informal firms* flexible 
specialisation can produce high increases in efficiency and 
productivity at the same time as fostering employment. The 
second is the question of wages. The government claims that 
the reduction of wages is a necessary prerequisite for 
increasing the competitiveness of Spanish production. 
Comparing Spain’s labour costs with the rest of Europe, it 
emerges that Spain’s remain markedly lower (chapter IV); in 
addition these figures are not very representative, given that 
the informal sector accounts for 9.6-11.3 per cent of total 
employment and thus real labour costs are unknown but lower.
The economic consequences of such growth of the informal 
sector are important. Not only for the reasons put forward,
^Piore and Berger, 1984; Sabel, 1982; Capecchi, 1990.
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namely a change in the structure of production that has been 
achieved by means of subcontracting, but also because the real 
rate of growth of the Spanish economy has been underestimated 
by about 20 per cent. It would also raise doubts about the 
extent of the economic crisis in the 1980s, and of PSOE’s 
legitimacy to implement austerity policies and to ask for 
social sacrifices. There has been an industrial crisis, as in 
Europe, where there has been a process of restructuring and 
deindustrialization from 1973 to 1986. In Spain, the "formal" 
GNP has grown substantially since 1986, but as has been seen 
in Chapter IV this is due more to the service sector than to 
industry. As distinct from other European countries, Spain’s 
service sector has not responded to international changes, 
accompanying productive activities, but rather it has been a 
question of expansion of construction and public services. 
However, services to industry seem also to have developed from 
the informal economy. The extension of the informal industrial 
sector seems to indicate that there has also been an increase 
in this sector.
Concluding this section, the Spanish government has 
pursued an active policy of rationalisation and industrial 
promotion, increasing public expenditure in this sphere beyond 
the levels in previous decades, including the ISI period. The 
criteria of for selection in this policy of promotion appear 
to have been socio-political ones. The subsidies were concen­
trated in those sector which had the greatest capacity to 
exert union or employer pressure. The SMEs received scarce 
state aid, and thus around 27% of Spanish industries opted to 
"turn black" as a survival strategy confronted with the
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effects of trade opening and tax reform. The Spanish
government has pursued a policy of toleration towards the
growing informal sector, justifying this on the grounds of the
need to increase competitiveness and efficiency nationally.
However, the evidence appears to indicate that a great part
of the productive efficiency and flexibility has come from the
69use of subcontracting to precisely this informal sector . 
Further, given the important decrease of labour costs and the 
extension of unemployment, Spain may be evolving towards post­
fordism through an enlargement of the informal sector.
Further, given that the black economy counts for 22% of all
economic activities, there are reasons to doubt about the real
extent of the Spanish crisis in the 1980s.
Part of the incoherence of this process of transformation 
of the structure of production derives from the bad diagnosis 
carried out by the first socialist government, which did not 
foresee the spectacular rise in interest rates and the appre­
ciation of the peseta. Incorporation into the EC has done no 
more than to accelerate the economic transformation, in a 
process of restructuring of production which is still incon­
clusive. Benefits coming from integration have not yet been 
fully shown. The reduction of tariffs after 1986 and the real 
appreciation of the peseta have created a worrying trade 
deficit; only those sectors with greater technological plants 
have been able to maintain/improve their export performance. 
These sectors have been among those with the highest propor­
tion of foreign investment and which have also received the
69See the discussion in section VI.4.C. of the conclusion.
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highest level of public subsidies. The dismantling of the 
dictatorship’s economic nationalism has resulted in an 
industrial network which is less extensive and more speciali­
sed, and which seems to have found an economic niche within 
the EC in cars and semi-elaborate goods (chemicals, steel, 
machinery). That is to say, Spain is incorporated into the 
world economy in the same way as seventy years ago -as a 
European semi-peripheral country. However, decades of economic 
nationalism have brought about some changes: Spanish export
production is now not only agricultural but also industrial.
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V.ll. INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN ARGENTINA
As in Spain, the ISI system had created a very diversified 
and oligopolistic industrial network, globally non-competitive 
and dependent on technological imports. The ISI system had been 
modified overtime. After 1955, it was "deepened" thanks to an 
expansion of the domestic market, the promotion of inter-mediate 
goods production and the welcoming of TNCs. From 1964 to 1974, 
industry grew at a rate of 7% p.a., increasing its percentage 
over GNP from 25% to 28%. The decade supposed an important 
increase in productivity, rise on real wages and fall of relative 
prices. The sectors leading this industrial expansion were metal- 
mechanics, chemicals and food-industry. These sectors counted for 
60% of total industrial output.
70Katz describes the structural characteristics of the 
Argentine industry in terms of its duality, vertical integration 
and distinct technological conditions. Duality refers to the 
existence of an exporting-oriented industry in parallel to a 
national industry oriented to the domestic market. Both have 
different productive structures. The size of industrial plants 
is ten time smaller in the later, productivity is lower and it 
has a high mix of production, consisting of a short series and 
many different models. Vertical integration refers, like Spain, 
to the poorly integrated industrial system. Self-provision of 
supplies is a common practice in firms, instead of recurring to 
the services of other companies, in a way that the global efforts 
of industry are multiplied. Finally, a distinct technological 
behaviour refers to the need to adapt imported technology from 
developed countries to local productive needs.
^In Azpiazu & Kosacoff, 1989:11-12.
Despite these differential characteristics, non-traditional
manufactured exports increased their share on total exports
overtime. From 3% in 1960, to 6% in 1965, 14% in 1970 and 24% in
1975. This was due to several factors, mainly the existence of
a qualified labour-force, state subsidies, regional trade
regimes, bilateral government agreements and the existence of 
71TNCs . Nevertheless, despite state programmes of export 
promotion, firms did not show an aggressive export orientation; 
exports were usually surpluses non-consumed in the domestic 
market.
V.II.A: INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1977-90: DIAGNOSIS AND OUTCOME
However, a general consciousness about the exhaustion of the
ISI model started expanding by the 1970s. This consciousness may
have been promoted by the fact that Peron came back to power in
1973, after fifteen years in exile. He was an aged Peron, with
a language and mentality of the 1950s. The two years he stayed
in power until his death in 1975 were shaken by political
violence and economic crisis. Peron expected to recompose the
corporatist system, and to achieve a social pact between
entrepreneurs, trade unions and the state. However, social
expectations were too high and the social pact proved difficult 
72to establish . His administration raised wages and boosted 
domestic demand. This triggered inflation and the resulting 
connection produced another cycle of recession. After the brief 
mandate of his wife, the military came back to power with a new 
economic plan for the Argentine: liberalism.
^Azpiazu & Kosacoff, 1989:13. 
^See Kaufman, 1985
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From Neo-Liberal policies it was expected much more than 
economic recovery. The military government also expected social 
change, the dismantling of the corporatist society that had 
coordinated the Argentine during forty years. The liberal 
discourse of the minister of Economy, Martinez de Hoz (1976-81), 
was based on the need for trade opening and the reduction/elimi­
nation of union power to achieve a reduction in costs and 
inflation.
Neo-liberalism was applied in a discriminatory manner. The 
dismantling of forty years of corporatism proved to be difficult. 
Social groups were highly organised and politised as to allow 
large reductions in their redistribution share. In the view of 
this, the military government used different strategies, 
depending on the interlocutor, from a brutal repression of unions 
to a polite indication to industrialist on the adequacy of 
private credits instead of public subsidies. However, the 
military themselves were splitted into several factions, since 
not all of them agreed either with the "new" neo-liberal 
philosophy or the way it was implemented. Most military had been 
trained with populist ideas, and thus neo-liberalism was suitable 
from the perspective of "ordering" and having a "hard hand" with 
"the anarchic" Argentine society, but not from the point of view 
"protecting" the population. This is a further complication when 
analyzing policy-making in the period 1976-82. As it was 
described in chapter III, the result was a mix of contradictory 
policies. Paradoxically, the Argentine neo-liberal discourse was 
parallel to an expansion on public expenditure, especially high 
on the fields of defense and health (tables III.3). Public 
expending moved from 25.1% of GNP in 1970 to 35.3% in 1980 and 
to 38.5% in 1982, this is, from the expending side, before the
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military the Argentine state was almost the minimalist state that 
liberals claim.
The annual company reports of ACINDAR are one of the best 
examples of the ethos of the 1976-81 policy-making, the mix bet­
ween political nationalism and a very particular economic 
liberalism:
"Inflation... is the main enemy of national grandeur... Inflation 
started when public sector companies were statised, and kept growing 
without a pause. In order to reduce it, it is necessary to diminish 
drastically the public sector, adjusting public spending to real needs 
and possibilities of the country. To make public opinion to become 
conscious about this... we should demonstrate that statists is not a 
synonym of nationalism. On the contrary, it weakens the roots of the 
Nation, given it is based on the marxist idea of poisoning the currency 
of the country we are wishing to built up" (the president, Lopez- 
Aufranc, 1980-81) "...[In this year] there were some transcendental 
happenings in this country. The most significative was the attempt to 
re-integrate The Malvinas to the national patrimony, given they were 
usurped 149 years ago with a total lack of respect for our rights as 
inheritors of the Spanish domination. Further to the negative result of 
the operation, the positive side is the evidence in front of the whole 
world that the Argentine has as a national objective the re­
incorporation of these territories; and in this objective [the country] 
is accompanied by all Latin America and by most nations in the five 
continents, which agree that colonialism is an aberration in the 
twentieth century... ACINDAR, a totally Argentine enterprise, gave the 
materials that were necessary, and shows its condolence to the citizens 
which gave their lives..." (the president, Lopez-Aufranc, 1981/82). "As 
it was predictable, the first year of democracy has not been easy... 
The state did not reduce its excessive intervention and public 
expenditure to the levels needed to control inflation... To finance 
[external] debt... will alleviate the balance of payments, but in 
parallel it will impose sacrifices. It will demand a great deal of 
energy from the government and the consensus of the population to carry 
the burden..." (The president, Lopez-Aufranc, 1983/84).
The text above is illustrative in its attack on state 
intervention in industry, characteristic of the ISI period, while 
justifying privatisation and reduction of public spending in 
1980/81. This is written when Martinez de Hoz, the previous 
president of ACINDAR, was Minister of the Economy and the company 
was being financed thanks to private credit. However, Lopez- 
Aufranc makes a defense of public spending on the Malvinas/Fa-
246
lklands affair in the following exercise, 1981/82. It also shows
the militaristic phobia of the marxist threat that justified the
73repression under the doctrine of "national security" and the 
emphasis on an "ordered Nation" and "glorious Argentine". Lopez- 
Aufranc accuses the government of not being able to control 
inflation because of incapability to reduce public intervention 
and spending. Also, he encourages both the government and the 
Argentine population to have courage and take the sacrifices 
needed to restore macroeconomic equilibria. This is rather cyni­
cal when considering that state deficit came with the 1982 
external debt crisis, due to the nationalisation of private debt, 
including all the ones that ACINDAR contracted in the period
1976-82!
Figure V.4 gives an scheme of the diagnosis that the mili­
tary government made in 1976. Globally, it was expected that 
liberalisation would encourage economic efficiency. As explained 
in detail in chapter III, the body of this liberalisation was 
based in the tablita anti-inflationary programme, a chronogramme 
of progressive devaluations in order to equal the domestic rate 
of inflation with the international one. The other planned factor 
to reduce inflation was a reduction in labour costs. The fall in 
wages while a large expansion of private credit should encourage 
investment and correct the public deficit. In parallel, trade 
opening would force Argentine industry to specialise and to 
compete internationally. In the medium term, the expected result 
was an increase in domestic competitiveness, economic activity 
that would result in an increase in employment.
^See chapter III.
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Figure V.4. : DIAGNOSIS AND OUTCOME OF ARGENTINIAN 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY. 1977-1990
DIAGNOSIS (1977-81)
TABUTA'
V INFLATION
A INVESTMENT
TRADE OPENING
A EMPLOYMENT
V LABOUR COSTS LIBERALISATION 
EXCH. RATE
OUTCOME (1982- )
A INFLATION
TRADE OPENING
V INVESTMENT
V EMPLOYMENT
FINANCIAL
COSTS
V LABOUR COSTS
INFORMAL SECTOR
DOMESTIC
DEMAND
LIBERALISATION 
EXCH. RATE
OVER
VALUATION
PESO
The outcome differed from expectations. There was some re­
activation of investment in those sectors benefited from state 
protection -coming mostly from the nationalisation of their 
debts. However, as in Spain, there was an unexpected factor, the 
increase in financial costs. The 1977 financial reform freed
interest rates and created a totally different mechanism in the
74assignment of domestic credits. The effect of the rise in 
international interest rates was worsened by high domestic infla­
tion and the results of the exchange rate policy which overvalued 
the Argentine currency. This led to a vicious circle: the
increase in financial costs pressured prices to rise, causing 
more inflation and thus increasing more domestic interest rates. 
Profits were not re-invested as expected but used to cover for 
financial costs. On the other hand, domestic demand decreased and 
trade liberalisation increased the quantity of imports which 
further reduced the demand for domestic products.
These policies had multiple effects. Initially, financial
facilities produced an increase in investment. Although import
75tariffs were reduced 40% during the period 1976-78 , domestic 
industry did not feel threatened by trade opening given the 
existence of tariff redundancy and remaining forms of industrial 
protection. However, economic liberalisation was accompanied by 
a policy of wage restriction and a regressive distribution of 
income which reduced domestic demand. National production 
encountered a market problem in the period 1978-81, which was
Between 1930s-1977 the Central Bank provided subsidised loans and credits to 
industry, with negative interest rates. Thus industrialist were used to have 
an access to credit and kept using it after the 1977 financial reform 
(Kosacoff, 1992)
75On average, from 90% to 50% in the period (Azpiazu and Kosacoff, 
1989:14).
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76worsened by the "tablita" anti-inflationary programme which 
overvalued the peso and thus reduced exports. In 1981-82, the 
situation kept decaying, given that remaining trade protection 
was disappearing and international competition was undermining 
domestic production. It was then when the results of the sui- 
generis liberalisation implemented by the military were shown in 
its worse side. An important number of public enterprises which 
generated substantial employment, were dismantled, favouring 
private firms of dubious efficiency. These private industries 
became heavily indebted. In 1982, in the view of firms* 
bankruptcy, the government nationalised private debt, absorbing 
a large share of public funds, at the cost of further reductions 
on state expenditure in social affairs -health, education, pen­
sions. In the name of the new order and the doctrine of national 
security, there had been a violent repression of "subversive" 
union and student activities. Kidnappings, tortures and 
assassinations cannot be forgotten when doing an overall balance 
of the social aspects of the military regime. Investment fell 
dramatically, not only because of the increase of financial costs 
but also because of a lack of business confidence in the 
government economic team after the failure of the anti-infla­
tionary plan.
As in Spain, industrial policy in Argentina had a secondary 
importance in front of the priority of anti-inflationary 
programmes. This is more justified in the Argentine than in 
Spain, given three-digit inflation. However, objectives were not 
accomplished in Argentina. On the one hand, inflation adjustment 
was slow and imperfect, in a way that the exchange rate was
^See chapter III
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overvalued. On the other hand, trade opening produced a massive 
increased on imports, which were later further encouraged by the 
overvaluation of the peso. The balance of payments was 
compensated through a parallel entrance of foreign capital. The 
final result of this badly implemented liberalisation was a large 
industrial crisis and a massive external debt. The minister of 
Economy, Martinez de Hoz, had to resign, and a new military 
faction took power. As it was explained in chapter III, its 
government was brief but had profound effects on Argentine 
society. The response to economic crisis was nationalism: the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict. After losing the war, the military 
abandoned government leaving the country in the worst economic 
crisis since the 1930s.
The new government was confronted not only with the 
challenge of a domestic crisis, but with the external debt. 
Inflation increased after the first months of democracy, so once 
again anti-inflationary policies were given priority. These were 
the Austral (1985) and Primavera Plans (1988), heterodox 
programmes designed to create a "positive adjustment", reducing 
inflation while increasing demand, investment and exports. 
However, technocrats at the Ministry of Economy had 
underestimated the extent of the economic crisis. Investment 
fell, and the industrial crisis was deepened. High interest rates 
inside and abroad attracted capital to domestic and international 
banks instead of productive activities. Further, in this context 
the credit system was based on the short-term, so long-term loans 
were almost non-existent.
Making a difference to the Spanish case, the Argentine 
government was not able to increase public spending to conduct
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the economic transition. Debt repayments had been carving up the
Central Bank reserves, and the peculiarities of the fiscal
system, based on indirect taxes which would increase inflation
if they were raised, made that further spending was very 
77limited. The remaining solution was to reduce the extent of 
the public sector, privatising assets and cutting expenditure. 
Tables III.3 give a relative and absolute account of public in­
vestment. After 1982, there was a dramatic fall for the economic 
sectors. Social expending was already reduced in 1979 under 
military government, but the fall was still larger after the 1982 
crisis, although it should be noted that public account do not 
consider transfers to enterprises, only public investment. The 
reduction in public spending did not only affect industry, but 
especially social services, such as health, housing, education, 
transport, and further re-enforced a regressive distribution of 
income.
The public deficit problem made that initially the democra­
tic government opted to not increase industrial subsidies but to 
leave tariffs as they were. The military faction of Galtieri 
(1982-83) had rised them totally after Martinez de Hoz left the 
Ministry of Economy. This is one of the reasons why the 
industrial census of 1984 does not really reflect the effects of 
the 1976-81 liberalisation. The only difference was that a 20% 
reduction of tariffs for those products coming from ALADI. 
However, in 1984 there was a redefinition of the tariff system
77As explained in chapter II, the traditional resource of taxing 
agricultural exports became difficult since between 1981-86 there was a 50% 
fall in the international prices of primary products. This meant that the 
Argentinian government could only use indirect taxes, VAT and the so called 
"inflation tax" (printing money by the Central Bank). Table V. gives an 
account of public resources/expenditure, and the ways of financing the 
deficit. External borrowing was no larger possible after 1982, the so-called 
"inflationary tax" created massive inflation and had to be controlled.
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under democratic rule, initiating a gradual and selective 
78opening. Initially, this new system made not much difference
since people in charge of import licences -like Israel Mahler,
later to become president of the Industrial Union- were pro
inward-market development. However, in 1986 R.Lavagna took the
secretary of Industry. Lavagna belonged to the Sourrouille*s
technocratic team, and his programme was to favour a gradual
opening in parallel to an export promotion. Trade policies kept
79in this way during the rest the Alfonsin period (1983-89). 
Besides, the system of maximum tariffs was changed by an unique 
and global 22% tariff. Menem*s Administration (1989- ) speeded
MERCOSUR negotiations with Brazil,• Uruguay and Paraguay, and the 
MERCOSUR tariff system was fully adopted. The guidelines for the 
system were 0% for primary products or goods non-produced 
domestically, 11% for intermediate goods and 22% for final goods.
Thus, there is a continuity between the Alfonsin and Menem 
governments. Along six years, there was a gradual and rapid 
reduction of tariffs, coordinated with the MERCOSUR counterparts. 
However, the lack of public resources made that the second part 
of Lavagna*s programme, the promotion of exports, could not be
78 The decree 4070/84 defined three anexes for imports. Annex I included 
a list of products which simply were not allowed to be imported. Annex II the 
majority of goods, which could be imported but after consulting to the SICE, 
which would give the licences and quantities (quotas) allowed to be imported; 
most products were in under this category. Finally, annex III was a list of 
goods which could be imported freely -those not produced in the country.
79The core of Lavagna*s policy was the dismanteling of Annex II. Every 
four months, a list of products was left out of the need to consult the 
government to be imported. Annex II was converted into a binary system: either 
one product could be imported, or not. In 1988 another modification is 
introduced, remaining tariffs have a maximum of 55% ad valorem. This was 
changed again in December 1990; by then, only a hundred products were under 
annex II, so the whole annex was eliminated.
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properly implemented. The main problem was the existence of
seventeen different incentives on export promotion since the
1970s, all of them still active when Alfonsin took power. These
80included* from draw backs and exemptions to pay VAT on
intermediate goods to easy credits to cover for packing, storing
or shipping costs and loans to third countries to import
Argentine manufactures. The redundancy of incentives resulted in
the state’s loss of control on the distribution of resources and
the evaluation of results. Many companies benefitted from several 
81mechanisms. In 1985, the law 23.101/85 was approved, with the 
intention of creating a single normative for export promotion. 
However, the implementation of the anti-inflationary Austral Plan 
the same year stopped its development, and traditional incentives 
kept functioning. Yet, the quantity of public funds devoted to 
export policies reduced over time. This was initially compensated 
by the devaluation of the currency, until November 1989, when the 
declaration of state bankruptcy forced the Law of Economic 
Emergency. The law allowed to pay export incentives in BOCREX, 
two-years credit bonus issued by the state, adjustable to LIBOR 
rates and negotiable at the domestic stock-exchange market. While 
export promotion incentives were differed two years in time, the 
chronogramme of tariff reduction continued to function. Moreover, 
Menem*s Administration Laws 23.696/89 on State Reform and 
23.697/89 on National Economic Emergency were launched to further 
reduce state expenditure. The later has supposed a 50% cut on 
industrial promotion programmes, besides the abolition of laws
80Duties on those imports used in the exported goody are returned
81Bisang, 1990:135-145, analyzed the use of these promotion regimes by 
a universe of 341 manufacturing firms. 80.9% of them were being beneffited 
from 2 to 6 of these export incentives at the same time.
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82concerning state demand for domestic products . Lack of 
reserves and the pressure of external debt have changed the 
distributive role of the Argentine state. Paradoxically, the 
military achieved their liberalising goals, but not through the 
designed policies, but through the effects of incoherent measures 
such as overexpansion of government spending in defense while 
reducing welfare and industrial promotion. Also, through 
unexpected external factors such as debt and the fall in the 
prices of primary commodities. It was after 1982, when the state 
became bankrupt that the redistributive mechanism that sustained 
Argentine society collapsed.
V.II.B: ARGENTINE INDUSTRIAL POLICIES 1977-90
Thus, the military regime was further from implementing 
strict neo-liberal policies. However, the effects of this mix of 
liberalism and nationalism produced a change in the pattern of 
Argentine development. It initiated a period of "import 
desubstition". Although Argentina’s turbulent political history 
between 1940s-70s, there were important lines of continuity in 
its economic policies. There was a continuous support of an 
import substituting industrialisation. The cyclic inflation 
strokes were a result of the expansion of the public sector, and 
they required brief periods of stabilisation in order to be 
corrected -the "stop-and-go". Although these periods of social 
tension, which usually were accompanied by a military government, 
the corporatist state continued to function since it was created 
in the 1940s.
From the industrial side, this continuity was even more
^The "buy national" law 5.340/63 and its later versions.
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explicit. Since the law 14.630 in 1944, industrial promotion has 
been a constant for Argentine industry. Thus, this law was 
corrected by the laws 14.780/58, D.5.338/63, D.3.113/64, 
L.18.587/73, L.20.560/73. After 1976, despite the neo-liberal 
rhetoric, the military government maintained an extense programme 
of industrial promotion through law 21.606/77. As it will be 
explained below, this law was kept under democracy, with some 
modifications regulated in law 22.876/83.
Figure V.5 shows the main lines of industrial promotion in
Argentina. From the policy point of view, it is interesting to
note that Argentina did not only maintain industrial promotion,
but also increased it during the "Neo-Liberal" period 1976-82.
Paradoxically, its reduction came under democratic rule, given
the effects of external debt (1982- ) on the public sector. Main
extensions of industrial promotion were regulated and implemented
under military regime. These were the creation of programmes for
83regional industrial development: La Rioja , San Luis and
84 85Catamarca , San Juan and the extension of the industrial
86promotion regime of Tierra del Fuego .
This shows a basic contradiction in the economic planning 
of the military government 1976-82. On the one hand, there was 
an attempt to liberalise overseas trade and the exchange rate. 
On the other hand, programmes of industrial promotion were 
enlarged and deepened. There are two possible explanations for
83L.22.021/79.
84L.22.702/82 
85L.22.973/83.
86L.19.640/72 and D.1.057/83.
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this. The first would simply point to the lack of coordination 
between the Secretary of Industry (SICE) and the Ministry of 
Economy. The second would confirm the hypothesis mentioned two 
paragraphs above; the military government took from liberalism 
only those aspects which were convenient politically. The fact 
of Martinez de Hoz, minister of Economy, was the president of 
Acindar before Lopez-Aufranc, the main Argentine steel industry, 
might be an example of the implication of the government in 
industry. Most relevant may be the case of Military Factories 
(MF, Fabricaciones Militares), whose industries produced from 
furniture to energy. Thus, the military government modified the 
corporatist state, breaking the compromise to protect all 
industries, excepting only those of ’’national interest". The ones 
not considered under such category did not get the benefits of 
industrial promotion and were left at the mercy of market forces.
Like in Spain, the objectives of the Argentine industrial 
promotion programme after 1976 were based on the diagnosis that 
it was necessary to correct the ISI model. The objectives of laws 
21.608/77 and 22.876/83 were: (a) To encourage improvements in
industrial efficiency through modernisation, specialisation, 
integration, fusion, economies of scale or changes in the 
structure of firms, (b) To generate an accelerated regional 
development and employment creation in specific provinces (c) To 
further encourage an industry for national security and defense. 
The instruments for these objectives were three: (a) Tariff
benefits, of two types: temporal import restrictions to protected 
products and the reduction or total exemption to pay tariffs on 
imported inputs (b) Fiscal incentives, of four types: exemption, 
reduction of allowance to differ the payment of VAT, taxes on
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capital, profits and mail stamps (c) Export promotion, covering 
up to 20% of exports (only in Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego). 
Law 21.608/77 assigned these benefits for a maximum of ten years, 
but the period was extended five more years in law 22.876/83. The 
pre-requisites to get the benefits of promotion were two: (a) To 
incorporate at least 20% of capital (10% in exceptional cases), 
and (b) to obtain SICE's or provincial authorities approval, 
depending on the project belonging to the national or regional 
programme of promotion.
From laws 21.608/77 and 22.876/83 it can be deduced the 
importance of official authorization, given that capital require­
ments were extremely low. From the firm point of view, it was 
more difficult to get the benefits of industrial promotion from 
the national programme than from the regional ones. Bureaucracy 
work was also slower through SICE than through local authorities. 
On the other hand, provincial authorities had less rigour in 
plan-approval, and the possibility of using political influence 
was much higher, given that there were not mechanisms of 
evaluation or responsibility in the implementation of projects. 
This is to say, since the regional programmes of industrial
promotion started functioning, it was easy to get an almost risk-
87free investment at the provinces .
On the other hand, if one of the main objectives was to 
promote efficiency, modernisation and specialisation, benefits 
given by the state were excessive and redundant. Benefited 
industries were not encouraged to rationalise production given 
that in the case that firms had to close down losses would be the
^See Azpiazu, 1989:41-50.
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initial 10% or 20% of total investment. Even when annual profit
taxes and taxes on imported inputs had to be paid, their economic
importance was minimal given that the payment period was extense
00
in a context of high inflation. Moreover, laws 21.608/77 and 
22.876/83 contradicted the objective of creating economies of 
scale, since they promote imports of industrial inputs. This is 
difficult to quantify in the national balance of payments, but 
the impact of such policy can be clearly appreciated at the 
regional level in the province of Tierra del Fuego. As it will 
be seen when analyzing the regional impact of industrial 
promotion, this province has developed an assembling-type 
industry, importing electronic components, with little integra­
tion in the national industry and very low participation of local 
technology.
Finally, it should be noted that the criteria to denominate
a province as beneficiary of industrial promotion were not
economic, but political. To promote employment and welfare in
poorer regions is a world-wide usual strategy of development, and
it is also the case for San Luis, San Juan and Catamarca in
Argentina. However, the criteria for the National Territory of
Tierra del Fuego are also geo-political. The area has been
89traditionally in dispute with Chile. Tierra del Fuego has a
88Law 21.608/77 introduced indexation; even in this case, high bank 
interest rates made that payable quantities were lower in real terms (Azpiazu, 
1989:41).
89The province is located in the southest region of Latin America, and 
its control is considered by the Argentinian and Chilean military as the 
strategic control of Cabo de Hornos and of the Antarctic Peninsula. The 
Chilean Ministry fo Defense has traditionally kept an active expansionist 
policy, populating the West side of the Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. During 
the Alfonsin Administration, there were many tensions over the Beagle Channel 
Islands in the area; in the threat of an armed conflict, president Alfonsin 
finished giving part of them to Chile (Poneman, 1987).
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polar climate and its location is more than 2,500 Km (1,600 
miles) from Buenos Aires; nevertheless, strategic reasons made 
that the military government on power in 1972 started a programme 
of regional development to stimulate Argentine activity in the 
area. Population increased; however, the distance factor has made 
that economic activities were not integrated with the national 
ones.
Public investment in industry in the period 1974/87 
consisted of 693 projects, which generated 53,772 new jobs with 
a gross investment of U$S 7,300 million. These quantities only 
represent 0.5% of the number of enterprises and 3.5% of employ­
ment in the 1973 census. From this perspective, the programme of 
industrial promotion may not have had much impact. However, it 
is interesting to observe that the distribution of funds was not 
equal among sectors nor regions. Table V.14 shows that for the 
period 1974-87, the industrial sectors of textile and leather and 
food and beverages got the largest number of projects; however, 
the ratio subsidy by project were among of the lowest. The 
highest corresponded to paper and graphics, metal industry 
(steel, aluminium) and chemicals. Below, it will be analyzed how 
these same sectors got state protection and hidden subsidies 
through different ways out of the programme of industrial 
promotion.
From the regional viewpoint, table V.15 shows the two most 
favoured provinces/territories have been Tierra del Fuego and 
Buenos Aires -out of any specific programme of promotion. 
Paradoxically, La Rioja, San Luis, San Juan and Catamarca, were 
the second last set of provinces with less funding. The regions 
with major subsidies in absolute terms and in relation to the
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number of projects were Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Santa Fe. Thus, 
the programme of regional development did not seem to especially 
promote it, except for Tierra del Fuego. Even there, the ratio 
investment/project is less than half than the one in Buenos 
Aires. Tierra del Fuego has become a centre for assembling 
factories in electronics. However, the regional consumption 
capacity is minimal since population was only 15.700 in 1970. On 
the other hand, the possibilities of exporting are weak given the 
location of the region -Ushuaia, the capital, is the southest 
town of the world. While regional imports were U$S 3,385 and 
exports U$S 8,329 in 1974, in 1980 the positive ratio had 
reversed to U$S 79,285 and U$S 9,059, and further worsened by 
1986, when imports summed up U$S 385,187 and exports U$S 18,487 
(Azpiazu, 1989, based on data by INDEC). In the same year, 1986, 
Tierra del Fuego imports counted for 8.1% of national imports, 
thus the effects of regional development have been negative for 
the national balance of payments. Until 1982, Tierra del Fuego 
imports did not suppose a weight on the national balance of trade 
(1.9%), but their importance kept growing and the regional policy 
was not modified.
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V.II.C: EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL SECTORS
The comparison between the industrial census of 1973 and
1984 show the effects of such policies. Manufacturing industry
lost 5% of its participation of Argentine GNP, from 28.3% to
20.7%. Industrial activity decreased by 25%, in a process of
terciarisation of the economy. In relative terms, the most
affected industrial sectors were steel, where output fell by
26.5%, wood and furniture (14.2%), food and beverages (10.4%),
machinery (8.5%), textiles, leather and shoes (4.5%) (table
V.16). However, other sectors and subsectors managed to avoid
international competition through different factors. Sugar,
steel, chemicals and machinery, through entrepreneurial pressures
to keep state protection. Gas cookers, thanks to legal
regulations on production standards. Concrete, thanks to a
natural competitive advantage and to the costs of transportation
when it is imported. Cigarettes, sweets and cars, thanks to the
90control of distribution networks Chemicals, petrochemicals and 
machinery were leading the deepening of ISI after the 1960s, and 
kept their protection thanks to pre-1976 programmes. The chemical 
sector had an increase on the national share of production of 
39.3%; this was not only due to the fact of keeping ISI policies, 
but also to the increase in petrol prices after 1973 and 1979. 
Machinery reduced its share of production 8.5%, but this 
behaviour is not shared by all its subsectors. Desegregated data 
show that this was caused by a 30% fall on the production of 
metal products and electric machinery, but the rest of the 
subsectors -non-electric machinery and transport materials- 
increased their production. Non-metallic minerals -basically, 
concrete- kept its share of production. Concrete was under
90From the intervirw to B.Kosacoff, UN ECLA Buenos Aires.
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promotion thanks to a pre-1976 programme, so investment kept its 
rate. Demand for concrete also kept its levels since the state 
is the main demander. Finally, paper and the graphic industry 
increased its share of total production by 20.5%. The sector also 
had industrial protection and the state as its main costumer.
The number of enterprises reduced by 4% for the whole of 
argentine industry. Steel reduced the number of plants by 61.6%, 
textiles by 21.5%, wood and furniture 9% and non-metal minerals 
7.8% (table V.17). Like in Spain, trade opening had a massive 
impact on SMEs. On the other hand, some sectors show an increase 
of their number of enterprises: food and beverages and chemicals.
The effects of the 1976-81 liberalisation were various and 
change depending on the characteristics of the sector. Different 
sectors tried to avoid the bad effects of trade opening as they 
could, and adapted to the new environment in distinct ways. 
Compared to the 1930-80 period, one of the main structural 
changes occurred during the "import de-substitution" of 1977 
onwards has been a growing heterogeneity of Argentine industry. 
Aggregated industrial stagnation should be desegregated into 
firms/sectors which have been dismantled or reduced and 
firms/sectors which have expanded and modernised.
Food and beverages expanded its number of enterprises and 
employees, and had a reduction in both production and producti­
vity. The fall in production was due to the fall in international 
prices; nevertheless, this is not applicable to all subsectors. 
The rise on enterprises is due to the expansion of SMEs supplying 
the internal market, in the subsectors of bakeries, wines and 
fruit packing. This sectors not only survived trade opening but
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TABLE V .14. z
ARGENTINA r INDUSTRIAL RROMOTION 
BY SECTOR # 19-74 — 3*7.
SECTOR N.PROJECTS
(A)
% TOTAL INVESTMENT % 
(B) Thousand U$S
B/A
FOOD+BEBERAGES 130 18.8 603,238 8.3 4,640
TEXTIL+LEATHER 168 24.2 853,358 11.7 5,079
WOOD+FORNITURE 55 7.9 368,714 5.1 6,703
PAPER+GRAPHICS 23 3.3 1,103,687 15.1 47,986
CHEMICALS+PETR • 104 15.0 2,232,539 30.6 21,466
NON-METAL MINE. 73 10.5 1,205,402 16,5 16,512
METAL INDUSTRY 21 3.0 515,728 7.1 24,558
MACHINERY 115 16.6 401,100 5.5 3,487
OTHERS 5 0.7 4,137 0.1 827
TOTAL 693 100.0 7,287,903 100.0 10,516
Source: UN ECLA.
also expanded thanks to the control of distributive domestic 
networks. However, this is not applicable to agroexporters, given 
that from a firm point of view, exporter agribusiness are big 
enterprises in 92% of the cases, with a mean of 83 workers by 
company. Traditionally, Argentina has been an agroexporter 
country. As it was pointed out at the begging of the section, the 
weight of manufactured exports kept raising after the 1960s 
through programs of export promotion. However, it is interesting 
to note in table V.16 that in 1984 Argentine agroindustries have 
increased their importance in terms of exports. This is mainly 
due to vegetable and animal oils and fats, which in 1973 counted 
for 10.8 of total industrial exports and in 1984 for 34.1%, while 
the traditional agroindustrial export, frozen and preserved meat, 
has reduced its importance from 39.4% of total manufactured ex­
ports in 1973 to 9.3% in 1984^. Thus, in 1984 Argentina shows 
a trend towards an international specialisation in semi-elaborate 
primary products. Yet, the problem this specialisation finds is
that its main market is the EC, where oils and meat are refined
92and packed, getting most of the added value .
The textile and leather industry was another main exporter, 
and this was due to leather and fashion clothes. Globally, 
production decreased 4.5% in relative terms, and the number of 
firms was reduced by 21.5% (table V.16). The opening badly 
affected to SMEs, which could not compete with the quality of 
Brazilian exports and the design and cheap prices of Western
^Gatto & Gutman, 1990:37.
92In the interview with J.Bogo, this was the main complain of the 
Chamber of commerce of Argentinian Agrobusiness.
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t a b l e :  v  . i  e  . z
ARGENTINA Z SHARE: OF* THE:
PRODUCTION, EXPORTS AND FDI BY 
I N D U S T R I A L  S El C T O R S , I N
PERCENTAGES, 1973 AND 1984.
SECTOR % PRODUCTION 
1973 1984
% : 
1973
EXPORTS
1984
%
1973
FDI
1984
FOOD+BEBERAGES 26 .9 24.1 41.6 49.3 21.2 19.4
TEXTIL+LEATHER 13 .1 12.5 5.7 15.6 14.3 13.4
WOOD+FURNITURE 2.1 1.8 0.1 0.1 2.8 2.0
PAPER+PRINTING 3.9 4.7 4.0 1.0 20.2 11.6
CHEMICALS+PETR•18 .8 26.2 10.4 16.8 42.2 33.1
NON-METAL MIN. 3.1 3.1 0.8 0.4 26.4 21.1
METAL PRODUCTS 8.3 6.1 9.3 7.1 30.1 35.8
MACHINERY 23 .3 21.3 28.1 9.7 45.5 38.9
OTHERS 0.4 0.4 — — 5.3 18.4
TOTAL 100 .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 30.3 26.8
Source: UN ECLA, World Bank.
93clothes. However, investment did not reduced in this period 
given the existence of a pre-1976 promotion programme. This has 
become a paradox with MERCOSUR. Only the strongest design 
companies will find an economic "niche"®*.
Chemicals were the second largest export, the only sector 
which largely increased its production and expanded instead of 
concentrating. Part of this dynamism is due to the rise in petrol 
prices after the late 1970s. In 1973, industrial chemicals 
counted for 5.3% of total exports and petrol derivates only for 
0.6%. In 1984, chemicals still only counted for 5.5% of total 
exports while petrol derivates had risen to 8.3%. The fact of 
this industry being considered of national interest made that it 
kept its level of ISI protection, and thus it was not affected 
by the 1976-81 liberalisation. Petrochemicals were under heavy 
state promotion after 1973 (Decree 592 within law 20.560/73) and 
especially after 1979 (Decree 814); this programme, continued 
under democracy. Fabricaciones Militares (Military Factories, FM) 
have a mean of 20% of the shares of petrochemical companies. 
Besides, 68% of the firms are benefited by state promotion and 
it may explain the massive increase in production (39.3%), in 
number of enterprises (15.5%), productivity and exports (61.5%) 
between 1973 and 1984 (tables V.16 and V.17). Also, the state is 
not only the main demander but also accepts whichever prices the
93The fact of Argentina being in the Southern Hemisphere and seasons 
being inverse than in the Norther Hemisphere makes that Norther-Western 
textile/fashion producers export the rest of their out-of-season products at 
bargain prices (Interview to Golbert, CIEPP. See also Golbert, 1983: 
Monetarismo global y respuestas industriales: El caso Argentino. 0IT-PREALC, 
Santiago de Chile).
94E.Colombo insisted on this point. It was interesting to see ADITA s 
office, overstuffed with company reports and industrialists complains because 
of trade opening.
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companies ask in the field of petrochemicals. Azpiazu and 
95Basualdo , analyzing the company records of Petroquimica Bahia 
Blanca, mentioned that in 1986 the price of a ton of ethylene was 
U$S 458 for satellite companies, U$S 350 for especial firm 
negotiations and U$S 250 for exports. Domestic prices subsiding 
exports is one of the characteristics of Argentine manufactures, 
and also of another late-comers such as Japan, possible given the 
mono/oligopolistic structure of the industry. This sector enjoyed 
of this state protection until 1988, when pressures towards de­
regulation started changing some of the conditions.
A similar case are metallic industries -steel, aluminium. 
Like chemicals, this was a leading sector after the deepening of 
ISI in the 1960s. In 1974, the decree 619 specifically protected 
steel in order to reach national self-sufficiency and to keep 
state control on the sector. Until 1983, the sector kept under 
either national or regional promotion, receiving subsidies and 
the rest of benefits observed under the law 20.560/73 and its 
later versions. 60% of the transfers went to ACINDAR, a private- 
owned steel firm whose previous president was the then minister 
of Economy Martinez de Hoz (1977-81). Yet, direct subsidies 
counted only for 11.3% of total investment, so the importance of 
direct subsidies for investment does not seem determinant. 
Investment was done basically through private bank credits. There 
are reported many other ways of subsidising Argentine steel, 
although the absolute numbers are difficult to quantify -for 
instance, the practice of overpricing products in the domestic 
market. State demand has been important (public works, military) 
but not decisive. The main demand comes from machinery industry
^Azpiazu and Basualdo, 1989:108.
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and motorcars. The transfer which seems much more relevant was
the nationalisation of the debt in main steel companies, Azpiazu
and Basualdo (1989) analyzed ACINDAR balances in 1982-83 and
Qfj
showed the "statisation" of two-thirds of company debt. Thus, 
direct or indirect promotion allowed to increase levels of 
investment, to modernise technology and to develop new products. 
Costs were reduced and productivity increased as shown in table
V.17 which pushed towards further concentration and re­
structuring in the sector.
Given the existence of practices such as overpricing of
domestic goods, it is difficult to know which companies may be
97the most efficient within a sector . Price differentials may
sum up to 200% the export price. However, overpricing is not
directly linked to better export performance. Table V.18 shows
the most successful exporters in 1984 had a 101-125% and 26-50%
price differentials. The most common rate, between 51-76%
overprice, was developed by sub-sectors with a low performance
in exports. The two subsectors which have the highest exports and
overpricing rates were steel and petrochemicals, which also
benefitted from many other subsidies and incentives to have this
98high performance in exports.
96From this perspective, it is interesting to see the cynism of Lopez 
Aufranc’s editorials shown in section V,II.A..
Q7See Sanmartin, 1986.
98The defense employed by steel industrialist in the interviews was that 
diferential prices (domestic/ international sales) are common in most 
developed countries -Japan, US- given that production is mainly oriented to 
the internal market and non-consummed products are exported. In the case of 
Argentina, overproduction was caused by bad planning. Investment in basic 
industries has to be done predicting the level of demand in a mean of 20 years 
time. Industrial promotion for the sector was started by the early 1970s, 
assuming a constant increase in domestic demand as it was the trend at the 
time. However, national consumption decreased dramatricly after the 1976-81 
liberalisation, and overproduction forced to export excedents.
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This is also the case for motorcars -included within
machinery. The car industry developed thanks to FDI investment
during the 1960s, under a regime of industrial promotion which
gave total trade protection. As demand rose and the state offered
good conditions, TNCs invested. Competition was not based on
99prices, but on models and design . Producers would offer a 
different model within the same category at similar price. Price 
differentials between cars for the domestic market and exports 
were 122% in 1969, and 184% in 1976. This was due to the fact 
that only non-consumed cars in the domestic market were exported 
-5.1% of total car production in 1972, 9.2% in 1977, 6 .8% in
1982, 7.6% in 1988**^ . In Argentina, TNCs did not establish
because of low labour costs in order to achieve competitive 
exports, but to supply the domestic market. This is why the 
severe wage reduction and adjustment policy implemented by the 
military government in 1977-81 badly affected domestic demand. 
Of a total of six firms, General Motors and Chrysler left 
Argentina in 1977 and 1979 respectively, and moved to Brazil. 
Interviewed industrialist in the sector agreed that the main 
reason was the contraction of domestic demand. Trade opening did 
not really affect car manufacturers given the existence of 
multiple non-tariff barriers which protected car production**** .
99Sourroille, 1980.
*****ADEFA annual report, 1989.
****As commented by I.Dasso (director of ADEFA, Argentinian Motorcar 
Industry Association) analysing statistics of the sector, the saturation point 
of the Argentine market came in 1973/74 (around 300.000 vehicles produced). 
The Martinez de Hoz liberalisation coincided with a small increase in retail 
saling, but not significant from a long-term perspective. Producers were 
conscious about the declining line of motorcar demand in Argentina from 1973- 
74 (in 1990, there were 130.144 vehicles produced, this is, 50% reduction from 
the 1973/74 level). This was also confirmed by A.Amasanti, from SEVEL 
Argentina. Further, the strategies for expanding demand in the late 1970s- 
early 1980s finished being a key for the survival of vehicle companies. As 
described by H.Salerno (SICE), the "car savings plan" allowed companies to
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With respect to investment, there was a fall in investment 
coefficients both in the private and public sectors. While 
investment was 19.6%% of Argentine GNP in 1974, it decreased to 
12.5% of GNP in 1984 and 7.5% of GNP in 1990^2. Macroeconomic 
uncertainty led to the transnationalisation of savings, which 
further reinforced economic crisis and thus capital flight. The 
loss of dynamism in industrial investment has been the most 
characteristic trait of the period. However, the overvaluation 
of the peso during the military trade opening led to an increase 
of imports, including technological imports. Some sectors renewed 
their equipments along 1976-81, when domestic industrial 
investment raised up to 22% of GNP. As explained above, most of 
this technological investments were due to an expansion of 
private credit, which led to the problem of external debt in 
1982.
The level of FDI also fell from all sectors -with the only 
exception of metal production (table V.16). There has been an 
important academic debate on the causes of TNCs to expand; the 
Argentine case may show that there is a positive relationship 
between industrial promotion and protection of domestic markets 
and FDI. This was also the case in Spain, where the percentage 
of FDI is much larger than in Argentina, and was stablished 
before Spain joined the EC as a way to penetrate the European 
market. However, the case of Spain is more controversial since 
also the country has one of the lowest labour costs in Europe.
Finally, the most noticeable effect of the 1976-81 trade
compensate for the reduction of demand, given the high levels of inflation and 
interest rates.
102CEPAL data.
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opening was the relative reduction in employment rates. The 
global 3% increase in employment is related to the growth of 
active population, given that unemployment also grew from less 
than 3% to 4.6% . The most important increases in employment were 
in food and beverages (21.3%), paper (12%), wood and furniture 
(11.8%) and chemicals (9.3%). However, steel reduced its numbers 
of employees by 30.6%, and machinery by 6.7%. This leads to the 
question of productivity. Table V.17 shows massive increases in 
terms of productivity in steel and chemicals, and important 
decreases in food and beverages and wood and furniture.
During the ISI period, Argentina had a highly qualified 
labour force compared to the rest of Latin America, due to the 
extension of the social welfare system. There were no employment 
problems and wages were also higher than in the rest of the South 
Cone. Migrant workers were not a problem for the Argentine labour 
force since they were unskilled; on the contrary, migrants were 
a complement in the cyclic periods of economic expansion. Unions 
played a critical role in the determination of wages, which also 
were higher than in the rest of Latin American countries. 
Compared to them, the Argentine showed a positive relationship 
between increases in productivity and improvements in real wages. 
However, productivity in the period 1976-90 was increased only 
in big enterprises, thanks to massive reductions in the number 
of employees. This was caused by a situation of "over-employment" 
in 1974/75 due to union pressures in large firms. These workers 
were initially absorbed by SMEs, which paradoxically increased 
the number of workers due to lower labour costs but decreased 
output and productivity. This is especially the case for food and 
beverages and for wood and furniture. The military employed the 
liberal motto that market forces would balance the economy,
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including the labour market. Minimum wages were abolished and 
trade unions dismantled; however, government intervened when 
market forces were not adequate to state policies, freezing 
nominal wages. The reduction in state protection to labour 
allowed industries to implement important adjustments in 
productivity. Yet, the beneficial effects of this policy were not 
clear. Few Argentine industries were net exporters, and the 
reduction in wages and increasing unemployment caused a 
contraction in domestic demand.
As Argentina advanced in the 1980s, unemployment rates and 
informality grew. The unemployment rate move from 4.2% in 1974 
to 7.4% in 1990, and sub-occupation increased from 5% in 1974 to 
9% in 1990. In 1990, Real wages were a third less of their value 
in 1974. The process of economic concentration has to be 
associated with a large increase in poverty. The number of poor 
households increased from 8% in 1980 to 27% in 1990**^ . Further, 
this regressive distribution of income should be understood in 
a context where the existing social welfare system is being 
dismantled. Thus, poor families are in a much worse situation 
than they could be two decades before, given that poor households 
have no access to public education, health, etc, and they do not 
posses income enough as to pay for private services. Blindly, 
these were encouraged by the government as a more efficient 
alternative to public services.
V.II.D: SMEs AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR
There is a debate on the dimensions and raison d ’etre of the 
Argentine informal sector. As in Spain, calculations use
^Cepal data.
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different methods and produce different results. Portes*^
calculated that it was 22.8% of the active population in 1950 and
25.7% in 1980, but the method is not mentioned. Kentis and 
105Yoguel , analyzing exclusively the industrial sector,
concluded that informality supposed 1% in terms of value of
10Kproduction. Beccaria and Orsatti based on the 1980 population
census -not the industrial- registered that 42% of the active
population was informal; under this category the authors included
household cleaning work, temporary and independent workers and
entrepreneurs and workers in firms with less than five persons. 
107Lindenboim also based his study on the 1980 population 
census, using the term "un-structured workers" to mean informal. 
This group was 32.6% of the active population, of which 21.5% 
were independent small entrepreneurs and workers while only 6.7% 
of the active population were working in household cleaning 
services.
Looking at the reasons of the growth of the informal sector, 
H.de Soto (1989) concluded for Peru that the extension of 
informality was mainly related to bureaucratic inefficiency and 
the high costs of licences and paper work in over-regulated 
states. This hypothesis looked plausible for Argentina, given the 
low level of taxes on capital and profits. However, although 
bureaucratic inefficiency may be a reason, the main reported 
reasons seem to be taxes, union quotas and labour protection, 
this is, fiscal reasons. In many cases, informality is a
104Portes, 1990:28.
*^Kentis and Yoguel, 1991:26.
^^Becaria and Orsatti, 1989.
107Lindemboim, 1988:153-177.
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temporary strategy to liquidate stocks before closing down. For
108Kantis and Yoguel , Argentina is not evolving towards an
increase of the informal sector but just towards a reduction of
109SMEs and increasing unemployment.
It is unfortunate that the 1991 population census has not 
yet been analyzed. In any case, if 21.5% of the active population 
was enroled in productive informal activities, it might mean that 
subcontracting may be a much more common practice than it has 
been calculated. It may also contradict Kantis and Yoguel*s 
hypothesis, based on their calculations on value of production. 
On the other hand, Beccaria^ assumed that the increase in 
informal activities would lead to decrease in productivity in 
Argentina. Beccaria’s argument should be understood in the 
context of an economy with a large public sector. The increase 
of informal activities may be done by using public infrastruture, 
thus increasing costs while apparently not increasing 
outputs.The case may be the opposite; in Spain the growth of 
informality has been parallel to important improvements in
^Kantin and Yoguel, 1991:30-31.
109Kantis referred to "industrial rotation". As he expressed in the 
interview, there were closures and mergers, not all SMEs were affected by 
trade opening. Many survived thanks to strategies such as diversifying 
production and markets, and rationalising employment. But, in his view, there 
was not an expansion of the informal sector.
^^Beccaria, 1989:21.
^*This was the research field of Fundacion Progreso y Trabajo. Anibal 
MartInez-Quijano*s team was analyzing data on Gross Internal Product of 
Argentine Public enterprises. As reflected in the interview, the research was 
finding many problems in getting desegregated data. The [partial] results 
showed that, while gross internal product of public enterprises had risen from 
100 base in 1970 to 166 in 1989, the increase of some costs such as 
communications had risen from 100 in 1970 to 221 in 1989,energy from 100 in 
1970 to 239 in 1989. this data, though, may not prove an increase in parallel 
informal activities, since new technologies in aluminium and steel required 
important increases in energy consumption.
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industrial efficiency. On the other hand, Argentina’s
specialisation in MERCOSUR may favour informal activities. The
size and scale of production of Brazilian companies is much
112larger than their Argentine counterparts. Hence, Brazil may 
keep big assembling companies and Argentina may develop 
specialised SMEs. Brazil may the be the centre of industrial 
decisions, and Argentina may lose ’economic sovereignty", but the 
later will generate employment in a new Latin American division 
of labour.
Concluding this section on Argentine industrial policies, 
to make an assessment is a difficult task. On the one hand, there 
are so many mechanisms and incentive redundancies, that the costs 
of such policies are difficult to be quantified. Globally, the 
effects of trade opening while stopping export promotion and 
reducing industrial promotion have been negative for Argentine 
industry. Sectorial differences show that some sub-sectors have 
successfully developed without any type of state subsidy -i.e. 
oils. Others have successfully developed precisely thanks to 
state promotion -i.e. steel, chemicals.
On the other hand, the evolution of Argentine industry in 
recent times should be put into context. Like Spain, it is a case 
of a transition from a highly interventionist corporatist regime 
to another system where the state modifies its role and control 
over the economy, opening up to international forces. The main 
actors, entrepreneurs, trade unions and the state, did not have 
consciousness of the extent of the transformation in the initial 
stages. All of them have been using traditional corporatist
112Argentina has an advantage in design (textiles), special products 
(steel) and components and parts (motor industry) (see chapter II).
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mechanisms to deal with economic change. By the late 1970s, both 
Spanish and Argentine industrialist tried to survived what it 
seemed a conjunctural crisis. In Argentina, a country used to 
inflation and rapid changes, industrial pressures and ways to 
manage the first opening were done in a much rapid way. For the 
Spanish, used to a relative economic stability, it looked as a 
deep crisis. However, in both countries the strongest industrial 
groups claimed and obtained state protection. The state itself 
has been rather low in both countries in dealing with the
problem. Political transitions, changes in government and 
economic teams, and the priority given to solving inflation, have 
seriously retarded the industrial and social questions. 
Surrounded in a feeling of crisis, the Argentine and Spanish 
states have performed a policy of "pick-up-the-winners", and thus 
securing future economic performance. The cost has been the
reduction of SMEs, and an important fall in employment rates. In
parallel, social aspects worsened given that initially states
overexpanded expenditure and later they have been faced with the 
problem of public deficits. The extent of the crisis is much more 
important for Argentina, where external debt repayments have put 
further pressure on government’s spending. Unions have been using 
corporatist ways -pressuring the government to change. The 
strongest unions obtained important concessions -such as the case 
of the Spanish Funds for the Promotion of Employment. However, 
both the Argentine and Spanish governments have been keeping 
emergency measures, leaving social aspects as a second issue. 
This has been a political decision: the binomy economic
growth/social equity has been understood as conflicting, giving 
priority to the first.
274
CONCLUSIONS
The political transitions occurred during the late 1970s and 
the 1980s in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe made 
academics to question the prospects of democracy in an 
environment of economic crisis. Most of the studies* can be 
accused of economic determinism: it was the economic
crisis/development which allowed or not an adequate political 
transition.
This study has attempted to show that the interdependence 
between the political and the economic arena are far more 
complex. The two variables need to be linked in order to 
understand the transformations occurred in the world semi­
periphery. It is not accidental that all the semi-peripheral 
countries experienced democratic transitions in parallel to 
structural economic changes. Together, these changes have 
produced extensive transformations in the productive, financial 
and societal systems of these countries. This is, they have 
produced the dismantling of nationalist, corporatist, 
interventionist systems of either a left (Eastern Europe) or a 
right wing political orientation (Latin America and Southern 
Europe).
Further, it would be more useful to reverse the analysis, 
and question which could have been the best political environment 
for economic transformation. Democracy gave a new political 
setting in which the traditional corporatist alliances were not 
valid anymore, and thus the new rules of the economic game had 
to be re-written.
*See chapter I.
This conclusion will attempt to integrate the detail of the 
preceding chapters along four main lines of discussion. First, 
the problems coming from economic liberalisations, mainly - 
supposedly- temporal economic recession and regressive income 
distribution. Second, the debate around political transitions and 
neo-corporatism as the best solution to deal with the social 
tensions coming from transformations in the productive sphere. 
Following from this, it will be examined the question of the 
autonomy of the state, given that one of the main paradoxes of 
these economic transitions is that it has been the state itself 
that has had to promote a reduction in state intervention and de­
regulate the sphere of its activities. Finally, a description of 
the main economic structural changes and its social implications 
will be provided around three axis: industrial restructuring and 
new international economic specialisations, the breakdown of the 
nationalist link between finance and industry, and the growth of 
the tertiary sector and the extension of the informal economy.
VI.1. ECONOMIC LIBERALISATIONS
The fatigue from tensions over income distribution within
corporatist societies and the economics of stop-go were
aggravated by international shocks in the period 1973-82. It is
then that the policy makers in the semi-peripheral countries
preferred not to implement the necessary corrections and
adjustments to maintain economic nationalism. This was not the
first crisis that their economies had faced; however, the feeling
o
of exhaustion of the ISI system meant that it was deemed 
preferable to try the neo-liberal alternative.
2
Import-Substituting Industrialisation.
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Both Neo-Liberalism and Neo-Structuralism underline the need 
to liberalise the economy to some degree. If economic 
liberalisation is desirable, which are the best ways to implement 
it? The issue is complex, given that every country starts from 
a specific regime of interventionism. A government has several 
ways of evolving towards economic de-regulation. The appropriate 
timing and sequence of reforms is vital for an optimal 
liberalisation. An important debate has been on the adequacy of 
implementing policy reforms all in one stage or undertaking 
them in a gradual form. Most authors agree that gradualism seems 
more adequate from a political point of view, given that 
deregulatory policies will lead to an initial worsening of income 
distribution and an increase in unemployment*. Moreover, usually 
there is/has been a need to first stabilise the economy, and thus 
the social impact will be further worsened given the negative 
effect of adjustment on wages and public spending.
Empirical evidence seems to indicate that gradualism is the 
most prudent option^. The effects of a sudden (it could be 
argued that badly designed) liberalisation in Argentina in 1976- 
81 have been briefly outlined in chapter III. The Tablita 
programme did not count with financial volatility, so that the 
effects of the opening up of trade and finance were not parallel. 
Capital mobility underlines the necessity of applying different 
treatment to the financial and the productive sectors. Thus, if 
a government chooses gradualism, then the next question is 
whether there should be a discriminatory or uniform treatment of
S^achs, 1991.
*Atkinson & Micklewright, 1991; Krueger, 1986; Michaely, 1986; Mussa,
1986.
K^orea in 1964, Argentina in 1978, Chile in 1980, Poland in 1990.
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sectors. Most economists agree on the adequacy of non-uniform 
processes. A.Krueger suggests that an optimal liberalisation 
should start with the deregulation of current account 
transactions, followed by the decontrol of agriculture prices, 
domestic labour and capital markets, leaving the capital account
for last . Those sectors that generate large employment should
<1
have a slower process of deregulation . Moreover, an important
debate has emerged among neo-liberals as to whether an optimal
liberalisation should go beyond deregulation and should subsidise
8 9to some extend unprotected sectors or not .
As compared to the Argentina, it could be said that 
"socialist" Spain 1982-92 is a successful example of this 
gradualist and discriminatory liberalisation*®. Relatively to 
other semi-peripheral countries, the PSOE managed over a decade 
to stabilise macroeconomic variables, de-regulating the financial 
and industrial sectors, transforming a highly interventionist 
society into a fast growing country. The lesson coming from the 
Spanish liberalisation is the cautious, step-by-step, dirigiste 
and interventionist manner in which the PSOE government managed 
reforms. However, as it will be discussed below, this relative 
success raises doubts when analyzing variables such as the trade 
deficit, unemployment rates and the extension of the informal 
economy.
K^rueger, 1986.
A^tkinson & Micklewright, 1991; Michaely, 1986. 
®Mussa, 1986.
®Rottenberg, 1986.
*®See chapter IV.
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Argentina, on the contrary, shows a failed "one-stage" 
liberalisation (under the military government 1976-81), and a 
series of new failed attempts under democracy, until a second 
stage of the Menem Administration (1991- ). The first
liberalising impulse led to a reactive "closing back" of the 
country. Tariff barriers were risen again, and private debt 
nationalised in 1982. External debt plus the fall of primary 
products prices confronted the democratic administrations with 
a large fiscal problem, which only could be temporarily solved 
issuing internal public debt, printing money and thus boosting 
inflation -ending in two hyperinflations in 1989. The eight teams 
at the from of the Ministry of Economy in the period 1983-1990 
tried different stabilisation plans without success, but 
privatised state assets and carried out a progressive trade 
liberalisation. Stabilisation was achieved in 1991, when the 
quantity of foreign reserves allowed the Central Bank to maintain 
a fixed exchange rate (Cavallo Plan). This is, again the state 
played an interventionist role to secure the success of 
macroeconomic policies. The balance sheet of the period 1976-91 
for Argentina is a relatively successful liberalisation, but with 
still no results in terms of investment, and with a high social 
cost. For the most alarmist, the period 1980-90 has been a "lost 
decade"^. GNP fell 9.9%, industrial output decreased 19.9%, 
investment fell 36.2%, wages were reduced by 32.8% and, among 
other indicators, foreign debt rose from U$S 27.2bn to U$S 
63.3bn.
The initially adverse effects of liberalisation opens 
another Neo-Structuralist debate. The option of discriminating
^See, among others, Azpiazu, 1991:41; Nun, 1987:109-116.
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some sectors has risen another controversy on which should be the
priorities to subsidise. The question comes in either a social
compensation emphasis or in a growth promotion priority. For Neo-
Structuralists, the orthodox target of combining macroeconomic
stabilisation with export promotion and trade liberalisation is
contradictory in the short-run: it is incorrect to amalgamate
12many goals as if they were part of the same package . An 
example of that are the cases of Korea and Japan in the post-war. 
These countries first stabilised their economies, when neither 
of them looked promising. After a considerable period of greater 
concern for controlling inflation, they moved towards export-led 
growth, achieving powerful international positions. Further, this 
was done without liberalising trade, protecting national 
industry, and controlling foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Drawing a parallel with other semi-peripheral countries, 
liberalisation was carried out in East Asia when growth had been 
achieved and governments had perform a relatively equal 
redistribution of income, which attenuated the effects of 
liberalisation. This is the opposite case in today’s Third World 
countries where, in the absence of such income equality, policies 
oriented towards efficiency may exacerbate an already highly 
unequal income distribution.^ Also, Neo-Structuralist writers 
insist in that stabilising/liberalising is not enough to correct 
domestic distortions, since Third World countries are today 
confronted with the problem of external debt^.
The second set of concerns about discriminatory gradualism
12Thorp, 1987:338-340.
13For these reasons, Berlinski has proposed that if international 
agencies desire to open trade, then the GATT principles should be modified to 
allow developing countries to subsidise exports as a program of "import 
liberalisation" (Berlinski, 1987).
^Sebastian, 1987.
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for Neo-Structuralism has been social compensation. Beyond the 
theoretical debates, both the Spanish and the Argentine 
governments found themselves with the paradox of whether a 
government needs to protect certain sectors during the period of 
liberalisation if it is to ensure the success of the economic 
transition. This is, one of the key questions is how to make 
economic liberalisation sustainable. In general, for policy 
reforms to be sustainable the cost they impose on some key social 
groups cannot be excessive. Economic liberalisation must be 
politically acceptable, so all groups get some gain. Thus, it is 
important to know which are the groups likely to win from policy 
changes, and especially who are the losers and what is their 
degree of political activity and power. Liberalisation may be 
easier when the state can somehow compensate the losers; but this 
may be difficult in underdeveloped countries, given governments* 
lack of resources -worsened in the 1980s by external debt. One 
of the key prescriptions for a successful transition -be it 
political or economic- is that there be no absolute losers, and 
that all social groups perceive some kind of relative benefit 
from the changes. In the majority of semi-peripheral countries 
the [in the long run structural] processes of liberalisation have 
been accompanied by economic adjustment in the short term. This 
has made it difficult to implement long term policies, since the 
population identified the harsh effects of economic austerity 
with structural reforms.
This identification is by no means erroneous with regard the
interest of wage-earners. The adjustment programmes brought with
15them a drastic contraction of real wages in the short term .
15In Argentina, real wages in industry fell 32.9% between 1980 and 1990. 
See chapter III.
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Economic liberalisation in the semi-peripheral countries has 
brought with it a regressive redistribution of income which has 
benefited those sectors of the economy which are competitive in 
international terms (normally semi-elaborate and/or primary
products) and has adversely affected industrial groups and
16workers linked to the protectionist policies of ISI . Given the 
existence of absolute losers in these economic transitions, the 
majority of states found themselves in the duty to somehow 
protect some of the most adversely affected sectors in order to 
alleviate the radical effects of the processes of liberalisation. 
This protection has not only been applied to workers, who have 
been most affected by the severe adjustment programmes, but also 
to all the economic agents tied to the old ISI system -industry, 
services and the state itself. One of the paradoxes of these 
economic transitions, which will be analyzed below, is that it 
has been the state itself that has had to promote a reduction in 
state intervention and the sphere of its activities.
For economic liberalisation to be sustainable, it is also
necessary that a coalition of winners will support state reforms;
17that will happen if there is confidence in future benefits . 
Thus, the prospects of Spanish integration into the EC have been 
an important factor in making economic liberalisation easier. In 
Argentina, on the contrary, there was a strong feeling of crisis, 
and no easy alternative to integration. And the main motivating 
factor in History for the implementation of economic regulations 
has been the perception of crisis -real or not, which makes the 
private sector try to circumvent it through state intervention.
^See Atkinson & Micklewright, 1991; Nelson, 1990. 
^Greskovits, 1991:22.
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The fundamental question of the implementation of adjustment
processes and economic liberalisation is that of its legitimacy 
18or lack of it , and the state’s degree of autonomy as regards 
carrying these policies through.
VI. 2. POLITICAL TRANSITION, CORPORATISM AND AUTONOMY OF THE STATE 
In 1986 O ’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead published a 
collection of studies in four volumes, the results of comparative 
analysis of the transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America. 
In their conclusions, they stressed how convenient a strategy of 
social pacts was for carrying out a successful transition, and 
pointed to Spain as an example of successful neo-corporatist 
practice. However, a retrospective analysis, seven years later, 
of the transitions in Spain and Argentina raises questions about 
Schmitter, O ’Donnell and Whitehead’s thesis.
Firstly, social pacts were of very limited scope in Spain. 
The policy of pacts was promoted by the state itself in the 
initial period 1977-86, at a time of confusion among the social 
groups in the transition. Despite the extensive literature on the
18This is one of the reasons why these processes of restructuring have 
taken place at the same time as political transitions. The Spanish and 
Argentinian cases show two moments when it has been easier to achieve 
political legitimacy. There is an initial "momentum" in the transition to 
democracy, in which the population may be better disposed to carry the burden 
of economic adjustment in exchange for obtaining civil liberties. The PSOE 
government in Spain knew how to make use of this strategy, whereas the 
Alfonsin government in Argentina did not. Once this initial momentum is lost, 
the government loses the credit for carrying out the adjustment. However, the 
Argentine case shows us that there may also be a second period in which the 
population is ready to accept economic austerity: when it is recognised the 
existence of a "national crisis". The problem of legitimacy is a problem of 
perceptions: in the eyes of the Argentine electorate, there was always a 
political alternative to Alfonsin -Peronism- whereas the was no such 
alternative to Menem’s Peronist government. Menem’s rhetoric was based on 
presenting his policy as the only one possible, without any alternative, in 
a country in crisis. As will be stressed below, PSOE in Spain have also put 
this argument forward.
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19significance of the Moncloa Pacts (1977) , these were not
really social pacts. The employers* organisation (CEOE) was 
formed that very year -at great haste, with no tradition in 
protecting business interests. 1977 was also the year in which 
the Francoist vertical unions were dismantled and the right of 
association was recognised. Neither the employers nor the unions 
signed the Moncloa Pacts, it was the political parties who did: 
it was a state policy aimed at legitimising a programme of 
economic adjustment. The vicissitudes of the period 1973-77 
required austerity measures, beyond democratic debate and party 
policy. It is for this reason that a political agreement was 
drawn up so rapidly. It was a political agreement and not a 
social one because the unions and the employers* organisation 
were not mature enough to take on the task of ensuring the 
implementation of the adjustment plan. Once the social actors 
were more organised, the government hoped to be able to proceed
to a genuine policy of social pacts, in line with the fashionable
on
theories on consociational democracy . The paradox of the
Spanish case is that social democratic ideas were adopted as the
most appropriate for economic transition, but that in the absence
of a consolidated system of pressure groups, the state itself
promoted and institutionalised the relations between the social
actors. That is to say that is not the case that neocorporatism
was a practice that consolidated the political transition in
21Spain, as Schmitter and O ’Donnell maintain, but rather that 
neocorporatism was a theory which justified the practice, in this 
case a combination of decisions which the state had already
19See, among others, Albizu, 1983; Alcaide, 1990; Fuentes-Quintana, 
1984; Lago, 1989; Martlnez-Cortina, 1990; Perez-Diaz, 1984; Velarde, 1989.
^Lijphardt, 1974.
^In O ’Donnell, Schimitter and Whitehead, 1986b:38-39.
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adopted beforehand.
An analysis of the participants in later "social pacts"
confirms this position. Given the irregularity of the agreements,
it is not possible to talk about the institutionalisation of
neocorporatism in Spain. Of the five agreements drawn up by 1992,
the two largest union organisations participated in just two (ANE
and AES), the employers’ organisation CEOE took part in all five,
and the government in just two (ANE and AES). If we take social
representativity as our criterion, only ANE (1982) can be
22properly considered a social pact. Since 1987, when both unions 
and employers became better organised, the government has not 
managed to secure a single social pact, even in a time of 
expansionary economic policy. Given that there is no continuity 
in the formula of the pacts, the social democratic system seems 
more a justification of the policy carried out by the Spanish 
government than a policy which has had an effect on the outcome.
22Even in this case, representivity is low, since the level of union 
membership in Spain in 11% (in 1986, according to the European Social 
Institute) compared to 50% in Argentina (according to Godio, 1991:427). The 
two largest union organisations (UGT and CCOO) argue that participation in 
union elections is representative (77% of the "formal" workers in the large 
companies) such that the workers do not participate actively but use the 
unions for the purpose of making demands on the state. However, this figure 
only amounts to 20% of the total active population in Spain. With respect to 
CEOE, what gives it its stategic power is the fact that it is the only 
employers’ organisation, is also its weakness. There are strong tensions 
within CEOE because of the different interests of the various employers; 
groups. The Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (88% of the total number of 
companies) claim that they are not adequately represented by CEOE.
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PARTICIPANTS IN THE SOCIAL PACTS OF THE SPANISH 
TRANSITION 1977-90
SOCIAL PACT PARTIES CEOE UGT CCOO GOVT
Moncloa, 1977 X X
AMI (Interconference 
Framework Agreement) 
1980-81
X X
ANE (National Agreement 
on Employment) 1982 X X X X
AI (Interconference 
Agreement) 1983 X X X
AES (Economic and Social 
Agreement) 1985-86 X X X
Secondly, the features of the Spanish case are exceptional 
and difficult to apply to any other country. This is especially 
the case for Argentina, which had developed a tradition of 
corporatism since 1945. All social groups have a tradition of 
political confrontation with the state, given that the state 
provided each group’s share of income through social bargaining. 
It is interesting to note that, in this sense, there is a 
continuity between the dictatorship and the democratic 
governments: the attempt to correct the corporatist society by 
reforming it.
Argentine democratic governments did not have any other option: 
corporatism could not be sustained economically, given that 
external debt and the fall in primary product prices left the 
Argentine state with no fiscal resources as to keep a 
redistributive role.
In 1985, president Alfonsin chose a group of technocrats 
with no ties to any of the economic gremios (guilds or
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associations) at the front of the Ministry of Economy, in a new 
attempt to break the corporatist structure. Traditionally, each 
corporation had nominated a candidate to defend its interests at 
the head of a Ministry (SRA-Agriculture; CGT-Labour; Church- 
Education). In this way, Alfonsin hoped that Minister Sourrouille 
and his team would draw up an economic adjustment plan that was 
fair to all social groups. This was the Austral Plan (1985-88), 
for which the government did not even attempt to draw up a prior 
social pact. Sourrouille himself eyed this with scepticism, 
because of the social confrontational tradition and because of 
the recent memories of the bad effects the adjustment under the 
military government had on both employers and unions. Thus, 
social consultation did not take place prior to the launch of the 
plan, but came a month later, with the Economic and Social 
Conference (CES), in which the employers and the unions accepted 
the adjustment. It was a brief agreement. Soon, the various 
social groups took note of the fact that the prospects of growth 
were nil, and therefore the economy was a zero sum game in which 
gains for one meant losses for another. The industrialists, 
brought together in a platform known as "the captains of 
industry”, withdrew their support for Alfonsin in 1987 on finding 
out his policies of privatisation of public firms and tax reform. 
The unions, traditionally Peronist, questioned the plan’s 
credibility even earlier, in 1986, with the result that there 
were an average of 250 labour disputes per year during Alfonsin’s 
administration, including 13 general strikes during the Austral 
Plan. Nor was any social pact established during the brief and 
also unsuccessful Primavera Plan (1988).
It was against this backdrop of economic crisis and 
political distrust that C.Menem launched an electoral campaign
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promising a new "revolution in production" and "salariazo” 
("salary coup d* efcai", meaning raising wages) in the most 
traditional Peronist style, which gave him the majority in the 
1989 presidential elections. Menem claimed to be returning to the 
tradition of co-optive pacts, where the authorities nominated a 
representative from each corporation to head the respective 
ministry. He even extended this spirit of social reconciliation - 
"strategic alliance" according to the press of the day- to the 
non-economic field and annulled all sentences passed on the 
military during the Alfonsin period. However, on coming to power 
he recognised that the policy of expansion had to wait, since it 
was necessary to have a severe economic adjustment beforehand. 
That is to say, he returned to the situation of Alfonsin, 
although the social groups had changed their attitude. Now they
did not present a unified opposition to the government’s policy,
23but rather were divided. As in Spain, the Argentine social 
actors also went through a initial period of disorientation 
during the transition, in which there was no real consciousness 
of the necessity and the scope of the adjustment process, such 
that they continued to pursue the same confrontational approach. 
Only in 1989, with the Peronist candidate C. Menem in power, did 
they change their attitude. However, the new attitude was not co- 
optive; both the union and the employers were divided, and 
although the government only recognised the official factions, 
the important opposition of the others made arranging a real 
social pact problematic.
In Argentina, what resulted was what Mancur Olson has called
23Within the CGE, the inward-market oriented faction confronted the 
faction in favour of the government’s economic policy. The CGT union grouping 
was divided between the pro-Menem CGT-San Martin and the opposition CGT- 
Azopardo. See chapter III.
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24 .pluralist stagnation . However, this situation did not require
a society with a long tradition of institutional stability like
the UK or the USA, as Olson argues; rather, a few decades of
corporatism were enough. The Argentine case shows the difficulty 
to co-ordinate co-optive social pacts in countries with a 
tradition of corporatism and rigid pacts, and that the 
prescriptions of O ’Donnell and Schmitter, and of Olson himself, 
are orientational, morally preferable in the face of
authoritarian governmental attitudes, but barely operational in 
practice.
It would be an error to judge the two democratic governments 
in Argentina by their incapacity to arrange social pacts. 
Neither Alfonsin nor Menem put this forward as a priority among 
their objectives, but rather the contrary. What both tried to 
achieve is precisely to dismantle the corporatist system, that 
is to say, to achieve greater autonomy for the state in order to 
implement policy reforms. This was what lay behind Alfonsin’s 
failed manoeuvre of putting Sourrouille and his team of
technocrats into office. The Peronist opposition took note of the 
fact that social groups were too well organised because of the 
long tradition of confrontation, and changed their strategy. Once 
in power, under the rhetoric of the "strategic alliance" Menem 
returned to nominating a representative from each socio-economic 
corporation to head the respective ministry. That is to say, he 
formally took the political situation back to the corporatist 
"normality". However, in the same year in which he was elected, 
he proclaimed the National Economic Emergency and Reform of the 
State laws, two extraordinary laws which, despite the "formal"
^See Olson, 1965.
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defence of corporatism, gave the state great room for manoeuvre. 
Later decisions on economic policy, for example the law on 
convertibility in 1991, have also been adopted by law-decree, 
which does not allow them to be either the subject of 
parliamentary debate or subject to a social pact. That is to say, 
the Menem government is continuing what was initiated under the 
military dictatorship -the dismantling of Argentina’s corporatist 
system.
If the Spanish case is paradigmatic of anything, it is of 
greater state autonomy, rather than of good neocorporatist 
management. This is a difficult question in the social science, 
since the autonomy of the state cannot be measured and is always 
subject to relative criteria. Even so, it is possible to infer 
the hypothesis by analyzing the role of pressure groups at the 
time of accepting or modifying the government’s economic policy. 
In Spain, the fact that there had been no tradition of 
confrontational social corporatism under the dictatorship created 
a technocratic elite which was much more isolated from social 
pressures than was the case in Argentina. This seems to be a key 
factor in the transition. The disorientation of all the social 
actors, including the state itself, gave the government an 
important margin for manoeuvre, such that it continued with the 
dirigiste style followed under the dictatorship. Between 1977 and 
1982, it was the state itself which promoted social pacts and 
encouraged the organisation of pressure groups. From 1982 on, 
PSOE won absolute majorities in three consecutive elections, so 
that the government had greater room for manoeuvre for 
implementing its economic policies. These electoral victories 
were not only due to the population’s acceptance of the political 
management of the country, but also to the apparent absence of
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a political alternative. The right is viewed poorly after the 
dictatorship, the left is divided and considered as too radical, 
and the parties of the centre have not known how to co-ordinate 
strategic programmes. This combination of factors is difficult 
to repeat in any other transition. The Argentine case seems more 
paradigmatic related to other semi-peripheral countries, where, 
through a series of trial-and-error attempts, the formal 
structure of corporatism was maintained but nonetheless a greater 
degree of autonomy of the state was achieved through the 
declaration of a National Economic Emergency.
This is not to argue that social pacts are not viable in the 
transition to democracy, but rather that "pactism" is just one 
strategy among others that may feasibly be implemented in those 
countries where conditions allow it. The central question, 
however, has been economic adjustment and restructuring. To be 
able to carry through such changes, the key factor from the point 
of view of policy-makers has been to achieve a greater relative 
state autonomy, so that dismantling the structures of corporatism 
has been a central axis in the transitions of the 1980s.
VI.3. REFORM OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE
Neo-Liberalism, adopted to a greater or lesser degree by the
majority of central and semi-peripheral countries in the 1980s,
advocates the reduction of state intervention in the economy.
Both "public choice" and Neo-Liberal theories consider states as
institutions with a tendency towards overexpansion, without real
control over the uses and effects of the expansion of public 
25expenditure . The recommended measures are to limit state
^Brennan & Buchanan, 1980.
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intervention to the sphere of public goods, and to control the 
management of both expenditure and income -taxes, debt and money 
creation. That is to say, for Neo-Liberalism it is a question of 
attaining "minimal states" which behave like businesses with a 
few concrete public objectives, which usually exclude 
redistributive measures, which are considered to distort the 
national economy.
Keynesianism generated a case of "Wagner’s Law", an 
empirical tendency observed in the nineteenth century according 
to which state expenditure tends to grow in line with the 
development of society and the demands from citizens for better 
living standards. This situation was sustainable so long as there 
was economic growth, but the oil crisis ushered in a new period 
of intermittent recessions in which maintaining the rate of 
public expenditure would have required increases in fiscal 
pressure. However, the decision taken in the majority of 
countries was the reverse: to reduce the sphere of state
intervention. That is to say, the Neo-Liberal proposals.
The extension of policies of a Neo-Liberal nature in the 
central countries converted them into a desirable alternative for 
the semi-peripheral nations. The deregulatory tendencies have 
served as overall guidelines for action. Liberalising implies 
that the state reduces the scope of its activity in the economy; 
in practice, the protection granted to some economic sectors has 
been cut, but globally state action has not been reduced. What 
has characterised the way that both the Argentine and the Spanish 
governments have handled their economic policies has been 
discretionality. The unpopularity of the liberalisation measures 
has meant that sectors of production, finance or services have
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been deregulated by decree, without parliamentary debate, whilst 
it is made apparent that there is the possibility of differential 
treatment for those subsectors or companies which are considered 
by the state to be of special interest. Only those sectors which 
are not considered of national interest in this way have been 
abandoned to the fate of market forces. That is to say, the 
Argentine and especially the Spanish states have maintained their 
interventionist stance, guiding the processes of economic 
liberalisation.
An example of this discretional intervention is the case of
26the Spanish banking system . The attempt at financial 
deregulation between 1978 and 1985 created the greatest banking 
crisis in post-war Europe. The state found itself at the 
crossroads: either it had to leave the 110 Spanish banks to the 
dynamics of market forces and abandon 51 banks to bankruptcy, or 
it had to intervene to protect both depositors and businessmen. 
Finally, the state opted to intervene in the stabilisation of the 
banking sector. It nationalised 20 holdings belonging to the 
RUMASA group and created the Deposit Guarantee Fund, known has 
the "banks’ hospital", which acted in 26 cases. The cost in terms 
of public expenditure was high (US $4.7 billion, excluding the 
capital which went to RUMASA). However, the financial collapse 
was avoided: only one bank went into liquidation.
Yet the most significant case of discretionality in the two 
countries is that of industry, the sector developed through the 
ISI policies, and of which the greater part owed its existence 
to the protection of the domestic market. The reduction or
^See chapter IV.
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elimination of subsidies and/or tariffs meant that this sector 
went into crisis practically in its entirety. On this basis it 
has been argued on many occasions that the governments of the 
transitional period lacked an industrial policy. In the section 
on new productive structures it will be argued that industrial 
policies did exist, the changes in their content and the 
instruments used will be analyzed, and the differential treatment 
given by the state to various sectors will be commented on.
With respect to state expenditure, it is interesting to note 
that in both countries there was a notorious increase in public 
expenditure during and after the periods of economic transition. 
The Spanish and Argentine states were almost model minimalist 
states before the processes of liberalisation. In Argentina, 
public expenditure was 25.1% of GNP in 1970 and 38.9% in 1981, 
from which it had to be reduced during the period of adjustment, 
under democratic rule -it was 31.7% in 1986. Even then, public 
expenditure in Argentina was greater than it was in 1970, before 
the first attempts to liberalise the economy. In Spain, the 
situation of economic growth allowed public expenditure to 
expand. As in Argentina, expenditure grew as the processes of 
economic restructuring progressed, passing from 33% of GNP in 
1980 to 42% in 1987.
There has also been an important change in the allocation 
of public resources. In Argentina, the large scale reduction took 
place in social sectors (above all, social security), defence and 
administration. Public investment in economic sectors is the 
least affected, with the exception of the industrial promotion
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27programmes which officially were stopped after 1982 . However,
the statistics on public expenditure in Argentina become less
relevant when it is born in mind that foreign debt -debt
contracted privately by banks and industries- was nationalised
in 1982.* This meant that the state indirectly financed indebted
companies with amounts far above those included in public
expenditure. In Spain, public expenditure on industry is higher
than it was under ISI promotion, but social sectors have barely
seen any increase in funds. Furthermore, relative to GNP,
spending on health actually fell. Neo-liberal democratic
governments have followed the Kuznetsian policy of promoting
28"growth first, redistribution later". The balance between 
economic growth and social equity has been one of the most 
criticised aspects of the transitional government’s policies.
That is to say, the Argentine and above all the Spanish 
cases show that in terms of both public expenditure and state 
intervention in the running of the economy, the role of the state 
has not diminished, as Neo-Liberalism postulates-. With respect 
to expenditure, it has increased. With respect to regulatory 
intervention, the role of the state has been transformed. The 
states are re-regulating new rules of the economic game in which 
less control of economic activities is envisaged, but 
paradoxically the states themselves have to chart this
^See chapter III.
28As described in chapter IV, the Spanish government’s policy has been 
for quantitative increase in the numbers of people covered, rather than 
qualitative improvement in the services themselves. The aim has been to extend 
cover to the majority of citizens, but with minimal investment, in such a way 
that health, education and other social services have become mass services 
with poor attention to the citizens needs. It could be said that Spain has a 
limited welfare state system, where the typical welfare state institutions 
exist nominally, but their capacity and resources are much less than those 
existing in a mature system.
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transition. Although Neo-Liberal theory advocates a reduction in 
the functions of the state in order to promote individual 
initiative, what it fails to mention is how to carry out these 
changes. In Spain, the state adopted a clearly dirigiste role n 
the transition. In Argentina, the lack of resources after the 
debt crisis of 1982 dictated that the state adopt a less 
interventionist process of liberalisation.
VI.4. NEW PRODUCTIVE STRUCTURES
A decade of changes in regulation and distribution of 
resources has given rise to important effects in the productive 
structures of both Spain and Argentina. Chapter V offered an 
study of the last industrial censuses available for Argentina 
(1973 and 1984) and Spain (1978-1989), and a description of the 
restructuring process as information was available along 47 
interviews and the bibliography. At the structural level, four 
changes are most relevant: A. industrial restructuring and new 
international economic specialisations; B. bank-industry 
relations; C. the growth of the tertiary sector and the increased 
role of the informal sector.
VI.4.A. INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
In Spain, the first measures were put forward under the 
first government of the democratic transition, UCD. However, 
political tensions made that this policy only "patched up" the 
most immediate industries in crisis. In 1981 the policy of aid 
to bankrupt firms began to be abandoned in favour of a programme 
of reorganisation for three industrial sectors. But it was to be 
under the socialist government of the PSOE (1982 - ) that the
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29reorganisation programme would really be put into force . The 
diagnosis which underlay the industrial reorganisation policy 
launched under the socialist government bore the marks of the 
perceptions that have been noted above. Spanish industry, 
developed thanks to a policy of ISI from the end of the last 
century, was rigid and unbalanced, made worse by the additional 
distortions of the 1970s: the rise in labour costs and petrol
prices. From the perspective of Spanish policy-makers, the crisis 
of industry was not a crisis of effective demand, but a crisis 
of productive structure which required adjustments on the supply 
side. The comparison is always made with the situation in Europe. 
The failure of the Keynesian policies implemented by the 
socialist governments in Greece and France at the start of the 
1980s'provided a very timely example. The public sector deficit 
strengthened this tendency to take supply side measures, and it 
was preferred that the private sector undertook the adjustments. 
The only strategy for boosting private investment without 
increasing the public deficit was to reduce labour costs, make 
the labour market more flexible and reduce the cost of finance.
Figure V.l presents the diagnosis and what followed in 
Spain’s industrial reorganisation in the 1980s. It was hoped that 
the reduction in labour costs and the cost of finance would 
result in an increase in profits, which would then be translated 
into a higher level of investment and thus of employment. 
However, the outcome was less simple and less desirable as expec­
ted. Part of the problem lay with the diagnosis of the industrial 
policy carried out by the Ministry of Industry concerned the 
increase in the cost of finance. It did not count on the
29Particularly with the implementation of L.27/1984; for further 
details, see chapter V.
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restrictive monetary and credit policy adopted by the Bank of 
Spain in order the reduce inflation. Moreover, the overvaluation 
of the peseta made Spanish competitiveness to decrease. Labour 
costs fell, and industrial profits rose, but there was little new 
reinvestment. Rather, companies used profits to liquidate debt. 
Also, there were channelled towards less risky activities such 
as public debt or property speculation. The most affected 
industries were the SMEs, most of which opted to turn black as 
a survival strategy, so there was an enlargement of the informal 
sector. Employment continued to fall until 1989, when the 
unemployment rate was reduced to 16 per cent ( ! ), but kept rising 
since then reaching 17.8% in 1992. A large part of the new 
investment made at this time came from TNCs, attracted by the 
future incorporation of Spain into the EC. Direct foreign 
investment changed from 8.3% of total direct investment in 1977 
to 34.5% in 1988. However, most of this was also on property and 
finance, with little effect on stablished productive capacity. 
Thus, proportionally TNC investments had little positive effect 
on levels of employment.
The main problem that the PSOE government faced was the 
question of reducing labour costs. This was not only because of 
the paradox that a socialist government was having to manage with 
the problems of economic adjustment and making Spain’s labour 
market more flexible, but also because the party inherited a 
situation of grave unemployment -18.1% in 1983. Making the labour 
market more flexible came into conflict with the socialist 
government’s objective of reducing unemployment. Precisely, one 
of F.Gonzalez* election promises in the 1982 campaign had been 
the creation of 800,000 jobs. With a programme which stood for 
the adoption of corrective measures on the supply side, the
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achievement of such an electoral promise necessarily remained 
postponed until such a time as new private investments appeared. 
However, they did not obtain the results they had hoped for: 
unemployment rose to 20% in 1987. Moreover, the government’s fear 
of inflation impulsed the adoption of deflationary policies which 
further reduced wages, causing the confrontation of unions. 
Unions demand for the creation of jobs is very correct when 
analyzing the worrisome evolution of "formal” employment in 
Spain. While population has grown from 36 to 40 million, the
quantity of jobs have remained constant since 1975 -around 12
• -l i • 30million
Although PSOE’s diagnosis was incorrect, there was an 
overall growth of industrial output. Closures and mergers took 
place, such that the number of enterprises fell 14.6% between 
1981 and 1988, and productivity grew thanks to a reduction in 
industrial employment of 17% over the same period. However, 
industrial growth was 1.8% between 1975 and 1985, and 5.2% in 
1986-89. One factor is the effect of entry into the EC, although 
this should not be overestimated since entry into the EC has 
caused a trade deficit of 11.2% of GNP in 1989 -when it was just 
1.4% in 1985. More relevant is state intervention in industry. 
Public expenditure on industrial policy between 1982 and 1990 has 
been far higher than during the dictatorship and ISI.
An analysis of public expenditure in this sector shows that 
resources have been allocated to the largest industrial groups. 
By size, 99.9% of the resources have been granted to big industry 
(0.1% to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises after 0.1/6/1988),
30See table IV.4.
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whereas SMEs represented 88% of firms in Spain. The lack of 
support to "internationally non-competitive" firms (SMEs in the 
government’s view) explains part of the unemployment situation, 
given that protectionism allowed the expansion of local SMEs. By 
industrial subsector, those which have received the largest 
grants and subsidies have been mining and non-metal industry 
(17.4%), electronics and computers (11.3%), chemical industry 
(10.5%), transport (10.1%), food (10.1%) and metal products 
(10%), which coincide with the main exporting sectors. In 1989, 
the ranking of Spain’s exports by subsector was transport, 
followed by chemicals, metal industries, machinery, electronics 
and computers, and food. That is to say, with the exception of 
mining and non-metal industry, which basically consists of 
construction materials with a high domestic demand, all the 
export "winners" are industries promoted not only through 
regional aid schemes but also through industrial restructuring 
programmes.
Once again, the Spanish state adopted an interventionist 
stance in a process of liberalisation. The various democratic 
governments protected certain companies in need of restructuring. 
The selection of which companies were to be protected is part of 
a discriminatory strategy of industrial promotion. A question 
could be risen on whether this policy was the fruit of a strategy 
worked out along the lines of "pick-up-the-winners" or the result 
of socio-political pressures on the part of the most powerful 
social or industrial groups who were resisting the harshness of 
economic liberalisation. With respect to the size of the company, 
for example, it is possible that the government allocated 
assistance on the basis of the equation "big company = greater 
efficiency", or it is also possible that the big companies had
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greater power to apply pressure and were better represented in
the employers* organisation CEOE. Given that the Spanish
government has favoured some uncompetitive industrial subsectors,
the criteria for preference in the industrial promotion policy
seem to have been socio-political. As explained in chapter V,
among these cases the ones that stand out are the "heavy forging"
and "basic electrical equipment for cars" sub-sectors^ or the
discriminatory choice of companies by the state Executive
Commissions, despite the complaints from employers in the
subsectors. The state was not only pressured from the employers*
side, but also from the workers. The Employment Promotion Funds
(FPE) were created to ameliorate the effects of restructuring,
and despite their scant success in generating alternative
employment they absorbed 17.5% of all funds devoted to industrial
policy between 1977 and 1989. However, they were not applied
extensively, but rather in a manner which benefited those sectors
32where the unions were most confrontational
In Argentina, there was an industrial and trade policy, but
the state did not embark on the restructuring of industrial
subsectors as in Spain. There were two distinct periods: the
military (1977-83) and the first democratic governments (1983- 
3390). As with Spain, it is interesting to note that industrial 
promotion was not only maintained with a certain degree of 
continuity, but that in addition was increased during the 
processes of "liberalisation" (Law 21,608/1977). From the
31Categories invented by the UCD government in order to elevate these 
industries to the rank of industrial sectors (Navarro, 1990).
32Special steels, integrated iron and steel, shipbuilding and domestic 
electrical appliances.
33Out of the period of study of this analysis, the second stage of the 
Menem administration (1990- ) initiated another liberalising impulse.
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regulatory viewpoint, the broadening out corresponds to the
34regional industrial promotion schemes: La Rioja , San Luis and
<i r Af
Catamarca , San Juan and the extension of the Tierra del
37Fuego National Territory promotion programme . From the 
expenditure side, the massive enlargement of public subsidies to 
industry came with the nationalisation of external private debt 
in 1982, when the military government took responsibility of 
industrial re-payments.
During Argentina’s military government (1976-82) a 
contradiction in the planning of industrial policy was apparent. 
On the one hand, attempts were launched to liberalise the 
exchange rate and reduce tariffs. On the other hand, the national 
and regional industrial promotion programmes were continued and 
deepened. There are two possible explanations for this. The first 
is that there may have been a complete lack of co-ordination 
between the Secretariat of Industry (SICE) and the Ministry for 
the Economy. The second possible explanation, which could lend 
support to the hypothesis laid out above, is that liberalism was 
only applied to those aspects which were politically convenient. 
There were many linkages between military policy-makers and 
industry . Fabricaciones Militares (FM, Military Factories) 
covered a wide range from furniture construction to energy. These 
are not proves of direct military intervention in industry;
34Law 22,021/79.
35Law 22,702/82.
36Law 22,973/83.
3^ Law 19,649/72 and Decree 1,057/83.
18For example, the Minister for the Economy, Martinez de Hoz, had been 
president of Acindar, the most important iron and steel company in the 
country. See chapter III.
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however, they are indicative of the military government’s 
involvement in industry, and of its interest in continuing and 
deepening the industrial promotion programmes. These, along with 
the simultaneous trade liberalisation, allowed the corporatist 
state to be reformed, in such a way that not all companies were 
protected, but only those which were ”of national interest”. The 
ones that were not considered as such went under the deregulation 
of state protection programme.
The aims of the Argentine industrial promotion programme 
after 1977 correspond -as was the case in Spain- to the diagnosis 
that it was necessary to correct the ISI model. The aims of Law 
21.608/77 and Law 22.876/83, in force until 1990, were: (a) to 
promote increased efficiency of industry through modernisation, 
specialisation, integration, mergers, economies of scale or 
changes in their structure; (b) to foster accelerated regional 
industrial development in the regions selected, and to stimulate 
job creation; (c) to push forward industries for national defence 
and security. There was an extensive range of instruments, from 
export promotion to tax exemptions, such that its redundancy 
contradicted the objective of promoting industrial efficiency.
Despite these problems in the delineation of the industrial 
promotion programme, overall it was hoped (Figure V.4) that 
economic liberalisation would provide the incentives for economic 
efficiency. The 1976 liberalisation programme was based in the 
tablita anti-inflationary programme, a chronogramme of progres­
sive devaluations in order to equal the domestic rate of 
inflation with the international one. The other planned factor 
to reduce inflation was a reduction in labour costs. The fall in 
wages while a large expansion of private credit should encourage
303
investment and correct the public deficit. In parallel, trade 
opening would force Argentine industry to specialise and to 
compete internationally. In the medium term, the expected result 
was an increase in domestic competitiveness, economic activity 
and therefore an increase in employment.
The outcome differed from expectations. There was some re­
activation of investment in those sectors benefited from state 
protection -coming mostly from the nationalisation of their 
debts. However, as in Spain, there was an unexpected factor, the 
increase in financial costs. The 1977 financial reform freed
interest rates and created a totally different mechanism in the
39assignment of domestic credits. The effect of the rise in 
international interest rates was worsened by high domestic infla­
tion and the results of the exchange rate policy which overvalued 
the Argentine currency. This lead to a vicious circle: the
increase in financial costs pressured prices to rise, causing 
more inflation and thus increasing more domestic interest rates. 
Profits were not re-invested as expected but used to cover for 
financial costs. On the other hand, domestic demand decreased and 
trade liberalisation increased the quantity of imports which 
further reduced the demand for domestic products.
At the beginning of the military administrations, in 1976- 
78, the financial facilities gave rise to an increase in 
investment. National industry did not find itself under threat 
from economic opening up due to the redundancy of the tariffs and 
the continued existence of various forms of industrial
iq
Between 1930s-1977 the Central Bank provided subsidised loans and 
credits to industry, with negative interest rates. Thus industrialist were 
used to have an access to credit and kept using it after the 1977 financial 
reform (Katz and Kosacoff, 1989: 32-33).
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protection. However, the liberalisation policy was accompanied 
by a restrictive wages policy and a regressive distribution of 
income which reduced domestic demand. National production faced 
a genuine problem of markets in the period 1978-81, made worse 
by the tablita, which overvalued the peso, also reducing exports. 
In 1981-82, the situation continued to worsen, since the 
remanences of industrial protection were disappearing and 
international competition was stagnating domestic production. 
Investment rates fell dramatically, not only because of the rise 
in interest rates, but also because of lack of business 
confidence in the government’s economic team after the collapse 
of the anti-inflation programme. The branches of industry that 
were most badly affected were wood and furniture, whose 
production fell 40%, textiles, hides and footwear (35%) and 
machinery and mechanical products (30%). Other sectors and 
subsectors, however, managed to avoid international competition 
through employers’ pressure on the government to maintain state 
protection (steel, chemicals, machinery, sugar), legal 
regulations on standards of production (gas cookers), and control 
of national distribution networks (tobacco, food, cars).
The second period corresponds to the rule of democratic 
administrations. These found themselves less able to act because 
of the debt crisis in 1982, which culminated in the 
nationalisation of the debt. As in Spain, the government’s 
priority was anti-inflationary policy, although three digit 
inflation justifies the Argentine administration’s objective. The 
necessity of implementing an adjustment programme concentrated 
the efforts of the Sourrouille team on the implementation of 
heterodox austerity measures aimed at a "positive adjustment" -to 
produce not only monetary results but also promoting productive
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activities. However, the technocrats at the Ministry of the 
Economy had underestimated the extent of the crisis, and 
aggravated the stagnation of Argentine industry. The high 
domestic and international interest rates attracted capital to 
non-productive activities, and the scarcity of loans did not lead 
to the hoped for re-investment. Furthermore, the various attempts 
at financial liberalisation permitted capital flight.*® Making 
a difference to Spain, the size of the public deficit left scant 
room for manoeuvre, so the main instruments for liberalisation 
were de-regulatory. From 1984 to 1990, a progressive reduction 
in tariffs was begun, with the same discretional criteria applied 
as elsewhere. The SICE retained a consultative role for itself, 
in which it could maintain tariff protection or offer special 
import licences. On the other hand, the industrial promotion laws 
were maintained, but the instruments available were increasingly 
limited as time went by to the point of their elimination. The 
National Economic Emergency Law (L.23697/1989), passed under 
President C. Menem, granted autonomy to the state to abolish 50% 
of industrial subsidies and to eliminate many of the benefits of 
industrial promotion.
There has been an extensive debate against Argentina’s
industrial promotion**. Two arguments are put forward. Firstly,
the scarcity of state resources compared to previous programmes
42and their inefficient allocation . Secondly, the fact that the
The Central Bank estimated that in 1982 capital flight rose to US 
$21,500 million, almost half the value of Argentina’s foreign debt (in 
Carciofi, 1990:37). This capital is no more than "internationalised savings", 
and therefore is liable to return to the country when the macroeconomic 
situation is seen as being stable.
**For a polemic review, see Waisman, 1987.
*^Azpiazu, 1989.
306
subsector which is at the top of the export ranking is food
industry, a subsector which has not benefited from industrial
promotion. Not only that, but the subsector has also moved away
from its traditional exports and successfully developed new areas
43-vegetable and animal oils . However, it cannot be concluded 
from this that there is no direct relation between industrial 
promotion and competitiveness. The second most important 
exporting subsector in Argentina is chemical industry, which 
benefitted from ISI promotion from 1973 on the grounds that it 
was in the national interest and which was therefore hardly 
affected by the liberalisation process between 1976 and 1981. 
Until 1991 FM held an average of 20% of all petrochemical 
companies, and 68% of the firms benefitted from specific 
industrial promotion schemes**. The state is the main customer 
of these products, and it allows the practice of overpricing 
because of the industry’s oligopolistic structure (the prices the 
state pays are 95% higher than export prices). The third ranking 
export subsector, metal industry (steel, mainly), is a similar 
case. Not only did it benefit from the industrial promotion 
programmes and used overpricing practices, but it also carried 
out substantial investment during the period of liberalisation 
between 1976 and 1981, financed through private debt. The foreign 
debt crisis of 1982 would have bankrupted the companies in the 
subsector had it not been for the intervention of the military 
government, which nationalised two-thirds of the main firms* 
debts. In real terms this meant that the public sector subsidised 
the metal industry’s restructuring in Argentina.
*^ Gatto & Gutman, 1990.
**Decrees 592/73 and 814/1979.
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The Argentine and Spanish experiences show us how state 
intervention has been important in the implementation of 
liberalisation measures. Those sectors or subsectors of industry 
which have been temporarily protected in the processes of 
deregulation are among those who have performed best. Political 
considerations have impeded the marginalisation of the rest of 
industry, and so governments have used liberal rhetoric but its 
practice has been discretional. Those sectors that were not 
considered to be of national interest, or which had less ability 
to exert socio-political pressure on the government, did not 
receive state protection and were abandoned to market forces.
On the other hand, the dismantling of economic nationalism 
has .led to less extensive and more specialised industrial 
structures. Spain seems to have found an economic niche within 
the EC in cars (transport) and semi-finished goods (chemicals, 
steel, machinery). Argentina has found an economic niche with 
agroindustry and semi-finished goods (chemicals, steel). That is 
to say, both Spain and Argentina have incorporated themselves 
into the international economy as they were in the 1930s: part
of the world semi-periphery. However, decades of economic 
nationalism have left their effect: export production now is not 
only from agriculture, but also from industry.
VI.4.B. BANK-INDUSTRY RELATIONS
Both the Spanish and the Argentine governments wanted to put 
an end to their costly industrial promotion schemes. In addition, 
both Spanish and Argentine industry had traditionally maintained 
high levels of indebtedness, the product of norms which imposed 
obligatory investment ratios on the domestic banking sector. It 
was thought that the best way of terminating the protectionist
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system would be to liberalise the financial sector and to link 
industry to private financing, in such a way that the market 
would allocate resources to the most efficient industries and 
Adam Smith’s "invisible hand" would take care of eliminating the 
inefficient ones. However, the result was not as expected, but 
rather the relations between banks and industry dissolved.
Part of the error of judgement derived from a poor
understanding of the problem. In the first place, indebtedness
is not necessarily a bad industrial strategy. Industry’s
indebtedness ratio depends on the type of relations between bank
and industry. In the majority of late-comers, these relations are
usually very close, so that the banks finance industrial 
45development . For example, in Japan in 1984 the equity/debt 
ratio was 1:4.77, whereas the figures for the US and the UK, 
countries with a liberal tradition where financial and industrial 
activities are not related, were 1:0.61 and 1:1.16 for the same 
year respectively. It is not the degree of indebtedness which is 
important so much as the significance of this indebtedness in the 
context of the concrete economic relations of a given country.
It is therefore interesting to note the evolution of bank- 
industry relations in semi-peripheral countries like Spain and 
Argentina. The inflationary situation and financial deregulation 
led to a tendency towards short-term perspectives in the banking 
sector. In Argentina, the financial sector found it not only more 
rewarding but also safer to speculate on exchange rates and 
interest rates in the short term than to lend long-term to an 
industry of dubious efficiency. During the period 1976-91, loans
^Gerschenkron, 1966.
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were scarce and always short term. There were two main reasons
46for this: inflation and the security of lending to the state.
Thus the Argentine state faced the paradox of having to take
responsibility once more for long term investment. In Spain, the
situation was similar. The government tried unsuccessfully to get
47the banks involved in financing industrial restructuring, as 
the financial sector was also undergoing a process of 
reorganisation and the prospects of restructured industry were 
not very clear.
In their turn, employers also distrusted the banks, and the rapid 
increase in interest rates prompted repayment of debts. For 
industry as a whole, the equity/debt ratio went from 1:1.62 in 
1982 to 1:0.77 in 1988; for the subsectors of industry that were 
undergoing reorganisation this ratio fluctuated around 1:4 in 
1982. The reduction in the rate of indebtedness shows how an 
integrated system of bank-industry relations, typical of late­
comers, is giving way to a disarticulated liberal system. That 
is to say, once more Spain and Argentina are examples of the 
disintegration of economic nationalism.
VI.4.C. THE GROWTH OF THE TERTIARY AND THE INFORMAL SECTORS
The reduction in the number of industrial enterprises led 
to increase in industrial unemployment. The deregulation of the 
labour market brought the previous nationalist priority of full 
employment to an end. The labour force was absorbed by both the 
service sector and the informal sector.
Iff
From the time of the Cavallo Plan, when the administration really 
constrained the public sector, the banks went back to offering lending 
facilities to the private sector.
47Law 27/1984 on compulsatory investment ratios. However, the banks 
limited themselves to buying the minimum quantities of Internal Credit Bank 
(BCI) certificates, leaving the BCI the task and responsibility of allocating 
the corresponding loans. See chapter V.
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With the respect to the service sector, the state accounted 
for the largest demand. The political transitions brought with 
them processes of administrative decentralisation, so that a 
large part of the shift in the labour force towards the service 
sector is due to the broadening of public administration. Again, 
the states played an interventionist role, themselves absorbing 
workers, leaving the question of rationalisation for the 
future.^
However, one of the most important effects of economic
deregulation and the lack of protection for small and medium
sized enterprises has been the expansion of the informal sector.
Different approaches produce different estimates of the extent
of the informal sector; in terms of the active population, it
49accounts for 32.6% in Argentina and between 9.6% and 11.3% in 
50Spain . There are a number of reasons for the development of
the hidden economy. As well as the "negative" reasons like tax
51 52evasion, reduction of labour costs and union power , avoiding
the long bureaucratic processes involved in obtaining 
53licences , and just economic survival in times of economic
48The magniture of Argentina’s public deficit meant that the first 
measures were put forward under Menem in 1989, with the Law on Reform of the 
State (L.23.696/89), which included a programme of privatisation, tax reform, 
and reduction of the "hyperbureaucracy of the state", through which it is 
estimated that 68,300 state functionaries lost their contracts. In Spain, the 
expansionary policy followed during the period 1986-89 and 1991-2 relegated 
the question until the "post-Olympics" adjustment of August 1992.
^Lindenboim, 1988:168-169.
^Ruesga, 1988:63.
51Sabel, 1982.
^Stepick, 1990.
^Portes, 1990; de Soto, 1989.
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crisis^4, there are also some of the firms in the informal
sector which exist because they can meet demands that are not
covered elsewhere, offering greater speed and higher quality of
production than "formal" companies^. Both Spain and Argentina
show both types of informality. In this way, it is interesting
to note that these semi-peripheral societies are evolving towards
post-Fordism through informal activities. The large companies
subcontract the services of small informal firms because of their
flexibility in offering changes in product and the speed with
which they deliver their services, normally at the same or lower
price. The Spanish and Argentine governments themselves have
adopted a very tolerant attitude towards the informal sector,
since their flexible specialisation is producing increases in
efficiency and productivity, and alleviates unemployment even
56though the sector escapes tax collection. The problem, 
however, is that the workers are paying the price for this post- 
Fordism, since the small scale of small and medium sized 
enterprises and their informal status neither facilitates 
unionisation nor offers security on their own account. 
Furthermore the segmentation of firms and activities makes it 
difficult to create a collective identity and a consciousness of 
the common problems of the "informals".
54Pahl, 1984.
55Benton, 1990:255-271; Capecchi, 1990:213-239; Piore & Berger, 1984.
56 In Spain, the large extension of social security provision is related 
to this policy of permissiveness towards the informal economy -i.e. the 
General Law of Public Health extended public medicine services to all the 
Spanish population in 1986, meaning a real increase of 6.3 million 
beneficiaries although investment only rose by one per cent of GNP in the 
period 1982-89. In Argentina, government’s tolerance towards the informal 
sector is even greater given the extension of the public deficit and the need 
of a tax reform -this is, the argument of supporting "formality" on tax 
grounds is not relevant in the Argentine 1976-90.
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The political effects of this diversity are important. The 
corporatist model has been dismantled, and with it the capacity 
of social actors to influence state affairs. After the crisis of 
the 1930s, states were adopting civil responsibilities to correct 
market failures, in a way which involved increasing public 
spending. It was in the 1970s when the tensions coming from 
redistributive policies plus the dynamics of the stop and go 
produced among policy-makers a feeling of exhaustion of the 
Keynesian model. States began to reduce public spending, in a way 
which rolled back its sphere of action on society, and with this 
the corporatist system was losing its raison d*etre. This is
especially relevant for the late-comer countries which developed 
within a framework of economic nationalism -Southern and Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. The result of this reduction in the 
degree of state intervention in social activities has been a 
society that is increasingly segmented, where the social groups 
formed within the corporatist framework lose their 
representativeness. Such is the case with unions and employers* 
groups; in Spain and Argentina, these found themselves divided 
and disoriented. Social segmentation makes it increasingly 
difficult to create a sense of collective identity and 
consciousness of common interests. Increasingly, labour disputes 
are being resolved through local rather than national channels. 
This reinforces the state’s reduced capacity for action. To
abandon its role of social mediator means also to lose part of
its control over the regulation of wages, and therefore control
over inflation and tax receipts.
It is interesting to note that the extension of the sphere 
of state activities in the twentieth century led many authors - 
Huxley, Orwell- to project their imagination and describe the
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aberrations of totalitarianism. At the end of the twentieth 
century, societies have evolved to the opposite direction, 
towards a more heterogeneous and segmented society, where 
conflicts are increasingly more specific and treated in an 
isolated manner. This increasing separation of the economic and 
the political spheres has led some Marxist sociologists to talk
rg
of "the disorganisation of capitalism" Perhaps the most 
appropriate term would be reorganisation, were the social actors 
-the state, unions, businesses- which made up the Keynesian- 
nationalist systems from the early part of the twentieth century 
are losing their importance, and where the states themselves are 
re-regulating less autocentric systems, favouring processes of 
economic and political decentralisation, and progressively 
separating the interrelations between the economic and the 
political arenas.
To conclude, if the 1930s crisis created ISI and 
corporatism, the 1980s crisis is generating a new system which 
is not fully evident. Adjusting and opening national systems to 
the world economy while reducing state protection meant that some 
social and economic sectors would lose their privileged domestic 
conditions. However, such transformations have not yet configured 
a new model of accumulation.
57However, segmentation and heterogeneity have been inherent 
characteristics of liberalism. Contrary to the first writings of Piore and 
Sabel (1984), mercantile capitalism in the XV-XVI centuries appears to have 
developed through the surpluses generated by the use of labour not linked to 
the guilds (Kriedte, 1982), and the informal sectors have always been present 
in all economies. Further, segmentation grew with the development of 
capitalism, as it expanded cities and reinforced the urban-rural dichotomy 
(Shanin, 1980). It is possible that the perception of the evolution of society 
towards homogeneity may have resulted from the expansion of state activities 
themselves.
^Lash & Urry, 1987.
314
This re-regulation of the new economic system may be still 
incomplete, but it seems difficult to reverse. While the 
extension of the informal sector is very malleable, "submerged" 
activities may emerge easily, other transformations such as the 
separation between finance and industry are not.
Given that the world periphery is evolving towards a larger 
integration into the international economy, it is questionable 
wether the economic transition will be sustainable or not for 
those semi-peripheral countries who may not easily find an 
economic niche. States like the Argentine are dismantling their 
own sphere of action, and looking for new private international 
development partners in a domestic atmosphere of rising conflicts 
and political discontent. Whether these semi-peripheral countries 
will be able to find these "associates" in order to generate an 
extensive impact as Neo-Liberal governments hope for, is still 
a matter of history fiction.
The intention of these lines is far from pessimism. 
Transitional governments have often defined Neo-Liberal policies 
as the only alternative to "a new age" of international changes. 
However, the analysis of industrial re-structuring shows that 
governments have been more cautious than initially it may seem. 
It is just a question of extending the same discretional 
discriminatory philosophy to other sectors, and applying some of 
the available Neo-Keynesian tools when short-term neo-liberal 
policies may not offer many guarantees of success in the long- 
run. Given that, if there is a definition of politics, it is the 
search for alternatives to solve present problems.
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A r g e n t i n a :
THE BEGINING 
OF A NEW AGE
: MINSTTIY O f ECONOMY
AND PUBUC WORKS 
A M ) SERVICES
T he NEW AGE BASES.
Today, Argentina is involved in a deep 
transformation process, which includes 
political, economical and social fields.
1992 will be the key year for the explotation 
of entrepreneurships in Argentina. The peso, 
launched on the first of this year as the 
country's new currency, is a fitting symbol 
for Argentina's awakening to a new age of 
economic development.
Many investment opportunities have 
emerged as a consequence of the current 
Economic Plan:
•  The integration with the new world order 
increases business posibilities.
•  American integration agreements, such as 
Mercosur, open up new markets.
•  Privatization offers new and very 
interesting opportunities for business.
Privatized Companies
companies to be privatized
■ Telephones ■ National oil
■ National Airline company
■ TV channels ■ National energy
■ Radio Stations company
■ Railways ■ National gas
■ Roads company
■ Metropolitan services ® Petrochemical and
(i.e. traffic control, siderurgical plants
repairs, deaning, etc) *  Other railways
■ Subways
•  Stock Exchange Market is growing as a 
consequence of new capital investment, the 
development of new industries and the 
incorporation of new companies (such as 
the ones recently privatized). Blue chips 
growth in 1991:381%.
A r g e n tin a 's transform ation  in  numbers
YESTERDAY TODAY
Government
Political instability: 
predominance of 
De Facto rules
8 years 
of democratic 
governments
Less than 1 % 
per month Last 
quarter 1991
184% per year 
[annual average)
1971-1988
Inflation
5.3%  
October 1991
8.8% 
June 1989
Unemployment rate
Annual drop 
of 1.2% 
(1987-1990)
5% 1991 
6.5% 1 9 9 2 0
Gross National 
Growth
17% of G.D.P. 
1991
13.2%  of G.D.P 
1990
I n v e s t m e n t
Central Bank 
Reserves in US 
dollars
5 ,780  millions (* 
January 1992
112 millions 
June 1989
33%  
January 1992
Quoted value of 
Foreign Debt Papers
13% 
June 1989
Daily trading volume 
on stock exchange
4 million dollars 
December 1990
40  million dollars 
December! 991
Private deposits in 
US dollars in local 
banks
6 ,450  millions 
December 1991
816 millions 
M ay 1989
Less than 1 % 
per month Last 
quarter 1991
40% per month 
(monthly average) 
1989
Interest Rate Time
deposits
IN NUMBERS
TODAY
8 years 
of democratic 
governments
Less than 1 % 
per month Last 
quarter 1991
5.3%  
October 1991
5% 1991 
6.5% 1992(*
17% of G.D.P. 
1991
5 ,78 0  millions (*) 
January 1992
33% 
January 1992
40  million dollars 
December 1991
6 ,450  millions 
December 1991
Less than 1 % 
per mont
F o reign  investment
GUARANTEES TODAY.
MINSTRY OF ECONOMY
AND PU8UC WORKS
A N D
Political Stability.
A r v  OCAVIV.C.
Economic Stability.
Free Exchange and Prices.
Deregulation of the Economy.
Fiscal Equilibrium.
Privatization of State Companies.
Deregulation of Foreign investment.
Equal Treatment of Domestic and 
Foreign Investors.
Freedom to Remit Dividends and 
Capital Abroad.
Treaties for the Guarrantee of 
Foreign Direct Investment.
Simpler and Better Controlled Tax
System.
Reduction of Import and Export Tax.
Flexibility of the Labor Market.
Regional Integration Agreements.
ANNEXES
TABLE I.l.s
ARGENTINA AND SPAIN: MAIN INDICATORS, 1950-80.
ARGENTINA SPAIN
YEAR
REAL WAGES 
1974=100
UNEMPLOY. 
% active 
labour 
force
INFLATION
(%)
POPULAT.
(000)
REAL WAGES 
1974=100
UNEMPLOY. 
% active 
labour 
force
INFLATION
(%)
POPULAT.
(000)
1950 145.3 7 • 2 (*) — 15,893 — 2 .8 (*) — 27,800
1955 122.2 — — 17,070 — — — 29,250
1960 100.0 — — 20,669 62.0 — 1.8 30,400
1965 122.6 5.5 — 22,352 49.8 — 9.7 31,600
1970 118.7 5.4 21.7 23,748 176.8 4.1 6.6 34,000
1975 100.0 5.3 335.1 25,383 100.0 16.1 24.0 35,800
1980 128.1 3.2 87.6 27,863 121.4 19.8 15.5 37,600
Sources: Argentina: real wages- INDEC in BAC, 1982; unemployment- INDEC in BAC, 1982; inflation- 
Dornbuch & De Pablo, 1988.
Spain: real wages- Ministerio de Trabajo in Tamames, R. 1986; unemployment- INE in 
Rodriguez, J. 1989; (*) UN statistics; Inflation in Rodriguez, J. 1989.
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TABLE I - 2 . :
A r g e n t i n i a n  and. Spanish,
presidents.
YEAR ARGENTINA SPAIN
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
(...) A.P.Justo
* 1936:R.M.Ortiz
* R .S.Casti1lo
* 1944: E.J.Farrell
* J.D.Peron
* E.Lonardi
(...) Second Republic
* 1936-39: Civil War
* 1939: Gral.F.Franco
Falangista (=fascist) 
economic team
 ^_
* 1958: Frondizi
1960
* 1962: J.M.Guido
* 1963: A. I 11 ia
1965
* 1966: J.C.Ongania
1970 * R.M.Levingston
* 1971 : A.A.Lanusse
* 1973: J.D. Peron
1975 * 1974: Isabel de Peron
* 1976: J.R.Vi del a
1980 * 1981 : R . V i o 1 a/L. Ga 11 i erii
* 1982: R .B .B ignone
* 1983: R.Alfonsin
1985
* 1989: C.S.Menem
Opus Dei economic 
team into government
* 1977: A.Suarez 
"* 1982 : F . Gonza I ez
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[YEARS
1 9 5 0
1 9 5 1
1 9 5 2
1 9 5 3
1 9 5 4
1 9 5 5
1 9 5 6
1 9 5 7
1 9 5 8
1 9 5 9
1 9 6 0
1 9 6 1
1 9 6 2
1 9 6 3
1 9 6 4
1 9 6 5
1 9 6 6
1 9 6 7
1 9 6 8
1 9 6 9
1 9 7 0
1 9 7 1
1 9 7 2
1 9 7 3
1 9 7 4
1 9 7 5
1 9 7 6
1 9  7 7
1 9 7 8
1 9 7 9
1 9 8 0
. - -
TABLE I .3.Z
na and Spain r areal GDP per 
capita and. its components , 19 5 0 —
8 0, ±n 19*75 U$S .
ARGENTINA
R D G P p c %  C %  I %  G O V
1 8 7 7 7 3 1 4 1 3
1 9 8 1 7 0 2 0 1 2
1 7 8 3 7 1 1 8 1 3
1 8 2 9 6 8 1 8 1 2
1 8 8 6 7 1 1 7 1 2
2 0 0 0 7 2 1 8 1 1
1 9 6 1 7 1 1 6 1 3
2 0 2 5 7 2 1 7 1 1
2 1 3 6 7 2 1 7 1 1
1 9 7 5 7 1 2 3 1 2
2 1 3 4 6 6 2 3 1 2
2 2 7 5 6 8 2 2 1 1
2 1 5 2 6 7 1 9 1 1
2 0 4 3 6 9 2 1 1 1
2 2 3 7 6 9 2 1 1 0
1 3 9 2 6 9 2 1 9
2 3 5 9 7 0 1 9 1 0
2 3 9 1 6 9 2 0 1 0
2 4 7 1 6 9 2 1 9
2 6 5 5 6 7 2 3 9
2 7 5 0 6 7 2 4 9
2 9 0 1 6 2 2 7 1 1
2 9 6 8 6 2 2 6 1 2
3 0 4 5 6 3 2 4 1 2
3 2 0 2 6 5 2 4 1 2
3 1 5 9 6 6 2 3 1 2
3 0 0 4 6 1 2 5 1 2
3 0 7 1 5 7 2 8 1 1
2 9 0 3 5 7 2 7 1 2
3 1 4 8 5 8 2 8 1 2
3 2 0 9 5 8 3 0 1 2
SPAIN
R G P p c %  C %  I  % G O V
1 1 6 3 7 6 1 5 9
1 3 4 7 7 5 1 6 9
1 4 0 3 7 7 1 4 9
1 3 4 0 7 5 1 6 9
1 5 0 6 7 4 1 7 9
1 5 7 6 7 4 1 8 9
1 6 8 0 7 4 1 9 9
1 7 3 4 7 3 1 9 9
1 7 9 5 7 3 2 0 8
1 7 5 3 7 5 1 7 9
1 7 3 7 7 2 1 8 9
1 9 3 2 7 1 2 0 8
1 0 9 8 7 0 2 2 8
2 2 8 1 7 1 2 3 8
2 3 8 2 7 1 2 3 8
2 5 5 0 7 0 2 6 8
2 7 3 0 6 9 2 7 -?
2 8 1 1 7 1 2 5 7
2 9 1 6 7 0 2 5 7
3 1 0 8 7 0 2 5 7
3 2 3 1 6 9 2 5 8
3 3 3 7 6 9 2 3 8
3 5 8 7 6 9 2 5 7
3 8 4 1 6 9 2 6 7
4 0 3 1 6 8 2 7 7
4 0 3 2 6 9 2 6 8
4 1 1 1 7 0 2 5 8
4 1 5 9 7 0 2 3 8
4 1 8 7 7 0 2 2 8
4 2 3 3 7 0 2 2 8
4 2 6 4 7 0 2 2 9
RGDPpc - Real GDP per capita
% C - Percentage of RGDP into consumption
% I - Percentage of RGDP into investment
% GOV - Percentage of RGDP into government
SOURCE: Summers & Heston, 1985.
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TABLE X •4•s
Argentina and Spain s
alisation, 1950—80.
ARGENTINA SPAIN
---------
YEARS I.I.P PG I.L.pc. I .1 .P. PG I.L .pc.
1950 100 100 100 100 100 100
1951 102.6 102 100.6 104.5 100.9 103.5
1952 100.7 104.1 96.7 125.8 101.7 123.7
1953 100.1 106.2 94 .2 126.1 102.6 122.9
1954 108.1 108.3 99.8 135.4 103.4 130.9
1955 121 .3 110.3 109.9 145.9 104.2 140.1
1956 129.7 112.3 115.5 159.9 105.1 152.3
1957 139.9 114.3 122.4 174 .9 105.9 165.1
1958 151 .6 116.3 130.3 191 .3 106.8 179.1
1959 135.9 118.2 114 .9 193.9 107.7 180.1
1960 149.6 120.1 124.5 190.6 108.7 175.3
1961 164 .5 122.1 134 .8 226.1 109.7 206.1
1962 155.5 123.8 125.6 250.8 110.8 226.3
1963 149.2 125.6 118.8 262.8 112.1 234.6
1964 ' 177.3 127.4 139.2 285.4 113.2 252.1
1965 201 .8 129.2 156.2 335.3 114 .5 292.8
1966 203.1 131 .1 155.1 358.1 115.7 309.5
1967 206.2 132.8 155.2 379.7 117.1 342.2
1968 219.6 134.7 163.1 410.7 118.4 346.9
1969 243.4 136.5 178.3 476.7 119.8 397.9
1970 258.8 138.4 186.9 532.4 121 .2 ■ 439.2
1971 274 .7 140.2 195.9 542.2 122.5 442.6
1972 285.7 142.2 200.9 614 .5 123.8 496.3
1973 297.1 144 .1 206.2 653.3 125.1 522.2
1974 314.4 146.1 215.3 721.2 126.4 570.5
1975 306.4 147.9 207.1 706.8 127.7 553.4
1976 297.1 149.9 198.1 729.8 129.1 565.7
1977 320.3 151 .8 211 .1 725.7 130.3 556.9
1978 286.5 153.8 186.2 701 .1 131.6 532.7
1979 315.7 155.8 202.6 740.1 132.8 557.3
1980 303.6 157.7 192.5 768.7 134.1 573.2 
_________ _
IIP - Index of Industrial Production (1950 = 100)
PG - Population Growth (1950 =100)
ILpc - Industrialisation Level per capita (1950 =100)
SOURCE: Argentina in Feldman & Sommer, 1986, p.22 
Spain in Carreras, 1989, p. 193.
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TABLE X X . 1 .Z
Main Paradigms in development•
MODERNISATION STRUCTURALISM DEPENDENCY
IDEOLOGICAL
BACKGROUND Liberalism Nationalism Marxism
POLICIES Difusion of
modern values 
in backward areas, 
technology and 
capital imports, 
integration into 
the world economy.
INSTITUTIONS Rostow, 
and Lewis, Hirschman,
AUTHORS Myrdal, IMF, most
of WB.
Promotion of nat­
ional industry 
through protection 
(ISI); rural and 
fiscal reform, 
regional integrat­
ion.
UN ECLA(Prebisch, 
Furtado) Neo­
structuralist 
(Foxley, Bianchi, 
some WB staff)
State inter­
ventionism, 
erradication 
of poverty, 
improvement 
of social 
conditions.
Cardoso, Amin 
Faletto, Frank 
Baran, Warren, 
UN Basic Needs 
approach.
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TABLE II . 2 .5
Debt indicators for five large 
debtor countries : quantity debt -+-
d e b t  s e r v i c e  / e x p o r t s
C percentage) , 1972—8 1-
i
1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 ’ 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9
i
1 9 8 1
C O U N T R Y
ii
b $ d / X b $ d / X b $ d / X b $ d / X b $
i
d / X
B R A Z I L
i
1 3 , 8 3 6 , 7 2 3 , 3 4 0 , 8 3 5 , 2 4 8 , 7 5 7 , 4 6 5 , 6 7 5 , 7
i
6 6 , 9
M E X I C O
i
8 , 6 2 8 , 7 1 6 , 9 3 0 , 3 2 7 , 1 5 3 , 6 4 0 , 8 6 7 , 7 6 7 , 0
i
4 8 , 5
A R G E N T I N A 6 , 4 1 9 , 9 7 , 9 3 1 , 9 9 , 7 1 9 , 1 . 1 9 . 0 2 1 , 3 3 5 . 7
i
3 7 , 5
S P A I N 5 , 7 5 , 2 . 1 0 , 7 9 , 3 . 1 6 , 3 1 3 , 3 2 2 , 2 1 5 , 7 3 3 , 2
i
1 9 , 0
K O R E A 4 , 6
ii
1 1  , 5 7 , 3 1 2 , 5 1 1  , 2 1 0 , 2 2 0 , 5 1 3 , 9 3 1  , 2
i
1 8  , 8
ii
S O U R C E :  C l i n e  , M .  1 9 8 3 .
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TABLE XX.3.z
ARGENTINAr EXBORTS BY COUNTRY OE 
DESTINATION „ XN XJ$S # X 9 *7 <5 —8 0 .
COUNTRY NON-INDUSTRIAL INDUSTRIAL TOTAL %
Netherlands 432,232 191,600 623,692 11.5
Italy 399,703 95,291 494,995 9.1
W.Germany 262,437 88,581 351,018 6.5
UK 90,389 90,319 180,708 3.3
France 147,743 28,726 176,470 3.2
Belgium 65,801 15,894 81,695 1.5
Greece 46,267 2,256 48,522 0.9
EC 1,447,572 512,528 1,960,100 36.0
Brazil 361,935 260,980 622,835 11.5
USSR 520,345 48,621 568,966 10.5
US 166,410 336,895 503,305 9.3
Japan 251,223 49,551 300,774 5.5
Spain 252,030 48,541 292,571 5.4
Chile 83,719 122,912 206,631 3.8
Uruguay 32,317 108,190 140,507 2.6
Paraguay 21,601 106,727 128,328 2.3
Venezuela 22,729 95,919 118,648 2.2
Bolivia 28,945 82,910 111,855 2.0
China 87,668 19,534 107,203 1.9
Mexico 33,073 62,569 95,642 1.7
Others 110,040 116,452 226,952 3.2
Source: IMF, 1985.
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TABLE IX.4.s
2 exports and imports t>y 
country of destination/origin_ in 
percentages / 1 9*7 3 —86 , selected
EC US RestOECD OPEC CMEA LatinAm Rest
EXPORTS
1973
1980
1986
48.5
49.7
60.1
13.9 7.8 
5.6 5.8 
9.2 7.7
6.2
12.8
5.6
3.0
3.0 
2.9
7.0
7.7
2.9
13.6
15.4
11.1
IMPORTS
1973
1980
1986
43.2 
30.9
50.2
16.1 11.1 
13.1 7.5 
9.9 11.4
11.8
29.7
11.3
2.6
2.2
2.0
7.3
8.2
6.5
7.9
8.4
8.6
Source: Alonso,J. 1991.
T A B L E  X  X  . 5  . z
S p a i n : 
a r e a s
c o m p o s  i t i o n  o  f  t r a d e  t>y 
a n d  p r o d u c t s  , i n  
a g e s ,  1 9 8 5 - 8 6  -
EXPORTS IMPORTS
EC US RestOECD RestWORLD EC US R.OECD R.WORLD
ENERGY 7.8 12.8 4.1 7.5 4.8 11.0 4.2 64.4
FOOD 16.8 14.3 21.4 10.2 7.2 8.5 5.8 12.1
INTERME
GOODS
CONSUMM
GOODS
INVESTM
GOODS
. 29.3 
. 25.8 
. 19.7
34.1 42.8 
24.9 14.0
12.1 16.5
51.0
10.1 
20.7
40.0
6.5
34.5
44.5 38.7 
2.7 16.6
32.5 34.2
17.5
3.5
2.3
Source: Alonso,J. 1991, based on data of Spanish General Customs
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TABLE II . <5 -
MERCOSUR PROTOCOLS.
PROTOCOL A B C D E
I. Capital Goods *
II. Wheat *
III. Food Supplies *
IV. Trade Expansion *
V. Binational enterprises *
VI. Finances *
VII. Investment Funds *
VIII. Energy *
IX. Biotechnology *
X. Economic Studies *
XI. Information and mutual aid in case
of nuclear accidents and other *
emergencies
XII. Aeronautic Cooperation *
XIII. Metallurgy *
XIV. Land Transport *
XV. Sea Transport *
XVI. Communications *
XVII. Nuclear Cooperation *
XVIII. Cultural *
XIX. Public Administration *
XX. Currency *
XXI. Vehicle Industry *
XXII. Food Industries *
XXIII. Regional Frontiers *
Source: Ala-Rue, P. & Lavergne, N., 1991.
KEYS:
A. Trade related protocols, aimed at stimulating intra-MERCOSUR 
trade.
B. Scientific and technical protocols.
C. Infrastructural protocols.
D. Protocols governing structural and sectoral coordination, the 
creation of a single currency in the long run, etc.
E. Others.
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TABLE 11 - *7 - x
ANNUAL WORLD MARKET ERICES OE 
MAIN RRIMARY COMMODITY EKRORTS 
OR LATIN AMERICA IN CURRENT 
VALUES 0 19-73 — 88.
YEAR
BEEF 
(US Cts./Kg)
MAIZE 
(US $/mt)
1973 201.1 97.8
1974 158.2 132.1
1975 132.7 119.6
1976 158.1 112.4
1977 150.8 95.3
1978 214.0 100.7
1979 286.0 115.5
1980 276.0 125.3
1981 247.4 130.8
1982 239.0 109.3
1983 244.0 136.0
1984 227.3 135.9
1985 215.4 112.2
1986 209.2 87.6
1987 238.6 75.7
Note: Cts./Kg = cents per kilogram. $/mt = dollars per metric 
ton.
Source: World Bank, International Market Division, International 
Economics Department, November 16, 1988.
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TABLE XXX - 1 - r
ARGENTINIAN PUBLIC SECTOR
E X 1ST A1STC X NG AS PERCENTAGE
OF GlsTE , XQ-7 O —ae, SELECTED YEARS .
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Resources 23.3 15.8 27.8 25.5 23.4 23.6 22.8 27.9 28.1
* Tax 19.4 13.6 23.3 20.4 18.7 18.7 18.1 22.0 22.9
Others 3.9 2.2 4.5 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.7 5.9 5.2
Expenditure 25.1 31.2 35.3 38.9 38.5 40.4 35.6 33.8 31.7
Fiscal
Deficit 1.8 15.4 7.5 13.4 15.1 16.8 12.8 5.9 3.6
Way of financing 
* Borrowing 0.9
deficit: 
1.8 3.4 8.3 6.4 -1.5 -1.1 0.6 2.9
* BCRA (*) 0.9 9.8 3.5 5.1 4.8 15.4 5.8 2.3 ---
* Others --- 3.8 0.6 0.1 3.9 2.9 8.1 3.0 0.7
(*) Central Bank issuing paper money ("inflationary tax")
Source: Presupuesto General de la Administracion Nacional, 1987.
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TABLE XXX.2.
STATE TAX REVENUES XN REROENTAOE 
OE GNE # XSYO—88 ,
SELECTED YEARS.
1970 1975 1980 1983 1985 1988
TOTAL.................... 16.67 12.48 18.89 15.91 18.61 16.27
INCOME TAX...............
Capital gains tax.......
Net wealth tax..........
Bank debits.............
Others...................
1.38 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00
1.38
0.30
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.29
1.25
0.77
0.02
0.00
0.46
1.28
0.90
0.01
0.09
0.28
1.04
0.54
0.02
0.29
0.19
1.96
0.61
0.13
1.00
0.22
TAX ON GOODS AND SERVICES
VAT......................
Petrol...................
Internal taxes..........
Others...................
5.20
1.85
1.08
1.34
0.93
4.46
1.86
1.26
0.60
0.71
8.49
4.32
1.25
1.57
1.35
8.33
3.36
2.37
1.34 
0.96
8.34 
3.21 
2.78
1.34 
1.01
7.68
2.74
1.01
1.28
2.65
SOCIAL SECURITY......... 4.74 4.85 6.14 2.44 5.12 4.10
TURNOVERS AND BENEFITS...
Benefits.................
Others...................
2.26
2.12
0.14
0.80
0.75
0.05
1.57
1.47
0.10
1.29
1.01
0.28
1.17
0.96
0.21
1.57
1.25
0.32
INTERNATIONAL TRADE.....
Import duties...........
Export duties...........
Others...................
1.98
1.16
0.58
0.24
1.77
0.55
0.70
0.52
2.09
1.31
0.04
0.74
2.46
0.83
1.48
0.15
3.27
0.78
1.99
0.50
1.76
0.97
0.22
0.57
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda, en Carciofi, 1990.
327
TABLE XXX - 3 Z
E V O L U T I O N  O E  A R G E N T I N I A N  P U B L I  
I N V E S T M E N T z T O T A L  A N D  E C O N O M I
S E C T O R S „ 1 9 7 6 - 8 5 # E A S E  X O O  =  M E A
1 9 7 1 / 7 5 .
3 . X .  E C O N O M I C  S E C T O R S  I
YEAR TOTAL ECONOMIC SECTORS
TOTAL ENERGY TRNSPT. TELEC. INDUST. AGRIC.OTHERS
1976 125.4 123.1 143.8 122.3 43.8 122.3 88.2 36.7
1977 141.2 133.8 155.8 120.6 125.1 111.6 117.6 41.3
1978 132.6 121.5 153.5 106.4 115.6 45.1 117.6 45.9
1979 120.2 108.6 126.5 102.2 146.9 45.1 117.6 36.7
1980 111.2 108.2 127.1 82.9 203.1 53.6 58.8 36.7
1981 101.2 95.5 120.8 71.2 184.4 6.4 58.8 32.1
1982 98.4 102.2 141.6 70.4 143.8 2.1 58.8 27.5
1983 91.5 93.7 127.1 62.8 143.8 2.1 29.4 50.5
1984 76.3 87.7 111.9 85.4 90.6 0.1 29.4 41.3
1985 68.4 78.4 111.5 54.4 71.9 0.0 88.2 41.3
3  - 2  . S O C I A L  A N D O T H E R  S E C T O R S
YEAR SOCIAL SECTORS OTHER SECTORS
TOTAL HEALTH EDUC. SOC.SEC. TOTAL ADMINIST. DEFENSE
1976 98.6 300.1 80.1 77.9 165.6 35.7 185.9
1977 109.3 250.1 100.1 116.9 223.5 95.2 243.5
1978 111.1 350.1 113.3 90.9 231.5 119.1 249.1
1979 77.1 250.1 113.3 19.5 242.8 142.9 258.4
1980 78.9 300.2 106.7 19.5 162.4 107.1 171.1
1981 53.8 250.1 106.7 13.0 184.9 95.2 198.9
1982 39.4 100.2 86.7 6.5 123.8 83.3 130.1
1983 48.8 150.1 106.7 13.1 114.1 107.1 115.2
1984 30.5 100.0 73.3 0.0 35.4 83.3 27.9
1985 37.6 100.0 93.3 6.5 24.1 47.6 20.4
Source: Informe sobre la Inversion Publica Nacional, 1986.
Contaduria General de la Nacion, en Carciofi, 1990.
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TABLE XXI.4.r
na : number of
institutions# 1970-84.
financial
J970 1976 1978 . 1980 1982 1984 a/
H.O. B. H.O. B. H.O. B. H.O. B. H.O. B. H.O. B.
TOTAL 864 2532 692 3171 721 3621 469 4119 4J3 4364 372 4779
ConxnercLal Banks 115 2199 111 2906 150 3101 207 3714 197 3957 203 4393
Public National 1 418 1 553 1 566 1 570 2 553 2 554
Public Provincial 22 743 24 976 24 1025 24 1083 24 1122 24 1144
Public Municipal 4 31 4 51 5 56 5 (2 '5 67 5 69
Private National 69 756 64 1100 102 1250 151 1784 133 1869 140 2283
Private Foreign 19 251 18 228 18 204 26 215 33 346 32 343
Development Banks — — 2 33 2 33 2 33 2 33 2 33
Investment Banks 1 25 4 — 3 — 3 — 3 — 3 —
Housing Bank 1 50 1 51 1 52 1 52 1 53 1 53
Savings and Loan 3 33 1 40 1 39 1 40 J 50 1 53
Credit Unions 549 20 424 13 377 173 92 24 76 23 53 16
Financial Companies 81 57 80 40 138 147 135 216 111 214 92: 193
Other ty 114 148 69 88 49 76 28 40 22 35 17 38
H.O.: Headquarters Officies; B.: Branches 
Source: World Bank, 1985.
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TABLE I X X - 5 . =
••THE CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY”
"CAPTAIN" INDUSTRY ACTIVITY/IES
Gurmendi,Manuel 
Gamboa,Javier
Pagani,Fulvio 
Braun Cantilo,Eduardo
Gruneisen,Ricardo
Nunez,Jaime 
Bago,Sebastian 
Hojman,Julio 
Bulgeroni,Alejandro
Roig,M ./Rapanel1i,N .
Cartellone,Gerardo 
Kuhl,Guillermo
Blanquier,Martin 
Fortabat,Amalia
Macri,F./Haiek,J . 
Madanes,Manuel
ACINDAR
ALPARGATAS 
Grupo ROBERTS
ARCOR
ASTARSA
ASTRA
BAGLEY
BAGO
BGH
BRIDAS
BUNGE & BORNE
CARTELLONE
CELULOSA JUJUY 
SAAB SCANIA
LEDESMA
LOMA NEGRA
Grupo MACRI 
(SEVEL,SIDECO, 
PHILCO, MANLIBA, 
PLUS-PETROL)
Grupo MADANES 
(FATE,ALUAR, 
KIKSA)
Steel
Textil
Food
Ship Building,
Cattle + Agriculture
Petrol,petrocheraics 
Transport
Food
Pharmaceutical
Electronics
Petrol, Banks 
Paper Industry
Food, textil, banks 
chemics, agriculture 
pharmaceuticals, 
computers, fi shing.
Construction
Cellulose, Paper 
Lorries + trucks
Sugar, agric+cattle
Concrete, agricult 
cattle
Motorcars, services 
construction
Aluminium, tyres
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Massuh,Arain
Ors i, V ./Vicente,O .
Pescarmona,Enrique 
Master H o n e , Pascual 
Tramutola,C ./Rocca,R . 
Zorraquin,Federico
MASSUH Paper and Cellulose
PEREZ-COMPANC Petrol, banks,
construction,computer 
chemics, nuclear, 
telecomunications
IMPSA/PESCARMONA Steel
LA SERENISIMA Food
TECHINT Steel, construction
GAR0VA6LI0 Y 
ZORRAQUIN
Banks, petrochemics 
sugar, agric+cattle
Source: Ostiguy, P., 1990.
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TABLE 111 . <5 . z
ARGENTINIAN TJJSTXOlSrS LINKED TO THE 
CGT AJSTD WORKERS MEMEERSHXR XJST 
1986 .
UNION ACTIVITY N.MEMBERS
Conf.Gral.Empleados Comercio Commerce 408 000
Union Obrera Metalurgica UOM Steel 267 000
Conf.O.Empleados Municipal.COEMA Local Public W. 250 000
Conf.Tr.Educacion CTERA Teaching 188 854
Union 0.Construe.UOCRA Building work 186 614
Fed.Asoc.Tr.Sanidad FATS Health services 170 900
Asoc.Bancarios Banking 156 070
Fed.Tr.Ind.Alimentacion Food 148 703
Union Ferroviaria Rails 143 304
Un.Pers.Civil de la Nacion Civil Service 133 188
Asoc.Tr.del Estado ATE State work 85 927
Un.Tr.Gastronomicos UTGRA Restaurants 85 481
Asoc.Ob.Textil AOTRA Textil 73 646
Un.Obr.Empl.Municipal Local state work 73 000
Fed.Tr.Rurales FATRE Agriculture 72 677
Fed.Tr.Luz Y Fuerza Electricity 69 952
Un.Tranviarios Automotor Transport 56 214
Sind.Mec.yAf.Transp.Aut.SMATA Motorcars 53 976
Fed.Ob.Ind.del Vest.FONIVA Textil 45 318
Fed.Obr.y Empl•Telef.FOETRA Telecommunicat. 39 888
Fed.Nac.Tr.Com.Ob.Tran.Aut.Carga Removals 38 961
Fed.Unica Viajeros FUVA Travel 38 261
Fed.Gr.Pers.Ind.Carne Meat 37 667
Fed.Ob.Tuc.Ind.Azucarera FOTIA Sugar 35 273
Union Sind.Ind.Maderera USIMRA Wood and Paper 33 080
Fed.Obr.Empl.Vitivinicolas FOEVA Wine 30 260
Fed.Obr.Empl.Correos y Tele.FOECT Postal services 28 370
Fed.Ag.Tra.de Farmacio FATFRA Pharmaceutics 28 122
Source: Godio, J., 1991.
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TABLE III.7:
ARGENTINIAN MONTHLY LABOUR
C O N F L I C T S , 1 9 8 5 — 9 0 .
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
1985 52 24 48 42 28 26 24 12 19 31 16 22
1986 17 21 33 45 55 69 52 52 67 66 54 32
1987 13 12 13 11 28 39 42 48 51 56 50 35
1988 25 27 51 56 53 66 48 47 37 55 45 31
1989 21 31 38 32 71 52 58 50 51 48 68 60
1990 54 69 92 56 62 68 61 57 - - - -
Source: Palomino, H., in "El Bimestre Politico y Economico", 
1985-91. Buenos Aires, CISEA.
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T A B L E  X X X . 8 . z
Unemployment, subemployment and 
industrial real wages, 1981 —90 -
% UNEMPLOYMENT % SUBEMPLOYMENT R.WAGES* 1983=100
1981 4,8 5,5 94,3
1982 5,3 6,6 82,6
1983 4,7 5,9 100,0
1984 4,6 5,7 122,9
1985 6,1 7,3 109,0
1986 5,6 7,6 116,4
1987 5,9 8,4 103,6
1988 6,3 8,5 95,5
1989 7,8 8,9 66,3
1990 8,60 9,30 67,8
@ Only first quarter of the year. 
Source: UN data.
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TABLE XV.X . z
Spain : evolution of ttie main
macroeconomic aggregates, 1976—
92 .
YEAR
GNP 
OOO Mill, 
pesetas
GNP 
per capita
A
GNP
FISCAL 
PRESSURE 
% GNP <t>
BUDGET 
DEFICIT 
y. GNP
% PUBLIC 
DEBT/GNP
CENTRAL BANK INTEREST 
RESERVE RATE, 3 
USS millions MONTHS
1976 6849 191,2 3,3 • • -0,0 0,00 4952 • •
1977 8695 239,8 3,0 • • -2,1 16,18 6132 15,5
1978 10751 293,2 1,4 24,3 -1,5 14,97 10015 17,6
1979 12529 338,7 -0,1 25,4 -1,8 16,13 13117 15,5
1980 15209 408/1 1,2 26,7 -2,8 20,22 12358 16,4
1981 16989 450,0 -0,2 27,9 -3,0 22,46 15337 16,2
1982 19567 515,3 1,2 27,9 -5,4 25,97 11530 16,3
1983 22235 582,6 1,8 30,1 -5,2 29,60 11228 20,0
1984 25111 655,2 1,8 30,4 -5,5 34,79 15778 14,9
1985 28201 733,0 2,3 31,2 -6,5 38,89 13301 12,2
1986 32324 837,3 3,3 32,0 -5,2 39,02 16001 11,7
1987 36144 933,6 5,2 33,8 -4,4 42,55 30172 15,8
1988 40164 1034,9 5,0 33,5 -3,2 38,42 39875 11,6
1989 45025 1157,8 4,5 35,0 -2,5 37,56 44422 15,0
1990 50074 1285,3 3,7 33,9 -2,8 37,52 53104 15,1
1991 54775 1403,6 2,3 34,1 -2,9 37,79 66283 13,2
1992 58677 1501,2 1,0 33,3 -2,6 39,98 50484 13,3
Source: GNP: INE
Others: Banco de Espaffa.
<*> includes social security and taxes.
TABLE XV.2.S
SPAIN S INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY
GINI AND DECILES , 1964 — 30,
SELECTED YEARS -
YEAR GINI LOWER DECILE UPPER DECILE
1964 0.421 1.43% 36.84%
1967 0.463 1.33% 41.32%
1970 0.457 1.44% 40.76%
1974 0.446 1.76% 39.57%
1980 0.294 2.41% 29.23%
1987 n.a. 2.64% 28.85%
Source: Alcaide, J., 1991.
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TABLE IV . 3 . Z
SPAINr CONNECTIONS BETWEEN BANKS
AND INDUSTRY I INDUSTRIAL.
DIRECTIVE ROSTS OCUBBIED BY BANK 
DIRECTORS OR RELATIVES, X9YOS-
Industrial Sector Presidents Other Directive Posts
Cars 29 205
Chemicals 95 509
Concrete 50 260
Building works 50 244
Electricity 46 382
Electrical supplies 47 220
Insurances 52 324
Machinery 125 619
Mining 58 295
Ship building 13 81
Shipping 25 134
State Agencies 96 367
State Banking 1 51
Steel 15 125
Textiles 57 284
Other sectors 531 2,641
TOTAL 1,290 6,741
Source: Tamames, R., 1979.
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TA.I33L.E X V  - 4  - :
SpaXn: ©volution of labour
indicators ^ 1976—92 .
YEAR
TOTAL WORKING 
POPULATION AGE POP. 
(000) (000)
ACTIVE EMPLOYED 
POP. POP. 
(000) (000)
UNEMPLOY­
MENT 
RATE (7.)
A  ANNUAL 
WAGES PRODUC­
TIVITY
1976 35824 26724 13120 12544 4,39 19,3 •  •
1977 36256 26962 13172 12432 5,62 25,0 4,05
1978 36667 . 27284 13172 12180 7,53 20,6 4,78
1979 36995 27482 13101 11896 9,20 14,1 4,40
1980 37272 26737 12660 11404 9,92 15,3 7,31
1981 37751 27115 13045 11172 14,36 13,1 4,50
1982 37970 27483 13206 11061 16,24 12,0 6,31
1983 38162 27837 13353 10984 17,74 11,4 6,45
1984 38328 28203 13437 10668 20,61 7,8 8,37
1985 38474 28583 13542 10571 21,94 7,9 7,92
1986 38604 28907 13813 10880 21,23 8,2 7,62
1987 38716 29306 14306 11368 20,54 6,5 5,16
1988 38809 29763 14620 11772 19,48 6,4 5,79
1989 38888 30173 14819 12258 17,28 7,8 6,54
1990 38959 30429 15019 12578 16,25 8,3 7,73
1991 39025 30690 15073 12609 16,35 7,9 9,13
1992 39085 30953 15142 12439 17,85 7,2 9,36
Sources Total population: INE.
Wage increases: Ministerio de Trabajo. 
Others: Encuesta Poblaciftn Activa.
3
3
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TABLE XV.S .S 
Spains external s , 1976-92.
YEAR
IMPORT. 
000 Mill.
EXPORT.
pesetas
COMPETITI­
VENESS
INDEX
TRADE
BALANCE/
GNP
1976 1169,4 583,3 -8,56
1977 1350,5 775,2 -6,62
1978 1430,9 1001,5 ’ -3,99
1979 1704,0 1221,2 -3,85
1980 2424,1 1462,2 100 -6,32
1981 2970,4 1888,4 105 -6,37
1982 3476,0 2233,9 106 -6,35
1983 4175,3 2833,2 117 -6,04
1984 4628,9 3730,7 113 -3,58
1985 5073,2 4104,1 112 -3,44
1986 4890,7 3800,2 103 -3,37
1987 6029,8 4195,6 106 -5,07
1988 7039,5 4686,3 99 -5,86
1989 8396,3 5134,5 95 -7,24
1990 8914,7 5642,7 89 -6,53
1991 9636,8 6064,7 89 -6,52
1992 9322,0 5974,2 88 -5,71
Source: Competitiveness index: Informacidn Comercial Espanol 
Others: Banco de Espana.
TABLE XV.e •;
COMPANIES ASSOCIATED TO CEOE , 
1977-87 -
YEAR N.COMPANIES % EMPLOYMENT
1977 800,000 60
1978 1,000,000 70
1979-84 n.a.
1985 1,100,000 75
1986 n.a.
1987 1,350,000 95
Source: CEOE Reports.
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TABLE XV.7.:
AFILIATION TO SPANISH TRADE
uisnoisrs , x ^ 8 2  ,
TRADE UNION TRADE UNION
CCOO......... Nationalist T.U...
UGT.......... Other unions.....
USO.......... Independents.....
Source: EDIS, 1983, in Miguelez, 1991.
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TABLES XV . Q . s
SPANISH TRADE UNION ELECTIONS, 
X980 —8*7 .
1980 1982 1986 1987
ENTERPRISES 52,664 53,601 70,814 1,432
WORKERS VOTING 3,365,000 2,985,000 3,159,778 997,522
% participation 
with respect: 
-workers in
enterprises (n.a.) 
-total active
79.2 79.8 71.6
population 25.3 22.1 22.5 6.9
CCOO
-total votes 50,817 47,016 56,065 3,165
-% 30.8 33.4 — 24.2
UGT
-Total votes 48,194 51,672 66,411 3,016
-% 29.2 36.7 — 23.1
USO
-total votes 14,296 6,527 n.a. —
-% 8.7 4.6 — —
Independents
-total votes 43,553 17,024 10,833 1,874
-% 26.4 12.0 — 14.3
CSIF
-total votes — — — 3,260
-% — 24.9
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo
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TABLE IV .^ . z
RESULTS OF SPANISH GENERAL
ELECTION£» , I1ST PERCENTAGES OF
VOTES AND PARLIAMENT SEATS , 19*7 *7 —
89 .
15/06/1977 1/03/1979 28/10/1982 15/06/1986 29/10/1989
Votes Seats Vot Sea Vot ISeats Vot Seats Votes Seat:
UCD 
CDS ( * )
34.6 47.7 34.9 48.8 7.1
2.9
3.4
0.6 9.2 5.4 7.7 4.0
PSOE 29.3 33.7 30.5 34.6 48.4 57.7 44.1 52.6 40.2 50.0
PCE 9.4 5.7 10.6 6.5 4.1 1.1 4.6 2.0 8.9 5.1
AP/PP 8.8 4.6 5.9 2.6 26.2 30.3 26.0 29.1 25.6 30.6
CIU 3.7 3.7 2.7 2.3 3.7 3.4 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.1
PNV 1.7 2.3 1.5 2.0 1.9 2.3 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.4
Others 12.5 2.6 13.9 4.0 5.7 1.2 9.6 4.1 11.1 3.8
(*) UCD finished integrating into the center coalition party CDS 
Source: Maravall, J.M., 1991.
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TABLE XV. X O . t
SPANISH SAISTKS XIST CRXSXS „ X9*7S —S3.
YEAR NUMBER BANKS CAPITAL (*) BRANCHES WORKERS
1978 4 67.9 185 1,977
1979 2 46.3 201 1,026
1980 9 295.0 775 6,553
1981 4 144.8 362 2,143
1982 11 750.2 726 10,761
1983 21 1,145.3 1,193 13,204
TOTAL 51 2,449.9 2,622 35,664
(*) Including deposits, bonds and credits, in million pesetas. 
Source: Olarra, R., 1989.
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TABLE XV. X X . z
SPANISH TAXES 11ST PERCENTAGE OE 
GNP , 1978-89.
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Direct Tax 5.5 6.0 7.0 7.2 6.8 7.9
-IRPF 3.3 3.8 4.7 5.0 4.5 5.4
-IS 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5
indir.Tax 6.2 6.3 6.6 7.3 7.8 8.5
-VAT - — — - — '
S.C. 12.6 13.1 13.1 13.4 13.3 13 .7
Fiscal Press. 24.3 25.4 26.7 27.9 27.9 30 .1
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 OECD(*)
Direct Tax 8.3 8.5 8.3 10.5 10.6 12.1 17.3
-IRPF 5.9 5.8 5.5 7.1 7.2 8.0 12.1
-IS 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.2 3.1 3.0
Indirect T. 9.0 9.6 10.7 10.4 10.2 10.1 11.5
-VAT 4,4 5,2 5,1 5,4 —
S.C. 13.1 13.1 13.0 12.9 12.7 12.8 9.3
Fiscal Press. 30.4 31.2 32.0 33.8 33.5 35.0 38.1
IRPF: Tax on personal income; IS: tax on companies; SC: Tax
wages for social security
(*) OECD data correspond to 1986.
Source: Bank of Spain
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TABLE XV.12.;
FISCAL PRESSURE X1ST EC COUNTRIES , 
XN PERCENTAGE OE GISTE 1977-89 „
SEX. EOT ED YEARS .
1977 1982 1986 1989
BELGIUM 43.4 46.7 46.3 45.2
DENMARK 48.3 52.0 59.4 60.7
FRANCE 42.8 47.6 48.8 48.7
GERMANY 45.7 46.1 45.4 45.4
GREECE 29.6 32.0 35.5 35.5
HOLLAND 50.6 54.2 53.6 52.6
IRELAND 35.5 40.3 42.1 40.5
ITALY 30.0 36.1 39.3 40.9
LUXEMBURG 55.3 55.4 54.8 54.3
PORTUGAL n.a. 35.4 37.5 35.1
SPAIN 26.8 31.9 35.6 37.4
UNITED KINGDOM 38.6 42.3 40.7 38.9
Source: EC, 1989.
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TABLE XV- I 3 - s
EVOLUTION OE SOCIAL EXPENDITURE 
11ST SPAIN , 1975-89 , SELECTED
Y E A R S .
1975 1982 1989
General Social expenditures
-as % GNP 9.9 14.6 17.8
-New beneficiaries (millions) .... 5.9. 8.2
Pension system,
-as % GNP 3.5 6.3 8.7
-Increase number pensionists(mil. ) .... 1.4. 1.2
Health system,
-as % GNP — 4.0 5.0
-Increase n.benef (millions) .... 3.7. • • • a • 6.3
Education,
-as % GNP — 2.5 4.4
-Increase in postcompulsatory ed, % • • .45.1. a a a a • 30.4
Source: Maravall, J.M. 1991.
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1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
TABLE XV.14.r
Spain: 
inf 1 at
sectoraX evolution of
.on a n d  s e c t o r a l
ion “to GNP, 1976-92 .
DEFLATORS 7. BY ECONOMIC SECTORS
INFLATION -----------------------------------  -----------------------------------
AGRICUL. INDUSTRY CONSTR. SERVICES AGRICUL. INDUSTRY CONSTR. SERVICES
17, 6
24,5 21,4 19,3
19,7 15,0 16,3
15,7 8,3 16,1
15,6 7,3 15,5
14,4 14,1 15,9
14,4 15,7 12,4
12,2 8,9 14,0
11,3 10,1 12,2
8,8 3,8 : 8,0
8,7 8»,8 - 0,9
5,3 -2,8 0,8
4,8 3,3 3,0
6,9 '7,5 . 4,2
7,4 0,7 2,2
6,9 3,6 4,7
6,2 0,5 1,5
14,6 21,6
9,3
9,1
16,6 17,1 8,9
15,9 16,1 7,9
17,6 14,2 11,2
16,8 15,6 6,1
11,6 16,1 6,3
12,3 13,3 6,2
10,5 11,0 6,5
8,8 9,3 5,9
4,8 11,3 5,6
4,1 7,7 5,4
5,5 7,7 5,3
8,3 9,0 4,8
8,3 9,2 4,5
8,2 11,3 4,0
1,9 6,0 4,0
30,6 8,3 51,7
30,1 8,1 52,7
29,3 7,8 54,0
28,8 7,9 55,4
30,2 8,4 56,7
30,5 7,8 58,2
30,1 7,8 58,4
30,3 6,0 58,8
30,5 6,5 60,4
30,6 6,7 54,8
29,2 6,5 53,2
28,4 6,9 52,9
27,5 7,5 53,1
26,7 8,4 53,4
25,3 9,2 54,7
24,4 9,4 56,1
24,6 9,3 55,9
Source: Inflation: Banco de Espana.
Deflators: Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda.
GNP: Contabilidad Nacional (INE).
<*) It is a weighted index which relates the contributions of 
the different sectors to GNP and their respective deflators. 
Values menor to 1 indicate more inflationnary pressure coming 
from construction and services, while values major to 1 would 
correspond to agriculture and industry.
TABLE V .1. Z
SPAIN : XMRORTS AND EXPORTS BY
X NT D U S T R X AX, S E C T O R S ,  X 1ST
RERCENTAGES, 1975-89, SELECTED
YEARS.
SECTOR IMPORTS EXPORTS
1975 1985 1989 1975 1985 1989
ENERGY 30.6 39.0 13.1 3.6 8.7 5.8
MINING 4.0 2.5 3.0 1.6 1.2 1.3
STEEL 10.4 7.9 7.4 14.5 17.2 10.4
CONSTRUCT.MATS. 1.1 0.4 1.4 4.3 2.8 3.8
CHEMICALS 15.3 14.0 13.3 13.2 15.5 13.7
MACHINERY 23.0 12.2 16.6 14.4 9.8 9.5
ELECTRON.+COMP. 1.4 8.5 14.7 1.4 3.8 7.7
TRANSPORT MAT. 5.7 8.5 15.1 20.2 27.1 24.2
of which cars 0.3 1.4 11.6 3.5 9.9 20.4
FOOD+BEBERAGES 4.9 2.0 3.5 7.6 6.2 6.9
TEXTIL 1.6 1.4 2.1 5.7 4.4 2.4
SHOE+LEATHER 0.5 0.9 2.8 9.9 5.7 6.2
Source: MINER
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TABLE V . 2 . t
SPAIN: EVOLUTION OE INDUSTRIAL
SECTORS r CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT, 
NUMBER OE ENTERPRISES AND
PERCENTAGE OE ACCUMULATED ANNUAL 
GROWTH, 1975-89.
SECTORS EMPLOYMENT 
% CHANGE 
1981-88
% CHANGE 
N.BUSINESS 
1981-88
% ANNUAL 
1975-85
GROWTH
1986-89
ENERGY -5.2 -27.1 4.7 2.4
WATER 10.8 0.5 —— ——
MINING (METAL) -45.3 -59.0 1.9 —
STEEL -34.3 -31.7 2.1 -0.5
MINING (NON-METAL). -14.0 -18.9 0.6 4.6
NON-METAL. INDUSTRY -26.4 -18.2 -1.0 6.4
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY -9.8 -16.6 3.1 6.8
METAL PRODUCTS -15.4 -11.2 0.6 7.2
MACHINERY -20.0 -12.1 -0.6 4.2
ELECTRIC MATERIAL -20.2 -6.4 1.8 13.4
TRANSPORT MATERIAL -16.2 -32.4 -17.4 29.2
of which cars 5.4 10.6
FOOD, BEBERAGES, TABACO -4.6 -10.5 4.4 —
TEXTIL -18.8 -17.7 0.2 5.5
SHOE + LEATHER -32.5 -14.1 -3.0 -3.7
WOOD + FORNITURE -18.4 -13.3 -0.3 9.4
PAPER + ARTS -4.3 4.4 3.6 4.6
RUBBER + PLASTICS -2.8 7.1 4.0 —
OTHERS (toys, optics •..)—28.8 14.2 1.6 —
TOTAL -17.0 -14.6 1.81 5.2
Source: Encuesta Industrial INE, MINER.
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TABLE V . 3 . S
SPAIN 5 EVOLUTION OE INDUSTRIAL 
SECTORS Z IP ERC ENT ACES OF
ENTERPRISES DEBT , OF USE OF
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY AND OF 
INFORMALITY„ 1982—83•
SECTORS % DEBT 
1982 1988
% USE P.C. 
1986
% INFORMAL. 
1986
ENERGY 179 66 86.5 8.3
WATER — — —
MINING (METAL) — — 92.1 6.2
STEEL 428 142 78.7 5.3
MINING (NON-METAL). 251 102 67.1 —
NON-METAL.INDUSTRY 41 20 82.1 —
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 118 76 79.7 —
METAL PRODUCTS 74 78 79.4 —
MACHINERY 147 76 82.6 —
ELECTRIC MATERIAL 125 130 81.3 —
TRANSPORT MATERIAL 426 164 87.6 —
of which cars — — — —
FOOD, BEBERAGES, TABACO 69 4 7 72.3 17.6
TEXTIL 110 121 82.3 33.1
SHOE + LEATHER 101 67 85.4 34.9
WOOD + FORNITURE 220 27 79.1 2.3
PAPER + ARTS 124 48 83.0 16.9
RUBBER + PLASTICS 100 60 87.0 —
OTHERS (toys, optics...) 30 21 78.7 17.9
TOTAL 162.0 77.8 81.0 20.0
Source: MINER, Ministerio de Economia.
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TABLE V . 4 . r
TOT AH. FOREIGN 
SECTOR AND
OE F O R E I G N
INVESTMENT #
SECTORS %FI/TInvest 
1977 1988
%FDI
87-88
ENERGY 6.5 4.4 0.9
MINING (METALS) 19.6 33.3 0.4
STEEL 8.7 2.4 0.5
NON-METAL (MINING+INDUS) 4.9 31.8 3.5
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 35.9 64.7 32.3
METAL PRODUCTS 26.1 8.5 2.2
MACHINERY 8.5 63.6 5.2
ELECTRIC MATERIAL 27.1 73.2 3.8
TRANSPORT MATERIAL 20.0 28.1 1.7
of which cars 59.4 39.3 6.5
FOOD, BEBERAGES, TABACO 
TEXTIL
12.2 49.4 15.6
SHOE + LEATHER 7.4 9.6 0.6
WOOD + FORNITURE - - 0.9 0.1
PAPER + ARTS — 161.9 14.9
RUBBER + PLASTICS 31.8 11.2 1.4
OTHERS (toys, optics..) — 9.4 0.4
AVERAGE 8.3 34.5 5.6
Source: MINER, Ministerio de Economia, Buesa & Molero, 1988, INE.
SRAIN2 SHARE 
INVESTMENT 
E E R G E N T A G E £  
INVESTMENT 
1987-88.
OF
BY
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TABLE V .5.2
INDUSTRIAL POLICY 11ST SFVAIJST , 1975-
8  2 *
I. RESTRUCTURING PLANS
* Textil (D.693/1975, D.694/1975, RD.1243/1976) Extensions 
R.31-1*1977, RD.1675/1977, RD. 3448/1977, R.21.4.1978, R.31.7.1980.
* Baking industry (RD.97/1977, RD.1675/1977).
II. COORDINATED ACTIONS
* Mining (Coal) (D.2485/1974, extension RD.2286/1980)
* Non-integral steel and iron industries (D.669/1974, aditional 
credits 0.22.5.1980)
* Electronics (D.175/1975)
* Leather (0.22.8*1964, extension 0.23.12.1976)
III. PREFERENTIAL INDUSTRIAL SUBSECTORS
* Integral steel and iron industries (D.774/1969, D.669/1976)
* Mining (zinc) (RD.3006/1980)
* Motorcars (final and parts) (D.3757/1972, D.677/1974, extensions 
RD 198/1977, RD.1679/1979)
* National Defense (RD.2135/1976)
* Chemicals (D.3374/1971, D.732/1973, RD.2002/1976, RD.3150/1977, 
RD.1665/1980, RD.2948/1982)
* Nuclear Energy (D.924/1972) and gas (D.1350/1976)
* Electronics (D.2593/1974, extension RD.1860/1981)
* Commecial Shipyards (RD.1286/1976, extension RD.144/1978, 
RD.2173/1979, RD.871/1981).
IV. EXTRAORDINARY CREDITS TO COMPANIES IN CRISIS (Ley 13/1971)
* Special Steel industries (N.E: 3? PUD in 1985: 56%)
* Common Steel (NE: 2, PUD: 10%)
* Household Electrical Appliances (NE:2, PUD: 100%)
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* "Heavy forging” (NE:1; PUD:56%)
* Metals (NE:6; PUD:58%)
* Shipbuilding (NE:3, PUD:70%)
* Integral Iron and Steel (NE:3; PUD: 2%)
* Others (NE:8? PUD:68%)
V. ABSORPTION OF ENTERPRISES BY PUBLIC SECTOR:
Main companies: Textil Tarazona (1977), Altos Hornos M (1978),
Imepiel (1978), CSB (1979), Babcock Wilcox (1980), Minas de 
Figaredo (1980), Intelhorce (1980), Hilaturas Gossypium (1980), San 
Carlos (1980), Marsans (1980), Ateuinsa (1980), SEAT (1981),
Transanlantica (1981), Hytasa (1982).
NE: Number of entreprises 
PUD: Percentage of Unpaid Debt 
D : Decree 
RD: Royal Decree 
O: Order
Source: Navarro, M., 1990.
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TABLE V .e . z
SPAIN5 BALANCE OF TRADE (WORLD 
AMD EC)„ XM MXX.X.XON RESETAS, X9BS 
AMD 1989.
SECTORS WORLD TRADE BALANCE EC TRADE BALANCE
1985 1989 1985 1989
ENERGY -1,423.7 -736.6 99.8 20.8
MINING (METALS) -35.8 -6.7 -85.6 -59.4
STEEL 308.8 -74.0 11.6 -103.3
NON-METAL (MINING+INDUS) 56.8 38.3 10.8 10.9
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY -112.1 -443.4 -166.2 -400.0
METAL PRODUCTS 84.2 -14.1 7.0 -49.6
MACHINERY -132.9 -587.6 -163.5 -490.2
ELECTRIC MATERIAL -214.1 -776.5 -96.3 -340.3
TRANSPORT MATERIAL 359.4 -61.7 248.7 44.2
of which cars 310.5 32.7 256.8 44.1
FOOD, BEBERAGES, TABACO 180.7 12.2 67.9 -31.3
TEXTIL
SHOE + LEATHER 270.6 8 133.1 8.3
WOOD + FORNITURE 15.5 -67.9 30.9 -11.5
PAPER + ARTS 28.0 -66.9 16.3 -19.0
RUBBER + PLASTICS 54.5 43.6 18.7 3.9
OTHERS (toys, optics...) 19.9 -30.7 7.7 -3.6
TOTAL -787.1 -3,115.5 93.2 -1,521.2
Source: MINER.
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TABLE V . *7 . 2
SRAX1ST : WORKERS X1ST THE ERE
PROGRAMME, X 9 8 G — 8 9
SECTORES 1986
TOTAL REMAIN
1989
TOTAL REMAIN
Cons.Naval 137,598 12,347 17,730 10,982
Electr.LB 2,330 2,123 3,652 2,236
Aceros 4,046 3,092 7,174 5,280
Siderurgia 2,629 1,438 6,867 5,545
TOTAL 22,763 19,027 35,432 24,043
Source: MINER, 1990.
T A B L E  V . 8 . 2
T H E  Z T J R  1 1ST S R A X  1ST „ X 9 8 5 — 9 0 .
AREA PROJECTS INVESTMENT
m.ptas
EMPLOYMENT FPE SUBSIDIES
m.ptas.
ASTURIAS 101 21,722 1,619 348 4,046
BARCELONA 275 126,031 8,054 4,229 14,802
CADIZ 39 31,183 1,406 666 3,423
GALICIA 128 25,661 2,043 1,137 5,393
MADRID 72 81,593 4,241 1,442 12,661
BILBAO 104 53,575 2,901 1,089 8,974
TOTAL 721 339,765 20,336 8,911 49,303
Source: MINER, 1990.
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TABLE V .9.s
SPAIN : OPLJB3L.XO SPENDING ON
INDUSTRIAL X'OEXCY , XN MXLLXON
PESETAS, 1978-90.
ABRIL-MARTORELL 1978-80
ICO Credits.......
Steel (integral)...
Construccion naval.
IMPI (SMIS 1979-89)
Technology (CDTI)..
BAYON 1980-82
MINER subsidies....
INI credits to steel......
ICO credits...............
Construccion naval(premium)
Unemployment..............
SOLCHAGA 1983-86
MINER subsidies (1982-88)..
INI(increase capital 1982-88)..............
INI credits (to shipbuilding + fertilisers)
Construccion Naval (premium)...............
PPE........................................
ZUR subsidies (until 89)...................
GA (83-85).................................
ZYPPLI (83-85).......................... .
CROISSIER 1986-89
Steel subsidies...................................... 283,322
Construccion naval (premium).......................... 88,000
FPE.................................................. 275,000
ITT.................................................... 3,800
GA (1985-89).......................................... 42,168
ZYPPLI (85-89)......................................... 8,097
ZPE (1988-89)......................................... 41,490
ZID (until 1990)...................................... 26,554
R&D (1988-89)........................  32,746
PEIN II (1988-89)...................................... 8,132
Q&D (1988-89).......................................... 3,699
R&D EC II FRAME PROGRAMME (1987-91).................. 11,903
Other R&D programmes......................  2,508
EC Structural Funds -RDP (Zl) (1989-93)................ 2,306
-RRP (Z2) (1989-93).................. 243
TOTAL (Spanish public funds)...................... 2,803,604
TOTAL (Including EC financing).................... 2,820,564
Source: PAE, 1988, 1989, MINER, 1990, Navarro, M. 1990.
217,326 
589,403 
337,638 
108,200 
220,000 
.49,303 
.12,116 
..5,803
20.000
88,857
80,570
80,300
30,321
23,639
42,040
79,959
.3,427
.1,687
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TABLE V.ll.2
DISTRIBUTION OF SPANISH SUBSIDIES 
BY SECTORS# IN MILLION RESETAS# 
FRO GRAMMES ZXJR , Z ID , Z RE , ZYPPLI 
Sc GAEI „ 1985—90.
SECTOR N.PROJECTS SUBSIDY % SUB/PROJECT
ENERGY 25 800.3 0.5 32.0
METALS (mining+industry) 79 4,862.8 3.3 61.5
NON-METAL (") 596 25,432.0 17.4 42.6
CHEMICAL 251 15,417.1 10.5 25.8
METAL PRODUCTS 586 14,708.0 10.0 25.0
MACHINERY 262 6,978.5 4.7 26.6
ELECTRONICS+COMPUTERS 68 16,604.9 11.3 244.1
TRANSPORT 179 14,760.6 10.1 82.4
FOOD INDUSTRY 359 11,908.6 8.1 33.1
TEXTIL,LEATHER,SHOES 565 7,418.0 5.0 13.1
WOOD+FORNITURE 565 10,380.0 7.1 18.3
PAPER+PRINTING 234 4,501.8 3.0 19.2
RUBBER+PLASTICS 46 2,468.3 1.6 53.6
OTHER MANUFACTURES 323 9,879.8 6.7 30.5
TOTAL 4,138 146,120.7 100.0 35.3
Source: MINER 1987, 1989.
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TABLE V •12 .z
SPAIN s __
5Y
1  9 8  *7 — 8  9  _
_ PERCENTAGE OE 
R&D b y a c t i v i t y
e e s e t a s  , -t.-LVJ.TY
f u n d i n g  e o r
XN MILLION
SECTOR/ACTIVITY SUBSIDY PERCENTAGE PROGRAMME
AGRO+CATTLE+
FISHERIES 2,329 8.5 PNICDT
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1,949 7.1
EC FISHERIES (88-92) 
PNICDT
ENERGY 1,574 5.7
EC ECLAIR (88-92) 
EC EP (89)
ENVIRONMENT 108,000 - PNICDT (1990-94),
HEALTH 558 2.0
EC THERMIE, FEDER 
PNICDT,
IT 8,482 30.9
EC M&H (1987-91), 
EC AIM (88-90), 
PNICDT, PEIN II,
ELECTRONICS 5,314 19.4
EC ESPRIT (88-92) 
PEIN II, EC ESPRIT,
(incl.micro) 
IND.MATERIALS 2,054 7.5
EC Radioprotection 
(90-91)
PNICDT,EC BRITE-
MINING (coal) 500 1.8
EURAM (89-92) 
EC CECA 89
PHARMACEUTICALS 582 2.1 PNICDT
PHYSICS 494 1.8 EC CERN (86-89)
ROBOTICS 1,440 5.2 PEIN II,
SOCIAL SCIENCES 334 1.2
EC EUROTRA (87-90) 
EC DELTA (88-90),
SPACE 1,217 4.4
EC SCIENCE (88-92). 
EC DOSES (89-92),
EC SPES (89-92). 
PNICDT + EC ESA,
STEEL 332 1.2
EC BRITE (89-90) 
EC CECA (89)
TECH.TRANSFERS 213 0.7 PEIN II,
TOTAL R&D 27,372
EC SPRINT 89
Note: Environment has not been accounted in the total given the
programmes are planned to start after 1990 
Source: MINER, 1990.
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TABLE V .13• z
SE>AII*r FUBLTC EXPENDING AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF GNP , 1980 —8*7.
1980 1984 1987
TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDING 33.0 39.5 42.0
DEFENSE 1.9 2.3 2.1
SERVICES 3.2 3.6 4.0
PENSIONS 12.6 14.5 14.5
EDUCATION 3.6 3.3 3.6
HEALTH 4.5 4.0 4.3
HOUSING 1.1 1.7 2.0
ECONOMIC TRANSFERS 5.5 7.9 7.7
PUBLIC DEBT 0.7 2.0 3.7
Source: Fundacion FIES, based on INE.
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TABLE V .14. Z
ARGENTINAI INDUSTRIAL PROMOTION 
BY SECTOR # 1974-87 .
SECTOR N.PROJECTS
(A)
% TOTAL INVESTMENT % 
(B) Thousand U$S
B/A
FOOD+BEBERAGES 130 18.8 603,238 8.3 4,640
TEXTIL+LEATHER 168 24.2 853,358 11.7 5,079
WOOD+FORNITURE 55 7.9 368,714 5.1 6,703
PAPER+GRAPHICS 23 3.3 1,103,687 15.1 47,986
CHEMICALS+PETR. 104 15.0 2,232,539 30.6 21,466
NON-METAL MINE. 73 10.5 1,205,402 16,5 16,512
METAL INDUSTRY 21 3.0 515,728 7.1 24,558
MACHINERY 115 16.6 401,100 5.5 3,487
OTHERS 5 0.7 4,137 0.1 827
TOTAL 693 100.0 7,287,903 100.0 10,516
Source: UN ECLA.
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TABLE V .XS.Z
ARGENTINA r INDUSTRIAL X»ROMOTXON 
BY PROVINCE ^ X9Y4 —S*7 .
PROVINCE N.PROJECTS % TOTAL INVESTMENT % B/A
(A) (B) Thousand U$S
Buenos Aires, Cordoba
and Santa Fe............115
LA RIOJA, SAN LUIS
SAN JUAN and CATAMARCA...49
Formosa, Misiones.......103
Chubut, La Pampa,
Rio Negro, Santa Cruz and
TIERRA DEL FUEGO........237
Jujuy, Salta, Santiago 
del Estero and Tucuman.,109 
Mendoza y Entre Rios.....80
TOTAL................... 693
Source: UN ECLA.
Note: Provinces in capital blocks were in a regime of regional 
promotion.
16.6 2,227,810 30.6 19,372
7.1
14.9
475,161
1,388,674
6.5
19.0
9,697
13,482
34.2 1,957,301 26.9 8,258
15.7 845,826 11.6 7,759
11.5 393,131 5.4 4,914
100.0 7,287,903 100.0 10,516
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T A B L E  V . X e  . S
ARGENTINA= SHARE OE THE
PRODUCTION , EXPORTS AND EDX BY 
I N D U S T R I A L  S E C T O R S , IN
BERCENTAGES, 1973 AND 1984.
SECTOR % PRODUCTION 
1973 1984
% ] 
1973
EXPORTS
1984
%
1973
FDI
1984
FOOD+BEBERAGES 26.9 24.1 41.6 49.3 21.2 19.4
TEXTIL+LEATHER 13.1 12.5 5.7 15.6 14.3 13.4
WOOD+FURNITURE 2.1 1.8 0.1 0.1 2.8 2.0
PAPER+PRINTING 3.9 4.7 4.0 1.0 20.2 11.6
CHEMICALS+PETR. 18.8 26.2 10.4 16.8 42.2 33.1
NON-METAL MIN. 3.1 3.1 0.8 0.4 26.4 21.1
METAL PRODUCTS 8.3 6.1 9.3 7.1 30.1 35.8
MACHINERY 23.3 21.3 28.1 9.7 45.5 38.9
OTHERS 0.4 0.4 — — 5.3 18.4
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 30.3 26.8
Source: UN ECLA, World Bank.
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TABLE V . I 7 . 2
ARGENTINAI NUMBER OE ENTERPRISES,
EMPLOYEES AND PRODUCTIVITY BY 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR , I ^*7 3 and 1934.
SECTOR N.ENTERPRISES EMPLOYEES PRODUCTIVITY
1973 1984 1973 1984 1973 1984
FOOD+BEBERAGES 24,623 26,558 290,392 352,306 123.1 93.8
TEXTIL+LEATHER 14,795 11,609 202,063 206,669 85.8 82.9
WOOD+FORNITURE 16,033 14,564 70,471 78,800 40.3 30.7
PAPER+GRAPHICS 4,813 4,972 66,346 74,311 78.2 87.7
CHEMICALS+PETR. 5,359 6,193 135,550 148,238 183.6 242,7
NON-METAL MINE. 10,265 9,461 84,520 86,199 49.2 50.1
METAL INDUSTRY 1,339 514 70,664 48,995 156.7 170.2
MACHINERY 26,029 26,065 394,768 367,941 78.4 79.6
OTHERS 2,387 1,558 12,363 9,682 41.5 42.0
TOTAL 105,642 101,474 1,327,137 1,373,163 100.0 100.0
Source: UN ECLA, 1990.
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TABLE V .18.I
ARGENT I IsTA r OVERBRIC I NG
MANUFACTURING SUBSECTORS , 0.984
PRICE DIFERENTIAL QUANTITY OF SUBSECTORS % EXPORTS
0 % 7 4.2
0-25 % 8 7.7
26-50 % 6 26.5
51-75 % 9 7.2
76-100 % 3 10.9
101-125 % 2 41.5
126-150 % 2 2.2
151-200 % 1 0.0
Source: UN ECLA, 1990.
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T A B L E  V - 1 ^ . z
of the 
informa1
Spanish and
C O U N T R Y M E T H O D  A N D  Y E A R I N F O R M A L  S E C T O R
N O T  M E N I O N E D  
( P O R T E S ,  A . , 1 9 9 0 )
1 9 5 0  -  2 2 - 8 7 -  O F  
A C T I V E  P O P U L A T I O N  
1 9 8 0  -  2 5 . 7 7 .  O F  
A C T I V E  P O P U L A T I O N
A R G E N T I N A
V A L U E  O F  I N D U S T R I A L  
P R O D U C T I O N  -  1 9 8 4  
I N D U S T R I A L  C E N S U S  
( K A N T I S ,  H .  &  Y O G U E L ,  
M . ,  1 9 9 1 )
1 7  O F  I N D U S T R I A L  
S E C T O R
1 9 8 0  P O P U L A T I O N  C E N S U S  
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Figure V.4. : DIAGNOSIS AND OUTCOME OF ARGENTINIAN
INDUSTRIAL POLICY. 1977-1990
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
A:
ADEBA:
ADIMRA:
ADITA:
AES:
AI:
AMI:
ANE:
AP:
ATE:
BCI: 
BCRA:
BOP:
CAC:
CACON:
CAP:
CAUCE:
CCOO:
CDS:
CDTI:
Austral (Unit of Argentinian currency, subsituted the 
peso [$] after the Austral heterodox anti-inflationary 
programme, 1985).
Asociacion de Empresas Bancarias Argentinas (Banking 
Association, Argentina).
Asociacion de Industriales Metalurgicos Argentinos 
(Argentinian Metalwork Enterpreneurs Association).
Asociacion de la Industria Textil Argentina (Textil 
Enterpreneurs Association, Argentina).
Acuerdo Economico y Social (Social and Economic 
Agreement, 1985-86, Spain)
Acuerdo Interconferencial (Interconferential Agreement, 
1983, Spain)
Acuerdo Marco Interconferencial (Interconferential 
Framework Agreement, 1981-82, Spain).
Acuerdo Nacional sobre el Empleo (National Agreement 
on Employment, 1982, Spain).
Alianza Popular (Popular Alliance, Spanish conservative 
party, later to become PP).
Asociacion de Trabajadores del Estado (State Workers 
Association, Argentina).
Banco de Credito Interior (Internal Credit bank, Spain)
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (Argentinian 
Central Bank).
Balance of Payments.
Confederacion Argentina de Comerciantes (Commerce 
Association, Argentina).
Confederacion Argentina de Construcciones y Obras 
Nacionales (Building Works Association, Argentina).
Common Agricultural Policy.
Argentinian-Uruguayan Agreement on Economic Cooperation
Comisiones Obreras (Workers Commission, Spain).
Centro Democratico y Social (Social-Democratic Center 
Party, Spain, previosly UCD).
Centre for Technological and Industrial Development, 
Spain.
CEDES:
CES:
CES:
CIEEP:
CGT:
CREAs:
EC:
ECLA:
ECSC:
EFTA:
EMS:
FDI: 
FGD:
FM:
FONAVI:
FONIT:
FPEs: 
GA:
GATT: 
G-5: 
IDB: 
IDES:
Center for the Study of the State and Society, 
Argentina.
Consejo Economico y Social (Social and Economic 
Council, Spanish State Social Bargaining Organisation)
Conferencia Economica y Social (Social Pact 1985, 
Argentina).
Center of Research and Studies on the Enterprise, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Confederacion General de Trabajadores (General Union 
of Workers, Argentina).
Consorcios Rurales de Experimentacion Agricola (Rural 
Councils for Agricultural Research, Argentina)
European Community.
Economic Commission for Latin America (United Nations) 
Euroepan Coal and Steel Community.
European Free Trade Area.
European Monetary System.
Foreign Direct Investment.
Fondo de Garantia de Depositos (Deposit Guarantee Fund, 
known as the banks* hospital, Spain)
Factorias Militares (Holding of Military Enterprises, 
Argentina).
Fondo Nacional para la Vivienda (National Housing Fund, 
Argentina).
Fondo Nacional para la Infraestructura del Transporte 
(National Fund for Transport Infrastructure, Argent.)
Funds for the Promotion of Employment (Spain).
Grandes Areas (Large Areas for re-industrialisation, 
Spain).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Group of five (US, France, UK, W.Germany and Japan).
Interamerican Development Bank
Instituto de Desarrollo Economico y Social, Argentina 
(Institute for Social and Economic Development).
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IMF: International Monetary Fund.
IMPI: Instituto de la Pequena y Mediana Industria (Institute
for Small and Medium Sized Industrial Business, Spain)
INEM: Instituto Nacional del Empleo (National Institute of
Empoyment, Spain).
INI: Instituto Nacional de la Industria (National Industrial
Institute, Spanish version of the Italian IRI).
INTA: Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (National
Institute of Agrofood Technology, Argentina).
ISI: Import Substitution Industrialisation.
L.: Law (Prefix to Argentinian and Spanish Laws).
LAFTA: Latin American Free Trade Association.
LAIA: Latin American Integration Association.
LDCs: Less Developed Countries
LIBOR: London Interbank Offer Rate.
ME: Ministry of Economy.
MERCOSUR: South American Common Market.
MFA: Multifibre Agreement.
MINER: Ministerio de Industria y Energia (Ministry of
Industry, Spain).
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Association.
NTBs: Non-Tariff Barriers.
0.: Order (prefix to Spanish laws)
OIT: Iberoamerican Labour Organisation.
PC: Partido Comunista (Spanish Communist Party).
PP: Partido Popular (Popular Party, Spain, previously AP).
PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (Spanish Workers*
Socialist Party).
Pta: Peseta (Unit of Spanish currency).
RD: Royal Decree (prefix to Spanish laws).
SF: Santa Fe Documents (SFI dated 1980, SFII dated 1988)
(US Republican Foreign Policy manifests towards Latin
390
America)
SICE: Secretaria de Industria y Comercio Exterior (Ministry
of Industry and External Trade, Argentina)
SMEs: Small and Medium Enterprises.
SRA: Sociedad Rural Argentina (Association of Rural
Enterpreneurs, Argentina).
TNCs: Transnational Corporations.
UCD: Union de Centro Democratico (Democratic Centre
Coalition, Spain, later to become CDS).
UGT: Union General de Trabajadores (Gneral Union of Workers,
Spain).
UIA: Union Industrial Argentina (Association of Argentinian
Industrialists).
UN: United Nations.
UOM: ' Unidad de Obreros Metalurgicos (Metal Workers Union,
Argentina).
WB: World Bank.
ZID: Zonas Industriales en Declive (Declining Industrial
Zones, Spain).
ZPE: Zonas de Promocion Economica (Economic Promotion Zones,
Spain).
ZYPPLI: Zonas y Pollgonos Industriales Preferentes
(Preferential Zones and Industrial Complexes, Spain).
ZUR: Zonas de Urgente Industrializacion (Urgent
Reindustrialisation Zones, Spain).
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INTERVIEWS1
ALCANTARA,M.
AMASANTI,A. 
AZPIAZU,D .
BASUALDO,E . 
BATALLER,F .
BISANG,R .
BOGO,J. 
BUESA,M. 
CALCAGNO,E . 
CANITROT,A . 
CAVAROZZI,M . 
COLOMBO,E .
CUEVAS,J .M .
D ’ALESSIO,N .
DASSO,I.
Senior Lecturer Faculty of Politics Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid and Research Felow 
University of North Carolina (US) [several 
meetings 7/90 to 8/93]
Manager of SEVEL (Fiat/Peugeot Argentina) [5/91]
Economist Industrial Development Area, United 
Nations ECLA Delegation, Argentina [6-7/91].
Economist, Researcher at ATE (State Workers 
Association, Argentina) and at FLACSO (Facultad 
Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales) Buenos 
Aires [5/91]
Principal Administrator, Directorate-General 
External Relations DG I, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels [several meetings 
10/92-3/93]
Economist Industrial Development Area, United 
Nations ECLA Delegation, Argentina [several 
meetings 3-7/91]
Chamber of Commerce of Argentinian Agrobusiness 
[5/91]
Director department Industrial Economics at 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid [11/91]
Director OIT (Iberoamerican Labour Organisation) 
Buenos Aires [6/91]
Economist, Instituto Guido di Telia Buenos Aires 
[5/91].
Politologist, Lecturer at the Massachussets 
Institute of Technology (US). [Madrid, 11/90]
Director of ADITA (Textil Enterpreneurs 
Association) and Member of Parlament, Buenos Aires 
[several meetings 5-6/91]
President of the CEOE (Spanish Enterpreneurs 
Association) [11/90]
Senior Lecturer Sociology Deptament University of 
Gottingen (Germany) [several meetings in Buenos 
Aires 5-6/91]
Director of ADEFA (Argentinian motorcar industry 
association) [5/91]
*Month and year of the meeting are in braquets []
DE JONG,M .
DE RIZ,L. 
DIAZ-PENA,M .
FANELLI,J.M. 
FERRER,A.
Secretaire Commerciel of the Argentinian Trade 
Department Delegation in Brussels [3/93]
Senior Researcher at the Politics Unit at CEDES, 
Buenos Aires [4/91]
President of the Consejo Economico y Social of 
Madrid (Social and Economic Council, State Social 
Bargaining Center). [8/92]
Economics Unit of CEDES, Buenos Aires [several 
meetings 3-7/91; also in London 3/92]
Economist at CEC and IDES (Instituto de Desarrollo 
Economico y Social, Argentina) [4/91]
FRENKEL,R. Director of the Economics Unit of CEDES, Buenos
Aires [several meetings 3-7/91]
FUENTES-QUINTANA,E . Ex-Minister of Economy of Spain (1977-79), 
Director of the FIES Foundation [11/91]
GOLBERT,L . 
GRANDI,D .
Politologist, senior researcher at CIEEP, Buenos 
Aires [several meetings 3-7/91]
Sub-director IRELA (Instituto de Relaciones 
Europa-America Latina, Spain) [12/90]
GUTIERREZ-COBOS,D . Manager INI (National Institute of Industry)
[11/90]
ITURRIETA,A.
KENTIS,H . 
KONIECKI,D . 
KOSACOFF,B .
Director of Sintesis (Spanish Journal of Latin 
American Studies) [several meetings 12/90 and 11- 
12/91]
Coordinator of the steel department at the 
Secretary of Industry SICE, Buenos Aires [5/91]
Director of the Ebert Foundation Spain, [several 
meetings 7/90, 12/90, 11-12/91]
Director Industrial Development Area of United 
Nations Argentinian Delegation [several meetings 
3-7/1991 in Buenos Aires, 9/92 Los Angeles (US) 
and 8/93 in Madrid].
LAGO-CARBALLO,A.Diplomatic School of Madrid, previous vice-
Minister of Education (1980-82) and Senior 
Lecturer in Latin American Political Regimes at 
Universidad Complutense of Madrid (1963-80) 
[several meetings 11/90 to 8/93]
LANDABASO,M. Principal Administrator Directorate-General for
Regional Policies DG XVI, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels [2/93]
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MALO-MOLINA,J. Studies ans Prospectives Department, the Central 
Bank of Spain [12/90]
MARTINEZ-QUIJANO,A . Director FPT (Fundacion Fomento y Trabajo), 
Buenos Aires [6/91]
MOLERO,J .
PALOMINO,H. 
ROJO,H.
Lecturer Department Industrial Economics at 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid [several 
meetings 11/91 to 8/93]
Researcher at CISEA, Buenos Aires [several 
meetings 3-7/91]
Trade Unionist UOM (Union Obrera Metalurgica, 
Argentina) [6/91, meeting of the non-governmental 
base unions in the ACINDAR factory of Villa 
Constitucion]
ROZENWURCEL,G. Economics Unit of CEDES, Buenos Aires [several 
meetings 3-7/91]
RUIZ-GIMENEZ,G.Spanish MP at the European Parliament Strassbourg
[meetings in Madrid 12/90 and 11/91, Strassbourg 
1/93]
RUSSELL,R. 
SALERNO,H.
Politologist, Lecturer and Researcher at FLACSO, 
Buenos Aires [several meetings 3-5/91]
Coordinator of the motorcar industry department 
at the Secretary of Industry of the Argentine SICE 
[5/91]
SCHWARTZER,J. Director of Research at CISEA, Buenos Aires [6/91]
STORIANI,F .
TRAMUTOLA,I 
TUSSIE,D .
Member of Parliament Radical Party, Argentina 
[several meetings Madrid 7/90, Buenos Aires 5/91 
and London 3/92]
Member of the directive board 
(Argentinian Steel Company) [5/91]
of SIDERCA
Economist, Lecturer and Researcher at FLACSO, 
Buenos Aires [4/91]
Van CLAVEREN,A. Senior researcher at AIETI (Agencia Internacional
de Estudios sobre Iberoamerica) and functionary 
of the Chilean Foreign Office [several meetings, 
Madrid 7/90 and 12/90]
VELARDE,J . 
YAGUE,M .J .
Economist, professor Economic Structure Department 
at Universidad Complutense de Madrid [12/90]
Economist, Studies Service MINER (Spanish Ministry 
of Industry) [4/92]
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